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Executive Summary 
 
 
The National Aviation Operational Monitoring Service (NAOMS) project was formulated to 
address a need that had been expressed by many aviation stakeholders – for a method to 
routinely monitor the status of the National Airspace System (NAS) and to identify potential 
problems as they arise.  The goal of NAOMS was to determine if this need could be met through 
the use of a comprehensive, system-wide, statistically–sound survey approach. 
 
NAOMS was developed as an element of the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling 
(ASMM) project of NASA’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) during the years from 2000 to 
2005.  ASMM was designed to provide the technologies to facilitate a data-driven basis for 
proactive safety decisions.  The ultimate goal of the ASMM was to identify, and in some cases 
correct, predisposing conditions that that could lead to accidents and thereby escape from the 
retroactive, accident-based policy-making syndrome,   
 
Fundamentally, NAOMS was a research project. Its primary purpose was to develop and assess 
the utility of a survey methodology for detecting relative changes over time in the frequency of 
safety-related events in the NAS.  The NAOMS project sought to assess the value and limitations 
of this concept, to uncover potential flaws in the approach, and, if demonstrated to be viable, to 
provide a basis for developing a continuing monitoring service that would serve the aviation 
system over the long term. 
 
NAOMS was designed to provide a statistically sound basis for detecting changes over time in 
the occurrence of events that might compromise safety by surveying all of the 'front-line' 
constituents of the aviation system and fusing the information provided by these different 
operator groups into a system-level perspective.  This approach would monitor the performance 
and safety of the overall national air transportation system and detect and evaluate the effects of 
new technologies or procedures as they are inserted into that system by seeking reports from the 
operators of the system (i.e., from flight crews, air traffic controllers, cabin crews, mechanics, 
etc.). NAOMS was not designed to measure safety of the air-transportation system in any 
absolute sense; nor was it designed to identify the precursors or the causal factors of unsafe 
events.  Its primary purpose was to assess the effects introduced by changes in technologies, 
procedures, or training on system safety by monitoring the experiences of operators.  NAOMS 
was intended to measure event-based experiences of reporters and to provide early indications of 
changes that deserve further investigation.  Such further investigation would rely on other 
sources of information. 
 
This report is a documentation of the development of the survey methodology and a 
demonstration of its capabilities.  Its focus is on the identification and resolutions of issues; 
including meeting the requirements to achieve data reliability, establishing the research 
protocols, resolving selection issues, designing the survey instrument, deciding on data-
collection procedures, and developing a plan for analyzing the data.  Also reported are the results 
of a NAOMS survey of air-carrier pilots that was conducted to demonstrate the sort of 
information NAOMS could provide.  Although the demonstration was limited to a survey of the 
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air-carrier pilots, the issues addressed are relevant for the design and implementation of surveys 
of other constituents of the air-transportation system. However, the resolutions of these issues 
will likely differ for each constituent group. 
 
Survey Development 
 
One measure of the methodological success of a survey is respondent acceptance.  During the 
forty-five months of this initial experiment, a total of 26,170 survey interviews were conducted.  
The air-carrier-pilot response to the NAOMS survey was enthusiastic.  Respondents' very 
positive feedback served to increase the NAOMS team's confidence in its approach. 
 
A number of air-carrier pilots were excluded from the sample because they could not be located 
or because they were ineligible.  Of the pilots contacted and found to be eligible, NAOMS 
achieved a survey response rate of 81%.  The exceptional response rate achieved by NAOMS, 
far exceeding that of typical survey efforts, indicates the quality of the survey design as well as 
the NAOMS team's effectiveness in enlisting the participation of the aviation community. 
 
During the first 2 years of the project, the NAOMS team concentrated on resolving 
methodological issues in order to establish a solid survey foundation, to maximize data quality, 
and to ensure the validity of the statistical results.  A number of questions required thoughtful 
resolutions before the air-carrier-pilot survey could be launched.  These questions included: 
1. How should respondents be selected, located, and engaged for the survey? 
2. What sample size would be needed to achieve desired levels of precision? 
3. How far back in time can respondents accurately recall safety events? 
4. How do pilots organize their recollection of events? 
5. What is the best survey-collection mode to use? 
6. Would a purely random or a panel sampling design work best? 
 
These questions and the extensive research accomplished to reach an answer for each are 
discussed in detail in this report.  As a result of these investigations, a source of potential 
interviewees was identified, the needed sample size was established, and an ordering to facilitate 
pilot recollection of events was determined.  Also, as a result of these investigations, decisions 
were made to utilize a telephone-based survey mode, a recall period of 60 days, and a random 
design for selecting interviewees. 
 
Another major activity during the first 2 years centered on the content and design of the survey 
instrument itself.  The NAOMS team needed to determine the types of events to include.  
Extensive input from the aviation community aided these determinations.  The general 
framework of the survey reflected its purposes.  Issues concerning the overall design were 
resolved early in the process, while many of the internal ordering and structuring questions 
awaited the results of the experimental investigations.  It was determined that the framework of 
the questionnaire should comprise four sections.  Section A measured baseline information for 
establishing event rates.  Section B captured the experiences of the reporters with safety-related 
events over time.  Section C was designed to shine a "spotlight" on a particular area of interest to 
the aviation community at a particular time.  Section D collected feedback information from 
respondents.  Section B was the "heart" of the survey.  In this section, the questions about events 
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were expected to remain relevant for many years, thus providing a basis for long-term trend 
analyses, which was the primary objective of the NAOMS project.  The statistical reliability of 
the collected data was assured by careful design, and was demonstrated in subsequent analyses. 
 
Results 
 
The data-gathering period of the study was sufficient to reliably measure trends for about half 
(43 of 91 questions with numeric answers) of the questions posed in Section B.  The remaining 
48 events addressed by questions in Section B occurred too rarely to collect sufficient data 
within the limited time period of the demonstration for reliable statistical analysis of change.  
The results of analyses of these 43 questions are presented in Section 7 of this report.   They 
illustrate the capabilities of the NAOMS survey methodology and provide evidence that the 
NAOMS survey can reliably identify relative changes over time in the rates of occurrence of 
safety-relevant events.  
 
Although data were gathered over a 45-month period, 9 months were used to conduct tests 
needed to resolve methodological issues.  Most of the analyses in this report are based on the last 
36-months of data collection.  Changes over time were measured over this period for data 
grouped into (12) quarters.  Of the 43 questions from Section B whose results were analyzed, 27 
showed no significant differences in event rates over the duration of the survey.  Fourteen 
questions showed reductions in event rates over this time.  Only 2 of the 43 questions (use of 
reserve fuel and expedite or divert landing due to medical emergency) showed increasing rates of 
events over the time period of the survey.  These results indicate that when changes over time 
occurred, they were predominantly in the direction of increased safety. 
 
In addition to assessing linear trends over time, year-to-year changes were examined.  Seventeen 
questions revealed significant year-to-year changes.  For most questions, these changes mirrored 
the linear trends by quarters.  However, changes across time could also follow a non-linear 
pattern.  For 3 questions in which there were no significant linear trends, there were significant 
year-to-year non-linear effects. 
 
The time period represented by each quarter approximated a season of the year, providing an 
opportunity to assess factors related to seasonal weather (e.g., icing, thunderstorms) or other 
factors (e.g., tourist travel) that vary regularly across the year.  Statistically significant seasonal 
effects were observed for 21 of the 43 questions analyzed.  One interesting demonstration of 
seasonal effects relates to the cyclical pattern shown in the data from the question involving bird 
strikes.  Here, events reported were highest in summer and fall, lower in spring than in summer, 
and still lower in winter, with no year-to-year variation. 
 
Although the primary purpose of NAOMS was to demonstrate a methodology for assessing 
changes over time, the NAOMS survey methodology also proved capable of revealing other 
important findings in the data that were unrelated to time changes.  The aircraft flown by pilots 
in the NAOMS survey were classified into 4 size categories: small, medium, large, and wide-
body.  Notable differences often distinguished these aircraft groups.  Significant differences 
among aircraft-size categories were found for 36 of the 43 questions analyzed.  For many events, 
it is the small and/or the wide-body aircraft pilots who experienced the highest event rates.  
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However, the differences among aircraft size categories were complex, reflecting the differing 
operations performed by these aircraft. 
 
Reports were further classified according to type of operation (cargo or passenger) in which the 
reporting pilot was engaged.  Of the 43 questions analyzed, 4 were specific to events involving 
passengers, and, therefore resulted in very few, or no, reports of those events from cargo pilots.  
For 13 events, there were no differences between operation types.  For 20 events, rates were 
higher in cargo operations than in passenger operations.  For 6 events, rates were higher in 
passenger operations than in cargo operations.  For both the aircraft-size categories and the 
passenger/cargo categories, the NAOMS survey revealed differences for events that were stable 
over time, as well as for events that changed over time. 
 
While the results from Section B was the prime interest to the demonstration of the NAOMS 
survey, the survey instrument also included a section (Section C) that could supply quick-
turnaround information on a particular topic of current industry concern.  The topic of this 
section was envisioned to change as new pressing questions arose.  For much of the NAOMS 
project, the topic-of-interest in Section C was In-Close-Approach-Changes (ICAC), a subject of 
particular interest at the initiation of the NAOMS study.  The results from this survey section 
revealed the frequency with which ICAC requests were made, the air-carrier pilots' responses to 
these requests, and the aftermath of making in-close approach changes on the remainder of the 
flight.  A second topic for Section C (that included inquiries on training, protocols and 
procedures) was initiated later in the NAOMS study period to address needs advanced by the 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team’s (CAST) subgroup, the Joint Implementation Measurement 
Data Analysis Team (JIMDAT).  Representatives of the JIMDAT and representatives of the 
NAOMS team worked collaboratively to produce and integrate into the main survey a new 
version of Section C that reflected the JIMDAT's particular information needs. This experiment 
proved successful in capturing information that had been judged to be unattainable through other 
approaches. 
 
The CAST/JIMDAT expressed interest in the operation of a survey of Part 121 pilots, but NASA 
could not commit to continuing the service after the expiration of NASA’s Aviation Safety 
Program.  The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) offered to perform the service provided that 
NASA could develop a less costly alternative to telephone interviews.  To address this issue, the 
NAOMS team developed and tested a Web-based version of the NAOMS survey, which was 
transferred to ALPA to be operated on behalf of the CAST. 
 
The Web-based survey itself was well received by the respondents.  However, preliminary data 
collected in the limited time that could be devoted to this effort prior to the conclusion of the 
NASA project resulted in a lower response rate, leaving open the question of whether the Web-
based approach could produce the same high-quality data as the telephone survey. 
 
Future Applications 
 
The NAOMS research project demonstrated that changes over time, across the system, could be 
measured reliably using a carefully crafted survey methodology to learn of the experiences of the 
system’s operators.  Information from such a survey could be the first indication of a developing 
new situation or trend deserving of investigation that could be accomplished through the use of 
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other sources of relevant information.  For example, the results reported in Section 7 of this 
report show that the rate of instances in which pilots reported beginning the takeoff roll while 
another aircraft was on the runway decreased between 2002 and 2003.  There is no evidence of 
interaction of this trend with either aircraft-size category or type of operation.  This pattern 
suggests that a discrete system-wide intervention may have been the cause.  What could it have 
been?  The rate of these events appears higher in small and medium aircraft and in passenger 
operations.  Why? Another example is the rate that pilots reported utilizing their reserve fuel 
supplies.  This rate increased linearly across the observation period.  This pattern suggests a 
slowly changing cause. This increase in the use of reserve fuel was observed in medium, large, 
and wide-body aircraft but only for passenger operations.  The increase in the use of reserve fuel 
could reflect changes in economic conditions or weather patterns or other factors - but why was 
it not observed in cargo operations?  NAOMS was not designed to answer these questions, but it 
can identify the foci for further investigation. 
 
To move beyond research to an operational implementation of NAOMS, some changes would 
need to be made in the methodology, but many of these changes would follow naturally.  The 
selection criteria used in the NAOMS experiment for air-carrier pilots was a compromise, dictated 
by project realities that resulted in some otherwise eligible respondents not being included in the 
selection pool.  The NAOMS team attempted to determine if this limitation affected the results.  
For the great majority of questions, no effect of these criteria was observed on the temporal 
pattern of responses.  A further limitation in the selection pool resulted from the absence of pilots 
who chose to remove their names from the public registry, an option that became available after 
the NAOMS project began.  While data were not available to examine temporal effects related to 
the opt-out option, no evidence was found in the experience level of pilots or in differences in 
their responses to questions in Section B to indicate that the option to opt out of the public 
registry created a substantial bias in the NAOMS data results.  However, in a full-scale 
operational implementation of a NAOMS-like survey, neither the NAOMS selection criteria nor 
the “opt-outs” from the public registry would be an issue, as the participant pool would be 
selected from the full FAA Airman Registry and based on prevailing relevant requirements for the 
particular user group (e.g., air-carrier pilot, air traffic controllers, etc.).  Nor would the ability to 
include the analyses of rare events be an issue.  For the NAOMS study, the data-gathering period 
was insufficient to obtain reliable results for rare events.  This limitation would not exist in an 
operational application of NAOMS in which data gathering would be continuous. 
 
Summary 
 
Over the years, a need has been expressed for a methodology to routinely assess the status of the 
National Airspace System (NAS) with the goal of identifying factors that could affect the safety 
of its operations.  The results reported here demonstrate that a statistically reliable, scientifically 
sound survey of the various operators of the aviation system could be that methodology.  
Through this research effort, the NAOMS project has laid a solid foundation for developing a 
continuing monitoring service to capture the status of the NAS and to identify changes that could 
compromise safety. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In response to a Presidential declaration of a national goal to reduce the fatal aircraft accident 
rate by 80% within 10 years after the tragedy of TWA 800 in February 1997, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) undertook a new program in aviation safety. In 
collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB), NASA formed the Aviation Safety Investment Strategy Team (ASIST), 
which organized a series of conferences with participants from all sectors of the aviation industry 
to examine the options and recommend an approach for NASA to develop the enabling 
technologies that addressed the President’s goal. The result of these deliberations was a three-
thrust program covering: 
1. Accident Prevention: Preventive technologies to eliminate accident precursors. 
2. Accident Mitigation: Stay-alive technologies to decrease fatalities in survivable 
accidents. 
3. Aviation System-Wide Monitoring and Modeling: Technologies to identify existing 
accident precursors in the aviation system, and to forecast and identify potential safety 
issues to guide the development of future safety technology. 
 
Following the ASIST workshops, formative planning and preliminary studies of approaches were 
conducted during the years of FY98 and FY99. NASA’s 5-year Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) 
was initiated in FY00 with the goal of developing technologies that, depending upon 
implementation, could reduce the aircraft accident rate by a factor of five within ten years, and 
by a factor of ten within twenty years.1 
 
One of the projects within the AvSP, the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) 
project, addressed the need to provide decision makers with system-wide analysis tools for 
identifying and correcting the predisposing conditions that could lead to accidents. System-wide 
analysis is a concept with extraordinary potential benefits and challenges because of the 
complexity and diversity of objectives and relationships among the manufacturers, users, and 
regulators of the modern aviation transportation system.  
 
ASMM was primarily concerned with aiding the decision makers in gaining insight into the 
health and safety of the national air-transportation system. This would be accomplished by 
providing technologies to facilitate efficient, comprehensive, and accurate analyses of data 
collected from various sources throughout the aviation system during normal daily operations. 
ASMM addressed the need of aviation policy makers for reliable measures of events related to 
aviation safety, particularly as capacity becomes constrained and the skies become more 
crowded. As portrayed in Figure 1, fatal accidents are only a portion of the data relating to 
overall aviation safety. The focus of the ASMM project was to ensure that precursors of the next 
potential accident as indicated by the incidents and problematic trends in routine operations are 
reliably detected, identified, assessed, and managed. 
 
                                                
1 After 9/11, the Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) became the Aviation Safety and Security Program (AvSSP).  
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Figure 1. Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) focus on precursors. 
 
 
The ASMM project developed computational tools that provide decision-makers with regular, 
accurate, insightful information on the performance and safety of the aviation system. The ability 
to monitor continuously, convert the collected data into reliable information, and share that 
information for collaborative decision making is the basis for a revolutionary, proactive approach 
to managing the aviation-transportation system for the prevention of accidents.  
 
The ASMM objectives were to develop the technologies to: 
1. Identify causal factors, accident precursors, and off-nominal conditions in the aviation 
data. 
2. Provide health, performance, and safety information to decision makers. 
3. Ensure seamless aviation information services. 
 
The ASMM project consisted of the following four elements:  
The Data Analysis Tools Development element developed capabilities to automatically 
extract information from large databases of textual and numerical data and to present 
meaningful displays of that information. These data-analysis tools were developed to meet 
the needs of the Intramural Monitoring and Extramural Monitoring elements described next. 
 
The Intramural Monitoring element provided individual air-service operators (i.e., air 
carriers and air traffic control facilities) with the tools needed to monitor their own 
performance continuously, effectively, and economically within their own organizations. 
This was the ‘bottom-up’ part of a two-phase strategy for monitoring the system. The goal 
was that eventually information extracted from these various data sources would be shared to 
gain insight into the performance and safety of the national air-transportation system.2  
 
The Extramural Monitoring element was the ‘top-down’ part that complemented Intramural 
Monitoring. It developed a comprehensive system-wide statistically sound survey as an 
                                                
2 That goal was not achieved in the time frame of this project because it was not possible to overcome the 
concerns of owners of data for potential misuse of proprietary data. 
ASMM 
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approach for monitoring the performance and safety of the overall national air-transportation 
system and for detecting and evaluating the effects of new technologies or procedures as they 
are inserted into the system. The method employed was to seek the perspectives of the front-
line operators (i.e., flight crews, air traffic controllers, cabin crews, mechanics, etc.). This 
concept was called the National Aviation Operational Monitoring Service (NAOMS). 
 
The fourth element of the ASMM project was the Modeling and Simulations element that 
addressed the need to support predictions and safety risk assessments by developing and 
validating system-wide models and simulations.  
 
Although the products of these four elements of the ASMM project all have stand-alone value 
and many have, in fact, been deployed to the industry as such, they had been planned and 
developed in concert to be complementary, interdependent, and interrelated. The information 
extracted by the tools of these four elements could be merged into a system-wide framework 
enabling aviation policy makers to collaborate in aviation safety-risk management. This 
information was to be shared while respecting the proprietary rights to some sources of data and 
sensitivities to potential misuse should they be released outside the owning (i.e., commercial) 
organization. While this was not achieved during the life of the ASMM project, it is being 
addressed in activities initiated by the industry after the Aviation Safety and Security Program 
(AvSSP) ended. 
 
The present report focuses on the development of the NAOMS survey methodology. For more 
information on the ASMM Project generally, the reader is referred to ASMM Project Plan 
(AvSSP, 2004) and Statler. 2007, which documents the achievements of the ASMM project 
during the life of the AvSP/AvSSP from FY00 to FY05. 
 
 The goal of the NAOMS research project was to develop survey methodology to support a 
continuing, comprehensive and coherent survey of all of the operators of the aviation system 
(i.e., its pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, and others). The information provided by 
these operator groups was to be integrated to provide a multifaceted picture of national aviation 
system safety that would complement and supplement information extracted from other national 
aviation safety data sets. The goal of developing a survey methodology that included all operator 
groups was not achieved by the NAOMS project largely due to the cost of designing and 
implementing a statistically sound survey for each new constituency and the practical limitations 
on the project’s time and funds. Only pilots could be surveyed within the time and resource 
limitations of the project as a demonstration of the methodology. Air-carrier pilots were the 
primary respondent group for a NAOMS survey conducted from April 2001 until December 
2004, but, in 2002, there was also a 9-month survey of General Aviation (GA) pilots3. 
 
Although the data presented relate only to the air-carrier-pilot survey and to the period during 
which these data were gathered, the report presents sufficient information on the research and 
                                                
3 This report has been delayed due to decisions by AvSP/AvSSP management that diverted the personnel 
and resources needed to perform and interpret the analyses to higher priority activities during 2005, 2006, 
and 2007, and by subsequent management decisions. Recently, the NASA leads of the NAOMS team 
were authorized to re-engage, to analyze the data, and to produce this report. 
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development underlying the NAOMS concept and methodology to assess its viability for future 
applications to all operators of the aviation system.  
 
The following is a general overview of the content of this report. In Section 2, the NAOMS 
concept, its purposes and objectives, and the rationale for its implementation as a continuing 
service to the industry are described. The established methodology for acquiring survey data 
and the measures of a successful survey used by NAOMS are described in Section 3. Section 4 
describes the development process of designing and implementing a survey instrument 
appropriate for air-carrier pilots. The conduct of the air-carrier-pilot survey and preliminary 
findings about the data are described in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the approach to 
analyzing the data which evolved, in large part, during the process of collecting and assessing 
the data. Section 7 presents the results of the analyses of relative changes over time performed 
on the survey data obtained in interviews with air-carrier pilots during almost three-years from 
February 2002 through December 2004. Section 8 describes the approach and results from a 
Spotlight (or Section C) survey conducted for the CAST/JIMDAT (Commercial Aviation 
Safety Team/Joint Implementation Measurement Data Analysis Team). Section 9 describes the 
development of a Web-based version of the NAOMS survey of pilots and the transfer of this 
capability to the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). Section 10 discusses the lessons learned 
during the research and development of the NAOMS survey. A summary, conclusions, and 
recommendations for NAOMS’ future are presented in Section 11. 
2. Why NAOMS? 
2.1 The Rationale for NAOMS 
The value of the information contained in experiential reports on performance of the system from 
its operators has been well established in the 35 years of the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS). Many U.S. air carriers have recognized the value of voluntary experiential reporting and 
have implemented Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP) internally. However, these 
voluntary reports only provide information on events deemed important to the reporter, while 
events that may be important from a system’s perspective may not be recognized as such and are 
not reported. The NAOMS concept was designed to address this limitation. NAOMS was not 
designed to replace current sources of aviation-safety information, but to supplement these 
sources. 
 
The need for this kind of information had been documented when the NAOMS research project 
was initiated. For example, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 
(1998) said in their report: “The most effective way to identify incidents and problems in 
aviation is for the people who operate the system (pilots, mechanics, controllers, dispatchers, 
etc.) to self-disclose the information.” The Government Accountability Office’s Safer Skies 
Review (2000) emphasized the need for additional performance measures. The NTSB Report on 
Transportation Safety Databases (2002) said that there was a “need to address the problem of 
under-reporting in current aviation safety data systems.” When the NAOMS project was 
initiated, there were a number of databases that attempted to capture safety-related information 
concerning the national air-transportation system. These databases were designed to address 
particular needs, and, like all databases, had certain limitations. A representative listing of 
aviation safety data resources that existed at the time of creation of the NAOMS project, their 
foci and their limitations, is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Sources of Aviation Safety Data 
Data Set Value Limitation 
ATC radar 
tapes 
Captures data on aircraft trajectories. Captures data mainly on aircraft 
trajectories. Data contain relatively few 
parameters. Very limited ability to 
address human performance issues. 
Air carrier 
digital flight 
(FOQA) data 
Captures aircraft performance information 
continuously from hundreds of sensors. 
No information on operative ATC 
clearances, which makes data difficult to 
interpret. No insights on human cognition 
or affect. Considered proprietary data by 
owners. 
FAA Accident/ 
Incident Data 
System (AIDS) 
Contains data records for incidents 
gathered from FAA Incident Report Form 
8020-5, and teletype preliminary data. 
Data collected include date, location, pilot 
qualifications, type aircraft, type of event, 
pilot experience, limited narrative 
descriptions and other descriptive data.  
The incidents recorded are limited to 
events investigated by the FAA. AIDS 
data are not suitable for trend analyses 
since not all incidents for each category 
are included in the database. Data are 
also of limited use for safety analysis 
since the focus is on investigation of 
enforcement events. 
NASA/FAA 
Aviation 
Safety 
Reporting 
System 
(ASRS) 
 
Contains voluntary reports of occurrences 
that could impact aviation safety. Reports 
are submitted by pilots, controllers, 
mechanics, other interested parties, and 
users of the NAS. Extensive narrative is 
the norm for each report. All privacy or 
identifying data are expunged or sanitized. 
Limited by self-reporting biases, which 
affect the statistical representativeness of 
the data. Does not actively collect data on 
topics of interest. Data cannot be used for 
trend development since voluntary reports 
represent a subset of all events. 
Bureau of 
Transportation 
Statistics 
(BTS) 
Data are typically used in calculation of 
accident and incident rates. Reports are 
reliable since data originate with the 
carriers who are required to report them. 
BTS Form 41 Reports provide summary 
activity levels for U.S. certificated air 
carriers. 
Data are collected on levels of flight 
activities but no information is collected 
about unwanted aviation events. 
General 
Aviation 
Avionics and 
Activity 
Survey 
(GAAAS) 
 
Data are derived from a survey that is 
applied annually to the U.S. GA 
community. Information is obtained on 
estimated flying time, number of landings, 
fuel consumption, lifetime airframe hours, 
avionics, and engine hours of the active 
GA aircraft. These data are typically used 
for the development of incident and 
accident rates for GA aircraft. 
Designed to collect information on GA 
aircraft activity, the survey is considered 
unrepresentative due to a low response 
rate. Some of the estimates have very 
large estimation errors and as a result any 
calculated trends or rates using this 
information in the calculation will have 
very large margin of error. 
continued on next page 
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Table 1. Sources of Aviation Safety Data (continued) 
Data Set Value Limitation 
National 
Airspace 
Information 
Monitoring 
System 
(NAIMS) 
The following systems are the core of 
FAAʼs aviation safety monitoring efforts: 
PDS (Pilot Deviation System): Contains 
pilot deviation reports resulting from 
violation of a federal aviation regulation or 
a NORAD Air Defense ID Zone tolerance. 
OEDS (Operational Error and Deviation 
System): Contains all operational error or 
deviation reports that occurred in the NAS.  
NMACS (Near Midair Collision System): 
Contains voluntary pilot-reported near 
midair collision incidents.  
VPDS (Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation 
System): Contains information on 
incidents involving unauthorized entry or 
movement on an airport by a vehicle 
operator or pedestrian. 
RIS (Runway Incursion System): Contains 
information derived from OEDS, VPDS, 
and PDS airport surface incidents that 
created a collision hazard or resulted in 
loss of separation with an aircraft taking 
off, intending to take off, landing, or 
intending to land. 
A broad variety of FAA incident and 
airman enforcement data systems 
comprise the NAIMS. These systems 
vary in accuracy and ability to capture 
events. 
National 
Transportation 
Safety Board 
(NTSB) 
Aviation 
Accident/ 
Incident Data 
System 
Contains information collected during 
investigations of accidents or incidents 
involving civil aircraft within the U.S., 
its territories and possessions, and 
international waters. NTSB is the 
official source of accident data and 
their causal factors. Information is from 
1983 to present and includes 
preliminary and final reports, 
narratives, and findings. The database 
serves as the gold standard for the 
counts of accidents in the U.S. Data 
are used as the source for accident 
statistic trends and rates. 
Addresses commercial part 121 
accidents and high profile incidents, 
but contains very little data on the 
tens of thousands of aviation safety 
incidents (accident precursors) that 
occur annually. The quality of the data 
varies. While the data are excellent 
for large aircraft accidents, they are of 
lesser quality for smaller aircraft 
accidents. 
Service 
Difficulty 
Reporting 
System 
(SDRS) 
Contains GA malfunction and defect 
reports and air carrier mechanical reliability 
report subsets. Air carriers, field offices, 
manufacturers, repair stations, and 
individuals submit the data. 
Focuses on aircraft equipment 
problems. Only limited information 
about human operator performance 
(mechanics) in the context of 
equipment maintenance and repair. 
This database suffers from 
underreporting and poor data quality. 
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All of these data resources, while containing valuable information, were limited in their scope or 
in their quantitative properties. None of these programs could provide decision makers with 
statistically defensible estimates of the frequencies with which many unwanted events occurred 
or with reliable information as to whether the frequencies of such occurrences were changing 
over time. Similarly, the national capacity to measure the effects of aviation safety interventions 
and their unwanted side effects was limited. There was a need to obtain rapid feedback on the 
effects of technological and procedural changes to the system and to detect, as soon as possible, 
changes in the rates of safety-related events that deserve immediate attention. There was a need 
to escape from a reactive policy-making syndrome to a proactive approach. NAOMS was 
expressly designed to meet these needs by way of a comprehensive, statistically sound survey on 
which assessments of relative changes over time in the rates of unwanted events could be 
reliably based. 
2.2 The NAOMS Concept 
NAOMS was an attempt to address the performance of the national air-transportation system as 
an entity in a quantitatively defensible fashion by providing an active, broad-spectrum, safety-
data collection capability with sound statistical properties.  
 
The NAOMS concept entailed a scientifically designed survey to obtain the front-line operators’ 
experiences with system performance and to provide a statistically sound basis for evaluating 
relative changes over time of the rates of incidents that might compromise safety. As indicated in 
Figure 2, information was to be solicited from the operators of the aviation system about the 
things they have experienced. The information provided by these operator groups was to be 
fused to develop a system-level perspective of the performance of the national air-transportation 
system. NAOMS was not designed to measure safety of the air-transportation system in any 
absolute sense or to identify the causes of unsafe events, but rather to assess the effects on 
system safety of changes over time in technologies, procedures, or training. By directly 
contacting randomly selected individuals, the NAOMS approach complements systems such as 
the ASRS and the ASAP which solicit from the community more broadly while relying on user-
initiated reporting. Information from NAOMS surveys could be the first indication of a 
developing problem or trend deserving of further investigation using other sources of relevant 
information.  
 
The key conviction underlying the NAOMS concept was that the operators of the aviation 
system—its pilots, air traffic controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, and others—collectively 
have the ability to accurately observe and report the safety events they encounter. The challenge 
was to collect these data in a systematic and objective manner. NAOMS was conceived as a 
research project to develop the methodology for a well-designed survey process that could meet 
this requirement. 
 
NAOMS’ goal of a data-driven approach to aviation-system safety analysis required the 
collection of data that were statistically valid, meaningful, and representative of the system. The 
NAOMS project team set out to develop a survey methodology to acquire such data. There was 
nothing that met the needs addressed by NAOMS when the project started over 10 years ago nor 
is there today.  
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Figure 2. The NAOMS concept. 
 
 
The nation is preparing for a major transition from the current system to a far more complex 
national air-transportation system. Yet some of the problems implicated in current accidents and 
incidents are not themselves adequately understood. Many of these problems entail factors that 
are not revealed in the data collected by the current automatic recording systems like the Flight 
Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. The predetermined categories used in FOQA 
programs are highly airframe oriented, lacking detail on human performance and other important 
operational factors. The best source of information among the present systems about such aspects 
of unwanted events is the ASRS and the airline-based programs (e.g., Aviation Safety Action 
Program). The problems reported to the FAA under mandatory reporting rules are a small 
extreme subset of the problems that could be precursors of accidents. The NAOMS survey 
measures reports of event-based experiences  This was conceptualized as a viable approach to 
complement existing systems for obtaining information on relative changes over time of the 
range of events that could compromise the safety of system operations is the use of surveys. 
 
Surveys could potentially address a broad array of safety issues involving system design, human 
operator performance, organizational policies, procedures, regulations, publications, charts, 
aircraft and ATC equipment, airspace structures, and other aspects of the aviation system. The 
NAOMS survey is a pointer to events that could compromise the safety of the air-transportation 
system. It would precipitate further investigation using other capabilities and data sources such 
as those developed under Intramural Monitoring to identify the causal factors and, thereby, 
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suggest an intervention. NAOMS was not designed for investigatory purposes nor for causal 
analyses and it was not designed to provide sufficient information by itself to enable the design 
of an appropriate intervention.  
 
The potential benefits of a NAOMS survey system include:  
• Providing decision makers in air carriers, air traffic management, and other air- services 
providers with regular, reliable, and insightful measures of the health, performance, and 
safety of the national air-transportation system.  
• Providing decision-makers with reliable information to determine if changes in technology 
or procedures introduced into the system are producing expected improvements without 
inducing unwanted side effects.  
• Establishing the baseline of operational performance against which to measure the system-
wide impact of changes in the technologies, procedures, or training introduced into the 
system.  
• Contributing to the information extracted from other data sources to support investigations 
of the causal factors of system-wide safety unwanted events. 
• Enabling a quick look or “snapshot” of operational issues of interest to the aviation 
community at a particular time.  
 
The NAOMS survey measures reports of event-based experiences. While originally intended to 
be broader, as the project evolved, funding limitations restricted the reporter population for the 
purpose of demonstrating the concept to pilots. The data presented in this report are those 
gathered from the air-carrier-pilot population.  
 
NAOMS was a research and development project. It allowed the concept’s value to be assessed, 
flaws to be discovered, and provided a basis for developing a continuing monitoring service. 
Once this was accomplished, NASA planned to hand off the process to another aviation safety 
agency with the hope that NAOMS would serve the aviation community by becoming a fully 
implemented institutional capability based on the lessons learned from this research. 
3. Approach 
The NAOMS project focused on research and development. It allowed a solid, scientific 
foundation to be laid for the methodology, the concept’s value to be assessed, flaws to be 
discovered, and a basis for developing a continuing monitoring service to be provided. Once this 
was accomplished, NASA planned to hand off the process to another aviation safety agency with 
the hope that NAOMS would serve the aviation community by becoming a long-term 
institutional survey capability based on the lessons learned from this research. While originally 
intended to be broader, as the project evolved funding limitations restricted the reporter 
population for the purpose of demonstrating the concept to pilots. The data presented in this 
report are those gathered from the air-carrier-pilot population. 
 
Since the purpose of the NAOMS project was to determine if a viable survey method could be 
developed, the project was heavily “front-loaded” to examine, in as many ways as feasible, those 
factors that could impact success. An understanding of these factors would also be essential to an 
 
15 
 
operational implementation of NAOMS if the concept proved viable. These factors are examined 
in this section and throughout the report. 
3.1 Literature Review 
The science of conducting a survey has evolved over several decades. This is exemplified by the 
literature on survey methodology included in the bibliography of Appendix A. The body of 
literature on the science of conducting surveys is very large and has been a subject of research 
and development for a long time. The fundamental concepts of the design and implementation of 
a survey instrument have been honed by psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, 
philosophers, mathematicians, and statisticians.  
 
Correspondingly, the development of NAOMS and the achievement of its objectives required a 
multidisciplinary team. The core project team included experts in aviation safety, aviation-
safety-data systems, survey research, statistics, and system-monitoring design. In addition to the 
core team members, nationally recognized experts in survey research design and statistics served 
as project advisors. (See Appendix B for biographical sketches of the NAOMS project team and 
consultants.) Equally important to the adaptation of this methodology to the domain of aviation 
safety were the team members and advisors with extensive domain knowledge of, and experience 
in, aviation operations.  
 
The NAOMS project team conducted an extensive literature review of survey methods and 
published studies of surveys of pilots and other aviation personnel. The team found very few 
aviation-specific studies that demonstrated a rigorous survey approach. The use of surveys to 
acquire data in support of aviation safety has been episodic and not always well done. In 
particular, there was very little published data relating to pilot recall ability, memory 
organization, and like matters of great importance to NAOMS.  
 
The concept and the design of the NAOMS survey employs the best practices of surveys used in 
other policy domains and provides comparable benefits. The information that was available in 
related literature is summarized in Appendix C. 
3.2 Survey Methodology 
Survey methods are mature, well understood, and are known to produce reliable data when the 
survey instrument is properly designed for the objectives, the domain, and the interviewees for 
which it is intended. For at least five decades, the U.S. federal government has been actively and 
extensively involved in the collection and analysis of survey data. Surveys have been routinely 
sponsored by a wide range of federal agencies seeking a wide range of types of information 
about life in America. Surveys have been used to shape national policy for many decades, 
especially in areas such as public health, economics, and criminal justice. Following are a few 
examples of on-going Federal surveys and their sponsoring agencies: 
• Survey of Income and Program Participation (Census Bureau) 1984  
• Consumer Expenditure Surveys (Census Bureau) 1968  
• Annual Housing Surveys (Census Bureau) 1973 
• Survey of Consumer Attitudes (National Science Foundation) 1953 
• Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys (National Center for Health Statistics) 1959 
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• National Health Interview Surveys (National Center for Health Statistics) 1970  
• American National Election Studies (National Science Foundation) 1948 
• Panel Study of Income Dynamics (National Science Foundation) 1968 
• National Longitudinal Surveys (Bureau of Labor Statistics) 1964 
• Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (Center for Disease Control) 1984 
• Monitoring the Future (National Institute on Drug Abuse) 1975 
 
One of the reasons for the popularity of surveys is that they can be used to measure important 
phenomena that would be very expensive and difficult-to-impossible to measure in other ways. 
For example, when an entire population or sub-population may have been affected by some 
event, it would be impractical to try to identify, and learn from, the experience of each 
individual. But in many cases a representative sample of affected people can be selected and 
interviewed to learn about their experiences. When the survey is properly conducted, valid 
conclusions about the entire population may be based on a sample, making the impractical 
practical. It is often impossible to compare survey results to other benchmarks to assess the 
accuracy of the surveys because surveys are so often conducted in contexts where no other 
indicators measure the same phenomena. 
 
There are three key measures of survey success (i.e., is the survey measuring things consistently) 
that can be used to evaluate whether the survey instrument was properly designed and 
implemented: (1) response rate; (2) data quality; and (3) validity of statistical results (i.e., is the 
survey measuring what it says it is measuring).  These measures of survey success are also 
indicators of the confidence one can have in the data. (For example, see Weisberg et al, 1996, 
and Lyberg et al, 1997.) They are described in the following section. 
4. NAOMS Concept Development 
As there was little experience in the adaptation of survey methodology to aviation safety, the 
NAOMS project team approached the development and implementation of NAOMS with 
methodological thoroughness and probity as their foremost concern. The development of the 
NAOMS survey entailed the careful adaptation of survey methodologies to the aviation-safety 
domain to ensure a robust survey process in accordance with the measures of success mentioned 
above. The NAOMS survey was designed to obtain reliable information on: 
• Composition of U.S. commercial and GA flight operations. 
• Long-term temporal changes in the frequencies of unwanted events. 
• Effectiveness of interventions intended to enhance aviation safety and the occurrence of any 
unwanted side effects due to such interventions. 
• Relative frequencies with which unwanted events occur. 
• Other aviation operational and safety topics amenable to quantification and of interest to 
aviation policymakers and operators. 
 
The design of the survey instrument and the method of conducting the survey that would produce 
results sufficiently reliable to support aviation-safety policy decisions required careful 
consideration of many factors. The treatments of many of these factors are likely different for 
each constituency of operators. The NAOMS project team focused its efforts during the first two 
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years on ensuring methodological rigor in the treatment of these factors, with particular emphasis 
on their application to surveys of air-carrier pilots. Further, the emphasis of the initial survey was 
on obtaining reliable information on relative changes over time in the rates of occurrences of 
unwanted events. Descriptions of the factors considered and how the NAOMS project team 
addressed them for the survey of air-carrier pilots are presented below. For additional detail on 
the development of the concept, the reader is directed to the Battelle Reference Report (Battelle, 
2007). 
4.1 Data Reliability 
4.1.1 Response Rates 
The NAOMS team followed the general guidance of Dillman (1978) in designing the survey for 
the most effective ways of maximizing response rate and data reliability. Dillman identified 
several methods to increase respondent attention to, and understanding of, survey questions in 
both mail and telephone-interview formats based on psychological research on attention, 
information processing, and compliance, as well as empirical data from surveys conducted using 
his recommendations. 
 
The NAOMS project included a field trial, a demonstration test, and the full survey of air-carrier 
pilots. The response rate (i.e., percentage of those located and eligible who completed the 
survey) during the NAOMS field trial was encouraging with very low rates of refusal among 
eligible respondents in any of the modes tested. This indicated that a response rate of at least 
70% for eligible respondents could be expected during the full survey. The response rate for the 
NAOMS survey of air-carrier pilots benefited from the large sample size used. Spanning both the 
demonstration test and the fully implemented survey, approximately 7,000 air-carrier pilots were 
interviewed each year from 2001 through 2004. These pilots were randomly selected from a pool 
of about 40,000 eligible pilots available from the data source used for the survey.  
 
Over the course of the air-carrier survey, about 24% of the pilots drawn from the Airmen’s 
Registry who met the NAOMS selection criteria could not be located. Also, about 23% of those 
contacted were found ineligible because they had not flown as commercial air-carrier pilots in 
the recall period. These latter pilots were eligible for possible later random selection. Excluding 
those who could not be located and those who were ineligible, the air-carrier survey response 
rate far exceeded the standard set by survey experts. The NAOMS team was gratified to find the 
enthusiasm among the air-carrier pilot community to participate in an activity related to 
maintaining and improving the safety of the system. 
 
High response rates increase confidence in the results of a survey because they indicate that the 
responses obtained are minimally influenced by self-selection bias. Furthermore, a high response 
rate is an indication of the participants’ interest in contributing to the understanding and 
improvement of the system in which they work and, therefore, in providing accurate responses. 
4.1.2 Data Quality 
The following indicators are gauges of the quality of the data collected by a survey such as 
NAOMS: 
• Extreme Outlier Frequency. Properly obtained and recorded high-quality data contain 
relatively few extreme outliers resulting from misunderstood questions, intentionally 
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misleading responses, or data-collection errors. Relatively few extreme outliers were found 
in the data from the air-carrier-pilot interviews, further attesting to the pilots’ 
conscientiousness in responding accurately. The data from the surveys of the air-carrier 
pilots contained few (much less than 1%) extreme outliers.  
• Survey Completion. Having agreed to participate, the respondents answered all, or almost 
all, of the questions presented to them. Fewer than 2% of the respondents to the NAOMS 
survey of air-carrier pilots broke off their interviews before completion. 
• Respondent Assessment of Survey Quality. Respondents were provided an opportunity to 
comment on the survey process in the design of the questionnaire. The responses to the 
questions regarding the survey spoke very favorably of the NAOMS survey design and 
process. 
4.1.3 Valid Statistical Analysis 
Another measure of the success of a survey is that the analyses of the data produce statistically 
valid results that are viewed as operationally important by the domain experts. This is, of course, 
the end purpose of conducting the survey. It requires strict adherence to the concerns addressed 
above by the first two measures of success. However, the achievement of both statistical and 
operational validity entails other considerations that are more domain and constituency specific. 
The success of the NAOMS survey in terms of data reliability and data quality, as well as how 
statistical analysis and operational validity were achieved is discussed in detail later in this 
report.  
4.2 Voluntary and Anonymous 
Participation in the NAOMS project was voluntary and the NAOMS project team assured 
protection of the anonymity of the respondents. The names of potential respondents were 
drawn from the Airmen Certification Database as published on the Internet. The NAOMS 
project team sent letters to each of the potential respondents requesting participation. The letter 
made clear that the recipient was under no obligation to participate but promised anonymity if 
he or she chose to do so. The very high voluntary response rate to the NAOMS’ survey 
indicates the pilots’ confidence in NASA’s assurance of anonymity. 
 
All data provided by respondents to the NAOMS survey were held in confidence. The NAOMS 
team maintained records of who participated in the survey to avoid unnecessary follow-on 
mailings and to prevent an individual from being asked to participate more than once a year. 
However, there was no linkage in NAOMS’s data repositories between the names of respondents 
and the data they provided. The confidentiality checks that were established to protect the 
respondents’ identities included the following:  
• Although pilots were assigned identification numbers for administrative purposes, the data 
were stored with complete anonymity. 
• The computerized interview form did not contain a pilot-identification number or any other 
form of identification linking a pilot to a completed interview. 
• No link was maintained between the interview form and the pilot data file after the survey 
interview was completed. 
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These controls produced the desired results. The responses are functionally anonymous. There 
were no breaches of anonymity guarantees during the NAOMS survey development and 
operational periods or thereafter. 
 
Also, because the pilots were being asked to report some information that might be considered 
sensitive, the questions in Sections B and C of the survey instrument were carefully phrased to 
avoid asking pilots directly about their performance. (For example, most questions began with the 
phrase “How many times did an aircraft in which you were a crewmember...”.) Considerations 
such as these resulted in the highly positive responses from the interviewees when asked their 
opinions of the survey in Section D. 
4.3 Emphasis on Experience Rather than Opinion 
During the very early phases of formulating NAOMS, the team found that presentations on the 
survey concept were received with reservations by some elements of the aviation community. 
This attitude was largely attributed to beliefs that opinion-based surveys are volatile, they can 
shift rapidly in response to current events, and they can be structured in ways that predispose the 
responses sought by survey operators. However, the NAOMS survey was not an opinion-based 
survey. The NAOMS survey focused on collecting data about recalled personal experiences, not 
personal opinion. This is a distinction that some have found difficult to grasp. Most of the 
questions in the NAOMS survey instrument ask respondents whether or not they have personally 
experienced or observed particular types of events within a specified period of time. This 
emphasis on recalled experience minimizes the subjectivity and volatility of the data obtained 
from survey responses. 
 
An exception to this policy of focusing on experience was made for some questions that were 
specially designed for a study that was performed at the request of the CAST/JIMDAT 
(discussed in Section 8.3) for which there was interest in pilot views (i.e., opinions) about a 
variety of operational and training practices. 
4.4 Methodological Issues 
There were many other issues that required thoughtful resolution before the air-carrier-pilot 
survey could be initiated. The NAOMS team applied considerable effort to obtain the best 
answers to the following questions as they applied to the air-carrier pilots: 
• What is the appropriate content of the NAOMS questionnaires for the survey of air-
carrier pilots? 
• How should the questionnaires be structured? 
• How far back in time can respondents accurately recall safety events? 
• What is the best survey-collection mode to use? 
• What should be the source of the respondent names (i.e., the air-carrier-pilot 
population pool) that would be sampled and what sample size of this pool is needed to 
achieve desired levels of accuracy? 
• How should respondents be selected, located, and engaged for the survey? 
• Would a purely random or a panel sampling design work best? 
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The way that the NAOMS team addressed each of these issues for the air-carrier-pilot survey is 
described below. The manner in which each of these issues is resolved is not only aviation 
domain specific, but is likely to be different for air-traffic controllers and for mechanics and for 
cabin crews. Similar considerations would have to be given to the design of the survey 
instrument and the manner of its implementation for each of the other constituents. The 
unanticipated magnitude of the research effort required to prepare the survey instrument for the 
single constituency of the air-carrier pilots led to the conclusion that there would not be 
sufficient time or funds available to support surveys of all the other constituents within the 
ASMM Project. 
 
The research and experiments conducted by the NAOMS team to address each of these issues are 
described along with the resolution of each issue. Some of these issues were addressed in the 
first two years of research and questionnaire development. Others were resolved in a field trial of 
data collection from November 1999 to February 2000. The field trial provided feedback on the 
interview mode, obtained a first measure of probable response rates, and explored pilot-recall 
capabilities. The field trial also provided first approximations of the safety-event frequency rates 
that respondents would be reporting in the NAOMS survey. This information provided a basis 
for the number of interviews needed for acceptable reliability. The results of the field trial are 
discussed below as they pertain to each issue. 
 
However, while the field trial resolved most issues, it could not resolve them all. The field trial 
lasted about 3 months. That was not sufficient time to conclude the optimal recall period or to 
assess adequately the sampling strategy for data collection; that is, whether it should use cross-
sectional (random) selection or panel selection. Also, the field trial revealed some problems with 
the questionnaire as it was structured at the time. Cognitive experiments that were conducted 
after the field trial resulted in changes to the order and content of questions in the final survey 
instrument. The study of these issues had to continue into the first year of the survey using the 
final survey instrument. Consequently, the first year (actually, the first nine months) of the full 
survey should be viewed as a second trial or demonstration test in the development phase of the 
survey. The data from those first nine months were not used in the primary data analysis (Section 
7) but were useful in resolving remaining issues. 
4.4.1 Questionnaire Content 
Issue: 
The NAOMS survey needed to collect the following types of content-centered information: 
• Measures of respondent risk exposure, such as the numbers of flight hours and legs flown, 
which act as the denominator of rate estimates, and estimates of the number of safety 
incidents and unwanted events that respondents experienced during the recall period, which 
act as the numerator of rate estimates. 
• Answers to questions on identified general topics. 
• Answers to questions on special focus topics requested by stakeholders. 
• Feedback on the quality of the questions asked and of the overall survey process. 
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Resolution: 
The NAOMS team developed a survey instrument composed of a four-part questionnaire for the 
air-carrier pilots that addressed these informational needs. The final design included a major 
effort to solicit input from the aviation community on the events to be addressed, question format 
for each event, order of questions, and structure of survey instrument. This entailed peer reviews 
by focus group sessions with air-carrier pilots, one-on-one interviews, and two workshops 
arranged by the NAOMS team. The NAOMS team consulted existing aviation safety data 
repositories maintained by NASA, the FAA, and the NTSB to identify known safety issues. One 
source was the ASRS analysts who identified the recurring and emerging safety issues they saw 
in their reviews of ASRS reports. 
 
This section discusses the design of the resultant survey instrument. Particular emphasis was 
given to identifying the safety topics that would be the bases for the longitudinal survey (Section 
B of the survey). 
 
The structure of the NAOMS survey instrument for air-carrier pilots is shown in Figure 3. 
Section A provides information on the interviewee’s activity that is used for normalizing the data 
to establish rates of occurrences. Section B provides information to reveal changes over time of 
events addressed in the survey questions and constitutes the numerator of the statistical analyses 
to establish rates of occurrences. Section C addresses a particular subject of special interest to the 
aviation community at that particular point in time. Section D asks for an evaluation of the 
survey and any other comments the interviewee cares to make. 
 
Section A. Aviation Activity Data 
• Hours and legs by make-model and by crew position during 
the recall-period and over life-time (total hours only). 
 
Section B. Safety Related Events 
• Provides a consistent data set over time. 
• Safety-related occurrences such as airborne conflicts, 
spatial deviation, ground events, weather encounters, 
equipment problems, pilot-ATC interaction issues, 
turbulence, passenger issues, and aircraft handling. 
 
Section C. Focus Questions 
• Topics driven by government/industry priorities for short-
term response. 
 
Section D. Survey Feedback 
Figure 3. The structure of the NAOMS survey instrument for air-carrier pilots. 
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Each of the four sections of the NAOMS survey instrument is discussed below. However, as the 
focus of the survey and this report is on relative changes over time, the emphasis of this report is 
on the exposure information from questions in Section A and the safety event questions in 
Section B. 
4.4.1.1 Section A: Flight Activity Levels 
The data in Section A of the survey instrument for air-carrier pilots measure the respondent’s 
flight activity during the recall period and over his or her career. The information on flight 
activity during the recall period is crucial to developing safety rate estimates from data collected 
by the NAOMS survey. Data from Section A provide the denominators in rate calculations (data 
from Sections B provide the numerators in rate calculations). Data from Section A can also 
function as explanatory variables when responses to Section B are statistically modeled. 
 
In the aviation domain, there are two primary flight activity measures: flight hours and flight 
legs. Flight hours measure the time spent maneuvering aircraft in the air and, depending on the 
specific measure used, taxiing on the ground. A flight leg is a segment of flight from departure to 
arrival. Flight hours and legs are measures of flight activity, and by extension, these activity data 
also measure the risk exposure of a flight crew. These numbers are the key variables used to 
estimate aviation safety event rates because they are measures of the opportunities of the flight 
crew to experience a safety event or an accident4. 
 
The strategy of the NAOMS survey design maximizes the potential for accurate rate 
estimates by collecting the data on risk exposure (from Section A) simultaneously with the 
data on safety events experienced from Sections B (and C) so that the events and the flight 
activities are for the same recall period.  
 
Among other factors, the risk exposure during a flight hour or a flight leg can vary depending on: 
• make and model of the aircraft flown 
• flight mission (i.e., passenger, cargo, business, utility, recreational, etc.) 
• portion of the flight that was international (i.e., outside the U.S.) 
• season of the year 
 
The NAOMS survey acquired data on each of these factors using the questions in Section A. 
Also, the respondent was asked to indicate the flight position he/she held (Captain, First Officer, 
Relief Pilot, other). The interviewee was also asked for the order-of-magnitude size (i.e., small, 
medium, or large) of the air carrier for which he/she flew. 
 
The full questionnaire, including questions in section A, can be seen in Appendix D. 
                                                
4 The use of flight hours and legs as measures of risk exposure pertains specifically to pilots. Other 
operators of the aviation system (e.g., air traffic controllers or mechanics) would require some other set of 
activity measures for Section A of their survey instruments for measures of their risk exposure. 
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4.4.1.2 Section B: Longitudinal Safety Event Questions 
The questions of Section B are longitudinal in nature, that is, they were intended to be collected 
routinely over a long time period to identify those relative changes with time in reported rates of 
events experienced by pilots that might be indicative of potential decrease of safety. The same 
questions were maintained throughout the survey so as to maintain continuity throughout the 
data-collection process. 
 
Deciding on the topics to be addressed in the questions of Section B was of fundamental 
importance. A survey of pilots on their perspectives on the performance and safety of the 
aviation system could entail many aspects such as the aircraft being flown, airports, procedures, 
policies, training, and air- carrier organizational factors. The NAOMS survey could address a 
great many topics but it was not practical to consider all. Also, many areas of potential inquiry 
would entail an opinion, which the NAOMS survey was designed to avoid.  
 
The approach used by the NAOMS team for selecting the highest priority topics and developing 
questions that would yield valuable insights on them entailed an iterative process of consultation 
with the community. The NAOMS team consulted existing aviation safety data repositories to 
identify known safety issues appropriate for the longitudinal study of Section B. One of these 
sources, the ASRS, is a very large repository of aviation safety reports managed by NASA on 
behalf of the FAA. The NAOMS team consulted with ASRS analysts to identify the recurring 
and emerging safety issues the analysts saw in their reviews of ASRS reports.  
 
Input was also obtained from aviation domain subject matter experts (SMEs) who were asked 
about the safety issues important to them based on their personal experiences. These inputs were 
obtained during focus group sessions with air-carrier pilots, one-on-one interviews, and the two 
workshops hosted by the NAOMS project team. 
 
The focus group sessions with air-carrier pilots were held in the Washington, D.C., area in 
August and September 1998. The focus groups were directed through a range of questions, 
beginning with open-ended questions to tap the issues that came up naturally and proceeding 
through more structured questions designed to help recall in specific areas. In addition, the focus 
group pilots were encouraged to provide feedback on the concept and the possible structure of 
the questionnaire. The participants included 37 active air-carrier pilots flying both domestic and 
international routes. Between 2 and 15 pilots participated in each session. Each session lasted 90 
minutes and was led by a professional facilitator who encouraged the participants to mention as 
many different types of safety-related events as possible. This included anything that should not 
occur during normal air operations. The responses of the participants in these focus groups were 
de-identified and consolidated.  
 
One-on-one interviews were conducted with active air-carrier pilots flying both domestic and 
international routes to identify additional events that did not surface in the focus groups. The 
one-on-one interviews allowed for more intensive discussion between the interviewer and a 
single pilot than is possible in a group setting. Also, any apprehension that a pilot might feel 
about mentioning some types of events in front of other pilots is minimized during the one-on-
one interviews. Nine such interviews were conducted in the Washington, D.C. area and in 
Columbus, Ohio, during September 1998. Each interview lasted up to 90 minutes. The responses 
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of the participants in these one-on-one interviews were de-identified and considered in 
conjunction with the responses from the focus groups. 
 
Decisions about which of the aviation safety topics generated by this process of consultation with 
the aviation community were driven by a desire to select events serious enough to be good 
indicators of the safety performance of the aviation system, yet not so serious that they would 
occur too rarely to be captured reliably in a survey. Questions about a few serious rare events 
were included in Section B in recognition of the industry’s interest in those topics. 
 
The topics selected for Section B needed to be judiciously grouped and ordered, and then 
translated into one or more carefully crafted questions. The approach to grouping and ordering 
Section B questions was based on the results of the NAOMS team’s research on pilot-memory 
organization, which is described in Section 4.4.3. The NAOMS team included input from experts 
in survey methodology and in aviation operations to craft questions that would elicit the desired 
information on each survey topic. 
 
The questions were arranged to maximize the accuracy of recall within each first-level category 
of questions and each category was appropriately introduced as a separate set of questions by the 
interviewer. At the first level, the questions were grouped by general safety-related events, 
weather-related events, passenger-related events, airborne conflicts, ground operations, aircraft 
handling-related events, altitude deviations, and interactions with air traffic control.  
 
The full questionnaire, including questions related to section B, is in Appendix D. 
4.4.1.3 Section C: Focus Questions 
The third section of the NAOMS survey questionnaire was designed to address special focus 
topics. Whereas Section B questions were expected to persist over a period of many years to 
provide a basis for trend analyses of long-term aviation safety rate measures, Section C topics 
were expected to arise and be the subject of data collection generally for a number of months, 
after which they would be replaced with new topics. Section C was envisioned to focus a 
“spotlight” on timely concerns of the aviation community.  
 
Three Section C question sets were developed during the NAOMS tests and implementation 
periods. The first of these, used in the field trial only, dealt with minimum equipment lists 
(MELs). The second dealt with “in-close” changes to approach and landing clearances (ICACs). 
The third and final Section C question set involved the development of baseline aviation system 
performance measures requested by the CAST’s JIMDAT.  
 
The full questionnaire, including questions developed for the Section C implementations of the 
ICAC and the JIMDAT studies, can be found in Appendix D. The results of the ICAC study and 
the special study for the CAST are presented in Section 8. 
4.4.1.4 Section D: Respondent Feedback Questions 
Section D of the survey obtained feedback on the interview process and the questionnaire. For 
example, respondents were asked directly about the quality of the survey process, including the 
relevance and understandability of questions, and their ability to reply meaningfully and with 
confidence to those questions. Respondent feedback was very positive and increased the 
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NAOMS team’s confidence in its methodological approach. For example, when asked if any of 
the questions were confusing, poorly worded, or ambiguous, about 92% of the respondents 
answered “no”. When asked, only a small percentage of the respondents offered comments on 
the survey and these were, in general, highly positive. In response to the question of the accuracy 
with which they counted the reported events, over 93% said they were “extremely” or “very” 
confident of their replies. 
4.4.2 Questionnaire Structure 
Issue: 
The content requirements of the four sections of the NAOMS survey instrument described in 
Section 4.4.1 drove its structural organization at the high level. The desire of the NAOMS team 
to minimize respondent burden while maximizing respondents’ abilities to recall the information 
sought by the NAOMS survey influenced other structural aspects, such as how questions in 
Sections B and C were grouped and the order of questions within each section. 
 
Resolution: 
The questions were grouped, ordered, and sequenced to take advantage of the ways people 
naturally organize memories.  
 
Research on human cognitive and memory organization (e.g., Anderson, 1976; Pryor and 
Ostrom, 1978; Srull, 1983; Barsalou, 1988; and Sedikides and Ostrom, 1988) shows that 
memories of similar events are typically stored together in clusters in a person’s memory. It is 
easiest and most efficient to recall all other memories in that cluster, rather than jumping to 
another cluster. Therefore, the NAOMS team grouped questions about a particular event (or 
closely related events) as one would expect them to be stored in memory. 
 
The a priori expectation about pilots’ memory organizational schemes was derived from the 
organizational scheme used by the ASRS, from discussions with pilots, and from reading 
aviation literature. The NAOMS team anticipated that pilots might organize safety-related events 
in terms of their causes (e.g., equipment failures, flight-crew mistakes, weather, etc.), the phase 
of flight in which they occur (e.g., takeoff, ascent to cruise altitude, etc.), or their seriousness 
(e.g., minimal, moderate, or severe). These expectations contributed to the design and analysis of 
the following experiments to explore pilots’ organization of safety-related events:  
• Autobiographies: Pilots were simply asked to recall all of the aircraft safety problems they 
had witnessed in their careers.  
• Sorting: The NAOMS team constructed a list of 96 hypothetical safety-related aviation 
events. Pilots sorted the 96 events into groups, indicating which events seemed most 
similar or related to one another. The NAOMS team used this experiment to measure 
pilots’ perceptions of linkages among the events (i.e., that events that seem similar or 
related to one another are clustered together in memory).  
• Recall: In this experiment, another group of pilots read the 96 events used in the Sorting 
experiment and later recalled as many of the events as they could. The order in which the 
events were recalled indicated how those events were stored in memory. 
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As a result of these experiments, the NAOMS project team concluded that pilots use a hybrid 
structure combining elements of the flight-phase- and cause-based- organization schemes to 
organize aviation safety measures. The results of the memory-organization experiments indicated 
that there were individual differences among pilots and that not all pilots organized memory 
according to the hybrid scheme. However, the NAOMS team concluded that the hybrid scheme 
best reflected pilot-memory structure and that using a survey question order based on that 
structure could best facilitate accurate recall. As a consequence, the safety-event categories used 
in the final design of Section B of the NAOMS pilot survey were those shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Organization of Safety Events in Pilot Memory 
Category Scope 
Aircraft equipment Any aircraft equipment-related problem 
Turbulence Turbulence encounters due to wake or weather 
Weather Weather problems other than turbulence 
Passengers Any passenger-related problems 
Airborne conflicts Any conflicts with other aircraft in the air 
Ground events Runway and taxiway transgressions, ground 
conflicts, and all other ground-based events 
Aircraft handling Flight crew issues in managing the aircraft 
Altitude deviations Any deviation from assigned altitude 
ATC interactions Events rooted in pilot-ATC interaction difficulties 
 
 
Having resolved the grouping by survey topic of Section B, the NAOMS team then addressed the 
issue of how to sequence subtopics/questions within each topic area. Research in cognitive 
psychology has demonstrated that the recollection of strong memories (i.e., those that are vivid 
and easy to recall) makes it more difficult afterwards to recall weaker related memories (i.e., 
more common, everyday occurrences). (See for example McGeoch, 1942; Slamecka, 1968; and 
Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988). The NAOMS team followed this guidance in the final version of 
Section B of the survey instrument and, as much as possible, ordered the questions within each 
topic group from the least severe event type to the most severe event type.  
4.4.3 Recall Period 
Issue: 
The NAOMS survey needed to have respondents accurately recall not only safety events, but 
also the time frames in which they occurred. This requirement had implications for Sections A, 
B, and C of the questionnaire because the questions in all of these sections ask respondents to 
report on some aspect of experiences that occurred within a specified recall period. The NAOMS 
team did not know how far back in time pilots could reliably recall the timing of safety events. 
Asking pilots to reflect over a longer period of time is desirable from the standpoint of survey 
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efficiency because more safety events would be “captured” per interview thereby enabling higher 
levels of statistical accuracy to be attained for the chosen sample size. However, the accuracy of 
memories—including memories of when events occurred—fades with time. Hence, the quality of 
the data declines as the recall period increases. Data quality had to be weighed against cost in 
choosing a recall period. The goal of the NAOMS team was to find the longest recall period that 
could be used without unacceptably compromising data quality. 
 
Resolution: 
The NAOMS team recognized that accuracy of recall was an important issue to be resolved to 
meet the objectives so the team members attempted to address it early in the project (see 
contractor’s memorandum dated December 22, 1999, Appendix E). Appropriate recall periods 
are probably not the same for all aviation constituencies. The NAOMS team focused initially on 
air-carrier pilots and their recall ability. 
 
The literature on memory and the experience of survey researchers identify three types of 
misremembering that might impact the accuracy of survey responses. First, respondents might 
forget events that occurred. Second, they might remember real events but misremember the times 
in which they occurred. Third, respondents might imagine events that never occurred (perhaps 
derived from a general sense that certain kinds of events typically happen “roughly once every 
‘X’ weeks”). The NAOMS survey instrument needed to employ a recall period that kept the level 
of these potential errors acceptably low. 
 
A small experiment was conducted to help identify the most appropriate recall period for air-
carrier pilots. Pilots were asked to recall the number of landings they had performed recently. 
Comparisons of these data with each pilot’s flight log showed that pilots could recall these 
routine events very accurately for one week after their occurrence; thereafter accuracy declined. 
Therefore, the 7-day recall period was used as the baseline measure of extremely high reliability 
for evaluating longer recall periods. Longer recall periods were evaluated during the field trial 
and during the first nine months demonstration test of the survey as discussed below. 
 
During the field trial, the NAOMS team randomly assigned respondents to one of six recall 
periods: 7 days, 14 days, 30 days, 60 days, 120 days, and 180 days. Comparisons of the number 
of safety events remembered for each of these recall periods showed that the absolute number of 
events remembered increased as the recall period increased. However, the reported number of 
events per flight hour (i.e., the event rate) declined and also the variance of the event rate 
decreased as the recall period increased. The NAOMS team had hypothesized that more severe 
events might be “brought forward,” i.e. remembered as occurring within the recall period when 
they had actually occurred earlier. However, it appeared that based on the results of the short 
field trial, if this occurred at all it was more than offset by the number of events respondents had 
collectively forgotten. Also, during the field trial the respondents were asked how confident they 
were in their answers and the results showed that confidence levels dropped as recall periods 
grew longer. 
 
Based on evidence from experiments on memory recall and the field trial, the NAOMS team 
concluded that a recall period in excess of 90 days was unlikely to produce an acceptable level 
of data quality, while a recall period of less than 30 days would require an unacceptably large 
number of interviews. However, the quantity of data collected during the field trial was not 
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sufficient to settle the issue of what recall period should be used for the full survey. A final 
decision on this question was deferred to the first 9 months if the full survey. The first 9 
months of the full survey (from April 2001 through January 2002) were viewed as a trial 
period, essentially a second field trial using the final version of the questionnaire. The data 
from this period were not used in the primary data analysis (Section 7). During this period, half 
of the respondents used a 90-day recall period and the other half used a 30-day recall period. 
During the last 2 months a second test was conducted that entailed a three-way split: 30, 60, 
and 90-day recall periods. 
 
The first 9 months of the survey revealed that the total number of all events recalled per flight leg 
declined for each month added to the recall period as had been observed in the field test. 
Respondents using a 60-day recall period remembered on average 27% fewer events per flight 
leg than those using a 30-day recall period; those using a 90-day recall period remembered about 
41% fewer events per flight leg than those using a 30-day recall period. On the basis of all the 
data collected, the NAOMS team decided to use a 60-day recall period for all interviews 
conducted over the following 3 years of the full survey. This decision was a compromise 
between the practical requirement to maximize the number of safety events recalled per 
interview and the desire to reduce memory-related errors.  
 
This study of the effects of the recall period showed an important feature of the NAOMS survey. 
Regardless of whether a 30-, 60-, or 90-day recall period is used, the resultant event-rate 
estimates are biased downward compared to a more “instantaneous” recall period such as 7 days. 
This downward bias results in approximately 63% of events being reported for a 60-day recall 
period when compared with a 7-day recall period. 
4.4.4 Survey Mode 
Issue: 
Questionnaires can be applied using various techniques or “modes.” For example, mailed or 
computer-based questionnaires are used to obtain self-administered survey responses. Other 
survey methods rely on the assistance of trained interviewers. Whether self-administered or 
assisted, each survey mode has advantages and disadvantages and the selection of a survey-
administration mode is a compromise among collection cost, respondent satisfaction, response 
rate, and data quality. The NAOMS team needed to determine the best survey mode for its data-
collection system.  
 
Resolution: 
The NAOMS team evaluated the three most common survey data-collection modes in use at the 
time:  
1. Self-administered questionnaires (SAQ) 
2. Computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) 
3. In-person interviews 
 
The NAOMS team reviewed the general literature on the relative strengths and weaknesses 
relative to cost, respondent satisfaction, and response rate of each of these survey modes. (For 
examples, see Bishop, et al, 1988; DeLeeuw and van der Zouwen, 1988; Dillman, 1978; Groves, 
197; Hall, 1995; Jobe, et al, 1997; Jordan, et al, 1980; Krosnick and Green, 1998; Krywan, et al, 
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1994; Siemiatycki, 1979; Walker and Restuccia, 1984; Weisberg, et al, 1996.) Following are 
summaries of the literature on the relationship of each of the survey modes to the factors to be 
considered in selecting the mode: 
• Survey Mode and Cost. The literature indicates that, on a per-interview basis, in-person 
interviews typically are the most expensive; telephone interviews often are significantly 
less expensive; and SAQs generally are the least expensive. However, if efforts are made to 
achieve the highest response rates possible with SAQs, then the cost of that mode is close 
to the cost of applying the same questionnaire via the telephone. 
• Survey Mode and Respondent Satisfaction. In general, respondents tend to favor face-to-
face over telephone interviews since the former provide greater opportunity to develop 
rapport with the interviewer. However, the difference between the modes is not great. 
Although not necessarily favored, self-administered questionnaires when compared with 
interviews have the advantage of allowing the respondent more time to think but also are 
seen as impersonal (Weisberg, et al, 1996). 
• Survey Mode and Response Rate. In-person interviews were also found superior for 
response rates. It is widely recognized that in-person surveys can achieve response rates of 
70% or greater; telephone surveys can achieve a response rate of 60%; and mail surveys 
generally achieve response rates of only 10 to 20% unless exceptional efforts are taken 
(Dillman, 1978). 
• Survey Mode and Data Quality. Response rate and respondent satisfaction influence data 
quality. The literature also addresses, although not extensively, two other survey 
considerations that could negatively impact data quality. These factors are known as 
satisficing and social desirability bias. Generally, modes that encourage these phenomena 
also compromise data quality. 
– Satisficing. When satisficing behavior happens, respondents exert the minimal effort 
needed to satisfy survey requirements. Responses are not always well thought through 
and are more likely to contain bad data. Satisficing behavior can be encountered when 
surveys require respondents to do a great deal of cognitive work for little or no real 
reward (Krosnick, 1991). The literature, while not entirely consistent or conclusive, 
indicates that from the satisficing perspective telephone interviews are least desirable 
and self-administered questionnaires work as well or better than in-person 
interviewing. 
– Social Desirability Bias. Social desirability bias describes the tendency of 
respondents to answer questions in a way that present them to interviewers in a 
respectable light—even if it requires the truth to be “bent” or ignored. The literature 
suggests that SAQs appear to minimize social desirability bias while telephone 
interviews maximized this bias.  
 
In summary, the literature shows that SAQs are often the least expensive to run and can provide 
quality data. However, SAQs also have significant disadvantages. They usually have 
significantly lower response rates than other survey modes and it is difficult to implement 
complex skip patterns in the questions in paper-based SAQs. In-person interviews are superior 
with respect to respondent satisfaction and response rate but they are very expensive to operate. 
Telephone interviews can achieve a reasonably good response rate at a moderate cost but 
possibly at the expense of user satisfaction.  
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The literature review did not provide a clear choice of survey mode to use for NAOMS survey of 
air-carrier pilots. The NAOMS team decided to use the field trial to conduct additional 
evaluation of different survey application methods with measures of response rate, data quality, 
cost, and other key indicators for comparison.  
 
The field trial was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of three different data-collection 
modes; (1) SAQ; (2) CATI; and (3) in-person interviews. Multiple versions of the questionnaire 
were developed to test different hypotheses in the field trial. All three of these trials were 
administered by the Centers for Public Health Research and Evaluation (CPHRE), a division of 
Battelle that is highly experienced in performing surveys involving sensitive information. For the 
field trial of each of the three collection modes, letters were mailed in advance to all selected 
pilots on NASA letterhead and signed by the NASA NAOMS project managers. The letter 
informed pilots of the study’s purpose and the selection process. It committed NASA to 
maintaining the anonymity of the interviewees and the confidentiality of their survey responses. 
Respondents were asked to affirm their eligibility and intention to participate on the pre-
addressed, postage-paid return postcard. Each postcard contained an indentification number that 
allowed Battelle’s CPHRE staffers to eliminate pilots from the sample pool who were ineligible 
or who indicated they did not wish to participate in the survey. 
 
Self-Administered Questionnaires. Dillman’s principles of design were implemented in several 
stages during the field trial to maximize response rate and data quality of the SAQ survey mode 
(Dillman, 1978). 
 
At the outset of the field trial of the mailed SAQ, the NAOMS team conducted a small 
experiment to determine if the mailing method would influence response rate. Other survey 
results have indicated that the use of Priority Mail for sending the survey packets increased 
response rates. Half of the first-mailed self-administered survey packets were sent using U.S. 
Postal Service (USPS) Priority Mail while the other half was sent by regular USPS First-Class 
Mail. The response rate was essentially the same for both groups. 
 
The letter sent in advance to pilots selected to be SAQ respondents in the field trial told them to 
expect a follow-up mailing that would include the questionnaire. A week later each pilot 
received a packet that included a cover letter, the questionnaire, a pre-addressed postage-paid 
return postcard to confirm eligibility and to let the NAOMS team know whether or not the 
addressee agreed to participate, and a pre-addressed postage-paid return envelope for the 
completed questionnaire. A week after sending the first packet Battelle’s CPHRE staffers sent a 
postcard to participating pilots to remind them to return the questionnaire if they had not done so 
but to ignore the postcard if they had. One week later a second packet was mailed if the pilot had 
agreed to participate but the questionnaire had not been returned. Except for a slightly revised 
cover letter, this packet was the same as the first packet. 
 
Similar correspondence was sent to potential interviewees for the CATI and in-person interviews 
requesting their participation. Upon receiving confirmation of their willingness to be 
interviewed, appointments were arranged.  
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Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). Both the CATI and in-person data-
collection modes used trained interviewers. Interviewers serve as the interface between survey 
operators and respondents. Well-trained, poised interviewers are essential to the success of a 
professional interviewer-based survey effort. The rapport developed between interviewers and 
interviewees during the NAOMS survey—enhanced by the promise of anonymity—encouraged 
candor. The NAOMS project team employed CPHRE to conduct its surveys because of 
CPHRE’s experience in performing surveys involving sensitive information.  
 
It might be thought that it would be important to have knowledgeable aviation personnel asking 
the survey questions. However, the use of professional and highly trained interviewers supported 
the desire of the NAOMS project team to use the standard survey methodological approach in 
which each interview is conducted in exactly the same manner. This approach has been verified 
as the best way to minimize the interviewer’s influence on participant responses and to maximize 
data quality (Fowler and Mangione, 1990). 
 
CPHRE trained nine interviewers for the field trial of the NAOMS survey of air-carrier pilots. 
They trained as a group for a total of 12 hours. This was followed with supplemental personal 
training. Interviewers were introduced to the study, its background, and purpose and they were 
given an overview of aviation and aircraft terminology. The interviewers were briefed on the 
issues pertaining to different recall periods and to panel or cross-sectional selection; on the letters 
that had been sent to the respondents; on the need for confidentiality; and on various 
administrative forms and procedures. Group role-playing helped interviewers to practice 
administering the questionnaire and to anticipate responses to questions pilots might ask.  
 
Each interviewer was tested by conducting actual interviews with NAOMS team members 
during which they were challenged with errors, balking, and other faults. Finally, the interview 
process itself was carefully scripted. Interviewers were very disciplined and did not depart from 
the script. The NAOMS team developed standard responses for the interviewers for those few 
questions where pilots might ask for additional clarification.  
 
After being certified, CATI interviewers began making calls from the telephone center at 
CPHRE using CATI versions of the questionnaire. Battelle’s CPHRE validation staff silently 
monitored the interviewers. The introductory telephone script notified pilots that supervisors 
could monitor calls for quality assurance purposes. 
 
In-Person Interviews. Certified CPHRE field interviewers called pilots and scheduled 
appointments for in-person interviews. Pilots were allowed to choose an interview location, 
including a home or domicile airport. Interviewers conducting in-person interviews were 
required to wear photo-ID badges identifying them as members of the study workforce. 
Interviewers also carried a letter signed by the NASA project managers identifying them as 
legitimate interviewers for the study. 
 
Interviewees were asked to provide mailed feedback on the quality of the interview experience 
using a form supplied by Battelle CPHRE. 
 
Field Trial Findings. The NAOMS team expected to find positive and negative aspects for each 
of the collection modes (SAQ, CATI, and in-person interviewing) with respect to the cost, data 
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quality, and response rate. Although in-person interviewing proved effective, this mode was 
terminated early in the field trial due to the excessive time and cost of implementation. 
Consequently, findings of the field trials are presented for only CATI and SAQ methods. 
 
Collection Mode Effect on Cost. The field trial of the NAOMS survey provided validation of 
earlier estimates of the cost of conducting the survey. As expected, the least expensive data 
collection method proved to be the self-administered questionnaire. Based on field trial 
numbers, the NAOMS project team estimated that data collection costs for a fully operational 
program would run $85 per CATI interview and $67 per SAQ. This estimate is in 1999 
dollars and is for a survey questionnaire of moderate length. 
 
Collection Mode Effect on Data Quality. A relative measure of data quality is the time spent 
to complete the questionnaire, the assumption being that the more time a respondent takes to 
complete a questionnaire the better the quality of the resulting data. During the field trial, 
respondents who completed a SAQ spent on average about 40% less time on the survey than 
those interviewed by CATI (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Indirect Measures of Data Quality 
 
Mode 
Mean Completion 
Time 
(Minutes) 
Respondents Failing to 
Complete All Questions 
(Percent) 
Self-administered 
(SAQ) 
17 4.8% 
Telephone 
(CATI) 
29 0.0% 
 
 
It takes less time to read, understand, and, possibly, skip a question (especially when it is one 
of many to which the response is “none” or “never”) than it does to listen to each one being 
read over the telephone and responding. Nevertheless, the presumption is that the 
significantly shorter amount of time spent in completing the SAQ is indicative of pilots 
working through the questionnaire quickly, paying less attention to questions, and spending 
less time trying to accurately recall events. The appropriate response to most of the questions 
in the NAOMS survey was “0” (i.e., the respondent experienced no occurrence of that safety 
event during the reference period). This characteristic of the questions in Part B is likely to 
tempt respondents to skip quickly across questions in the SAQ mode and therefore take much 
less time to complete than the telephone-interview mode. 
 
Another indirect measure of data quality is the number of missing responses for the 
questionnaire, i.e., unanswered questions. As shown in Table 3, there were no missing 
responses for the telephone mode of interview during the field trial. When an interviewer 
reads a question during CATI, a response is required (including that the pilot chooses not to 
respond) which explains the fact that all questions were completed, at least during the 
telephone interviews of the field trial.  
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Another indicator of the quality of a respondent’s data is the relationship between the 
reported number of events and the total hours (or legs) flown in the recall period. If the 
questionnaire is capturing accurate responses from pilots about the frequency of events they 
experience, then pilots with more flight time should experience and report a proportionately 
greater number of events than those pilots who flew fewer hours.  
 
Statistical analyses of the number of events reported and number of hours flown during the 
recall period showed positive associations for both CATIs and SAQs (i.e., the number of 
safety events increased in conjunction with reported flight activity during the recall period). 
However, the CATI data from the field trial showed a greater number of events being 
reported per hour flown, suggesting a more deliberate approach to completing the survey 
than in the SAQ mode. 
 
Collection Mode Effect on Response Rate. The response rates for the SAQ (70%) and the 
CATI (81%) are both excellent. However, it is important to point out that regardless of mode 
these rates were achieved as the result of multiple reminders to those pilots who had agreed 
to participate. With most respondents, more than one request was needed before a successful 
interview was accomplished. Follow-on contacts were needed because the pilots did not 
respond to earlier requests, had scheduling conflicts, lost the original mailing, etc.  
 
After due consideration of all of the factors, the NAOMS team decided that the CATI mode was 
the best compromise for conducting the NAOMS air-carrier-pilot survey  
4.4.5 Sample Source and Size 
Although it was recognized that some events are so rare that it was unlikely that reliable 
measures of changes over time could be achieved in this limited experiment, an objective was to 
attain solid, statistical estimates for many, and hopefully most, of the questions in Section B of 
the NAOMS air-carrier-pilot survey. 
4.4.5.1 Sample Source 
Issue: 
The NAOMS team had to find a practical, accessible source of information on pilots who would 
qualify as participants in the air-carrier-pilot survey.  
 
Resolution: 
The NAOMS team undertook an investigation to determine the number and distribution of 
aviation operational personnel working in commercial aviation organizations within the United 
States. The results of this study are presented in Appendix F. The data for 1998 indicated that 
there were about 127,000 pilots in the United States with air-transport-pilot (ATP) ratings at the 
time the NAOMS survey was being designed. It was estimated that there were 50,842 pilots 
employed by major carriers, 8,314 pilots employed by national (i.e. mid-size carriers), 13,323 
employed by regional carriers, 10,468 employed by cargo-only carriers, and 3,713 employed by 
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non-scheduled carriers for a total of 86,660 employed commercial pilots5. This was used as the 
estimate of the full population of active air-carrier pilots at the time of the field trial.  
 
In the process of selecting pilots for the survey, NASA wanted to: (1) maintain the independence 
of the NAOMS-survey data-collection effort; (2) have a logistically simple process of selecting 
potential respondents; and (3) avoid any appearance of intruding on the privacy rights of 
respondents. After careful consideration and investigation of possible sources, the NAOMS team 
chose to use the publicly available FAA-maintained Airmen Certification Database. This registry 
identified potential participants who were current in their certification. The Airmen Certification 
Database, in part because it was publicly releasable, was deemed to be the most practical source 
of interviewees and would suit the objectives of the experimental demonstration of NAOMS 
survey. 
 
However, there was no way to be certain that a pilot in the Airmen Certification Database was an 
air-carrier pilot or was active at the time. Therefore, the NAOMS team introduced criteria to 
maximize the likelihood that the pool from which the interviewees were selected was composed 
of pilots who very likely had been actively flying as air-transport pilots during the recall period. 
The following criteria were established for a pilot to qualify for the sample pool used in the 
NAOMS survey: 
• have an Air Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate 
• be U.S. based 
• have a current six-month first class medical certificate 
• have a multi-engine rating 
• have a Flight Engineer certificate 
 
It was recognized that these five criteria (especially the requirement for a Flight Engineer 
certificate) would eliminate people from the sample pool of the NAOMS survey who in fact flew 
in the cockpits of air-carrier aircraft. However, they also markedly reduced the number of pilots 
who otherwise would have been contacted but who were not active air-carrier pilots. These 
criteria helped minimize the effort to find air-carrier pilots eligible for the NAOMS-survey 
sample pool. 
 
Another event occurred that might have affected the NAOMS-survey sample pool. A factor that 
has implications with respect to both response rate and data quality of a survey is self-selection 
bias which results when prospective respondents decide to “opt out” of participating in the 
survey. Opting out is generally a reflection of a refusal rate, or unwillingness, to do the survey.  
In the course of the development of the NAOMS survey experiment, a different kind of opt out 
occurred—one that was unrelated to the NAOMS survey. Between the time of the field trial and 
the initiation of the full survey, pilots were granted the option to opt out of the publicly 
releasable Airmen Certification registry thereby avoiding commercial solicitors and protecting 
personal privacy. The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and the Allied Pilots Association 
(APA) provided their members with a convenient way to opt out of being included in this 
                                                
5 At this time, there were also 1,772 helicopter pilots. However, these were not included in the pool of air-
carrier pilots from which the sample for the NAOMS survey was taken and to which the results of this 
study would apply. 
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database. However, members of both the ALPA and the APA did remain in the registry and did 
participate in the NAOMS survey. Although it is possible that the “opt outs” introduced a bias in 
the pilot distribution remaining in the registry, it seems unlikely that the desire for privacy would 
be other than random with reference to safety-related events. 
 
Within a few months of the onset of routine NAOMS-survey data collection, an initial 
comparison of NAOMS-survey and Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) data showed that 
the NAOMS-survey data samples were biased towards wide-body flight operations and away 
from small transport operations. While the BTS data indicate that 35% to 45% of the legs flown 
by air-carriers in the years 2002 to 2004 were by aircraft in the Small Transport category, only 
about 10% of the legs reported to the NAOMS survey were flown by Small Transport pilots. 
Also, about 55% of NAOMS-survey respondents indicated that they flew mainly as air-carrier 
Captains, whereas a roughly 50/50 split between Captains and First Officers would have been 
expected. Both of these effects are likely due to the limitation to pilots with both ATP and Flight 
Engineer certificates as these are probably the older pilots who become Captains and fly wide-
body aircraft.  
 
Implications of both the selection criteria used and the opt-out option will be discussed in 
Section 7.  
4.4.5.2 Sample Size 
Issue: 
The critical factor in selecting the sample size is the number of respondents needed to attain 
reliable estimates for questions in Section B of the NAOMS air-carrier-pilot survey.  
 
Resolution: 
The results of the field trial of the NAOMS air-carrier-pilot survey, coupled with some relatively 
simple statistical calculations and simulations, provided the basis for selecting the air-carrier-
pilot sample size for the NAOMS survey. NASA’s principal concern was that the NAOMS 
survey be able to detect operationally meaningful changes over time in Section B rate data. As 
will become clear in succeeding paragraphs, the available budget became the constraining factor 
for the sample size selected. 
 
The field trial demonstrated that the incident types being tracked by the NAOMS survey with the 
questions of Section B covered a very wide range of event frequencies as shown in Figure 4. 
Pilots might experience some classes of events frequently (e.g., encountering wind shear), 
whereas other types of events might never be experienced in an air-carrier-pilot’s entire career 
(e.g., going off the edge of a runway or taxiway while taxiing). Detecting trends or other changes 
with time, pertaining to relatively high-frequency events, requires a small sample size; whereas 
detecting rate changes for relatively rare events potentially requires a much larger sample size. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of the periodicities of NAOMS events. 
 
 
For an adequate demonstration of the concept, the team determined it needed a sufficient number 
of events reported in the limited duration of the NAOMS survey to be able identify a 20% 
change in an event rate with 95% confidence. A 20% change in a safety event rate would be a 
large change given the maturity of the U.S. aviation system and would generally occur only as a 
consequence of a safety intervention or a serious system perturbation. If the survey could be 
continued over a long period of time, trends could be observed with diminishing year-to-year 
differences.  
 
Simulation studies based on field trial data suggested that as many as 65,000 interviews would 
need to be conducted each year to achieve rate estimates with tight confidence intervals for every 
question in Section B of the air-carrier-pilot survey. This number of interviews per year was far 
in excess of NAOMS’s project budget and might have imposed burdens on the respondent 
community. It was clear that some compromises would need to be made because the NAOMS 
project had neither the mandate nor the budget for a survey effort of that magnitude.  
 
The dilemma that the NAOMS team faced was that the less-frequently-occurring event types are 
often those with the greatest safety significance whereas many more-frequently-occurring events 
could be dismissed as having minimal safety meaning.  
 
The NAOMS team concluded that it was necessary only to show changes in less rare events to 
demonstrate the capability of the methodology to identify relative changes. Given enough time 
(were the industry to adopt NAOMS as a permanent measure of system safety) relative changes 
in more rare events, where they occurred, also would be demonstrated. As a result, the NAOMS 
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project team arrived at a compromise between considerations of the available time and funds and 
the desired statistical accuracy for the largest number of questions. They established a goal of 
8,000 completed air-carrier surveys each year. This was done with the understanding that this 
sample size would permit the NAOMS survey of air-carrier pilots to achieve event rate estimates 
with satisfactorily tight confidence intervals for a significant portion of the questions of Section 
B and rate estimates with broader confidence intervals for most of the rest of the questions. In 
fact, a simulation study using data on event frequency collected using the records of the first 
8,000 interviews of the air-carrier-pilot survey indicated that the NAOMS survey would be able 
to detect 20% rate shifts for about half of Section B questions with 95% confidence should such 
changes occur (see Appendix G). Although 8,000 interviews per year was the target of the 
operational survey of air-carrier pilots, the actual sample attained was about 7,000 interviews 
annually for each of the 3¾ years of the experiment, bringing the total sample for the April 2001 
to December 2004 time period to 26,170 interviews completed. Moreover, as discussed in 
Section 5, the discovery of the need to consider data by aircraft-size categories further reduced 
the number of events for which the desired reliability could be expected in this demonstration. 
 
In summary, the NAOMS team determined that the full population of current air-carrier pilots to 
be addressed by the survey was about 87,000; that although it was not perfect, the most practical 
source of information on this group was the publicly available FAA-maintained Airmen 
Certification Database and that 7,000 to 8,000 interviews per year was the best compromise 
between cost and statistical accuracy. 
4.4.6 Selecting Respondents 
Issue: 
Having determined the approximate size of the full population of active air-carrier pilots and the 
sample size for acceptable statistical accuracy, the NAOMS team needed to find a way to obtain 
the names and addresses of the potential survey respondents to construct a “sample pool” from 
this group. The next challenge was to engage the respondents to achieve an adequate response 
rate and quality.  
 
Resolution: 
As noted above, the NAOMS team chose to use the publicly available FAA-maintained Airmen 
Certification Database to obtain the names of potential respondents who designated themselves 
as U.S.-based commercial aviation pilots flying multi-engine aircraft. However, the NAOMS 
team knew that a portion of these potential respondents might be ineligible because the 
information in the Airmen database is not always current. Most of the Airmen database records 
were about two years old even though pilots can update their information online. 
 
For all three interviewing modes used in the field trial, only those pilots were selected for whom 
telephone numbers could be obtained and for whom the addresses provided in the Airmen 
database were currently correct. As telephone numbers are not listed in the Airmen database, the 
NAOMS team used Telematch©, a service that matches names and addresses with telephone 
numbers in order to identify pilots that could be in the sample pool of potential respondents. 
Missing addresses and/or the inability to locate telephone numbers reduced the sample pool by 
about 25%. 
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The workshops, briefings, presentations, and focus groups during the formative years of the 
NAOMS project that are discussed elsewhere in this report not only engaged the aviation 
community in the development and design of the survey of air-carrier pilots but they also served 
to advertise and encourage participation from the community when they were asked. By the time 
the field trial and the full survey were initiated, the NAOMS team found a receptive pool of air-
carrier pilots. The NAOMS team developed a very successful routine of systematic mailings 
followed up with multiple reminders that explained the objectives, requested their participation, 
enabled them to choose whether to participate or not, and assured anonymity. The response rate 
during the 3¾ years of the air-carrier pilot survey was consistently well above the “gold 
standard” for surveys. 
4.4.7 Random versus Panel Sampling Approaches 
Issue: 
Surveys are often conducted by randomly selecting a participant for interview from the sample 
pool. This is a “random” design. Another approach is to select a participant from the sample pool 
and ask him or her to periodically complete the survey over an extended time period. This is 
called a “panel” design. Panel design can allow researchers to measure the experiences of that 
individual over time. The “Nielsen” survey used to monitor television-viewing habits is a panel 
survey design with which most people are familiar. 
 
The NAOMS team needed to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the random and the 
panel designs to decide which was most suitable for the objectives of the NAOMS survey. 
 
Resolution: 
It was not possible to fully explore the issue of random versus panel designs during the brief 
duration of the field trial because the panel approach would have required repeated interviews 
with the same pilot over the course of a year. Therefore, as in the resolution of the recall period 
discussed above, a decision on the use of random or panel sampling was postponed until the 
initial operational phase of the program.  
 
The panel design introduced a number of logistical challenges that were not present in the 
random design. However, the panel design also was thought to lead to a high response rate, while 
the response rate from the random sample was yet to be determined. The goal was to evaluate 
random and panel designs to determine which gave better insight into the safety issues 
confronting air-carrier pilots. 
 
During the first 9 months of implementation, the NAOMS survey of air-carrier pilots used a 
split-design whereby approximately half of the interviews were conducted with respondents 
chosen at random from the sample pool and the other half with respondents who agreed to join a 
NAOMS-survey panel. A comparison of the results showed that the demographics of the two 
groups (as reflected by responses to questions in Section A) were similar. Furthermore, the 
random design resulted in a high response rate comparable to that of the panel design.  
 
Several factors led the NAOMS team to its decision to use the random design. First, the panel 
approach for the NAOMS survey had been suggested because enlisting respondent cooperation 
in this manner could produce higher response rate and better response quality. However, during 
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the field trials and the first 9 months of implementation, it became clear that the NAOMS survey 
of air-carrier pilots would achieve a very high response rate and quality from randomly selected 
respondents and that virtually all of the randomly selected persons who agreed to participate 
would complete the survey. Consequently, this presumed benefit of the panel design did not 
exist.  
 
Second, the repeated observations produced by the panel design can be statistically useful if 
these repeated measurements could be analyzed within participant across time. However, the de-
identification policies favored for the NAOMS survey respondents made this very difficult to 
implement. 
 
Finally, panel designs are logistically more complex to administer.  
 
With no compelling advantage attributable to the panel approach, there was no reason to incur 
this added burden. Consequently, after the first 9 months of data collection, the decision was 
made to use the random (cross-sectional) design for all subsequent data collection efforts. 
4.5 NAOMS Development Roadmap 
Figure 5 shows the sequence of project development steps from project commencement in 1998 
through December 2004 when NAOMS-survey data collection ended. During the two subsequent 
years (2005–2006) the NAOMS team developed a streamlined version of its data-collection 
system, adapted it to a Web-based survey, and transferred the capability to the ALPA for 
continued surveys of the Part 121 pilots on behalf of the CAST. 
 
NAOMS Development Timeline 
FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 
 
   Briefings to Aviation Safety Decision Makers 
   NAOMS Concept Presented at NASA  
    Data Analysis & Monitoring Workshop 
 
       Methodological & Field Research 
 
            Pre-Field-Trial Workshop 
             Field-Trial Data Collection 
 
               Post-Field-Trial Workshop 
 
                       Air-Carrier-Pilot Survey 
                        GA-Pilot Survey 
 
                         GA-Pilot Survey  
                         Suspended 
 
                       National Data Collection  
                       Concludes 
      Phase 1       Phase 2   Phase 3  Phase 4   Phase 5 
       Developmental Phases   Implementation Phase  Hand Off Phase 
 
Figure 5. NAOMS development timeline. 
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The following paragraphs briefly describe the key steps shown in Figure 5. Other sections of this 
report address these topics in greater detail. Phases 1, 2, and 3 were considered the Development 
Phases. 
 
Phase 1: 
Literature Review: The team examined published studies in order to learn about what worked 
with previous survey research efforts involving aviation personnel, including pilots. It was 
determined that little had been published that was specific to aviation. Some information was 
gleaned from analogous work done in other professional operating domains. 
Questionnaire Development: With the help of focus groups, the team developed a first draft 
survey instrument; a “straw man” for what eventually became the NAOMS air-carrier pilot 
survey. 
Methodological Research: The NAOMS team conducted research focused on topics such as 
the demographics of pilots and other aviation operating personnel; pilot event recall and 
memory organization; the identification of high priority aviation safety topics; and related 
matters. 
Pre-Field-Trial Workshop: An industry workshop was held in May 1999, in part to provide 
an opportunity for industry participants to review and critique the draft questionnaire. That 
draft was revised in response to input from workshop participants. 
Field Trial: Once the research and methodological experiments had been conducted, the 
team developed a sampling plan. The team then ran a small-scale field trial from November 
1999 to February 2000 with several purposes. The NAOMS team was seeking additional 
feedback on the survey instrument, obtaining its first measure of probable response rates, 
further exploring pilot-recall capabilities, and—importantly—obtaining first approximations 
of the likely safety event frequencies that respondents would be reporting once NAOMS 
survey of air-carrier pilots began. 
 
Phase 2: 
Post-Field-Trial Workshop: A second workshop was held in March 2000. Attendees were 
briefed on field trial tests of the NAOMS-survey questionnaire and interview process. 
Additional revisions were made to the questionnaire in response to input offered at the 
workshop. 
 
Phase 3: 
First Nine Months of Air-Carrier-Pilot Survey: The NAOMS survey of air-carrier pilots 
using the final survey questionnaire started in April 2001. However, the first 9 months were 
used to investigate issues such as recall period and panel vs. random sample that had not 
been fully resolved by the field trial. 
 
Phase 4: 
Air-Carrier-Pilot Survey Implementation: The NAOMS full survey of air-carrier pilots using 
the final survey questionnaire and final protocols started in February 2002 and continued 
until December 2004. 
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GA-Pilot Survey Implementation: The concept of NAOMS was to adapt and implement the 
survey process to collect data on aviation safety from a variety of aviation operations 
groups, including pilots, flight attendants, maintenance technicians, air traffic controllers, 
and others. Unfortunately, time and funding were insufficient to survey every operational 
group. However, a survey of GA pilots was developed and interviews were conducted from 
August 2002 until May 2003 when funding for this activity was cut. The present report 
addresses results only of the survey of air-carrier pilots. 
 
Phase 5: 
Hand Off: The NAOMS team developed a streamlined, Web-based version of its air-carrier-
pilot survey questionnaire and transferred the operation to ALPA. 
4.6 Reviews and Approval Process 
4.6.1 Aviation Industry 
The adaptation of the classical survey methodologies to each domain of aviation operations and 
to the specific objectives of the survey of that domain required special considerations and 
decisions in the design of each survey instrument. The NAOMS team made an extraordinary 
effort to engage the aviation industry and academia in the development of the survey concept. 
Validation of these decisions entailed presentations in a variety of venues to representatives of 
the aviation operations industry, the unions, the FAA, and academia who provided peer reviews 
of not only the fundamental methodology but also the decisions regarding objectives, content, 
instrument design, and the specific questions. Content for the survey was developed through a 
series of focus groups, personal interviews with active commercial pilots, discussions with 
various professional aviation organizations, and also through workshops and briefings to the 
FAA, industry, pilots’ union, and academia that were conducted during 1998 through 2000. 
These workshops and briefings served the dual purpose of providing information to the 
community and gathering the input from the community. 
4.6.1.1 Focus Groups and Personal Interviews 
Focus groups and personal interviews were used to identify the safety issues of greatest interest 
to line pilots and to provide feedback on the proposed structure of the questionnaire. A total of 
37 active air-carrier pilots (flying both international and domestic) were interviewed during three 
focus groups convened in the Washington, D.C., area during August and September 1998. 
During each focus-group session, the pilots were asked to list all of the safety-related events that 
pilot experienced. During nine one-on-one interviews, pilots were asked to describe all the 
safety-related events they themselves had witnessed during their careers. The NAOMS team 
developed a first-draft survey instrument (a “straw man”) for what eventually became the air-
carrier-pilot survey based on the inputs from these focus groups and interviews. 
4.6.1.2 Workshops 
The NAOMS project team sponsored two workshops during the development phase. The first of 
these preceded the field trial; the second followed it.  
 
The first workshop was convened in Alexandria, Virginia, on May 11, 1999, when the concept of 
NAOMS was still in its early development. This first workshop was to acquaint stakeholders 
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with the objectives and methods of NAOMS and for participants to review and critique the 
NAOMS concept, the survey methodology, and the draft of the questionnaire for the field trial. 
There were 76 participants representing the FAA, Department of Transportation, Department of 
Defense, air-carrier operators, manufacturers, software vendors, unions, and academia in this 
first workshop. Although the meeting was open, the attendees were largely respondents to 
invitations that sought participants who were experienced in survey methodologies, air 
transportation operations, and/or aviation safety to serve as peer reviewers of the NAOMS 
concept and the adaptation of survey methods to aviation. The NAOMS team also used this 
forum to enlist the support of this community in implementing the program and especially to 
elicit their participation in the field trial. Appendix H provides the workshop agenda, the list of 
attendees, the questions addressed during the sessions, and a summary of the feedback from 
workshop participants on each of the questions. The draft questionnaire for the field trial was 
revised in response to these comments and recommendations.  
 
The FAA Office of System Safety conducted a survey of FAA staff members who attended this 
first NAOMS Workshop. In general, the comments were supportive of the concept, but there 
were questions about its implementation and the design of the questionnaire, many stemming 
from the incorrect expectation that a NAOMS survey by itself would provide sufficient 
information to identify causal factors and appropriate intervention strategies and, thereby, affect 
accident rates. In response, it was explained that NAOMS was designed to be primarily a pointer 
to events with a trend towards decreased system safety; other sources of data would be required 
to identify the causal factors of that trend. The FAA inputs and NASA responses to those inputs 
are summarized in Appendix I. 
 
The second workshop was held in Washington, D.C., on March 1, 2000. Its purpose was to 
update stakeholders on progress being made toward NAOMS implementation and, in particular, 
to report on the findings of the field trial. There were 37 invited participants in this second 
workshop with representations similar to that of the first. Appendix J presents the workshop 
agenda, the attendance list, the issues posed by the NAOMS team and addressed during the 
sessions, and a summary of the feedback from the workshop participants on those issues. 
 
The NAOMS team considered all of the feedback from both workshops in the final design of the 
survey instrument for air-carrier pilots. 
4.6.1.3 Field Trial 
After the research and methodological experiments had been completed, the focus groups and the 
first workshop had met, and all the inputs consolidated, the NAOMS team developed a sampling 
plan using a random approach and conducted small-scale field trial data collection from 
November 1999 to February 2000. The field trial had several objectives. The NAOMS team 
sought additional feedback on the survey instrument, obtained its first measure of probable 
response rates, further explored pilot-recall capabilities, and most importantly obtained coarse 
preliminary approximations of the safety event frequencies that respondents would be reporting 
once NAOMS became fully implemented. In April 2000, after all field trial data had been 
collected, the NAOMS team produced the report on field-trial results that is provided in 
Appendix K. The results, most of which were summarized in the discussions of the issues and 
resolutions in Section 4, pointed the way toward implementation of the full air-carrier-pilot 
survey. As was previously mentioned, the 3-month field trial was not able to answer all the 
 
43 
 
questions and so certain studies were continued and completed within the first nine months of the 
full survey using the final questionnaire. 
4.6.1.4 Briefings 
In addition to the two workshops, the focus groups, and the individual interviews, from 1998 
through 2005 the NAOMS team conducted 13 briefings to external stakeholder organizations 
about the program’s status and reported preliminary findings to other federal agencies. These 
briefings are listed in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Briefings of NAOMS by Project Team 
 
Date 
 
Location 
 
Audience 
 
Subject 
Preliminary 
Data 
Included? 
 
Comments 
3/5/98 Washington* Aviation Safety 
Investment 
Team (ASIST) 
NAOMS 
concept 
 No  
11/13/98 Ames* NASA ASRS 
Advisory 
Subcommittee 
Review 
development 
approach 
 No  
1/26/00 Langley* Aviation Safety 
Program 
Executive 
Committee 
(AvSPEC) 
Program 
overview; 
partial field trial 
results 
 Yes Preliminary results of 516 pilot 
interviews as of January; planned 
conclusion by February 2000. 
8/28/02 Ames Participants in 
ICAC study 
ICAC results  Yes Share information on ICAC from 
various ASMM sources. 
12/5/02 Langley AvSSP 
leadership 
Program 
overview; 
preliminary 
results 
 Yes Report on project status and 
results to date. 
4/9/03 Washington* FAA senior 
management 
Detailed 
program view; 
results to date 
 Yes Share preliminary air-carrier-pilot 
data results. 
5/7/03 Ames National 
Research 
Council (NRC) 
Review 
Committee 
NAOMS 
program review 
 Yes Describe organization, approach, 
methodology, and results to date. 
8/5/03 Newport, RI* FAA and 
CAST/JIMDAT 
NAOMS 
overview and 
status 
 Yes Present NAOMS concept; discuss 
applicability to JIMDAT needs. 
6/16/04 San 
Francisco* 
CAST/JIMDAT Construction of 
Section C for 
JIMDAT study 
 No Discuss questions on the Safety 
Enhancements selected by 
JIMDAT for demonstration study. 
9/1/04 Washington* FAA ATO Program 
overview; 
Section C ICAC 
study results 
 Yes Overview of preliminary data; 
request FAA Performance 
Analysis Office join in NAOMS. 
9/8/04 Ames* FAA Tech 
Center 
Program 
overview 
 Yes Data briefing. 
1/26/05 Washington* CAST/JIMDAT JIMDAT study 
(Section C) 
results 
 Yes Data analysis report. 
1/28/05 Washington* CAST JIMDAT study 
(Section C) 
results 
 Yes Data analysis report. 
Note: Meetings highlighted in green and noted with an asterisk (*) included participation by 
representatives of the FAA. 
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4.6.2 Government Reviews 
4.6.2.1 Programmatic Reviews 
All elements of the ASMM Project, including NAOMS, were conducted in full compliance with 
the descriptions, definitions, and requirements in the NASA Procedure Guidelines (NPG) 
7120.5a. The documentation of ASMM Project Plan and its annual revisions were written 
accordingly and reviewed and approved by the AvSSP Office. Further, the progress and plans for 
NAOMS including assessment of technical status, cost, schedule progress versus plans, and 
identification of problems, issues, concerns and any major interactions with industry were part of 
the ASMM’s Project Manager’s monthly report to the AvSSP Manager. 
 
In addition to these regularly scheduled program reviews, the NAOMS team participated in 
various other ad hoc reviews that had been established to communicate information on AvSSP to 
diverse committees and agencies. For example, the Agency sponsored Independent 
Implementation Reviews and independent AvSSP Executive Council meetings to assess project 
stability, technical progress, technology impact, and technology relevance. 
4.6.2.2 Special Required Reviews 
Certain reviews were required because the survey dealt with the public and entailed human subjects. 
 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB requires review and approval of all surveys 
of the public conducted by a Federal agency. Consequently, representatives of the OMB were 
provided with requested information in the submission for approval of the air-carrier survey and 
in the subsequent submission for approval of the GA-pilot survey in accordance with OMB 
#2700-0099 (see Appendix L). The issues addressed in OMB’s review process included 
justification, why the information was necessary and non-duplicative, to whom it would be 
useful, how the data were to be collected and processed, assurance of confidentiality of 
respondents, the time burden on respondents, the cost to government, collection procedures and 
analysis plans, methods of maximizing response rates, and identifications of the survey 
methodologists and statisticians. The NAOMS survey was announced publicly in the Agency 
Federal Register of May 23, 2000, as required by OMB.  
 
Institutional Review Board. The NAOMS concept and planned implementation were reviewed 
and approved by the NASA Ames Research Center’s Institutional Review Board (ARC IRB) 
responsible for review, approval, and monitoring of research protocols involving human subjects. 
The ARC IRB operates under the guidance of the NASA Institutional Review Board as outlined 
in Ames Procedural Requirements (APR) 7170.1. 
4.6.2.3 Other Special Reviews 
FAA Review. In 2003, subsequent to a briefing by the NAOMS team to FAA senior management, 
the FAA convened an ad hoc group from various elements within the FAA to evaluate the 
NAOMS survey concept and to make recommendations on the FAA’s role to senior 
management. This committee documented its concerns, questions, and suggested revisions in an 
internal FAA memorandum. The committee concluded that information on trends of rates of 
events, the main objective of the study, was very useful and they recommended that the FAA 
support the NAOMS survey of air-carrier pilots, at least through the processing of the existing 
data. 
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National Research Council Review. In 2003, a Panel of the National Research Council (NRC) 
conducted a review of the entire Aviation Safety and Security Program. During its review of 
the ASMM Project, the Panel reviewed the NAOMS survey methodology, the survey-
instrument design, the findings of the field trial, and a few preliminary findings from the 
survey of air-carrier pilots. The NRC Panel’s primary finding with respect to the NAOMS 
project was that NAOMS resources might be combined with those of the ASRS to enhance 
the ASRS capability. NASA’s response was to clarify the obvious misunderstanding that the 
Panel had about NAOMS and its relationship to the ASRS. The ASRS is a voluntary reporting 
system and therefore is not a sound basis for statistical evaluations of frequencies of 
occurrences or trends. NAOMS was designed to complement information gained from 
voluntary reporting systems such as the ASRS by providing statistically reliable information 
on the relative frequency of events, thereby allowing assessment of temporal changes and of 
the impact of intervention strategies. 
5. Conduct of the Air-Carrier-Pilot Survey 
The survey began in April 2001 and interviews continued until December 2004. During the 45 
months of this initial experiment, a total if 26,170 telephone interviews of air-carrier-pilots were 
completed. The interviews were conducted evenly over each 12-month period to ensure that 
seasonal impacts on some of the events (e.g., weather-related events) would be detected reliably. 
5.1 The First Nine Months 
As was discussed in Section 4, the three months of the field trial were not long enough to 
determine the optimal recall period or to determine whether to use random selection or panel 
selection of interviewees. Therefore, the first nine months of the full survey (from April 2001 
through January 2002) were used to collect data with which to resolve these questions. These 
first nine months were viewed as a trial period and were considered part of the NAOMS 
Development Phase. It was essentially a second field trial using the final version of the 
questionnaire. 
5.1.1 September 11, 2001 
Five months after the start of the full NAOMS survey in April 2001 (about mid-way through the 
nine-month Development Phase), the nation suffered the attack of September 11, 2001. The 
repercussions from this attack were felt nationwide and resulted in impacts to the national air 
transportation system, which included an immediate reduction in the number of aircraft flown, 
followed by a return to more normal operations. 
 
The NAOMS study relies on rates, i.e. the number of events experienced for a given period of 
exposure. The NAOMS team believed that, although the occurrences of a few of the events 
addressed by the questions in Section B of the survey might be affected by reduced volume of 
traffic in the national airspace, the large majority of questions would be unaffected since they 
were independent of how many aircraft were flying at a given time. The fact that when 9/11 
occurred different recall periods, as well as panel and random modes, were still being 
investigated made a formal pre- and post-9/11 analysis unfeasible. However, the team did note 
the rates reported following September 11th and informally compared them with those reported 
prior to September 11th. 
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As anticipated, for the vast majority of questions there was little evidence of rate changes 
between the two periods. There was one clear exception to this general observation. This 
exception was to Question CP3, which dealt with a pilot leaving the cockpit to attend to a 
passenger disturbance. After 9/11, the FAA issued strict instructions for structural and procedural 
changes restricting access to the flight deck and the flight crew leaving the flight deck 
throughout flight. The results of those restrictions were clearly evident in the NAOMS-survey 
data, even with the cursory analysis the team was able to conduct.  
 
Both the similarity of rate results for most questions and the clear reduction in reported rates of 
pilots leaving the cockpit provided some assurance that the NAOMS-survey approach was 
working as intended. By the end of the nine-month Development Phase, air traffic had returned 
to normal, the 60-day recall and the random selection mode decisions had been made, and the 
stage was set for the acquisition of the data that became the basis of the analyses shown in 
Section 7. The data from the first nine-month period were not used in the primary data analysis 
of this report. 
5.2 The Data 
The air-carrier-pilot response to the NAOMS survey was enthusiastic. The NAOMS survey 
achieved exceptional completion rates—81% of those contacted and found to be eligible 
completed their interviews.  
5.2.1 Questions 
In March 2003, midway through the air-carrier-pilot survey, a simulation study was conducted to 
estimate sample-size requirements for each event addressed in the questions of Section B of the 
air-carrier-pilot survey using the records of the first 8,000 interviews that included 30-, 60-, and 
90-day recall periods. Results were obtained for 88 event questions. According to the analysis of 
data run at that time, the NAOMS survey would be able to detect 20% rate shifts with 95% 
confidence for 47 events (53%) with 8,000 interviews per year. 
 
After the completion of the data collection from the air-carrier-pilot survey in December 2004 
and prior to the final analyses of the data, a power analysis was performed on the 60-day recall 
data that were collected over the final three years to determine which questions provided 
sufficient information to support reliable analyses of relative changes. Questions that displayed a 
sufficiently large number of events to allow detection of a 20% change in event rate with 95% 
confidence, should one occur, were retained for further analysis. Of the 91 questions in Section B 
of the air-carrier-pilot survey with numeric answers, it was determined that respondents had 
reported enough events on 43 questions to support further analysis (based on approximately 
7,000 interviews per year). The remaining questions (those reflecting rarer events) would require 
a larger sample size to produce sufficient power to justify further analyses. 
5.2.2 Re-Classification of Pilots 
During the survey of air-carrier pilots, a similar survey of GA pilots was conducted for about 
nine months. A number of interviewees contacted during the GA survey were found to have been 
operating primarily as air-carrier pilots during that period. When the interviewer made that 
determination, he/she shifted from the GA survey questionnaire to the air-carrier survey and 
collected data based on that survey. By the time the GA survey ended, 407 pilots selected as part 
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of the GA survey process had been identified as having flown as air-carrier pilots during the 
recall period. As these 407 pilots had not been required to meet the selection criteria that had 
been imposed for eligibility in the sample pool used for the NAOMS survey, they were not 
included in the analyses of the survey of air-carrier pilots. However, these 407 pilots were 
valuable in assessing the impact of the selection criteria, as will be discussed in Section 6. 
 
The raw data file of the NAOMS air-carrier-pilot survey is defined as the original capture of the 
25,763 (26,170 minus 407) survey-participants’ responses to the series of questions. A small 
subset of the 25,763 interviews (208 interviews) could not be used for analyses because 
respondents did not provide key operational risk exposure data (i.e., either the hours or legs 
flown during the recall period). The balance of 25,555 air-carrier pilots supplied the needed risk-
exposure data (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Number of Interviews 
Recall 
Period 
Number of 
Interviews 
Conducted 
Information on 
Exposure Missing 
or in Error 
Number of 
Interviews 
Available for 
Analysis 
30-day 3,152 16 3,136 
60-day 18,611 144 18,467 
90-day 4,000 48 3,952 
Total 25,763 208 25,555 
 
 
The usable data were further reduced because the aircraft make/model could not be identified 
from the information recorded during 12 interviews. The elimination of these 12 cases left a total 
of 25,543 interviews, of which 3,134 interviews used 30-day recall, 18,460 interviews used 60-
day recall, and 3,949 interviews used 90-day recall.  
 
Furthermore, there were 52 cases of aircraft identified during the interviews that fell below the 
5,000 lb. gross takeoff weight (GTOW) lower boundary that had been set for the Small Transport 
category. Eliminating these resulted in a total of 25,491 valid interviews, of which 3,128 
interviews used 30-day recall, 18,422 interviews used 60-day recall, and 3,941 interviews used 
90-day recall.  
 
Finally, as discussed in Section 5.1, the data collected during the first nine months of the survey 
were used to resolve issues of recall period and panel versus random selection and are not 
included in the analyses described in Section 7. The results presented in Section 7 are based on 
the data collected over the last three years of the survey for which only the 60-day recall period 
was used. 
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5.2.3 Data Cleansing 
In any large survey, erroneous data are inevitable due to interviewer typing errors, 
misunderstanding of the question by the interviewee, misinterpretation by the interviewer, etc. 
These errors often appear as outliers and are typically omitted from final analyses of actual valid 
data. A multistage process was used to eliminate erroneous data. 
 
First, interviews reporting impossible or extremely improbable flight times were eliminated. The 
flight time per leg was calculated for each interview. Interviews that showed less than 20 minutes 
per leg or more than 20 hours per leg were deleted from all further analyses. There were 45 such 
situations in the data of Section A collected over the final years using 60-day recall period. 
Eliminating these reports reduced the number of interviews for the analysis in Section 7 to 
18,377 interviews with 60-day recall,  
 
Second, data for a question were deleted from consideration if the interviewee provided no 
information in response to that particular question. Responses to other questions for that 
interviewee were not deleted.  
 
Third, for the remaining interviews and events, a case-by-case evaluation of the responses to 
each survey question was performed to determine whether the participant’s responses indicated 
that the participant had misunderstood or misinterpreted the question or the interviewer had 
entered an incorrect value. Experienced aviation-safety researchers and an experienced air carrier 
pilot (retired Boeing 777 Captain) judged whether the number of events entered was reasonably 
likely given the type of aircraft flown and the number of hours of flight time and legs reported 
during the recall period. Responses to questions judged to be operationally impossible or 
extremely improbable were deleted for that question. The number of responses deleted varied 
from question to question, but in no case was that number in excess of 0.2% of the total number 
of interviews for a single question6. This supports the confidence that the NAOMS team had in 
the data quality achieved in the survey. 
 
Finally, a statistical filter was applied. The distributions of responses for each question 
considered here were examined separately and trends across time modeled. The observations that 
departed greatly from the general trend were then removed and the analyses repeated. These 
analyses were then repeated again, this time eliminating only those observations that departed by 
more than eight standard deviations from the mean rate for the question. In no case did the 
results of the analyses using data cleaned using one procedure differ substantially from the 
analyses conducted on the data cleaned using the other procedure. Therefore, for each question, 
responses in which the reported rate differed by more than eight standard deviations from the 
mean were removed. This procedure always eliminated substantially less than 1% of the 
responses.  
 
                                                
6 As we were examining the data from this operational perspective, it became evident that interviewees 
were interpreting certain of the questions differently. This was particularly evident in the responses to 
questions pertaining to communications with ATC. Some counted the event as having occurred once if 
they had a problem with communication on a flight segment while others apparently counted the number 
of times they may have attempted communication on a single leg. 
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In the results presented in Section 7, the number and proportion of cases removed is reported for 
each question. For comparison, the results of an analysis based on the data containing the likely 
erroneous observations are also included for each question. In general, the data-cleaning 
procedure had little effect on the analyses other than to reduce the variance and improve the fit of 
the statistical models.  
 
For example, in the case of the question asking about evasive maneuvers to avoid an in-flight 
collision, a total of 42 observations (0.23% of the observations) were removed. For these 
observations, the mean reported rate was more than 63 times greater than the mean rate for the 
remaining responses. Yet there was very little difference in the estimated linear trend across 
quarters. The slope changed from -.018 when only the cleaned data are used to -.014 when the 
suspect data are included. 
6. Analysis Methodology 
6.1 Overview 
A primary purpose of NAOMS was to explore the use of survey methods for the detection of 
relative changes, and primarily in temporal shifts, in potentially hazardous events. Hence, the 
results presented in this report focus on analyses of changes over time in the rates of events 
reported in response to the questions contained in Section B of the NAOMS survey. For each 
event, rates per 1,000 legs were calculated for each quarter. These data were then examined for 
time trends using nonlinear regression techniques. The effects of two factors—aircraft type and 
type of operation—on event rates were also examined because the rate at which hazardous events 
are encountered may depend on the type of activity in which the pilots are engaged. 
6.2 Criterion Variables 
Most of these questions were phrased to elicit the number of times that an event occurred during 
the recall period. However, the frequencies of these events are dependent on the opportunities for 
the events to occur. Therefore, data on the number of hours and the number of legs (i.e., flight 
segments from departure gate to arrival gate) the pilot flew during the reporting period were 
collected. Rates of events per 1,000 legs or 1,000 hours were then calculated for each quarter. In 
general, hazardous events are more likely during the dynamic flight that accompanies the 
departure and approach and landing phases of flight. Hence, the number of legs flown is usually 
a better measure of exposure than the number of hours flown. Therefore, the rates of events per 
1,000 legs (or the equivalent) for each quarter were the primary data analyzed. 
6.3 Quarterly Data 
Interviews were conducted continually throughout the years during which the NAOMS survey 
was administered. During the main portion of the NAOMS survey, interviewees were asked to 
report on their experiences during the preceding 60-day period. Therefore, the particular days 
covered by the reporting periods for each interviewee could differ. For ease of presentation and 
analysis, the data were grouped into quarters according to the mid-point of the recall period. 
Interviews for which the mid-point of the recall period fell between December 12 and March 11 
were categorized into the first (winter) quarter of each year. Interviews for which the mid-point 
of the recall period fell between March 12 and June 10 were categorized into the second (spring) 
quarter of each year. Interviews for which the mid-point of the recall period fell between June 11 
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and September 10 were categorized into the third (summer) quarter of each year. Interviews for 
which the mid-point of the recall period fell between September 11 and December 10 were 
categorized into the fourth (fall) quarter of each year. This system tends to somewhat obscure 
differences between adjacent quarters because some of the experiences reported by respondents 
contacted in one quarter could have occurred simultaneously with experiences reported by 
interviewees contacted during the previous quarter.  
6.4 Temporal Patterns 
Temporal patterns can take many forms. Rates may increase or decrease linearly. They may also 
demonstrate curvilinear patterns, e.g., rising and then holding steady or decreasing and then 
rising. Cyclical patterns may also occur. For example, many potentially hazardous events (e.g. in 
flight icing, weather diversions) are related to seasonal fluctuations. Without a priori hypotheses 
concerning the form of the temporal patterns that might be observed, an analysis strategy was 
adopted that provided reasonably powerful tests for distinguishing potentially meaningful 
patterns from random fluctuations. Two types of analyses were performed. First, for each 
question analyzed, a test of linear trend across quarters was performed. These tests could detect 
generally increasing or decreasing trends. However, these trends could be obscured by seasonal 
fluctuations. So a second analysis was performed on the data from each question which took into 
account possible seasonal patterns while testing for temporal patterns across years. These tests 
can reveal both linear and curvilinear patterns across years as well as seasonal patterns in the 
data.  
6.5 Types of Aircraft and Operations 
In addition to the temporal analyses described above, two other sets of analyses were conducted 
designed to determine whether observed patterns were consistent across the sample or were 
limited to particular types of aircraft or operations.  
 
Many factors can affect the likelihood of experiencing a potentially hazardous event. These 
include whether the aircraft is engaged in cargo or passenger transport, whether the flight is 
conducted largely at low altitudes “in the weather” or at higher altitudes, whether small airports 
or large airports are used, etc. The NAOMS survey did not include questions soliciting 
information on all of these factors. However, aircraft type is identified in the survey and it can 
serve as rough proxy for many of them. Aircraft tend to be used in specific types of operations 
because they are designed with particular missions in mind. For example, turboprops are used to 
connect small airports to large airports and fly at lower altitudes. Wide-body aircraft are used for 
long-haul flights connecting large airports and fly at high altitudes. 
 
There were too many makes and models of aircraft and too few observations of each to use 
aircraft make/model directly in the analyses. Therefore the aircraft were grouped into categories 
by standard weight classes based on GTOW: 
Small Transports: GTOW greater than or equal to 5,000 lbs. but less than 100,000 lbs.  
Medium-Size Transports: GTOW greater than or equal to 100,000 lbs. but less than 200,000 lbs.  
Large Transports: GTOW greater than or equal to 200,000 lbs. with a single aisle. 
Wide-Body Transports: GTOW greater than or equal to 200,000 lbs. with two aisles. 
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In the NAOMS survey questionnaire, respondents were asked to estimate the percentage of time 
that they spent flying each aircraft they flew within the recall period. Based on these data, each 
interviewee was assigned to one of the four aircraft-size categories above determined by the 
category in which he/she flew the most. In a few cases, pilots reported flying exactly the same 
amount in aircraft that were in two different categories. On these occasions, the pilot’s report 
was assigned to one of the tied categories at random. The pilots were also asked to report the 
relative amount of time they spent flying passengers or only cargo during the recall period. Pilots 
were categorized as flying passenger or cargo operations depending on whether they reported 
flying passenger or non-passenger cargo aircraft during the majority of the time flown in the 
reporting period. 
 
To determine the impact of aircraft category and whether this affected the observed temporal 
patterns, predictors were added representing aircraft category to the statistical model used to test 
for year and seasonal effects. Then predictors were added representing the interactions between 
aircraft categories and the year and seasonal effects. Interaction terms measure the extent to 
which the effect of one factor (e.g. year or season) depends on another factor (e.g. aircraft 
category). The results were then tested both for aircraft category and for whether the interaction 
terms as a group improved the ability to predict the event rates. To determine whether aircraft 
category affected the observed temporal patterns, the interaction of aircraft category with year, 
aircraft category with season, and aircraft category with season by year as a group were taken 
into account and tested to determine whether it improved the ability to predict the event rates 
(identified as interactions with year/season in the results below). In most cases, the interaction 
terms did not improve the ability to predict the event rates—indicating that the observed 
temporal patterns did not differ significantly across aircraft categories. For those questions for 
which there was a significant interaction, the nature of that interaction was explored in more 
detail. So for some questions, although the rates of events differed by aircraft category, there was 
no significant interaction between a temporal pattern and aircraft category. This indicates that the 
temporal pattern (if any) was not significantly different across aircraft categories but that the 
reported rates of events for some types of aircraft were significantly higher or lower than the 
rates reported for other types of aircraft. Corresponding analyses in which the type of 
operation—passenger or cargo—was substituted for the type of aircraft are also reported in 
Section 7. 
6.6 Statistical Methods 
For most of the events, the probability that any pilot would experience an event on any single 
flight is very low. Indeed for most questions, most pilots did not report an event during the 
previous 60 days. Given this distribution of responses, statistical analyses based on the normal 
distribution are inappropriate. Analyses based on a Poisson distribution are frequently used to 
model this sort of data. The Negative Binomial describes a family of distributions of which the 
Poisson may be regarded as a special case. For most NAOMS survey questions, a Poisson 
distribution fits the data quite well (see Figure 6).  
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Figure 6. Comparison of actual data to Poisson estimates: Bird strike reports. 
 
 
In general, when a criterion (dependent) variable is a count of instances of rare independent events 
and there is no natural upper limit on the counts, a Poisson distribution will provide a reasonably 
good fit to the data. However, in many cases data will demonstrate greater variance than would be 
expected if the underlying distribution were Poisson. In these cases, a different Negative Binomial 
distribution may provide a better fit. Therefore, maximum likelihood regression techniques based 
on the Negative Binomial distribution were used in analyzing these data7. The 95% confidence 
level for these events that are shown in Section 7 reflect the Negative Binomial Distribution 
analysis used. These techniques, both the Poisson and the Negative Binomial Distributions, 
generally produce results that are analogous to those obtained from the commonly used ordinary 
least squares techniques used to analyze normally distributed data8. 
                                                
7	  More information on Negative Binomial regression may be obtained from Hilbe, J.M. (2008). Negative Binomial 
Regression. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and Cameron, A.C. & Trivedi, P.K. (1998). Regression 
Analysis of Count Data. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.	  
8 In Poisson and Negative Binomial regression, the natural logarithm of the count of the number of events is 
modeled as a linear function of the predictors. Measures of exposure (such as the number of legs flown) are 
entered as unparameterized predictors or “offset variables” in the model. Hence, the effect of the exposure is 
taken into account in estimating the effects of the other predictors. 
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7. Results 
7.1 Introduction 
In the analysis of the data, priority was given to assessing temporal changes because the main 
objective of this experiment was to demonstrate that the methodology could reliably measure 
relative changes over time of events occurring in the national airspace system. Such 
methodology would be key to assessing the impact across the system of technologies and 
procedures implemented in the interests of efficiency, modernization, or to address the many 
challenges suggested by the concept of operations of the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (NextGen). However, the data are also useful for assessing other relative differences, 
some of which are described below. 
 
Many of the events that were the subject of the NAOMS survey occurred at a rate sufficient to 
allow for analysis over the limited period of time of the present study. However, for some 
questions more time would be needed to attain a sufficient response to support reliable analysis. Of 
the 91 questions of Section B of the air-carrier-pilot survey with numerical answers, 43 questions 
resulted in sufficiently high response rates to support reliable trending analysis. The remaining 
questions, those reflecting rarer events, would require a longer period of time for data collection 
before a reliable analytic threshold could be reached to assess changes over time. When 
interpreting results for the 43 questions presented here, appropriate caution should be exercised. 
These data were gathered between 2002 and 2004; the results obtained for an event may not reflect 
the patterns that would be observed today. 
 
Section 6 described the statistical approach applied to each of the 43 questions analyzed. For each 
question, linear trends across the survey period (12 quarters) were assessed, as were year-to-year 
changes and seasonal effects.  
 
Once data were acquired, it became apparent that aircraft-size category (small, medium, large, or 
wide body) had an important influence on event encounters as did the type of operation (passenger 
or cargo). The effects of these additional variables, as well as interaction effects, are reported for 
each question. A significant effect for aircraft-size category indicates that the rate of the event 
differed depending on the size of the aircraft. Similarly, a significant effect for operation indicates 
that the rate of the event differed depending on whether the reporting pilot primarily flew passenger- 
or cargo-carrying aircraft during the recall period. A significant interaction effect between year or 
season and aircraft category indicates that the pattern observed across years or seasons differed 
depending on the category of aircraft. Similarly, a significant interaction between year or season and 
type of operation indicates that the pattern observed across years or seasons differed depending on 
the operation flown. 
7.2 Statistical Summary of the Data 
This section presents a summary of the results for the 43 questions analyzed for each of the 
variables investigated (i.e. linear trends [downward, upward, no change]; year-to-year changes; 
seasonal changes; effect of aircraft category; and effect of operations). The results are summarized 
in Table 6. See Appendix M for full analyses of each of these questions analyzed. 
 
 
 
55 
 
continued on next page 
  
Table 6. Results Summary 
Question 
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AC1: Bird strikes    ***  ***  ***  
AC2: Evasive action to avoid In-flight 
collision 
* ↓ ** *  ***  ***  
AC3: Loss of separation * ↓ ** *  ***    
AD1: Deviation from assigned altitude * ↓    ***  ***  
AH1: Use of reserve fuel *** ↑ ***   *** *** ** *** 
AH2: Accept ATC clearance unable to 
comply 
     ***  *** * 
AH3: Lost sight of aircraft * ↓ ** **  ***    
AH3A: Lost sight of aircraft – Less than 
3 miles 
* ↓  ***  *    
AH6: Inadvertent deviation from 
vector 
         
AH9: Hard landing   ** *  **  ***  
AH12: Takeoff improper configuration      ***    
AH13: Unusual attitude     ** **    
AH14: Stick shaker/stall warning ** ↓ *   *** * ***  
AT1: Unable to contact ATC     **  * *   
AT1A: Unable to contact ATC on 
ground 
     *** *** *** *** 
AT1B: Unable to contact ATC – 
terminal area 
     ** *   
AT1C: Unable to contact ATC – en 
route 
  * *** ** *** *** *  
AT2: High/fast approach due to ATC    **  ***  *  
CP1: Expedite/divert medical 
emergency 
** ↑ *   ***  INS INS 
CP3: Left cockpit to handle 
disturbance 
     ***  INS INS 
ER1: Divert due to equipment problem      ***  ***  
ER3: Cargo shift      *** ** *** ** 
ER5D: Smoke, fire, fumes in the galley * ↓    2  INS INS 
ER5E: Smoke, fire, fumes in passenger 
compartment 
** ↓ *    * INS INS 
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***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05; INS=insufficient data 
1. In this summary analysis, for a few of the events the results presented exclude the effect of an 
anomalous (in most cases the first) quarter. See Appendix M for details. 
2. Significant effect due to the inclusion of small aircraft, few of which have galleys. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Results Summary (continued) 
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ER5F: Smoke, fire, fumes – Other ** ↓ *       
GE2: Collision/near collision with 
ground vehicle 
* ↓ ** **      
GE3: Hydroplane increased stopping 
distance 
   ***  *  ***  
GE4: Rejected takeoff      ***  ***  
GE8: Begin takeoff – another aircraft 
on runway 
*** ↓ ***   ***  **  
GE9: Landing – another aircraft on 
Runway 
* ↓ ** ***      
TU1: Encounter severe turbulence    *** * *** * ***  
TU1A: Encounter severe turbulence – 
IMC 
     ***  ***  
TU1B  Encounter severe turbulence – 
clear air 
   ***  *** ** *** ** 
TU2  Encounter wake turbulence    **  *** * ***  
WE1  Lacked Wx info while airborne    *** ** *** *** *** *** 
WE1A  Lacked Wx info while airborne – 
non U.S. 
  *** ** ** *** *** *** ** 
WE1B: Lacked Wx Info while airborne – 
ATIS 
* ↓ **  ** * ** *** ** 
WE2  Fail to receive ATC app. to 
avoid Wx 
   *** ** *** ***   
WE3  Diversion to alternate due to Wx      *** ** *** *** 
WE4  Icing encounter causing 
anomalies 
* ↓ *   ***  **  
WE5  Encountered wind shear/ 
microburst 
   *** *** ***  *** * 
WE6: Wind shear/microburst 
avoidance man. 
   *  ***  **  
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In the following sections, results for each of the variables analyzed are summarized, followed by 
example questions demonstrating significant findings for each of these variables. The first 
example presented in Section 7.1.1.1 (GE8: Began Takeoff While Another Aircraft was on the 
Runway) illustrates a case of a downward linear trend over time. For this one example, the 
results of the full analyses for this question, not only of the downward trend, are shown. The 
complete presentation of results for this question is provided to demonstrate the analyses 
performed for each of the 43 questions. Similar full analyses for all questions analyzed are 
presented in Appendix M9. For upward linear trend, no trend change, year-to-year change, 
seasonal change, aircraft category effect, and operations effect only a single analysis is shown 
that illustrates the particular pattern being illustrated10,11 . 
7.3 Changes over Time 
To determine if newly implemented technologies, procedures, training protocols, etc., have 
unanticipated impact on the national airspace system, it is necessary to assess if exposure to 
safety-related events remains stable or changes over time. Developing a methodology for 
assessing such changes was the primary objective of the NAOMS study.  
7.3.1 Trending Data 
Of the 43 questions in the dataset used for analysis, 16 questions resulted in significant linear 
changes over time. For 14 of these 16 questions the reported rates decreased over time 
(indicating less exposure to a potential safety-related event over time). For two questions the 
reported rates increased over time (greater exposure to a potential safety-related event over time). 
The remaining 27 questions showed no significant linear changes over the period of the study. 
Three examples from the NAOMS survey discussed below illustrate the three linear effects: a 
positive change (reduced event rate), a negative change (increased event rate), and no significant 
change over time. 
7.3.1.1 Reduced Rates over Time 
An example of the 14 questions that showed reductions of event rate over time is question GE8: 
Began Takeoff while Another Aircraft was on the Runway. 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported beginning takeoffs while another aircraft was on 
the runway decreased linearly across the observation period (see Figure 7). This trend remained 
statistically significant when the data from the first quarter of 2002 is omitted from the analysis. 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.33 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate 
                                                
9 While results of significance testing are presented for the questions that follow, the interested reader 
should refer to Appendix M for a full description of statistical findings. 
10 As stated earlier, each survey question is best viewed individually; i.e., as a separate study. Although 
results are given here as examples of significant findings, the reader should refer to Appendix M for the 
full analysis of these events/questions as well as for all other questions analyzed. 
11 The number of reports gathered in the first quarter (and to a lesser extent, the last quarter) was fewer 
than in other quarters. When a particular question resulted in anomalous-quarter data that could affect the 
interpretation of findings, results are reported (here and in Appendix M) both with and without the 
anomalous-quarter data in the analysis. 
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was observed in the first quarter of 2004 (0.20) and the highest rate was observed in the first 
quarter of 2002 (0.93). 
 
 
Figure 7. GE8: Began takeoff while another aircraft was on runway; By quarter. 
 
 
Significant differences between years were observed for the event GE8: Began Takeoff while 
Another Aircraft was on the Runway (see Figure 8A). The reported rates of these events 
decreased linearly across the years in the sample. 
 
No differences between seasons were observed (see Figure 8B). No year by season interaction 
was observed. 
 
There were significant differences in the reported rates of this event (GE8: Began Takeoff while 
Another Aircraft was on the Runway) among aircraft-size categories (see Figure 8C). Pilots of 
medium aircraft reported the highest rates, significantly higher than those reported by pilots of 
large or wide body aircraft. The difference in reported rates between small and wide body 
aircraft was also statistically significant. No other differences between aircraft categories were 
significant. No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed for this 
event. 
 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported significantly lower rates of beginning takeoffs with another 
aircraft on the runway than did pilots of passenger aircraft (see Figure 8D). There were no 
significant interactions between operation and years/seasons. 
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A. By Year B. By Season C. By Aircraft Category D. By Operation 
 
Figure 8. Downward linear trend example: Began takeoff while another aircraft was on runway. 
 
 
7.3.1.2 Increased Rates over Time 
An example of the two questions that showed increasing rates of event over time is question 
AH1: Use of Reserved Fuel.  
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 4.13 events in which reserve fuel was used per 1,000 legs 
was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 2002 (2.94) and the highest 
rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 2004 (5.62). The reported rate of use of reserve fuel 
increased linearly across the observation period (see Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9. AH1: Use of reserve fuel; By quarter. 
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7.3.1.3 No Significant Changes over Time 
An example of the 27 questions that showed no significant differences in event rates over time is 
Question AH6: Inadvertently Deviated from Assigned Vector. 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 1.60 events of inadvertent deviations from assigned 
vectors per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2003 
(1.27) and the highest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 2002 (1.83). The rate of 
reported inadvertent deviations from assigned vectors did not change across the observation 
period (see Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10. AH6: Inadvertently deviated from assigned vector; By quarter. 
 
7.3.2 Year-to-Year Changes: Non-Linear Effects 
As shown in Table 7, seventeen questions revealed significant year-to-year changes. For most 
questions the year-to-year changes mirrored the linear trends. However, changes across time 
could also follow a non-linear pattern. For example, a successful change in air traffic control 
procedures could result in an immediate drop in the rate of events followed by a steady lower 
rate. In this case, the overall pattern might be approximated by a decreasing linear trend if the 
decrease was large enough and if the period-to-period variation was small. However, the actual 
temporal pattern would be non-linear and would be best tested using an analysis strategy that 
could detect non-linear patterns. To model non-linear temporal patterns, more complex curves 
could be fit to the data (e.g., a quadratic trend superimposed on a linear trend). Alternatively, one 
could re-conceptualize the data as yearly shifts potentially superimposed on seasonal cycles. We 
took the latter tack in the analyses reported here. For four questions, year-to-year changes were 
found where there was no significant linear trend. For three questions, in which there were 
significant linear trends, there were also significant year-to-year non-linear effects. Question 
AH9: Experience Hard Landing is an example of an event demonstrating significant year-to-year 
changes but without a significant linear trend. 
0	  
0.5	  
1	  
1.5	  
2	  
2.5	  
3	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   1	   2	   3	   4	   1	   2	   3	   4	  
Ra
te
	  p
er
	  1
00
0	  
Le
gs
	  
Quarter	  
2002	   2003	   2004	  
 
61 
 
 
Significant differences between years were observed (see Figure 11). The rate of hard landings in 
2004 was significantly lower than in the previous years. The mean rate of hard landings in 2003 
was higher than in 2002, but this difference was only marginally statistically significant. 
However, these differences are a product of a more complex pattern. Only the first quarter of 
2002 demonstrates a substantially lower rate than the corresponding quarter in 2003. In addition, 
after a drop in the rate of hard landings in the first quarter of 2004 the rate climbs steadily back 
towards the mean for 2003. 
 
To examine the year-to-year changes for each question, see Appendix M.  
 
 
Figure 11. AH9: Experience a hard landing; By year. 
 
7.3.3 Seasonal Effects 
Regular patterns across quarters in the rate of reported events could reflect the action of factors 
related to seasonal weather (e.g., icing, thunderstorms) or to other factors (e.g., tourist travel) that 
vary regularly across the year. If seasonal patterns are not taken into account, the variation due to 
seasons could obscure year-to-year differences in the reported rates of events. In the analyses 
reported here, the effects of year and season were estimated simultaneously so the effects 
attributed to either factor take into account the effects of the other.  
 
For 21 of the 43 questions analyzed, statistically significant seasonal effects were observed (see 
Table 6). For many of these events, seasonal effects appear to be directly relevant to identifiable 
weather conditions. In other cases, the seasonal effects may be unrelated or only indirectly 
related to weather conditions. One particularly interesting example of seasonal effects relates to 
the cyclical pattern demonstrated in the data from Question AC1: Experience Bird Strikes.  
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There is a significant seasonal pattern and no year by season interaction (see Figure 12). The rate 
of reported bird strikes is highest in the summer and fall (which do not differ), lower in the 
spring than in the summer, and still lower in the winter than in the spring. 
 
To examine the findings for various seasons for each question, see Appendix M. 
 
 
Figure 12. AC1: Experienced bird strike; By season. 
 
7.4 Aircraft-Size Categories 
Although the primary purpose of NAOMS was to demonstrate a methodology for assessing 
changes over time the NAOMS-survey method also proved capable of revealing other important 
relations in the data beyond changes over time. In the analyses reported here, aircraft were 
grouped into four size categories. The effects of these categories on rates of reported events were 
then examined. Differences in the reported rate of an event between aircraft of different 
categories may reflect factors directly related to aircraft size. For example, the probability of 
reports of an action taken in response to a medical event is greater on larger aircraft because 
more passengers are carried on larger aircraft. However, an aircraft’s mission often dictates its 
size. Therefore, differences between aircraft of different sizes in the reported rates of events may 
reflect differences in the operations—such as the airports used or routes flown—in which these 
aircraft are engaged. 
 
In the NAOMS-survey data, significant differences among aircraft-size categories were found for 
36 of the 43 questions analyzed (see Table 7). For many events, it is the small and/or the wide 
body aircraft pilots who experience the highest event rates. 
 
The following event showed no trending or year-to-year differences but did exhibit clear 
differences in the rates of events experienced by the different categories of aircraft. An example 
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of an event for which significantly different rates of occurrences were reported as a function of 
aircraft-size category was question ER1: Divert Due to Equipment Problem. 
 
There were significant differences between aircraft categories in the rates of these events (see 
Figure 13). Pilots of small aircraft reported the highest rates of these events, significantly higher 
than all other aircraft. Pilots of wide body aircraft reported the second highest rates of these 
events, significantly higher than medium and large aircraft, which did not differ. 
 
There were no interactions between aircraft category and year/season. 
 
To examine the findings for various aircraft categories for each question, see Appendix M. 
 
 
Figure 13. ER1: Divert due to equipment problem; By aircraft-size category. 
 
7.5 Operations 
In the analyses reported here, reports were also classified according to the type of operation—
cargo or passenger—in which the reporting pilot was engaged. There are a number of reasons 
why passenger-carrying pilots and cargo-carrying pilots may experience different events. For 
example, cargo aircraft often operate from different airports at different times of day with 
fewer other aircraft in the air space than do passenger aircraft. If the rate of an event were 
affected by characteristics of the airport or the time of day then this could result in a 
difference in the rate of occurrence of the event between types of operations. 
 
Of the 43 questions analyzed, four events were passenger-oriented and resulted in very few, if 
any, reports of those events from cargo pilots. About 70% of the 39 remaining questions showed 
differences between cargo and passenger aircraft. For 20 events, the rates were higher in cargo 
operations than in passenger operations. For 6 events, the rates were higher in passenger 
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operations than in cargo operations. For 13 events, there were no differences between operation 
types. A summary of the impact of operations on rates of reported events is given in Table 7. 
 
As with the aircraft size categories discussed above, the NAOMS-survey methodology revealed 
relative differences between passenger flights and cargo flights for events that were stable over 
time as well as for those that changed over time. The following is an example of an event, GE4: 
Rejected Takeoffs that showed significantly greater rates for cargo than for passenger flights 
while remaining stable over time.  
 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported a higher rate of rejected takeoffs than did pilots of passenger 
aircraft (see Figure 14). 
 
There were no significant interactions between operation and year/season. 
 
To examine the findings for cargo and for passenger operations for each question, see 
Appendix M. 
 
 
Figure 14. GE4: Rejected takeoffs; By operation. 
 
7.6 Interaction Effects: Aircraft Categories, Operations, and Changes Over Time 
In some cases, the factors that impact a temporal pattern affect all aircraft in the system similarly 
(e.g., global economic shifts). However, in other cases the factors that affect a temporal pattern 
affect particular segments of the system differently. For example, changes in icing forecast 
capabilities would be expected to influence predominately aircraft engaged largely in low to 
moderate altitude operations. In these cases, the temporal pattern will be different for some 
segments of the system. In the analyses reported here, this condition would result in a 
statistically significant interaction between variables representing the temporal pattern (year, 
season) and variables representing the aircraft categories and/or types of operations. Statistically 
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significant interactions between either aircraft category or operation or both and year/season 
were observed for 18 of the 43 questions analyzed (see Table 6). Some of these interactions 
reflect small but statistically reliable differences between aircraft categories or operations in the 
observed temporal patterns. In other cases, these interactions reveal substantially different 
temporal patterns in the different groups. These patterns are discussed in more detail in 
Appendix M for each event analyzed. 
7.7 Effects of Non-Random Bias 
In any survey, there are always possibilities of biases that can affect the validity of generalizing 
the survey sample to a fuller population. When these biases are random, there are statistical 
techniques to correct for them. However, corrections for non-random biases require complex 
analyses entailing both statistical and operational knowledge.  
7.7.1 The Effect of the Selection Criteria 
Many pilots obtain commercial pilot certificates but do not work as commercial pilots. To 
include as many air-carrier pilots as possible in the sample pool of the NAOMS survey while 
excluding those not engaged in air-carrier operations, only pilots who were based in the United 
States and had: (1) an Airline Transport Pilot certificate, (2) a current first-class medical 
certificate, (3) a multi-engine rating12,, and( 4) a Flight Engineer’s certificate were included in the 
sample pool. Many, although not all, pilots engaged in air-carrier operations have these 
certificates and ratings. Hence, the trends described previously in this Section are based on data 
from a large part of the air-carrier pilot population, but not the entire air-carrier pilot population. 
It is possible that the air-carrier pilots who were not in the population from which the NAOMS-
survey sample was drawn could have been involved in different operations and had different 
experiences. This issue is of limited interest because it would never be expected to arise in any 
full-scale implementation of a NAOMS-like survey, which would sample from the full FAA 
Airman Registry. However, for completeness, the results reported previously were examined for 
evidence of differences from the remainder of the air-carrier pilot population that were not 
included in the NAOMS-survey sample as a consequence of the selection criteria.  
 
To explore possible effects of the selection criteria used for the NAOMS survey sample pool, the 
data obtained from the pilots who matched the selection criteria were compared with data 
obtained during the same period from commercial pilots who did not match the selection criteria. 
For about 9 of the 45 months during which the survey of air-carrier pilots was conducted, a 
survey of GA pilots was conducted as well. The pool from which the GA pilots were selected 
was composed of pilots who had not met the selection criteria for the air-carrier pilot pool used 
in the NAOMS survey. However, some of interviewees contacted for the GA survey were found 
to have been operating primarily as air-carrier pilots during that survey period. Whenever 
interviewers made that determination, they shifted from the GA-pilot-survey questionnaire to the 
air-carrier-pilot survey and collected data based on that survey. The GA-pilot survey was 
conducted from August 21, 2002, to May 15, 2003. During the 9 months of the survey of GA 
pilots, 407 pilots had been identified as having flown as air-carrier pilots during the survey 
                                                
12 The requirement for a multi-engine rating was not a factor in this study because the experiment 
considered only aircraft of greater than 5,000 pounds GTOW and there were no single-engine aircraft that 
fit that condition that had been identified in the data set used for analyses. 
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period. After scrubbing the data, there were 402 of these interviews with viable responses. As 
these 402 pilots had not been required to meet the selection criteria for eligibility in the 
NAOMS-survey sample pool, they were not included in the analyses of the survey of air-carrier 
pilots reported previously. The results from the 402 pilots who did not match the NAOMS-
survey selection criteria for the air-carrier-pilot survey were compared with the results from 
5,944 interviews of pilots that matched the NAOMS-survey criteria collected during the four 
quarters that spanned the 9 months of the GA-pilot survey. 
 
The commercial pilots matching the NAOMS-survey selection criteria (referred to as ‘Match’ in 
the following tables and discussion) differed from the commercial pilots in the public FAA 
airmen registry who did not meet these criteria (referred to henceforth as ‘No Match’) on a 
number of measures included in Section A of the survey instrument (see Table 7). Compared to 
the commercial pilots in the Match group who met the selection criteria, the commercial pilots in 
the No Match group who did not meet the selection criteria were less experienced (t(6344)=9.38, 
p<.001), flew more legs during the survey period (t(419.62)=10.25, p<.001), flew more hours 
during the survey period (t(446.90)=5.42, p<.001), and flew shorter legs (t(495.54)=11.11, 
p<.001). In some cases the mean differences between these groups were quite large. However, 
for all of these measures there was substantial variation within the groups. On all of these 
measures, the standard deviations were larger than the differences between the groups—
indicating that on all measures there was considerable overlap between the groups. 
 
Table 7. Mean Experience of Pilots by Match to 
Selection Criteria 
 
Measure 
Selection Criteria 
Match No Match 
Hours – 60 days 97.57 (47.54) 112.12 (52.34) 
Legs – 60 days 38.26 (34.62) 68.97 (59.41) 
Hours/leg 3.75 (2.75) 2.50 (2.14) 
Total hours 10,349.72 (6,822.43) 7,068.58 (6,271.77) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
The distribution of aircraft by size categories flown was different between the pilot samples 
(X2(3)=798.4, p<.001). Nearly half (49.8%) of the pilots in the No Match group flew small 
aircraft compared to 7.0% of the pilots in the Match group. The proportion of pilots who did not 
match the criteria who flew large (6.0%) or wide-body (9.0%) aircraft was much smaller than the 
respective proportions of pilots who did match the criteria (large: 15.0%; wide-body: 30.3%). 
The pilots in the Match group were also more likely to fly cargo operations (22.0%) than were 
the pilots in the No Match group (6.0%; X2(1)=58.2, p<.001). The groups also differed in the 
positions flown (X2(2)=27.55, p<.001). With a completely unbiased sampling of the full air-
carrier-pilot population, one would expect an equal proportion (i.e., 50/50) of Captains and First 
Officers in both groups. However, results revealed that a larger proportion of pilots who matched 
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NAOMS-survey criteria and a smaller proportion of pilots who did not match the criteria flew as 
Captains (Match: 54.0%; No Match: 47.5%). These comparisons suggest that the NAOMS-
survey selection criteria resulted in sampling more experienced pilots who were Captains, flew 
larger aircraft, and flew longer hours per leg. In contrast, the pool of air-carrier pilots that were 
identified during the GA-pilot survey selection process were those who had not been included in 
the NAOMS-survey pool and tended to be the less experienced pilots who flew the smaller 
aircraft for fewer hours per leg. 
 
In summary, the two samples of air-carrier pilots differ in a variety of ways. Some of these 
differences affect the rates of reported events. These groups differ in the types of aircraft used 
and the type of operations flown. As noted, these factors affect the rates of some reported events. 
In some cases, aircraft category or operation affects the overall rate of an event. In other cases, 
these factors may affect the temporal pattern such that over time the rates for one aircraft 
category or operation may change differently from those for another category or operation. This 
added complexity does not affect the validity of the reported analyses. It simply reflects the 
reality of a multifaceted airspace system. Whenever aircraft category or operation affects the 
rates of a reported event, these factors must be taken into account when examining temporal 
patterns, as was done in the analyses reported in Appendix M . 
 
Negative binomial regression analyses were conducted to determine whether there were any 
differences between the two groups in the temporal patterns of rates of events that cannot be 
explained by differences in aircraft or type of operation flown. The trend analyses performed 
previously could not be duplicated because data for the two groups were available for only 4 
quarters (Summer 2002, Fall 2002, Winter 2003, and Spring 2003). It is not possible to 
distinguish between year and season effects with only these data. Only differences between the 
groups across these 4 quarters could be analyzed.  
 
Significant interactions between the selection criteria and quarter were observed on five 
questions. For these five events, there were differences between the two pilot groups in the 
temporal patterns that cannot be explained by the effects of aircraft category and type of 
operation (see Table 8)13. For one of these five events, the time trends for the pilot groups 
differed but no significant general linear trend was observed for either group. For the other four 
questions, linear trends were observed.  
 
For AT1A (Unable To Communicate With ATC While On The Ground), both the pilots in the 
Match group and those in the No Match reported generally increasing rates over the observed 
period. However, the increasing trend was significant only for pilots who matched the criteria. 
For AT1C (Unable To Communicate With ATC While En Route), pilots who matched the 
selection criteria demonstrated generally increasing rates of these events while pilots who did not 
match the criteria reported generally decreasing rates. For AT2 (Fly An Undesirably High/Fast 
Approach Due To An ATC Clearance), both the pilots in the Match group and those in the No 
Match group reported generally decreasing rates of these events over the observed period, but the 
rate of decrease was greater for the pilots that did not match the criteria. For WE5 (Encountered 
Wind Shear Or Microburst), both the pilots in the Match group and those in the No Match group 
                                                
13 For seven questions there were statistically significant differences in the overall event rates but not in 
the temporal patterns between the pilot groups that cannot be explained by the effects of the category of 
aircraft or types of operations flown. 
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reported generally increasing rates over the observed period, but the rate of increase was greater 
for the pilots who did not match the selection criteria.  
 
Table 8. Time Trends Across Four Quarters by Selection Criteria 
 
Item 
Selection Criteria 
Match No Match 
AT1A: Unable to contact ATC 
on ground 
 #***  # 
AT1C: Unable to contact ATC 
en route 
 #*  $*** 
AT2: High/fast approach due to 
ATC 
 $*  $** 
WE5: Encountered wind 
shear/microburst 
 #**  #** 
Note: Arrow indicates direction of trend. Statistical significance of the trend is indicated 
by the symbols:  * p<.o5 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
 
 
In summary, for the great majority of events, no effect of selection criteria on the temporal patterns 
of the rates of reported events was observed. For five of the 43 events examined, a significant 
interaction between selection criteria and quarter of observation was observed, with four of these 
events showing a significant linear pattern. However, for only one of these five events was the 
observed trend across quarters significant and different in direction between the sample of pilots 
that matched the selection criteria and the sample of pilots that did not match the criteria. For the 
other three events, the effect of the selection criteria was merely to alter the observed degree of 
increase or decrease. 
 
The comparisons presented above must be viewed cautiously given the small sample of 402 pilots 
that did not match the selection criteria. However, little evidence was found that the specificity of 
the NAOMS survey-selection criteria substantially influenced the temporal patterns reported 
earlier in this section.  
7.7.2 The Effect of the Opt-Out Option 
In 2000, between the time of the field trial and the initiation of the full survey of air-carrier pilots, 
Congress instructed the FAA to permit pilots to have their names removed from the public 
registry, which the NAOMS survey was using as its sampling pool. Shortly thereafter, major pilot 
unions provided pilots with a convenient way to use this option. It is at least possible that the pilots 
who chose to opt out of the public registry differ from the pilots who did not opt out of the public 
registry. If there are differences, then the temporal patterns in rates of events described previously 
might not reflect those found throughout the NAS; they may be peculiar to those pilots who chose 
not to opt out of the public registry. It is unlikely that a pilot’s exposure to the sorts of events 
addressed in NAOMS-survey questionnaire is related to the decision to opt out of the public 
registry, but it is possible. Hence, in this section, we compare the rates of events reported by pilots 
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who opted out of the public registry with the rates of events reported by the pilots who did not opt 
out of the public registry. As in the case of the effect of the selection criteria, this issue is of 
limited interest because it would never be expected to arise in any full-scale implementation of a 
NAOMS-like system that would rely upon random sampling from the full FAA Airmen Registry.  
 
For the decision to opt-out to substantially influence the previously reported temporal patterns it 
would need to be: (1) highly correlated with the criterion (event rate) measures; (2) highly 
correlated with the temporal pattern; and (3) not highly correlated with the other predictors 
(aircraft category, type of operation) included in the analysis. It would seem unlikely for all three 
of these relations to hold simultaneously. The authors didn’t have a way to examine the latter two 
conditions. Nevertheless, they examined the available data for evidence of significant differences 
between the two groups of pilots.  
 
Data from the field trial (see Section 4.6.1.3), which was conducted before pilots were allowed to 
opt-out of the public Airmen Registry, provided some bases of comparison with data from the full 
survey. The selection criteria for pilots used in the sample pools for both the field trial and the full 
survey were identical. These data cannot be used to assess whether there were differences in the 
temporal patterns of the events experienced between groups because the field trial occurred over a 
different period than the final NAOMS survey. However, a comparison of demographic 
information from Section A of the survey of the pilots during the field trial with comparable 
information from the pilots in the full survey could provide some evidence about how the pilots 
who chose to opt-out differ from those who did not opt-out. Also, responses to questions from 
Section B can be compared for evidence of differences in the rates of events reported by the pre-
opt-out and the post-opt-out groups. 
 
The questions used in Section A for the field trial were not all identical to those used in the final 
full survey. However, the question dealing directly with experience (“Approximately how many 
hours of total time have you flown a commercial aircraft during your career?”) was identical for 
both groups. Of the 626 interviews from the field trial, 7 provided no information in answer to this 
question and the remaining 619 responses were compared with the replies to this question from the 
25,555 pilots interviewed during the full NAOMS survey. The pilots who completed the NAOMS 
survey and thus had not opted out of the public Airmen Registry reported an average of 10,426 
hours of total commercial flight time while the pilots who completed the field trial prior to having 
the option to opt out reported an average of 10,235 hours of total commercial flight time. The 
difference in reported total flight time was not statistically significant.  
 
The responses to questions in Section B from the field trial and from the survey were also 
compared. The field trial was conducted about a year before the final NAOMS survey began. 
Therefore, differences in the event rates between the field trial and the final NAOMS survey could 
result from either temporal shifts or differences in the populations sampled. There were 25 first-
level questions from Section B that were presented in basically the same way in both the field trial 
and in the final survey for which comparisons of responses could be made. After deleting 
interviews for lack of information or improbable recorded values for hours or legs flown, 601 valid 
interviews remained from the field trial for all of the recall periods used in that experiment. Given 
the results of the memory studies indicating the greater accuracy obtained from the shorter recall 
periods, the analyses were limited to the data obtained from pilots who were asked to recall 
information from the 30 days or 60 days prior to the interview. These data were compared to the 
data from the corresponding recall periods obtained from the full survey. During the field trial, 
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there were 99 interviews over 81 days that used 30-day recall and 101 interviews over 73 days that 
used 60-day recall. For comparison, the first 81 days of 30-day recall (690 valid interviews) and 
the first 73 days of 60-day recall (602 valid interviews) were selected from the full survey. The 
number of valid reports varied slightly with each question of Section B because sometimes no 
information was provided or the recorded data were improbable. 
 
The proportions of participants in each group (i.e., the post-opt-out NAOMS full survey and pre-
opt-out field trial) reporting one or more events were compared using an exact probability test.  
 
Significant differences between the pre- and post-opt-out groups for both recall periods were 
observed for three of the 25 questions examined. For three additional questions significant 
differences were observed only for the 60-day recall period. The results of these analyses are 
presented in Table 9. In every case in which there was a significant difference between the groups, 
the proportion of pilots reporting an event was higher in the pre op-out group than in the post opt-
out group.  
 
Table 9. Significant Differences in Event Rates between 
Pre- and Post-Opt-Out Groups 
 Post-Opt-Out Pre-Opt-Out 
Mean 
Event 
Rate 
% of Pilots 
Reporting 
Event 
Mean 
Event 
Rate 
% of Pilots 
reporting 
Event 
Accept ATC clearance 
unable to comply 
2.45 2.9 (20) 24.04 24.2 (24) 
Inadvertent deviation 
from vector 
6.26 3.9 (27) 21.63 13.3 (13) 
Unable to contact ATC 45.2 30.9 (212) 123.20 60.2 (59) 
Accept ATC clearance 
unable to comply 
2.67 4.5 (27) 16.08 25.7 (27) 
Inadvertent deviation 
from vector 
3.48 6.0 (36) 22.21 18.4 (18) 
Unable to contact ATC 26.67 26.2 (158) 153.16 61.2 (60) 
Use of reserve fuel 4.02 8.3 (50) 11.58 16.5 (16) 
Hard landing 0.56 0.7 (4) 2.52 6.0 (6) 
Left cockpit to handle 
disturbance 
1.10 2.1 (10) 2.80 9.0 (9) 
Note: Mean event rates are per 1,000 legs. The number of pilots reporting one or 
more events is in parentheses. 
 
 
All three of the questions demonstrating differences between pre- and post-opt out for both recall 
periods reflected responses to questions involving contact with the ATC. The questions 
pertaining to interactions with ATC were not posed in precisely the same way in the field trial 
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and in the full survey; these differences, and/or the differences in the time of response, could 
have been responsible for the observed differences between groups.  
 
In summary, there is little evidence to indicate that the option to opt out of the public registry 
created a substantial bias in the NAOMS survey data. 
7.8 Discussion of Results  
The results summarized above and presented in more detail in Appendix M illustrate the 
capabilities of the NAOMS-survey methodology. Although limited in time, this project 
demonstrated that statistically reliable significant linear trends could be observed. The analyses 
demonstrated that both temporal shifts that followed a linear pattern and temporal shifts that did 
not follow a linear pattern could be reliably measured and distinguished from seasonal patterns. 
The analyses including aircraft-size categories and type of operation categories demonstrated 
that non-temporal information can be gleaned from the NAOMS survey and that it can be used to 
determine where in the airspace system particular temporal patterns occur. For this study, the 45-
months of data gathering was sufficient to obtain reliable results for about half the questions 
posed. This limitation would be relaxed in an operational investigation in which data would be 
gathered continuously.  
 
The effects of two possible limitations of these data—potential biases introduced by the sample 
selection criteria used for the NAOMS survey and potential biases introduced by changes in the 
FAA Airmen Registry—were also investigated. The effects seen were limited. If these factors 
did introduce biases into the collected data, they still would not affect the conclusions about the 
utility and viability of the methodology. The methodology is shown to work within the sample 
used for the demonstration of the concept.  
 
A comparison of the reports of pilots who matched the selection criteria with those of pilots who 
did not match these criteria indicated that there were few consistent differences in reported event 
rates due to the selection criteria. This conclusion by itself does not justify generalization of the 
rates of events based on the NAOMS survey to the full air-carrier population. However, it does 
provide evidence that this bias in the sample pool used in the NAOMS survey had little effect on 
the reported temporal patterns.  
 
Prior to the start of the NAOMS survey, the FAA allowed pilots to opt out of the public 
Airmen’s Registry. Comparisons between the reports of pilots who participated in a survey prior 
to the change in the FAA registry policy and reports of pilots who participated in the NAOMS 
survey revealed some differences. Although it was not possible to fully ascertain the effect of the 
potential bias introduced by the change in registry policy on the observed temporal patterns in 
event rates, the available evidence suggests that there were few differences in the experiences of 
pilots who opted out of the public registry and those who did not. The differences that were 
observed were in the direction of possibly higher event rates in the experiences of pilots not in 
the registry. Despite the lack of convincing evidence of a consistent bias caused by pilots 
deciding to opt out of the public Airmen Registry, the full Airmen Registry should be used in any 
future efforts similar to NAOMS.  
 
The results of the analyses of potential biases support the idea that the background of the pilot-
reporter does not affect the likelihood of encountering an event or reporting it. Most of the 
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questions asked in the NAOMS survey simply ask how many times an event was experienced 
while flying an aircraft during a specified recall period. These questions demand little if any 
judgment on the part of the reporter. An event is an event regardless of the reporter. 
 
Although conclusions can be drawn about the methodology, one should not rely upon the 
findings on specific events to draw conclusions about today’s national airspace system. In order 
to do so, a study would need to be conducted in a relevant time frame. The methods used in any 
such study should follow the recommendations mentioned above and detailed later in this report. 
But, with that caveat, the results of the analyses reported here could be helpful in formulating 
hypotheses for future study. 
 
For example, the rate of instances in which pilots reported beginning the takeoff roll while 
another aircraft was on the runway decreased between 2002 and 2003. This pattern suggests that 
a discrete intervention may have been the cause. The lack of interaction between aircraft 
category and type of operation suggests that the cause of the decrease had an affect across the 
system. What could it have been? The rate of these events appears higher in small and medium 
aircraft and in passenger operations. Why? The rate of events in which pilots reported needing to 
utilize their reserve fuel supplies increased linearly across the observation period. This pattern 
suggests a slowly changing cause. This increase was observed in medium, large, and wide-body 
aircraft but only for passenger operations. The highest rates were observed in wide-body aircraft 
and cargo operations. The increase in the use of reserve fuel could reflect changes in economic 
conditions, weather patterns, or other factors—but why was it not observed in cargo operations? 
NAOMS was not designed to answer these questions but it can provide focus for future research. 
 
In summary, NAOMS successfully developed and tested a survey methodology that can 
provide a reliable basis for determining temporal patterns in potentially hazardous events in 
the national airspace system.  
8. Analyses of Special Topics 
8.1 Overview 
The primary objective of NAOMS was to assess changes in event rates over time for the events 
addressed by the questions in Section B. Another objective of NAOMS was to provide the 
capability for quick research on topics of special interest to the aviation community. Section C of 
the NAOMS survey questionnaire addressed this goal. In contrast to Section B, Section C was 
designed to cast a “spotlight” on a particular issue at a particular time, not to measure changes 
over time. During the nearly 4 years of the full survey of air-carrier pilots, two topics were 
studied to assess the value of including a “spotlight” look at a selected topic. The first of these 
was the safety implications of In-Close Approach Changes (ICAC), a subject of interest to the 
aviation community at the time the NAOMS development began. An ICAC is defined as an 
unrequested clearance amendment when the aircraft is within 10 miles of its destination airport. 
This subject was the topic of Section C for the most of the survey. The second topic, 
implementation of selected safety interventions, was addressed later in the survey in response to 
interest expressed by the Civil Aviation Study Team. These two studies are discussed in this 
section. 
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8.2 The Study of In-Close Approach Changes  
In-Close Approach Changes, the primary topic of Section C of NAOMS, was also being 
investigated by other elements of the ASMM, providing a means of evaluating how NAOMS 
could complement other kinds of safety data. The description of ICAC used in this study was 
that an aircraft is given an unrequested clearance amendment when it is within 10 miles of its 
destination airport involving change in runway assignment, approach speed, or approach altitude.  
 
Sixteen questions related to ICACs were developed for Section C of the air-carrier-pilot survey. 
A total of 600,410 approaches were reported. Pilots reported experiencing ICAC requests from 
ATC on about 6% (34,291) of their flights. They almost always (93.5%; 32,054 approaches) 
accepted these requests. On 6.5% (2,076) of these flights, pilots reported experiencing a problem. 
These problems might have occurred in the absence of an ICAC and other problems might have 
developed if the ICAC had not been used. However, a reasonable conclusion is that ICACs 
contribute to many of these unwanted events. The problems most often mentioned following an 
ICAC were unstabilized approaches and long landings (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10. Problems Associated with ICAC 
 
Type of ICAC Problem 
 
Number 
Reported* 
% of Itemized 
Problems among 
Accepted ICACs 
Unstabilized approach 1,205 3.76 
Long or fast landing 1,128 3.52 
Wake turbulence 407 1.27 
Missed approach 404 1.26 
Ground conflict 99 0.31 
Airborne conflict 96 0.30 
Out-of-limit winds 64 0.20 
Landing without clearance 13 0.04 
Other 914 2.85 
* The number of problems reported adds up to more than the number of 
ICACs because a single ICAC could result in multiple events. 
 
 
The data displayed in Figure 15 demonstrate that the number of operations had a major impact 
on the likelihood of ICACs. However, the variability in ICAC rates at every level of traffic 
suggests that other factors, such as the configuration of the airport, the distribution of landing 
times, etc., also may affect the likelihood of an ICAC. 
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Figure 15. Probability of ICAC for 50 busiest U.S. airports. 
 
 
The ICAC study demonstrates the ability of NAOMS to support the needs of the aviation 
community for information on targeted special topics. The ICAC study also provided an 
opportunity to assess how NAOMS-survey data could be used in conjunction with other safety-
related data to present a fuller picture of what is happening in the national airspace. A study was 
performed under the ASMM project to demonstrate whether the fusion of information generated 
by ASMM tools (APMS, PDARS, and NAOMS) and other sources (ASRS and APMS) could 
provide more insight into safety events than each could do alone. The contribution of NAOMS to 
this larger effort was an understanding of the relative frequency of events and the context in which 
they occurred. Although limited by time and data availability, the ASMM study, involving 
multiple sources, provided valuable information on how the various sources might best be used. A 
summary of the results of this study is found in Statler, I.C., Morrison, R., and Rosenthal, L.J. 
(2003). 
8.3 The Study with the CAST/JIMDAT  
As the AvSSP was coming to its close in 2004, there was a strong emphasis on transitioning all 
of the technologies that had been developed under that program to the aviation industry. By that 
time, NAOMS was the sole remaining major development under the ASMM project without an 
identified permanent home. During the two years following the completion of the survey of air-
carrier pilots, the NAOMS team focused on transferring the capability to an organization that 
could continue the service after NASA ended the project. Consequently, efforts turned to that 
objective by pursuing contacts and briefings with several organizations during 2004. Among 
these many meetings were discussions with the JIMDAT, a subgroup of an international 
industry group, the Civil Aviation Safety Team (CAST). For several years, the CAST had been 
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examining accidents in depth, identifying common problem areas, and proposing interventions 
to mitigate those problems. This activity resulted in many recommended Safety Enhancements 
(SEs). The CAST organized the JIMDAT to monitor and measure the effectiveness of these SEs 
as they became implemented by the industry. Meetings with and briefings to the JIMDAT and 
the CAST by the NAOMS project team produced an interest in the possibility of using the 
NAOMS survey for their purpose. Consequently, NASA undertook a special study in 
collaboration with the JIMDAT to evaluate the use of the NAOMS survey to assess the 
efficacies and the extent of implementation of SEs. 
 
A working group was formed composed of members of the JIMDAT and the NAOMS team. 
This group decided that they should focus their experiment on the SEs that were concerned 
specifically with training and procedures and that these could be appropriately addressed in 
Section C of the pilot-survey questionnaire, the section that addresses special topics. The 
CAST and the JIMDAT specified the topics they wanted addressed by the questions in the new 
Section C of the survey instrument. These topics were: 
• Basic flying activity (during the recall period-60 days) 
• Ground proximity warning systems 
• Approach related issues 
• SOP related issues 
• Recurrent training 
• Safety reporting 
• Corporate safety 
 
The joint working group designed a new Section C that incorporated a total of 34 first level 
questions on these topics. The full air-carrier-pilot questionnaire, including the specific questions 
used in the survey for the JIMDAT, is provided in Appendix D. To meet the needs of the JIMDAT, 
this section included some judgments on the part of the pilots in addition to reports of their 
experiences.  
 
This new section became part of the air-carrier pilot questionnaire and replaced the Section C 
concerned with ICAC that had previously been part of the main survey. Selection of respondents 
continued as before from the pilot pool of the NAOMS survey described in Section 4.  
 
Telephone interviews were completed with 1,148 additional air-carrier pilots over a three month 
period from October 1, 2004, to December 17, 2004, to collect the data for this special study. 
The responses to the questions in Section A were used for normalization of the responses to the 
questions in Section C. The responses of this group of pilots to the questions in Section B (which 
remained unchanged) were included in the data set used for the analyses reported in Section 7. 
 
A complete set of the results for all of the questions in Section C used for the JIMDAT study is 
provided in Appendix N.  
 
The pilots were cooperative and responsive to the set of questions. The results indicated that pilots 
were aware and supportive of their companies’ procedures and policies and they presented a 
favorable view of their corporate culture and practices. For example, in response to questions 
related to their airline’s SOPs, 97% reported that their airline’s written SOPs describe how to 
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perform recovery from unusual attitudes and departure from controlled flight; 96% said the SOPs 
describe how to avoid approach and landing accidents; and 99% said they addressed how to fly 
non-precision approaches. On the topic of Corporate Safety, 93% said their airline had a Director 
or a VP of Safety and 85% said they had observed a strong commitment to safety among senior 
management. 94% said that, if they had a safety concern, there was a mechanism available to them 
for bringing that concern to the attention of senior management and 89% felt it was effective. 
 
Their responses regarding the training they received also were generally positive. For example, 
97% said their most recent recurrent training had addressed the criteria for initiating and the 
procedures for executing a go-around and missed approach and 95% rated the quality of their 
most recent C-FIT prevention training as Excellent or Good. 
 
The pilots interviewed were receptive to the safety reporting programs. For example, 86% 
reported that their airline participated in the Aviation Safety Action Program; 71% favored the 
establishment of an ASAP; 65% felt that there had been positive changes resulting from such 
pilot-reporting programs; and 98% said that, if the situation arose in the future, they would 
submit an ASAP report. 
 
The survey identified several specific areas where there was room for improvement. For 
example, while 100% said they had received CRM training, only 62% felt that this training 
changed how they managed the flight deck. Also, 73% said their airlines had a Flight Operations 
Quality Assurance Program, but for pilots whose airlines did not have such a program only 39% 
said they favored its establishment. 
 
The caution that was expressed with regard to the results of the ICAC study in the previous 
section pertains as well to this study. This was a limited study for the purposes of demonstrating 
a concept and the results should be viewed as preliminary. 
 
The analyses of the responses to the questions of the revised Section C were briefed to the 
JIMDAT and then to the CAST. Both groups were very pleased with the results of this small 
study. The CAST/JIMDAT expressed interest in the operation of a survey of Part 121 pilots but 
NASA could not commit to continuing the service. The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 
offered to perform the service on behalf of the CAST provided that NASA would develop a less 
costly alternative to telephone interviews. The hand-off of the NAOMS air-carrier-pilot survey 
from NASA to ALPA is discussed in the following Section. 
9. The Hand-Off Phase 
9.1 Background 
Two separate but related issues influenced the decision to stop collecting air-carrier-pilot data in 
December 2004. First, the limited term of the NASA Aviation Safety and Security Program 
(AvSSP), of which NAOMS was a part, expired in FY05. Second, NASA felt that sufficient data 
had been gathered to meet the core objective of assessing the feasibility of the methodology. As 
a research and development organization, NASA’s goal was to develop NAOMS, demonstrate its 
merits and limitations, identify its flaws and recommended improvements, and provide others 
with the knowledge needed to develop, expand, and operate such a survey over the long-term, as 
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had been planned. Consequently, as the AvSSP was coming to an end, NASA management made 
the decision to focus the NAOMS team on transferring the capability to the aviation industry. 
 
After the collaborative study described in Section 8.3, the CAST/JIMDAT became interested in 
using NAOMS and, in view of its pending termination by NASA, the ALPA offered to operate a 
survey based on NAOMS of Part 121 pilots on behalf of the CAST. However, ALPA stipulated 
that the CATI (telephone-interview) mode NASA had used in the pilot surveys would be too 
costly for them and requested that a less expensive way to collect data be developed. 
Consequently, NASA decided that the best path forward was to find a means of greatly reducing 
NAOMS operating costs—even if some reduction in data quality resulted. NASA turned its 
attention to determining if a more streamlined, yet still acceptable, process could be identified to 
meet the ALPA requirements and move the process forward to support aviation industry safety 
efforts. 
9.2 A Web-Based Survey 
Since the inception of the NAOMS project, Web-based surveys have become increasingly 
common. The NAOMS team hypothesized that the most cost-effective method of administering 
the survey would be Web-based data collection. The NAOMS team undertook to:  
• develop a Web-based implementation of the NAOMS survey for routine operation of a 
commercial-pilot survey 
• provide a comparison of statistical results of the Web-based survey to a NAOMS telephone 
survey 
• transfer an operational Web-based survey to the ALPA 
 
The NAOMS team also recommended that additional savings could be achieved by soliciting 
respondent participation, except for the initial contact, by e-mail rather than the U.S. Postal 
Service, which would eliminate much of NAOMS’ paper-and-postage-driven expenses. Taken 
together, these actions appeared to have the potential for substantially reducing NAOMS-survey 
data-collection costs. 
 
Web-based data collection is a recent variation of the self-administered questionnaire (SAQ) 
survey mode that the NAOMS team had considered in the formative years. There are 
considerations regarding the use of a paper-based questionnaire that pertain to an electronic 
version as well. For example, the quality of data collected via the SAQ mode is generally poorer 
than that of data acquired by CATI.  
 
The NAOMS team had not examined Web-based data collection as a modal option during the 
formative years of NAOMS because the approach was too new. There was limited information 
on the validity of survey results obtained through this means. The cost advantages of the Web-
based data-collection approach were clear but there were important unanswered questions 
about how these changes might impact survey quality. However, much has been published on 
this topic in recent years. The developing consensus in the literature is that Web-based data 
collection can produce consistent, quality results at significantly reduced costs (especially 
relative to CATI or face-to-face interviews) for some survey data applications. Nevertheless, 
the NAOMS team was not at all certain that a Web-based survey system for pilots would 
achieve the same response rates and level of quality achieved by the CATI survey.  
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Trust in the interviewing organization is critical to ensuring a good survey. Throughout the 
NAOMS project, the team investigated possible ways that the survey could be continued if the 
concept proved successful.  The question of trust was one of the reasons that NASA had 
difficulty engaging an appropriate agency to take over NAOMS. The airline operators and the 
unions have shown they are reluctant to entrust their identifiable data to their regulatory 
agency, the FAA, although the FAA was in many ways the most logical agency to whom to 
transfer custodianship. The purposes and objectives of the CAST motivated the team to attempt 
to find an agency or organization to continue the survey after the NAOMS project ended. 
However, even the transfer of NAOMS’ methods and procedures to the ALPA was 
accompanied by certain concerns. While ALPA members may trust their union with this 
information, pilots who are members of other unions may not. Also, it is not possible to obtain 
a full picture of the performance of the air-transportation system solely from the perspective of 
the pilots, which is the extent of ALPA’s interest in NAOMS. 
 
In addition to cost savings, Web-based data collection makes it practical for respondents to stop 
and ponder a response, consult logbooks, or do other types of data lookup that are impractical 
with a phone-based interview. However, the NAOMS team had several concerns:  
• Interface. A NAOMS Web-survey application would need to have a pleasing interface that 
would present questions to the respondents with the same clarity as phone interviewers. It 
would need to incorporate the capability built into the CATI system to skip over irrelevant 
questions and drill-down into pertinent follow-on questions and it must be able to satisfy 
respondent requests for clarifying information. All of this has been demonstrated with 
Web-based survey technology, but the NAOMS survey instrument is far more complicated 
and lengthier than typical Web-based surveys.  
• Response Rate. As noted earlier, the NAOMS survey achieved exceptionally high response 
levels during the 2001–2004 evaluation period using the CATI mode. The NAOMS team 
recognized that two of the key reasons for achieving this response rate were the trust that 
NASA brought to the data-collection effort and the Dillman design method that had been 
used for the survey instrument. These advantages would be lost under a cost-based Web-
based system administered by another organization.  
Also, NAOMS-CPHRE professional interviewers were very effective at establishing 
rapport with respondents. Evidence of this is that interviewees ended fewer than 2% of the 
telephone interviews prematurely even though they often ran more than one-half hour. In 
the absence of a human interviewer, it would be relatively easy for a respondent to 
disengage from a Web-based survey session. This concern is supported by the research 
cited earlier that shows SAQs tend to receive less complete responses than CATI surveys. 
• Quality of Responses. As noted earlier, it is possible for respondents to be more deliberate 
while completing a Web-based survey than during a CATI phone interview; it is also 
possible to skim rapidly through a Web-based survey and respond to questions with 
minimal thought. It is not possible to do this in a CATI setting because the interviewer 
paces the survey and presents questions one-by-one in the order structured by the survey 
instrument. 
• Potential Data Discontinuity. A major concern is that the change from the CATI to a Web-
based collection mode would affect the information provided by respondents and would, 
thereby, create a discontinuity between the several years of data collected via the CATI 
 
79 
 
mode and the data collected under a Web-based mode. Therefore, it might be difficult to 
interpret differences between the data collected by the CATI and Web-based approaches. 
One might not be able to differentiate between differences in the data that represent real 
measured changes in aviation safety and differences that are consequences of the change in 
data-collection mode. 
 
 Consequently, the NAOMS team undertook a study with the following objectives: 
1. Determine whether it is practical to accomplish the collection of NAOMS survey data of 
commercial pilots through Web-surveys rather than by CATI. 
2. Assess the relative merits of NAOMS Web-based vs. CATI-based data-collection 
approaches for commercial pilots against the following metrics: 
• Survey response rate: The percentage of eligible respondents who complete the 
interview. 
• Consistency of results: The differences between rates of events derived from Web-
based and CATI data. 
• Subjective quality assessments: The percentage of respondents who have high or very 
high confidence in the accuracy of their answers. 
 
The NAOMS team created a Web-based version of the NAOMS CATI instrument that had been 
used for the air-carrier-pilot survey. After trials of several commercial off-the-shelf Web survey 
products, the NAOMS team found that Illume™, vended by DatStat, Inc., offered the required 
programming flexibility with which to construct a Web-based NAOMS survey instrument.  
 
The team developed an interface and ways to deal with the concerns for security associated with 
Web-based data collection and conducted a brief field test to uncover any deficiencies. This was 
followed by a small trial of Web-based interviews of 1,000 air-carrier pilots randomly selected 
from the same subject pool as the NAOMS-survey study. The survey invitations to the selected 
group were issued on NASA letterhead and were the same as had been used for the CATI survey, 
except that there were no follow-up mailings as there had been for the CATI survey to those who 
had agreed to participate but had not responded.  
 
The trial ran for two months. Of the 1,000 pilots selected for the experiment, 128 completed the 
survey. Whereas the large majority of participants who were located and received invitations to the 
CATI survey responded to the NAOMS team, only a small portion of those whose participation was 
sought for the Web-based survey responded. Furthermore, of those who participated in the Web-
based survey, about 10% began but failed to complete the survey questionnaire whereas less than 
2% of the participants in the earlier CATI survey broke off before completing the interview. 
Consequently, the response rate realized in this small test of the Web-based survey was 
substantially lower that the 81% response rate for the CATI survey mode. This low response rate 
was disappointing but not wholly unexpected for the reasons described previously. It is possible 
that ALPA, with its access to better communication channels to air-carrier pilots, could achieve 
greater participation than was possible during the brief test conducted by the NAOMS team. 
 
Other aspects of the Web-based survey experiment had more favorable outcomes. The invitees 
who agreed to participate were asked to rate their ability to efficiently navigate the survey 
document as Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair, or Poor. Ninety-three percent of the respondents 
reported their experiences as being Excellent or Very Good. The median time to complete the 
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Web survey was 31 minutes. This is close to the average time required to complete the 
equivalent CATI survey. The respondents were asked to rate the time to complete the survey as 
Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair, or Poor. Seventy-nine percent of the respondents viewed the 
time required to complete the survey as Excellent or Very Good. 
 
The flight activity data reported by Web-based respondents to the questions in Section A were 
very similar to the equivalent data provided by CATI respondents. In particular, the average 
number of reported hours and legs flown for the two respondent groups were virtually identical. 
Compared to respondents to the CATI survey, proportionally more respondents to the Web-
based survey worked for small carriers and proportionally fewer worked for cargo carriers. 
Although there were some other differences of note, the Web-based data set was small and 
incomplete making it impossible to compare the event rates reported in the Web-based data to 
the rates obtained using the CATI survey. 
 
The trial of the Web-based version of the NAOMS-survey data-collection system produced 
mixed results. It successfully developed a Web-based version and attendant procedures. The 
application itself worked well and most respondents liked its navigational approach. However, 
the response rate was substantially lower than that of CATI, resulting in a dataset too small for 
reliable analysis. The feasibility of obtaining adequate data quality through a Web-based survey 
would require a larger data collection effort than was available to NASA in this initial 
development and testing effort. 
9.3 Transfer of Web-Based Data Collection System 
Although the NAOMS project had officially ended, NASA collaborated with ALPA 
throughout FY06 to ensure an effective and graceful transfer of the operation of the Web-
based NAOMS survey. The NAOMS team conducted training sessions on the Web 
application for ALPA staff members in early FY07. In January 2007, the operational data-
collection system and associated software licenses were conveyed to ALPA for continuing 
operation of a survey of Part 121 pilots on behalf of the aviation industry. 
10. Lessons Learned: Opportunities for Technical Improvement 
In addition to its primary objectives, the NAOMS project had the objective of identifying what 
worked well and what didn’t work well, and of making recommendations for future work. The 
NAOMS team placed great emphasis on developing and designing a survey process that would 
not only test the concept but also provide researchers and implementers with guidelines on how 
to proceed. Investigations into sample size; memory and recall period; questionnaire content, 
structure, and organization; preferred mode; number of events anticipated; number of interviews 
required; etc. served both the demonstration of the concept and also informational needs of those 
engaging in follow-on activities. But this experiment also revealed steps needed to improve the 
NAOMS survey process. These steps are described here.  
10.1 Improving the Sampling Process 
The most important improvement needed is to identify a means for selecting active air-carrier 
pilots from a fully representative pool of respondents. The NAOMS survey sampled the air-
carrier-pilot population by drawing from the public Airmen’s Registry published by the FAA. 
This registry describes the rating held by a pilot, but does not indicate whether he or she is flying 
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currently as an air-carrier pilot. The NAOMS team used the ratings to identify likely active air-
carrier pilots. To minimize false positives, the pilots were required to hold both ATP and Flight 
Engineers certificates to be eligible for inclusion in the sample pool of air-carrier pilots used for 
the NAOMS survey. This selection approach, and notably the requirement of the Flight Engineer 
Certificate, had the undesirable side effect of biasing the NAOMS-survey sample set of pilots 
toward Captains and pilots who fly the larger, wide-body transports. By contrast, First Officers 
and short-haul flights by regional carriers were under-represented in the NAOMS air-carrier-
survey data.  
 
Approval from the FAA to use the full Airmen Certification Database from which more 
representative samples could be selected could eliminate this potential bias. Fortunately, this bias 
in the NAOMS survey represented by over sampling of captains and pilots of large aircraft does 
not impact analyses of relative changes over time. Also, the size of the bias can be estimated, 
making it possible to compensate for this bias if required for other applications.  
10.2 Achieving Statistical Significance for Rare Events 
Many of the most serious aviation safety events occur very infrequently. This is the result of 
many decades of effort to make the aviation system as safe as possible. Part 121 commercial 
aviation accidents are exceedingly rare. It takes a great deal of data gathered over a long period 
of time to develop statistically reliable estimates of extremely rare event rates. Given the 
available time and financial resources only about 7,000 air-carrier-pilot interviews per year could 
be collected. This sampling rate was not sufficient to obtain statistically reliable estimates of the 
rates of some rare event but it was sufficient to identify relative changes over time of a number 
of aviation safety events. This served the purpose for the demonstration of the concept. 
 
After stratification of the data by four air-carrier-size categories, there were sufficient reports to 
enable statistically reliable analyses for nearly half of the 95 events addressed by the questions in 
Section B. This limitation could be eased by increasing the number of interviews per year and by 
extending data collection over a longer period of time and, preferably, continuously. 
10.3 Addition of Clarifying Drilldown Questions 
When pilots are asked whether they experienced the unwanted events covered by the questions in 
Section B during the preceding 60 days, the overwhelming response is “no.” In fact, the typical 
NAOMS interviewee experienced no more than a very few safety events during the preceding 60 
days. When a respondent says he/she experienced a safety event, it may be desirable, in some 
circumstances, to ask additional clarifying questions. For example, about 30% of all NAOMS-
survey respondents said they flew more than one make and model of aircraft in commercial 
service. The particular make and model that the interviewee said he/she flew the majority of the 
time during the recall period was used in the NAOMS analyses. For future projects, an 
interesting clarifying question that could be asked of pilots flying multiple types of aircraft is the 
make/model he/she was flying at the specific time that the reported event was experienced. 
10.4 Non-Response Bias 
Survey response rates are typically calculated as the proportion of individuals who are contacted 
and complete some substantial portion of the survey. Individuals who are in the target pool but 
who cannot be contacted are not considered. However, if this segment of the population differs 
in important ways from the individuals who are contacted, then the calculated response rate can 
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be misleading. Assessing the effects of this type of “non-response” to a survey is extremely 
difficult and rarely done. Further efforts to locate and survey individuals who cannot be found 
are often ineffective. The NAOMS team judged that, in this case, expending the resources 
needed to attempt to perform an assessment of this type of non-response bias was impractical. 
For future research, pilot unions and other industry representatives could be helpful in locating 
pilots who are selected for interview. 
 
Also, pilots who are contacted but who are ineligible because they had not flown during the 
recall period could be questioned further, though this may be of limited benefit since the only 
useful question from the NAOMS questionnaire is the single question about lifetime experience. 
All the other questions pertain to flying experience during the recall period.  
 
It is interesting to note that the FAA has recently taken substantial steps to update the Airmen 
Registry and ensure that it is up-to-date. If these efforts are successful, the likelihood of potential 
non-response bias would not be an issue for any future implementation of a NAOMS-like 
system.  
10.5 Opportunities for Reduced Cost of Operations 
NASA made a substantial investment in the research and development of the concept of the 
NAOMS survey. Much of that investment relates to the development of methodology, the 
engagement of the aviation stakeholders in the program, and the creation of prototypic NAOMS-
survey analytic outputs. However, the majority of costs relate to data collection. If the NAOMS 
approach is to go beyond the concept demonstration phase, the costs associated with survey data 
collection must be reduced.  
 
One factor in the cost of NAOMS-survey data collection was the investment to maximize 
response rate. To this end, the NAOMS team took its guidance from the “Total Dillman Method” 
that advocates various advance and follow-on mailings. This method led to high participation but 
increased the cost. If a continuing (i.e., long-term) survey were to be undertaken, the community 
would become sufficiently informed so the multiple mailings used for the NAOMS research 
project might not be necessary. 
 
Also, the NAOMS team selected the CATI data-collection method which, while not exorbitantly 
expensive, required training and professional interviewers, which were a significant fraction of 
NAOMS-survey data-collection costs. The fully allocated cost of data collection for the 
experimental NAOMS survey of air-carrier pilots from 2001 to 2004 ranged from $85 to $100 
per interview, depending on the length of the Section C topical section. This was deemed to be 
an acceptable cost during the proof-of-concept and early operational periods of the NAOMS 
survey but is not sustainable over the long run. High unit data-collection costs also create a 
barrier to expanding the survey to other constituent groups such as GA pilots, air-traffic 
controllers, mechanics, cabin attendants, and others in keeping with the original NAOMS vision. 
The NAOMS team actively explored ways to reduce costs and identified two main avenues of 
interest: (1) changing to a Web-based data-collection mode; and (2) soliciting respondent 
participation by e-mail. Taken together these actions have the potential for reducing NAOMS 
survey unit data-collection costs, possibly by as much as 80%. However, there are important 
unanswered questions about the impact these changes would have on the ability to achieve the 
exceptional high response levels realized by the NAOMS survey during the 2001–2004 
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evaluation period. The transition from a NAOMS CATI instrument to a Web-based instrument 
has been accomplished and is available for follow-on research. A properly designed research 
study would be needed to assess the effects of implementing these changes on the completeness 
and accuracy of the information collected by a NAOMS-like survey.  
11. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The NAOMS research project succeeded in demonstrating that it is feasible to use a survey of the 
operators of the air-transportation system to obtain statistically reliable information on the 
occurrences of safety-related events as a means for assessing safety-related changes in the 
National Airspace System. The telephone-based NAOMS survey produced reliable estimates for 
a three-year period of the relative changes over time in the rates with which many unwanted 
events occurred. This project demonstrated the viability of using the NAOMS survey to provide 
a basis for trend analyses of long-term aviation safety rate measures.14 
 
The successful achievement of the objectives of the NAOMS project to gain information that had 
not previously been attainable was due in large part to the care and attention with which the 
NAOMS team resolved a number of key methodological issues related to content and structure 
of survey instruments, the selection of potential respondents, the length of the recall period used 
in the survey, and like matters. The NAOMS team overcame each one of these methodological 
hurdles with carefully designed experiments, consultations with domain experts, and 
knowledgeable pragmatic decisions. The NAOMS survey achieved scientific integrity by using 
meticulously designed survey instruments and a carefully crafted statistical sampling design 
customized to the constituency. The value of viewing the aviation system through the eyes of its 
operators was demonstrated in a survey of 26,170 survey interviews with air-carrier pilots. The 
exceptional survey response rates achieved by the NAOMS survey far exceed those typical of 
survey efforts. This serves to affirm the quality of the survey design as well as the effectiveness 
of the NAOMS system for enlisting the participation of the aviation community. The statistical 
validity of the collected data was assured by this careful design and was demonstrated by the 
subsequent analyses. 
 
Other studies conducted as part of NAOMS dealt with the use of specifically designed questions in 
Section C of the NAOMS survey. This section demonstrated the potential value of including a 
“spotlight” look at a selected topic (see Section 8). Two topics that were of high-interest to the 
aviation community at the time were studied to demonstrate that the NAOMS survey could acquire 
reliable, stable data for rapid feedback on the effects of technological or procedural changes.  
 
A crucial, practical indication of the success of NAOMS was its ability to support the aviation 
community in the assessment of safety risks and the efficacy of government/industry 
interventions. The NAOMS team cultivated a close working association with the aviation 
industry and organized labor including the CAST. One of the studies reported in Section 8 was 
performed in collaboration with the CAST group. That study demonstrated the potential value of 
the survey concept in quickly providing reliable information regarding special topics of interest, 
                                                
14 Telephone use (hard wired or cellular) has changed dramatically since the NAOMS project was conducted. Future 
use of telephones for survey purposes will need to take these changed conditions into account, although the NASA 
methodology (and others that give advance notice and provide for scheduled interviews) should be less affected by 
these changes than those that attempt to conduct a survey on first contact. 
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such as the impacts on the system of new procedures, technologies, or training that the CAST 
had recommended. Section C was used to demonstrate the possibility of establishing 
performance baselines against which the effects of ongoing and future safety interventions 
recommended by the CAST could be measured. As a consequence of this demonstration, the 
CAST concluded that NAOMS afforded the best means currently available to assess the impacts 
of particular interventions. 
 
It is important to recognize that NAOMS was a research project whose purpose was to provide 
proof of a concept and to assess the feasibility of the methodology being proposed. NAOMS 
sought to test the methodology, identify what procedures worked well and what did not work 
well, and offer recommendations for future work. These recommendations could not be made 
until the analyses of the survey data had been accomplished. However, analyses of the data, as 
was done to demonstrate that they produce statistically valid results, does not translate into an 
assessment of the operational performance and safety of the air-transportation system nor is it 
appropriate to attempt to make that leap.  
 
Criticism of NAOMS and confusion as to its objectives followed from speculating on system 
safety based on the premature release of raw, unscrubbed, and unanalyzed data from a partially 
executed project.15 It was only recently that some of the team members have been able to re-
engage to complete the research project and produce this report documenting the achievement of 
its primary objective: providing statistically valid estimates of trends in the rates of problematic 
events experienced by flight crews. There is much more analysis that could be done to glean 
what else might be learned from viewing the aviation system through the eyes of these 26,170 
air-carrier pilots. However, the analyses performed so far provide justification only for the 
results reported here, with no implications regarding other aspects of system performance. 
 
Although conclusions can be drawn related to the methodology, no conclusions can be drawn 
from these data about the safety of today’s National Airspace System. For that, a study would 
need to be conducted in a relevant time frame and performed in accordance with the 
recommendations outlined in the previous section of this report. However, with that caveat, there 
are findings in these data that can be helpful in formulating hypotheses for future research. 
 
 In accordance with the appropriate objectives of a research project, the NAOMS approach was 
successful in identifying flaws and needed improvements. Although NAOMS solicited responses 
only from air-carrier pilots, it is reasonable to assume that these lessons learned could also apply 
to other respondent groups (GA, ATC, maintenance personnel, cabin attendants, etc.). The 
following modifications should be made before the NAOMS survey concept is translated into a 
fully operational national aviation safety-monitoring service.  
 
First, although NAOMS demonstrated the ability of the methodology to measure changes over 
time and other relative changes for a large segment of the air-carrier community, an 
                                                
15 The data collected over nearly 4 years of the NAOMS survey were released to the public in response to 
a FOIA request, despite the fact that the analyses had not been completed and the project was still a work-
in- progress. While the NAOMS team had followed strict procedures to protect the confidentiality and 
anonymity of reporters, NASA engaged in a further large redaction effort to assure anonymity before 
release of these raw data. 
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operationally implemented survey should select from a pool of the entire air-carrier population 
(as well as from the entire pool of other participants as these groups are added to the survey). 
Second, the sample size and duration of the survey must be adequate to yield statistically reliable 
estimates of event rates, including those of extremely rare events that may constitute high-level 
threats to aviation safety. Third, the costs of conducting a fully operational survey, and especially 
one that taps all participant communities, must be reduced. The majority of NAOMS costs 
related to identifying respondents and conducting the data collection. The NAOMS team 
identified several ways to potentially reduce these costs: (1) shifting to a Web-based data-
collection mode; and (2) soliciting respondent information via e-mail. Taken together these 
changes have the potential for substantially reducing survey costs. However, both Web-based 
survey and e-mail contact approaches need to be examined further for their impact on the quality 
of the data and the response rates. 
 
The goal of NAOMS was to conduct the research that would enable the creation of a permanent 
service of a continuing, comprehensive, and coherent survey of all of the operators of the aviation 
system by an appropriate agency. NAOMS demonstrated the viability of the concept. Even today, 
no other feasible approach for obtaining statistically valid data about a wide range of safety events 
from the various system operators has been identified. Therefore, the NAOMS research project 
team recommends that steps be taken to begin development of a fully operational survey of the 
operators of the air-transportation system.16 Such a system is needed to: 
• routinely measure the safety of the national air-transportation system in a quantitatively 
precise way 
• assess trends in the performance of the national air-transportation system that may have 
implications of compromised safety and identify the factors associated with those 
trends 
• identify safety and efficiency effects of new technologies and/or procedures inserted 
into the operating environment 
 
NextGen will involve numerous changes to the NAS.  A NAOMS-like survey provides the means 
to identify the effects of such policy changes across the National Airspace System. 
  
                                                
16 The primary step needed involves cost reduction. In particular, Web-based surveys require further 
investigation to supplement the research done under the NAOMS project. 
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Appendix B. NAOMS Project Team and Consultants 
 
 
NASA Management 
 
The following NASA Ames managers provided direct oversight for the NAOMS program: 
 
Dr. Mary M. Connors, NAOMS project co-lead. Mary Connors is Asst. Chief for Aviation 
Programs in the Human-System Integration Division at NASA’s Ames Research Center.  She 
received her Ph.D. in Communications from Stanford University and her M.A. in Experimental 
Psychology from Fordham University.  Much of her work with NASA has involved the impact 
of advanced technologies, including the interaction between humans and information / 
communications systems. She has authored numerous scientific articles on a range of behavioral 
science topics including visual perception, communications and space, and aeronautical human 
factors. She is the senior author of a book (“Living Aloft: Human Requirements for Extended 
Spaceflight”) that is considered a primary source in the field of space-human factors.  Most 
recently, her NASA work has been directed toward the development and implementation of 
projects to advance aviation safety. 
 
Ms. Linda Connell, NAOMS project co-lead. Ms. Connell is director of the NASA Aviation 
Safety Reporting System, director of the NASA/VA Patient Safety Reporting System (PSRS), 
and a research psychologist in the Human-System Integration Division at NASA’s Ames 
Research Center. Ms. Connell has been working at NASA Ames Research Center since 1981 and 
has participated in numerous studies with domestic and international research teams exploring 
human factor issues in aviation environments. During her graduate work at San Jose State 
University, Ms. Connell completed her master's degree in experimental psychology.  Ms. 
Connell also is a pilot and a registered nurse. 
 
Dr. Irving C. Statler, ASMM project manager. Dr. Statler is retired from NASA in 2008 and is 
currently a volunteer as an Ames Associate.  His last official assignment while employed by 
NASA was as the manager of the project that designed, established, and demonstrated national 
distributed archives of air-carrier flight-recorded data and of aviation incident reports. Prior to 
that assignment, Dr. Statler was the Lead for the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling 
(ASMM) Project of the NASA Aviation Safety Program from 1999 to its conclusion in 2005.  
He was the NASA Project Manager for the Aviation Performance Measuring System (APMS) 
research project since its inception in 1994 and the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting 
System (PDARS) research project since 1997, both of which became, along with NAOMS, key 
elements of the ASMM Project.  From 1991 to 1994, he was (Acting) Chief of the Aerospace 
Human Factors Research Division at NASA Ames Research Center.  From 1988 to 1991, Dr. 
Statler was a researcher in that division at Ames.  Prior to that, he was Director of the Advisory 
Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) to the NATO Military Committee 
from 1985 to 1988.  From 1970 to 1985, he was Director of the US Army Aviation Systems 
Command’s Aeromechanics Laboratory.  Dr. Statler received his Ph.D. from California Institute 
of Technology in 1956. 
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Contractor Research Team 
 
The following key personnel were instrumental in planning, conducting, and analyzing research 
for the NAOMS program: 
 
Mr. Loren Rosenthal, contractor’s project manager. Mr. Rosenthal is an aviation safety expert 
and manager of Battelle’s aviation safety information technology programs in Mountain View, 
CA.  Mr. Rosenthal's technical expertise includes systems and database design; systems safety; 
applied statistics; and transportation economics.  He received an MBA in Transportation and 
Public Utilities from the University of Wisconsin in 1977. 
Dr. Robert Dodd, contractor’s principal investigator. Dr. Dodd is currently a member of the 
National Transportation Safety Board. He has over 20 years as an aviation safety analyst and 
investigator.  He was a safety engineer for the Air Line Pilots Association, a safety investigator 
for the National Transportation Safety Board, and worked as a research scientist for Battelle’s 
ASRS program.  He obtained his doctorate from Johns Hopkins University in Public Health and 
is an ATP rated pilot.  Dr. Dodd served as the contractor’s principal investigator for the NAOMS 
project and oversaw the day-to-day operations of the research project. 
 
Dr. Jon Krosnick, survey methodologist. Dr. Krosnick is currently a professor in the Department 
of Psychology at Stanford University.  Prior to that, and during the time he was a consultant on 
the NAOMS project providing council on the design NAOMS survey instrument, he was a 
professor of psychology at the Ohio State University. He completed his undergraduate degree at 
Harvard University and his Ph.D. in Social Psychology at the University of Michigan.  Dr. 
Krosnick is an expert in survey design and application, and sits on the Board of Directors for the 
Gallop organization. He has authored numerous books on survey research and on designing 
questionnaires.  
 
Dr. Joan Cwi, survey application manager. Dr. Cwi is director of survey operations for 
Battelle’s Center for Health Policy Research and Evaluation (CHPRE).  Dr. Cwi obtained her 
Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University and has over 20 years experience in survey research.  She 
has managed many large survey efforts relating to public health issues.  For NAOMS, Dr. Cwi 
managed Battelle’s application of the surveys during the field trial and the full survey phase of 
air-carrier and GA pilots. 
 
Dr. Thomas Ferryman, senior statistician. Dr. Ferryman served as the senior statistician for the 
NAOMS project.  Dr. Ferryman is a Battelle research scientist who works as technical group 
leader in the Statistical and Quantitative Sciences Group of the Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory (PNNL) in Richland, Wash.  Dr. Ferryman obtained his Ph.D. from the University of 
California, Riverside and has more than 30 years of experience in statistical research.  He has 
performed work in a wide variety of projects, including environment, health/medical, national 
security, and aviation safety. 
 
Mr. Daniel Haber, research scientist. Mr. Daniel Haber has nearly a decade of multidisciplinary 
experience with Battelle.  His versatility has enabled him to provide critical systems 
development and research support to quality, safety, and advanced analytics programs for the 
NASA Ames Research Center as well as serve as a staff consultant to CompeteColumbus, an 
executive-level business consortium focused on regional technology-based economic 
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development.  In healthcare, Mr. Haber has worked with Central Ohio hospital systems to assess 
potential investments in health information technologies and a shared-use proton therapy facility.  
Mr. Haber is currently leading Battelle's strategic business development efforts surrounding 
healthcare research and quality.  Mr. Haber obtained his MBA from the Ohio State University 
and his BS in Business Administration and Computer Science from Oregon State University. 
 
Dr. Robert Mauro, experimental psychologist and statistical analyst. Robert Mauro is a Senior 
Research Scientist at Decision Research and an Associate Professor at the University of Oregon 
where he is a member of the Psychology Department and the Institute of Cognitive and Decision 
Sciences.  Dr. Mauro received an AB in Sociology from Stanford University in 1979, a MS in 
Psychology from Yale University in 1981 and his PhD in Psychology from Stanford in 1984.  
Dr. Mauro conducts research and teaches in the areas of decision-making, human emotion, and 
statistical methods with an emphasis on applied problems in law and aviation.  He has worked 
with a variety of organizations including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the 
Federal Aviation Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, and private concerns.  In 
aviation, Dr. Mauro has focused on issues related to pilot judgment and decision-making.  He has 
worked on projects related to the design and evaluation of airline procedures, the development 
and evaluation of pilot training materials, risk assessment, and the statistical analysis of rare 
events. 
 
Dr. Mike Silver, survey methodologist. Dr. Silver was a doctoral candidate in social psychology 
at the Ohio State University at the time he was working with Dr. Krosnick as a research associate 
for the NAOMS project.  He has conducted a broad variety of background research for the 
project and has been instrumental in the analysis of much of the information gathered during 
background interviews and focus groups. 
 
Mr. J.M. Jobanek, aviation safety analyst. Mr. Jobanek served as an aviation expert senior 
consultant to Battelle for the NAOMS project.  Mr. Jobanek received his undergraduate degree 
from the United States Naval Academy and holds two masters degrees, one in transportation 
safety and the other environmental engineering.  Mr. Jobanek has over 8,000 flight hours in a 
variety of civilian and military transport category aircraft.  He has flown as a civilian air-carrier 
pilot and was an air safety investigator for the Air Line Pilots Association.  He retired from the 
U.S. Air Force Reserves as a colonel. 
 
Ms. Andrea Renholds, research statistician. Ms. Andrea Renholds, senior research scientist at 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, has worked for many years in the area of radiation 
detection via gamma ray spectroscopy.  At the time she participated in the analyses of the 
NAOMS data, she was co-principle investigator for projects involving hyperspectral image 
analysis.  She has experience as a member of multidisciplinary teams working in areas as varied 
as infield radiation detection data collection and protein research involving micro arrays.  Ms. 
Renholds received her master of science in Mathematics from Brigham Young University in 
December 2001, specializing in numerical analysis. 
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Appendix C. Literature Review 
 
 
Evaluation of the literature at the time of the commencement of the NAOMS project indicated 
that little scientific survey research on aviation safety had been conducted.  Of those that were 
conducted, none were found to be ongoing systematic surveys. 
 
MITRE conducted a study for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on runway surface 
operations that relied on information from pilots derived from surveys.  The study, titled 
“Reports by Airline Pilots on Airport Surface Operations,” was published in March 1996 (FAA 
contract DTFA01-93-C-00001).  The survey was a lengthy instrument (over 200 questions) that 
included both formatted questions (questions that required specific responses) and questions that 
were open-ended.  The sampling frame for the survey was not based on a random selection 
process.  Rather, selections were limited to a sample of roughly 10,000 pilots of two airlines that 
fly throughout the United States.  Approximately 2,000 pilots responded for a response rate of 
about 20%.  The survey was a self-administered questionnaire that was distributed to pilots 
through their airline mail system.  Each survey contained only a portion of all 200 questions in 
an effort to reduce the burden on each individual pilot.  A field trial of the survey instrument was 
conducted and revisions made based on comments from the survey respondents, airline union 
officials, and airline management. 
 
Other surveys that were discovered were primarily conducted by special interest groups such as 
pilot unions or trade associations.  The results of these surveys were not available, but interviews 
with the sponsoring organizations indicated that the surveys tended to be limited, episodic and 
specific to particular subgroups.  
 
The NAOMS team turned to the general survey literature for insights that might be applied to 
aviation because so little aviation-specific survey literature was available.  Two generic issues 
this literature could address was the selection of data collection mode (described later) and the 
optimal approach to wording questions to maximize recall accuracy? 
 
C.1 Data Collection Mode Literature 
NAOMS evaluated the three most common survey data collection modes: self-administered 
questionnaires (SAQ), computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI), and in-person interviews. 
When choosing a survey administration mode, a number of considerations are relevant.  The four 
criteria influencing this choice are: collection cost, respondent satisfaction, response rate, and 
data quality.  
 
C.1.1. Mode Literature on Cost 
The literature review indicated that in-person interviews are usually the most expensive, 
telephone interviews are often significantly less expensive, and self-administered questionnaires 
are typically the least expensive.  However, if efforts are made to achieve the highest response 
rates possible with self-administered questionnaires, then the cost of that mode is close to the 
cost of applying the same questionnaire via the telephone. 
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C.1.2. Mode Literature on Respondent Satisfaction 
Respondent satisfaction metrics favored in-person interviewing.  In a study comparing 
respondents interviewed in-person and by telephone, Groves (1979) found that a large majority 
of the respondents to in-person interviews (78%) were satisfied with the experience, whereas 
only 38% of the respondents to the telephone interviews said they were satisfied. 
 
C.1.3. Mode Literature on Response Rate 
When comparing for response rate, in-person interviewing once again proves superior to the 
other modes.  It is widely accepted that in-person surveys can achieve up to 70% response rate; 
telephone surveys can achieve a 60%r esponse, and mail surveys typically achieve 10-20% 
response rates unless heroic efforts are implemented (see Dillman, 1978). 
 
C.1.4. Mode Literature on Data Quality 
Two other important considerations for NAOMS were not widely recognized in the literature on 
modes: satisficing and social desirability bias.  In general, modes that encourage these 
phenomena also compromise data quality. 
 
Surveys can require respondents to do a great deal of cognitive work for little or no real reward 
(see Krosnick, 1991).  This can lead to satisficing behavior.  When this happens, respondents 
exert the minimal effort needed to satisfy survey requirements.  Responses are not always well 
thought through and are more likely to contain bad data. 
 
Social desirability bias describes the tendency of respondents to answers questions in a way that 
present them to interviewers in a respectable light---even if it requires the truth to be “bent” or 
ignored. 
 
From the satisficing perspective, the literature indicates that telephone interviews are least 
desirable, and self-administered questionnaires work as well or better than in-person 
interviewing.  Likewise, self-administered questionnaires appeared to minimize social 
desirability bias, while telephone interviews maximized this bias. The results of this review are 
described in more detail in the report. 
 
C.1.5. Summary of Data Collection Mode Literature 
Self-administered questionnaires earned the distinction of being significantly less expensive to 
conduct, and they also scored high marks for delivering quality data.  However, they also have 
disadvantages.  They usually have significantly lower response rates than other survey modes, 
unless extensive effort is made to increase response in which case the cost becomes comparable 
to telephone interviews.  Furthermore, it is difficult to implement complex skip patterns in paper-
based self-administered surveys. 
 
When considering respondent satisfaction and response rate, the literature review favored in-
person interviews, hinting that the more expensive the data collection method, the better it would 
perform. 
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With no clear winner, the NAOMS team determined that additional research was needed to 
select the most appropriate interview mode for the initial population of air carrier pilots.  It was 
determined that the most efficient method to conduct this additional evaluation would be to test 
the different survey application methods during the field trial as discussed in the report.  That 
way, response rate, data quality, cost, and other key indicators could be compared.   
 
C.2. Memory Organization Literature 
NAOMS researchers hoped that a review of literature about memory organization would provide 
insights about where to set the recall period for pilots and how to structure a questionnaire that 
would lead to maximum recall of safety-related events.  The report and Appendix G speak to this 
topic in greater detail. 
 
Human memory is not necessarily organized chronologically with one discrete event following 
another in the order in which they occurred (Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996). Rather, the 
human mind employs many different types of memory organization approaches (Sedikides & 
Ostrom, 1988; Srull, 1983).  Techniques developed to assess how events or other information are 
organized in people’s memories include: open-ended verbal protocols (also called “think-
alouds”); listing; sorting; and speeded recall.  These techniques are ordered from the most 
exploratory to the most confirmatory. 
 
Verbal protocols are best used for assessing the structure of memory in domains where it is 
unclear in advance what structures might be prevalent, as was true for the NAOMS project, 
because they rely on open-ended responses.  Having discerned likely structures, one can then use 
the latter techniques to confirm the existence of those structures. 
 
Each of these techniques has advantages and disadvantages, and when used together, they allow 
researchers to converge on the memory organization typically employed by people who share 
occupation or other attributes that tend to shape memory organization.  Such knowledge would 
then allow the NAOMS team to design its questionnaire to mirror this organizational pattern.  
For example, if it was discovered that most pilots store safety-related events by flight phase, 
questions could be constructed to match that scheme.  In that case, the NAOMS survey 
instrument could instruct respondents to first think about any safety-related incidents that 
occurred during takeoffs during the last week and prompt them with a list of such possible 
incidents.  Alternatively, if pilots primarily organized their memories according to the focus of 
attention when the problem occurred, one might first ask them to think about any problems they 
might have had interacting with ATC during the last month, and prompt them with a list of such 
possible incidents.  
 
The NAOMS team undertook a simple experimental process to gain insights on pilot memory 
organization since the literature was bereft of information on this topic. The results of these tests 
are described in the report. 
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Appendix E. Memorandum on Recall Period 
 
 
Authors’ Note: The selection of an optimum recall period was one of the key methodological 
issues studied by the NAOMS team. Some of the factors that guided the memory 
studies the team conducted were addressed in the following decision document 
prepared by Battelle and Ohio State University in December 1999 largely based 
on a review of the literature. 
 
 
 
 
Input to NAOMS Decision on Selecting a Recall Interval to 
Maximize the Accuracy of Pilot Recollections 
 
Introduction 
 In the full-scale survey we will ultimately field, we will ask pilots to recall safety-related 
events that they have experienced. In order to design these questions, one of the fundamental 
issues we have to resolve is for how long in the past pilots can accurately recall the events that 
they have experienced (e.g., one week? one month? one year?). For purposes of efficiency, we 
would like to ask about as long a time interval as possible without compromising accuracy. To 
help make this decision, we conducted a review of the published literature on the accuracy of 
recall, and we conducted a study to assess the accuracy of pilots’ recall. This memo reports what 
we found. 
 In order for pilots to accurately answer our NAOMS survey questions, they must (1) 
remember that each event they witnessed actually occurred, (2) remember exactly when the 
events they remember occurred, so they can properly include it in or exclude it from the 
reference period we ask about, and (3) not believe they remember events that never in fact 
occurred (called “fabrications”). Therefore, we sought to assess how well people can recall that 
an event occurred, how accurate people are in recalling the dates of events, and how much they 
fabricate events. Not surprisingly, occurrence recall and dating become less accurate as the 
retention interval increases. Therefore, our primary goal in this memo is to ascertain the longest 
possible recall interval that is not associated with significant compromise in recall accuracy, to 
inform our decision about the best retention interval for the NAOMS survey. 
 Dating accuracy can be assessed in two different ways, and we will do both. First, we 
explore what we call absolute dating error, which refers to how far off a person’s recollection of 
a date is from the truth, regardless of the direction of the error (i.e., ignoring whether the person 
claims the event occurred more recently than it actually did or that it occurred less recently than 
it actually did).  
Second, we explored the direction of dating errors that people make, focusing on what we 
refer to as signed dating error, which is positive when people think an event occurred longer ago 
than it really did and negative when people think an event occurred more recently that it really 
did. In the memory literature, these two types of error are referred to as “backward telescoping” 
and “forward telescoping,” respectively (Rubin & Baddeley, 1989). Backward telescoping will 
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bias our event counts downward, and forward telescoping will bias our event counts upward, so 
we need to know when each type of telescoping occurs to inform our decision about recall 
period. 
 At present, NAOMS is not intended to ask respondents about the specific details of 
particular events they witnessed. That is, there are no plans to ask people about circumstances 
surrounding individual equipment failures they witnessed, for example. Rather, we plan simply 
to ask people to count up numbers of events. However, past studies of memory have often 
assessed people’s ability to recall details of events they witnessed, and we review this literature 
to get a sense of how quickly memory fades. It is well-known that memory for details of events 
fades as time passes, but literature reviews to date have not yet attempted to use the available 
evidence to inform decisions about optimal recall periods (e.g., Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 
1996). We do so. 
As we will document below, the findings of past studies of memory are consistent in 
supporting some conclusions but are very different in the specifics of findings in many regards. 
Furthermore, no past study we have located has explored people’s ability to remember events 
that occur in the course of professional work activity that is very involving but is also very 
repetitive. Therefore, it is difficult to comfortably generalize findings from these past studies to 
the work that pilots do. As a result, we felt it important to conduct research directly exploring 
pilots’ ability to remember events that occur repeatedly in the course of their professional 
activities. The new study we describe below did just that.  
Literature Review 
Criteria for Selecting Studies for the Review 
Psychologists and other social scientists have conducted thousands of studies exploring 
memory, but only a small fraction of these studies apply to the issues of current interest to us. 
Several criteria were used to select the studies most applicable and useful for our purposes.  
To be included in this review, a study had to address the accuracy of memory for specific 
events or the frequency of personal events that the respondent personally experienced or 
witnessed. This excluded studies that did not address the accuracy or validity of the memories 
recalled, studies that tested memory for non-events, such as word lists or abstract symbols, and 
studies of memory for events that were not personally experienced (e.g., memories of public 
news events, such as an earthquake that occurred far away from the respondent) or that focused 
on another person’s life events (e.g., a husband answering questions about his wife’s medical 
history). 
 Additionally, a study had to gauge memory using a free recall or cued-recall paradigm 
rather than a recognition paradigm. In the standard free recall paradigm, respondents are asked to 
generate recollections without being given any cues or hints. In a cued-recall paradigm, 
respondents are provided some help to facilitate remembering (e.g., cue words, a calendar). But 
in recognition studies, people are presented with descriptions of specific objects or events and 
are asked to report whether they did or did not occur, were or were not seen previously, and so 
on. Because the NAOMS surveys will not be able to describe specific events to respondents in 
this fashion, we focused on studies of free recall and cued recall, which are procedures more like 
what will be done in NAOMS.  
 To be included in this review, a study had to involve some method of assessing the 
accuracy of people’s recollections. That is, each study needed to involve use of an objective 
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indicator of the truth of events as a baseline against which to compare people’s recollections. For 
some studies, paper or computer records were checked. For other studies, researchers instigated 
and observed the events that respondents were later asked to recall. And in other studies, 
respondents kept diaries or other written records while events occurred, with which later 
recollections could be compared.  
Quite a few studies have gauged reporting accuracy by comparing the aggregation of 
reports from a representative sample of a population with aggregate figures for the same 
population derived from institutional records. For example, Gottfredson and Hindelang (1977) 
compared an aggregation of people’s reports of how often they had been victims of crimes with 
aggregate figures derived from police reports recording crimes. Although such studies are useful 
for many purposes, they do not address recall at the individual level and so were excluded from 
this review. 
Additionally, studies had to be published in English and relatively easily accessible in 
order to be included in our review. So, for example, theses, dissertations, and unpublished 
manuscripts were excluded. 
 Potentially relevant studies were found through several search methods. The primary 
method was a computer literature search of published studies in psychology and related fields. 
This search used keywords (such as “memory” and “recall”) and the names of researchers known 
to have conducted potentially relevant research on memory (e.g., Baddeley and Skowronski). 
Additionally, some studies were found by searching through the reference lists of all the papers 
and books we collected. 
Overview 
 General 
 The above criteria yielded 23 studies to address in this review. The studies involved a 
diverse set of methods, respondent populations, and memory measures. Some studies included 
only measures of event occurrence, some included only measures of dating accuracy, and some 
included only measures of characteristics recall.  
The second column of Table E-1 (attached to this appendix) indicates the method 
employed in each study. In record check studies, respondents were asked to recall events, and 
written records were checked to assess recall accuracy. In diary studies, respondents kept track of 
events in a diary and were later asked to recall the events; recollections were checked against the 
diaries to assess accuracy. In experience sampling studies, respondents carried devices such as 
electronic pagers that alerted them to complete a small (diary-like) questionnaire at randomly-
selected times throughout their days. Respondents were later asked to recall the events they 
reported on the questionnaires. Case studies involve interviews with a group of people who all 
experienced the same real-world event (e.g., a robbery). The recollections of these people are 
then compared to records that exist about the event to check their accuracy. 
In laboratory experiments, researchers controlled what respondents experienced, such as 
by having respondents watch a simulated bank robbery on videotape. Then, researchers could 
check the accuracy of recollections against the stimulus materials. Field experiments are 
conducted in natural settings (e.g., restaurants) rather than in a laboratory in order to improve the 
generalizability of the findings. Some experimental studies used between-subjects designs, in 
which different respondents provided data for different recall intervals (1-week in the past, 2-
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weeks, etc.). Other studies used within-subjects designs, in which the same respondents provided 
recall data for several recall intervals. 
Most respondents were adults, including undergraduate students, professional 
psychologists, crime victims, bank customers, and employees (see column 3 of Table E-1). 
Studies involving “one memory researcher” examined the recollections of a single researcher 
who kept a diary and gauges his or her recall over extended time periods (of up to six years). 
Most studies were conducted in the U.S., Canada, or Great Britain. No studies examined 
members of the aviation community as respondents. 
A few studies lasted several years, but because the most likely recall intervals for 
NAOMS surveys is likely to be no longer than one year, data from beyond one year are not 
addressed in this review. 
 Measures of Recall Accuracy 
Five different measures of recall accuracy were analyzed for this review. First, we review 
research addressing the degree to which people are able to accurately recall that an event 
occurred (regardless of the accuracy of dating that event, and regardless of their ability to recall 
specific details about that event). This is referred to here as occurrence accuracy. Occurrence 
accuracy was sometimes reported as the percentage of respondents who correctly reported that 
an event occurred. But occurrence accuracy was also sometimes gauged by the percentage of 
occurrences that were correctly reported by the entire sample of respondents. Both measures are 
used in the studies reviewed here. The fourth column of Table E-1 identifies the three studies 
that assessed occurrence accuracy, and the fifth column indicates what type of event was 
examined in each. 
Second, we review two sets of studies addressing how accurately people can recall the 
dates of events they have experienced: we report separately research regarding absolute dating 
accuracy and signed dating accuracy. Both forms of dating accuracy have usually been gauged 
by the inverse of accuracy, dating error, and this is the index we use in this review. Dating error 
refers to the deviation between the reported date of an event and the actual date on which it 
occurred. In this review, signed dating errors are calculated as actual date minus reported date. 
Therefore, negative deviations (e.g., -2 days) indicate reporting an event as occurring more 
recently than it actually did (the memory phenomenon known as “telescoping” or “forward 
telescoping”) and positive deviations (e.g., +2 days) indicate reporting an event as occurring 
further in the past than it actually did (a phenomenon known as “time expansion”). Absolute 
dating errors are the absolute (or unsigned) values of the deviations, computed by taking the 
absolute value of the deviation (and disregarding the direction of error). The last column in Table 
E-1 identifies the 14 studies that gauged dating accuracy, either absolute or signed or both. 
Next, we review evidence on the accuracy of recollections of the characteristics of 
events, which we call characteristics accuracy. Characteristics accuracy has usually been 
described in terms of the percent of characteristics that were recalled correctly by respondents. In 
these studies, characteristics accuracy data have usually been quantified in terms of the mean 
percent of the details of events recalled correctly at different recall intervals. However, some 
studies instead reported the percent of respondents recalling the details of a given event 
accurately. The sixth column of Table E-1 identifies the 11 studies that assessed characteristics 
accuracy, and the seventh column indicates what characteristics were examined.  
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Finally, we review evidence from two studies on fabrication of event characteristics, 
which is the only available evidence we have been able to turn up regarding fabrications. 
 Predictor: Recall Interval 
Our primary interest here is in understanding how the length of the recall interval affects 
recall accuracy. This predictor of accuracy was operationalized in various different ways in 
different studies. Some studies divided recall interval (and reported accuracy and date 
deviations) by days, others by weeks, others by months, quarters, 6-month blocks, or other 
intervals. Results from specific studies are reported in the study’s metrics, but occasionally small 
adjustments were made to allow maximally meaningful comparison.  
Findings 
Occurrence Accuracy 
Although many surveys have asked respondents how often they have performed some 
behavior, we found only the three studies assessing how recall interval affects accuracy. Key 
details of two of these studies are provided in Table E-2 (attached to this appendix).1 
The first column of Table E-2 identifies the study. The second column indicates what the 
respondents were asked to recall. At the tops of the remaining columns are the recall intervals 
examined in any one or more studies discussed in this review. For example, data in the “30 
Days” column represent the accuracy of respondents recalling events that occurred 30 days 
before the recall test. Reading across a single row illustrates the results of a single study, 
showing how longer recall intervals (shown farther to the right) do or do not compromise recall 
accuracy. Although any one study reported results for only a small portion of these intervals, all 
intervals are shown in every table of this review to facilitate comparison across tables. 
Hagburg (1968) asked respondents to remember (for two recall intervals) the number of 
times they had attended a class. In this case, a longer recall interval was not associated with 
lower accuracy. In fact, recall accuracy was slightly lower for events within the last 60 days 
(48%) than for events that occurred between 60 and 120 days previously (53%; see row 1 of 
Table E-2). 
However, Mathiowitz and Duncan (1988) examined a wider range of recall intervals and 
did find decline over time (see row 2 of Table E-2). These investigators asked respondents to 
recall the number of unemployment spells they had experienced. Recall accuracy declined as the 
recall interval increased from 30 days to 6 months, although there was a surprising surge in 
accuracy for 9 months. This may be attributable to the seasonal nature of employment and 
people’s enhanced ability to remember events that occurred during circumstances similar to the 
ones present at the time of recall.  
It is also interesting to note that Mathiowitz and Duncan (1988) found absolutely perfect 
recall at 30 days but less accuracy at all longer intervals. This is one data point suggesting the 
optimal recall interval for perfect accuracy may be between 30 and 60 days (the next recall 
interval examined in this study) for some types of repetitive events.  
One other study is relevant here but is not listed in Table E-2. Burton and Blair (1991, 
Study 2) also assessed occurrence accuracy, asking about the number of checks respondents had 
written in a given interval. These investigators did not report occurrence accuracy in terms of 
percentage but instead reported the average error in number of checks claimed to have been 
written. Not surprisingly, respondents made more errors for longer recall intervals. These 
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respondents reported they had written about one too many checks after seven days but almost 
two too few checks after six weeks. 
Summary. Although occurrence accuracy is one of the most important variables we need 
to consider in our decisions, very little evidence exists to assist us on this point. There is 
certainly evidence here that recall accuracy declines with increasing recall interval, but it is not 
clear from these studies along what the optimal interval may be.  
Absolute Dating Error 
Studies examining absolute dating error have also found a decline in accuracy with 
increasing recall interval. First, consider two studies that reported either the percentage of 
respondents who recalled the exact dates of events or the percentage of dates recalled exactly 
across all respondents in the study. Klein et al. (1999) examined recollections of the date of 
people’s visits to a medical clinic. After approximately 3 weeks, 20% of respondents could recall 
the exact date, whereas after approximately 6 weeks, only 3%could do so. Likewise, Skowronski 
et al. (1995) found that people recalled more of the exact dates of activities with friends for 
shorter recall intervals. The percentages of evenings recalled exactly at 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, and 12 
months were 65%, 37.5%, 43%, 36.5%, 14.5%, 16.5%, and 18%, respectively. 
Table E-3 (attached to this appendix) shows details of five other studies that included 
measures of absolute dating error. In this table, the average amount of dating error is reported in 
days. For example, at the 45-day interval, respondents’ date reports were wrong by an average of 
11 days in Linton’s (1975) study.  
 Three of these studies documented the expected decline in accuracy with increasing recall 
interval. For example, Linton (1975) found that she was personally able to date events extremely 
accurately for recall intervals of less than one week (with an average error of 0 for a two day 
interval and .8 for a seven day interval), but error rates increased precipitously for longer 
intervals (to an average of 10.5 days error for events six months in the past). 
 Rubin and Baddeley (1989, Study 1) asked respondents to recall the dates of research 
presentations made by scholars who visited their university and found absolute dating error were 
twice as large for events six months in the past (100 days error) than for events 30 days in the 
past (50 days error). Skowronski et al. (1991) found an increase in dating error from 2.1 days off 
at a two-day interval to 11 days off at the 72-day interval in recollections of rare life events.  
 Skowronski et al. (1995) also found increased dating error for longer recall intervals, but 
with one glaring exception. As the recall interval increased from 60 days to one year, average 
dating error increased from 18.3 days error to 62 days, with relatively small deviations from a 
steadily increasing rate. However, the highest absolute dating error found in this study, 91.7 
days, occurred at the 30 day recall interval, which is something of a puzzle.  
Finally, Czaja et al. (1994) found no difference in absolute dating accuracy between two 
relatively long recall intervals. When victims of crimes remembered the dates of those crimes, 
average error was 27.0 days for a six-month recall interval and 25.4 days for a nine-month 
interval.  
One additional study not listed in Table E-3 complements these results. Baddeley et al. 
(1978) reported a sizable positive correlation (r = .57, p<.001) between recall interval and 
absolute dating error for respondents who recalled dates on which they had previously 
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participated in laboratory experiments. Average dating error increased by an average of 19 days 
for every 100 days lengthening of the recall interval. 
Considering the data from each individual study in isolation allows the strongest 
scientific integrity to inferences, because all aspects of the recall task were held constant except 
for the recall interval. Therefore, inferences about the impact of recall interval can be made with 
confidence. However, each single study examined only a limited set of recall intervals, so it is 
difficult to use any one study to reach a more general conclusion about the optimal recall interval 
for accurate recollection.  
To address this issue, we conducted a quasi-meta-analysis by combining the results of the 
studies listed in Table E-3 to generate average figures. Admittedly, this combining entails 
significant confounding of recall intervals with various other variables, so the results produced 
should be viewed with significant caution. Specifically, occasionally outlying values should not 
be taken as seriously as a general trend in the data. Nonetheless, this exercise seems worthwhile. 
Consequently, we computed the mean absolute dating error for each column in Table E-3 and 
then graphed the resulting means (see Figure E-1).  
In Figure E-1, the x-axis shows each of the recall intervals reported in Table E-3. The y-
axis indexes the average absolute dating error in days. Data points and numerical values in the 
figure are the means computed from all studies for each recall interval. For example, for a 2-day 
recall interval, two studies yielded absolute dating errors of 0 and 2.1, the average of which, 1.1, 
is plotted above “2 days” in Figure E-1. All immediately adjacent point are connected by lines, 
and points separated by recall intervals with no data are not connected by a line (e.g., no studies 
reported absolute dating error rates at the 180-day interval, so no mean can be computed nor 
plotted). 
 
Figure E-1. Absolute Error in Dating Events. 
 
 If one ignores the single outlying point for the 30-day interval, Figure E-1 documents the 
excepted general trend of increasing error with increasing recall interval. Indeed, this pattern is 
remarkably clear. Absolute dating errors were relatively large (28.9 days error or more) for the 
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longest intervals (of 90 days or longer) and were remarkably small for recall intervals of 14 days 
and less (e.g., 3.3 days average error or less).  
Summary. Absolute dating error increases as the recall interval increases and average 
dating errors become substantial even for the 21-day recall interval. Therefore, in order to avoid 
sizable dating error, Figure E-1 suggests that the optimal recall interval for NAOMS may be less 
than 21 days.  
Signed Dating Error 
Next, we turn to studies examining signed dating error, documenting the prevalent 
direction of mistakes in dating events.2 Eight of ten such studies listed in Table E-4 (attached to 
this appendix) show a particular pattern: for shorter recall intervals, backward telescoping is 
generally the rule, whereas for longer recall intervals, forward telescoping appears to be the rule. 
That is, signed dating errors tend to be positive for short recall intervals and negative for long 
recall intervals. For example, Betz and Skowronski (1997) found positive signed dating errors 
for recall intervals between 1 day and 30 days, and negative signed dating errors for recall 
intervals between 45 and 72 days. Looking across almost every row of Table E-4 reveals the 
same positive to negative trend. 
The only exceptions to this general pattern were reported by Rubin and Baddeley (1989, 
Study 1) and Skowronski et al. (1995). With intervals of less than one year, both Rubin and 
Baddeley (1989, Study 1) and Skowronski et al. (1995) found no evidence of forward 
telescoping. Rubin and Baddeley (1989, Study 1) found essentially no difference in error 
between 72 days and six months, but the numbers in Table E-4 from Skowronski et al.’s (1995) 
study are consistent with the assertion that backward telescoping declines in magnitude as the 
recall interval increases. 
 Interestingly, both Rubin and Baddeley (1989, Study 1) and Skowronski et al. (1995) did 
in fact confirm the expected pattern of forward telescoping for long recall intervals, but only for 
intervals so long as not to appear in Table E-4. Both sets of researchers actually gauged 
recollection accuracy for recall intervals up to 2.5 years, and these investigators did indeed 
observe forward telescoping for the longest of these intervals. But because those long intervals 
fall outside of the range considered in this review, that pattern is not apparent in their 
contribution to Table E-4.  
This same conclusion was supported by another study that used a different analytic 
approach. Baddeley et al. (1978) found a correlation between recall interval and signed dating 
error of -.33 (p<.01), indicating that respondents recalled dates as progressively more recent the 
older they actually were (e.g., 10 days earlier at the 90 day interval but 30 days earlier at the one 
year interval). 
Again to yield heuristically value (though potentially misleading) figures, we averaged 
the values listed in Table E-4 to produce Figure E-2, which is formatted in the same way as 
Figure E-1. Surprisingly, this figure does not clearly show the pattern seen in most rows of Table 
E-4, moving from backward telescoping for short recall intervals to forward telescoping for long 
recall intervals. Instead, it appears that backward telescoping is greatest for the longest and 
shortest recall intervals, whereas forward telescoping occurs for moderate recall intervals. 
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Figure E-2. Signed Error in Dating Events. 
 
However, this is an illusion, due entirely to the two outlying studies by Skowronski et al. 
(1995) and Rubin and Baddeley (1989, Study 1). When we remove the data from these studies, 
we see the expected pattern with only one exception (see Figure E-3): a relatively smooth 
progression from backward telescoping for short recall intervals to forward telescoping for long 
recall intervals.  
Implications. Figure E-3 has especially interesting implications regarding the goals of 
NAOMS. First, note that there appears to be no systematic bias in dating for recall intervals of 
approximately 40 days. Therefore, if the recall interval specified for the NAOMS questionnaire 
is 40 days, telescoping should not bias event counts either up or down. Therefore, simply from 
this viewpoint, a 40-day recall interval might appear to be ideal.  
However, the data in Figure E-1 suggest caution about recall intervals of 21 days or 
longer. Does Figure E-3 indicate that we cannot have our cake and eat it, too? That is, must we 
reduce accuracy by lengthening the recall interval in order to reduce bias? Fortunately, matters 
are not quite so bleak. As long as our recall interval is at least 7 days, the sizable dating bias 
evidenced in Figure E-3 for very recent events (that occurred during the last couple of days) will 
not distort results, because even the misperceived dates of those events will appear to fall within 
the question’s reference period. Furthermore, the average magnitude of backward telescoping for 
a recall interval of between 7 days and 21 days is only 2.3 days according to Figure E-3. This 
means that event counts will be biased downward by about 16% for a 14-day interval (i.e., 2.3 
days/14 days) and by about 12% for a 21-day interval (i.e., 2.3 days/21 days). Furthermore, as 
long as recall interval is held constant across all NAOMS surveys, then this under-counting of 
events will not bias apparent trends in event rates over time. 
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Figure E-3. Signed Error in Dating Events - Excluding Skowronski et al. (1995) and 
Rubin & Baddeley (1989, Study 1) 
 
 Event Characteristics Recall Accuracy 
 Eleven studies measured the accuracy of respondents’ recollections of event 
characteristics.3 The first two columns of Table E-5 (attached to this appendix) list such studies 
and the particular characteristics being recalled. The remaining columns list the proportions of 
respondents who correctly recalled a characteristic or the percent of characteristics correctly 
recalled.  
 In 18 of the 25 rows in this table, the expected pattern is apparent: declining accuracy 
with increasing recall interval. In four of the remaining rows, there is no change at all in 
accuracy with increasing recall interval (the third row of Ebbesen & Rienick’s (1998) data; both 
rows of Klein et al.’s (1999) data, and the first row of Yuille & Cutshall’s (1986) data). Only 
three rows show increased accuracy with increased recall interval. However, these increases are 
generally very small: 1% in the first row of Baddeley et al.’s (1978) data, 3% in the third row of 
Smith’s (1935) data, and 7% in the third row of Bell’s (1992) data.  
The conclusion that recall accuracy declines as the recall interval becomes longer is also 
supported by Yarmey and Morris’s (1998) study, which used a different metric to assess 
accuracy. These investigators reported the number of characteristics of an event recalled 
correctly later; no percentages could be calculated, because the total number of characteristics 
potentially recallable could not be known. Respondents correctly recalled an average of 15.1 
characteristics within minutes of witnessing an event and recalled only 11.6 characteristics on 
average after a one-week delay. 
Whereas some event characteristics were recalled correctly by the vast majority of 
respondents long after the event had occurred, other characteristics were remember correctly by 
only a small fraction of respondents very soon after the event. Presumably the nature of the 
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events and characteristics studied contributed to this variability. As a result, Figure E-4 (which is 
again a rough graphical representation of the data reported in Table E-5) shows tremendous 
bouncing around and no evidence of a clear trend. Nonetheless, row-wise inspection of Table E-
5 makes it clear that decline accuracy with increasing recall interval is the rule here. 
Clearly, recall of event characteristics can be quite poor after even short periods of time. 
This has two important implications for NAOMS. First, our surveys will probably yield more 
accurate results if they focus on event occurrences rather than asking respondents for detailed 
descriptions of events. And second, given how low accuracy can be for even short recall 
intervals, these findings suggest that long recall intervals are especially risky.  
 
Figure E-4. Percent of Characteristics Recalled Correctly. 
 
Fabrications 
Fabrication of event characteristics (or errors of commission) were examined in two 
studies that we review next. Because the NAOMS surveys will not ask respondents about event 
characteristics, this sort of fabrication is not directly relevant to our questionnaire. Evidence 
regarding patterns of characteristic event fabrication could conceivably inform our design 
decisions, but unfortunately, these particular studies are not useful, as we explain next.  
Ebbesen and Rienick (1998) asked respondents to recall details of stories they read or that 
were read to them. Approximately one to two percent of all details respondents claimed to recall 
from the stories were in fact fabrications. Further, fabrication rates did not differ among the one 
day, 7 days, and 30 days time intervals. 
In Yarmey and Morris’s (1998) study, respondents watched a videotape of a simulated 
armed bank robbery and later recalled the details of the robbery, after either a few minutes or one 
week. These researchers did not report the levels of fabrications they observed, but they did 
report finding no significant difference in the fabrication rates for the two recall intervals. 
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Summary. These two studies found no evidence of increased fabrication with longer 
recall intervals. However, neither of these studies examined recall intervals longer than 30 days, 
so at best, they should be viewed as reassuring only regarding such relatively short intervals.  
Conclusions 
This review of the existing literature on autobiographic event recall supports a number of 
general conclusions. First, given how much important and consequential survey research asks 
respondents to report the frequency of particular events, it is remarkable how little published 
research has explored individual-level accuracy in respondents’ reports. Furthermore, the 
findings of the research that has been published evidence significant variability across studies. 
This suggests that the particular recall task and the particular population of respondents may 
substantially influence recall accuracy. So we certainly cannot walk away from the published 
literature with a strong recommendation about how to design the NAOMS survey questionnaires.  
However, the existing literature does clearly support two general conclusions. First, event 
occurrence and characteristic recall accuracy declines with increasing recall interval. Therefore, 
employing a longer recall interval entails the increased risk of inaccurate reporting. Second, 
dating of events manifests a particular pattern of bias, with backward telescoping characterizing 
short recall intervals, and forward telescoping characterizing long recall intervals. Furthermore, 
the particular patterns observed in past studies do suggest that recall intervals of 21 days or less 
are optimal for maximizing accuracy.  
Given the relatively small number of studies available to inform our decision and the 
clear variability of findings across event domains and respondent populations, it seemed 
worthwhile to supplement the above literature review with a study expressly examining the 
accuracy of airline pilots’ recall of repeated events that occur in the course of their professional 
activities. Therefore, a study of pilot recall accuracy was conducted to help guide our decision 
about the recall interval(s) to be used in the final NAOMS survey.4 
A Study to Assess the Accuracy of Pilots’ Recall 
To date, although we are considering other options, we have been most-seriously 
discussing a one-month recall period for the full NAOMS survey. This interval has been based 
simply upon our own intuitions and the intuitions of the pilots we have interviewed. The purpose 
of the study we conducted was to better inform our decision-making on this issue by providing 
empirical data. 
 Because it is essential that our measurements be as precise as possible, the possibility that 
pilots will misremember incidents is of great importance. Our goal in this study was to explore 
the impact of recall interval on all three sorts of misremembering that are significant threats to 
the validity of our measurements. First, pilots may forget incidents that occurred. Second, pilots 
may remember incidents that did occur but may misremember the dates on which they occurred, 
for example, leading them to report these incidents as having occurred during the “reference 
period” (i.e., the period during which they are being asked to recall incidents), when in fact they 
occurred prior to the reference period. Third, pilots may completely fabricate incidents that never 
occurred (commission errors). We therefore asked pilots to perform a relatively simple memory 
task, the results of which could be objectively verified against official records, and with which 
we could gauge the magnitude of these three types of errors for different recall intervals. 
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Method 
 For this study, we asked five of the pilots who performed cognitive interviews with us to 
complete the task of recalling all their flights during the previous 30 days without consulting any 
written records. Each respondent was given a piece of paper displaying a calendar with a box for 
each day. In each box, the respondent was asked to write “TO” for each takeoff that occurred and 
“LD” for each landing that occurred. They were then asked to indicate the city where each 
takeoff occurred and the city where each landing occurred. These data allow a simple assessment 
of these pilots’ ability to accurately recall the characteristics (i.e., location) and date of one type 
of routine event. 
After completing the recall task, the pilots took an identical calendar home with them and 
completed it accurately by using their log books. The respondents then mailed these second 
calendars back to us. We matched the recollections against the actual flight events to assess the 
accuracy of the pilots’ recall. 
Results 
Figure E-5 shows the total number of actual takeoffs and landings that pilots experienced 
per week for the four weeks preceding the recollection exercise. “Week 1” means the week 
immediately before the recall task was performed. “Week 2” means the interval between 8 and 
14 days before the recall task was performed. Because we asked about a total of 30 days, Week 4 
included 9 days. As can be seen, these pilots experienced a substantial number of takeoffs and 
landings: 44 during Week 1, 57 during Week 2, 41 during Week 3, and 62 during Week 4. 
 
Figure E-5. Number of Actual Takeoffs and Landings by Week 
 
Figure E-6 shows the proportion of these takeoffs and landings correctly recalled per 
week. The results here are quite striking. The pilots correctly remembered every single event that 
occurred during Week 1, but accuracy declined dramatically after that week. During Week 2, 
only 35% of the events were accurately recalled. During Weeks 3 and 4, these figures were 18% 
and 38%, respectively. This suggests that asking pilots to remember routine events more than 
one week previously risks significant forgetting and error in our estimates of safety-related 
occurrences. 
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This conclusion is reinforced by Figure E-7, which displays the proportion of events that 
occurred each week that were forgotten by pilots. These figures are simply the mirror images of 
the figures displayed in Figure E-6. They indicate that more than half the events that occurred 
during Weeks 2, 3, and 4 were completely forgotten by the pilots. 
Independent corroboration of this conclusion comes from Figure E-8, which displays the 
number of events that pilots said had occurred but in fact had not. Thus, these are purely 
fictitious events. Although not one such event was reported during Week 1, two such events 
were reported during Week 2, 8 were reported during Week 3, and 11 were reported during 
Week 4.  
 
 
Figure E-6. Percent of Correct Takeoffs and Landings Recalled by Week 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure E-7. Percent of Forgotten Takeoffs and Landings Recalled by Week 
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Figure E-8. Number of Fictitious Takeoffs and Landings by Week 
 
Our guess is that these reports are the result of forward telescoping, in which the pilots 
remembered events as having occurred more recently than they actually did. Thus, we suspect 
that many of these fictitious events may indeed have happened but took place prior to the 
reference period of the task. Because forward telescoping is more likely to cause small time 
displacements rather than long ones, it is most likely to appear near the boundary of the recall 
period, which in this case is Week 4. This would explain why the most fabrication occurred 
during this period. 
Put together, the results of this study suggest that accurate recollection of relatively 
routine events is likely to be significantly compromised if pilots are asked to remember such 
events that occurred more than seven days prior to completing the NAOMS survey 
questionnaire.  
A Final Consideration: Counting vs. Estimating 
 One final aspect of the memory literature worth considering when specifying our recall 
interval is work exploring the cognitive strategies that respondents employ when reporting event 
frequencies. According to much recent work informed by cognitive psychology, when a person 
is asked to say how many times a particular event occurred during a particular time period, one 
of two different strategies can be employed: counting or estimating (see Burton & Blair, 1991; 
Menon, 1993, 1994; Sudman, Bradburn, & Scharz, 1996). Counting involves attempting to 
remember each individual instance of the event, and totaling up the number retrieved from 
memory. In contrast, estimating involves using some sort of rule or principle to guess how many 
times the event occurred, without having to remember each individual instance. For instance, a 
person can guess how often the event has typically occurred during a one-week period and can 
then multiply by 12 to yield a total figure for a total figure for a 3-month period. 
 Most strategies for estimating are based upon counting for some time interval, so any 
errors inherent in counting are likely to be translated directly into estimates. Furthermore, 
additional error can appear in estimates if the principles used to estimate are incorrect or biased 
as well. Therefore, it is preferable to avoid inducing respondents to estimate if they can be 
induced to count instead, and if the counting task is one they can accomplish reasonably well.  
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 One factor that influences the likelihood of estimating is whether the event occurs 
relatively rarely—frequencies of rare events are more likely to be counted, whereas frequencies 
of common events are more likely to be estimated. Because some NAOMS events are thought to 
occur relatively frequently, there is a substantial risk that respondents will prefer to estimate their 
frequencies rather than count.  
A second factor influencing the decision to count vs. estimate is the distinctiveness of the 
events to be enumerated. If an event occurs quite similarly on repeated occasions, counting is 
more difficult, whereas if an event occurs quite differently each time it happens, counting is 
easier to do. Because some events to be addressed in the NAOMS questionnaire are likely to 
occur quite similarly each time, this further increases the risk that respondents will prefer to 
estimate their frequencies rather than count.  
Another factor that the existing literature suggests influences the choice of counting vs. 
estimating is the length of the recall interval. Longer recall intervals make it more difficult for 
respondents to count, so they resort to estimating. This suggests that we should keep the recall 
interval as short as possible in order to encourage respondents to count rather than estimate. But 
unfortunately, the existing literature does not provide good generic guidance on how short the 
recall interval needs to be to minimize the likelihood of estimating. This suggests that a future 
study might usefully have respondents think aloud when completing NAOMS questionnaires 
with varying recall intervals, so we can assess the extent of counting vs. estimating and identify 
the longest recall interval that allows for minimization of estimation.  
 
Conclusions 
Based on the results of a review of the available literature and the results of the study we 
conducted, we recommend that we explore the possibility of releasing separate representative 
samples of respondents each week, and that respondents be asked to recall events that occurred 
only during the seven days prior to their interview or questionnaire completion.  
Of course, we will not be able to complete data collection from every respondent during 
the week of his or her field period. So we will contact some people after the first week of their 
field period. This means that during the first week of the study, only easy-to-reach respondents 
will report data to us. The more difficult-to-reach respondents will not provide data until a week 
or two later. But during those subsequent weeks, easy-to-interview respondents will also be 
interviewed. This means that during each week after the first week, a mix of easy-to-reach and 
difficult-to-reach respondents will provide data. This means that there will be a minimal 
correlation between difficulty of reaching a person and the reference period for which he or she 
provides recollections. This will assure maximum data validity and reliability, which will allow 
us to obtain an adequate level of data precision from interviewing fewer people than would be 
required if there were substantially more measurement error in respondents’ recollections. 
 However, there is a drawback to maximizing recall accuracy in this way: increased 
necessary sample size and financial cost of data collection. This is so because many events of 
interest to the NAOMS project are presumed to occur quite rarely. Furthermore, given the nature 
of commercial pilots’ flying schedules, a substantial fraction (perhaps even as many as one-half) 
of our respondents do not fly during any given week. This further increases the risk of 
interviewing respondents who report witnessing no safety-related events if the recall interval is 
only one week. Therefore, to accurately measure the frequencies of rare events, we would need 
to substantially increase our sample size if the recall interval is made substantially shorter. But 
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almost no pilots do not fly at all during a one-month period, so this somewhat longer recall 
interval is much more desirable on these grounds. 
Therefore, our final decision about recall interval will need to be informed by the 
particular list of events chosen for inclusion in the final NAOMS questionnaire and the rates at 
which these events are witnessed by pilots.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix E: Footnotes 
 
1 The study by Burton and Blair, 1991, addressed occurrence accuracy, but is not 
included in the table because it focused on raw errors in the number of checks written and not the 
percent of accurate responses or percent of respondents recalling accurately. Although they 
cannot be included in the table, the error-related results of this study are mentioned in the text. 
2 The study by Baddeley et al. (1978) also measured signed dating error, but is not 
included in Table 4 because it did not include data for specific recall intervals. The error-related 
results that were reported are mentioned in the text. 
3 The study by Yarmey and Morris, 1998, addressed characteristics accuracy but is not 
included in the table because results were published as raw numbers from which percentages 
could not be computed. Other results from this study are mentioned in the text. 
4 Although it does not fit the criteria to be included in the review of the effects of time, 
the findings of Richman and Quiñones (1996) are potentially important to our current goals. In 
an experimental design, these researchers assessed recall immediately after their participants had 
either gained more or less experience at a novel activity (practicing three times or only one time 
constructing models in a production simulation). Importantly, they found, perhaps 
counterintuitively, that participants with less experience were more accurate than were 
participants with more experience in their recall of the number of times (events) several tasks 
had been performed during the simulation. Low-experience participants reported frequencies that 
deviated on average 1.9 events from reality while higher-experience participants reported 
frequencies that deviated on average 2.35 events from reality, a statistically significant 
difference. Because no studies in the review explored experience level, and since the level of 
experience in this study is actually quite low overall, it isn’t clear how these findings might apply 
to experience levels of aviation personnel, but it may be worth investigating. 
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Appendix F. Pilot Demographics: Distribution of Aviation Operational 
Personnel and Aircraft in the U.S. and Territories 
 
 
F1. Introduction 
An investigation was undertaken to determine the number and distribution of aviation operational personnel 
(i.e., pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, mechanics, and dispatchers) working in commercial 
aviation organizations within the United States as background for the development of NAOMS.  
 
Information for this study was derived from the following sources: McGraw-Hill World Aviation 
Directory (Winter 1999 edition), The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac 2000, Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), Air Transport Association (ATA), Regional Airline Association (RAA), 
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
(AOPA), Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), National 
Business Aviation Association (NBAA), American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO), and the Teamsters. In addition, individual aircraft operators were also 
queried by telephone for missing data.  
 
While Battelle made every effort to ensure that the information included in the report they prepared on 
this study was current, the accuracy of the information depended on the accuracy of the sources used to 
compile the results.17  The results on all of the constituents are presented in Battelle Reference Report 
(Battelle (2007).  This appendix focuses primarily on the information relevant to pilots that was extracted 
from Battelle’s report. 
F2. Findings 
F2.1 Operational Personnel  
Pilots compose the largest group of aviation operational personnel. Mechanics and repairmen represent 
the second largest grouping, with approximately 33% of the total.  Flight attendants, air traffic controllers, 
and dispatchers represent the smallest groups, with approximately 12% of the total when combined.  
Table F-1 lists the distribution of these groups. Each operational group has subgroups and distributions 
unique to its population. The balance of this paper describes these groups and their distributions in greater 
detail, as well as major aircraft operators and subgroups.  
 
Table F-1. Distribution of Aviation Operational Personnel 
Group Total % Total Date of Reference 
Active pilots 618,298 55.0% 1998 
Mechanics/repairmen 365,484 32.4% 1998 
Flight attendants 119,533 10.4% 2000 
Air traffic controllers 14,832 1.2% 2000 
Dispatchers 11,460 1.0% 1999 
Total 1,129,607 100% — 
 
                                                
17 With many references, there is a lag between data collection and publication of those data. 
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F2.1.1.  Pilots and Operators 
According to the FAA, there were 618,298 active pilots in the civil aviation community in 
1998.18  The types of pilot licenses (often called certificates) include the following: Student, 
Recreational, Private, Commercial, and Airline Transport Pilot.19  Table F-2 presents the 
distribution of pilots by age and by the type of pilot certificate held. 
 
Table F-2. Distribution of Pilots by Age and Certificate Type 
Age Total Student Recrea- tional Private Commercial* ATP** 
Rotorcraft 
Only** 
Glider 
Only** 
Flight 
Instructor*** 
14-15 220 220 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 
16-19 14,087 10,495 3 3,234 243 0 32 80 57 
20-24 36,205 13,427 5 13,430 8,523 313 304 203 4,359 
25-29 54,300 13,799 13 16,480 17,122 5,688 904 294 11,516 
30-34 68,330 12,964 13 22,866 15,133 15,460 1,289 605 10,462 
35-39 82,494 12,914 34 32,006 13,679 21,578 1,241 1,042 9,536 
40-44 86,772 10,829 38 39,048 13,464 20,536 1,065 1,792 9,260 
45-49 83,012 8,101 30 36,590 14,227 21,144 1,159 1,761 9,590 
50-54 70,017 5,265 35 29,929 14,397 18,417 630 1,344 8,594 
55-59 48,794 2,994 25 21,060 10,448 13,205 219 843 5,788 
60-64 33,362 1,809 17 15,547 8,734 6,538 60 657 4,235 
65-69 24,054 1,296 32 13,378 5,982 2,543 41 782 2,573 
70-74 13,697 572 16 7,382 4,433 1,274 15 5 1,540 
74-79 5,522 188 3 2,416 2,258 652 2 3 818 
80 and 
over 
1,395 74 1 636 544 138 0 2 223 
Totals 622,261 94,947 265 254,002 129,187 127,486 6,961 9,413 78,551 
% of Total 100% 15.30% 0.04% 41% 21% 21% 1.10% 1.50% 14.40% 
(Lampl, R., Editor. The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac Edition 2000, New York: McGraw-Hill) 
* Includes pilots with an airplane only certificate; also includes those with an airplane and a 
helicopter and/or glider certificate. 
** Glider pilots are not required to have a medical examination; however, totals above represent 
pilots who received a medical examination. 
*** Not included in total active pilots, since a flight instructor rating is added to an existing pilot 
license.  
                                                
18  A pilot needs a current medical certificate for his/her pilot license to be valid.  It is estimated that there are 
approximately 600,000 individuals in the United States with pilot licenses who have current medical certificates.  
The presence of a valid medical certification likely indicates an active pilot. 
19  U.S. Civil Airmen: Statistics pertaining to both pilot and non-pilot airmen were obtained from the official 
certification records (Civil Airmen Registry) maintained by the Airmen Certification and Medical Certification 
Branches of the FAA’s Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, OK. 
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Student Pilots: Requirements for a student pilot certificate are minimal.  One must have a 
current FAA third-class medical certificate (good for 24 months before medical re-certification is 
required).  The minimum age for obtaining a student pilot certificate is 14, but one cannot be 
certified by the FAA as a pilot until the age of 16.  There is no time or upper-age limit for an 
individual taking flying lessons from an FAA-certified flight instructor (CFI).20 
 
Recreational Pilots: A person must be at least 17 years of age to be eligible for a recreational 
pilot certificate.  A recreational pilot may fly no more than one passenger in a light, single-
engine aircraft fitted with four or fewer seats.  In addition, a recreational pilot is restricted to 
flying in good-visibility conditions during daylight hours.  A recreational pilot is also restricted 
from carrying passengers for hire and may fly no further than 50 miles from the home airport.21 
 
Private Pilots: To obtain a private pilot certificate, one must be at least 17 years of age and hold 
a third-class medical certificate. In addition, one must pass an approved FAA ground and flight 
examination. A minimum of 40 hours of flight experience (with an instructor and as a solo 
student pilot) is required before a private pilot applicant can obtain his/her license. Private pilots 
may fly at night, carry more than one passenger, and fly in poor-visibility conditions if they are 
appropriately trained and have an instrument rating.22 However, a private pilot certificate does 
not allow a pilot to carry passengers or cargo for hire.23  
 
Commercial Pilots: To obtain a Commercial Pilot certificate, one must be at least 18 years of 
age, have a minimum of 250 hours of flight time, pass an FAA written examination and flight 
check, and hold a second-class medical certificate (requires medical re-certification every 12 
months).  An FAA Commercial Pilot certificate allows a pilot to carry passengers or cargo for 
hire and is the minimum certificate required to be hired as a pilot for an airline or air taxi service.  
An individual with a Commercial Pilot certificate can serve as pilot in command (PIC) of an air 
taxi, but cannot serve as PIC of a commuter or air carrier aircraft operating under Part 121 of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations.  An airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate is required under these 
regulations.24  Commercial Pilots can act as second in command (SIC) in all Part 135 and 
121operations.  Commercial Pilots who do not have an instrument rating are limited to flying 
passengers for hire only in good weather during the daytime. 
                                                
20  Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Chapter I, Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 61, 
Subpart C, Student Pilots (1999), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
21  Title 14, CFR, Chapter I, Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 61, Subpart D, Recreational Pilots (1999), 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
22  An instrument rating is added to private and commercial pilot certificates when a pilot has passed a 
written, practical, and oral examination that demonstrates that he/she has the ability to control the 
aircraft in poor-visibility conditions solely by reference to aircraft instrumentation. A pilot is required to 
have a private or commercial pilot certificate and at least 40 hours of actual or simulated experience 
flying solely by reference to instruments before he/she is eligible to obtain an instrument rating. 
Developing the skills required to control the aircraft by reference to instruments requires additional 
training.  
23  Title 14, CFR, Chapter I, Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 61, Subpart E, Private Pilots (1999), 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
24  Title 14, CFR, Chapter I, Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 61, Subpart F, Commercial Pilots (1999), 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
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Airline Transport Pilots: An ATP certificate is the highest pilot rating given by the 
FAA.   Every PIC of a commercial aircraft operating under Part 121 and many turbojet aircraft 
operating under Part 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations is required to have an ATP rating.  
The applicant for an ATP certificate must be at least 23 years of age and hold both a commercial 
pilot certificate and an instrument rating.  Total flight experience required for an ATP in a 
rotorcraft is 1200 flight hours, while 1500 hours are required for an ATP airplane rating.  For the 
ATP pilot license to remain valid, a pilot is required to hold a first-class medical certificate 
(medical re-certification required every 6 months).25 
 
Flight Instructors: To be eligible for a Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) certificate, one must be 
at least 18 years of age, have a commercial pilot certificate, be instrument-rated, and pass an 
FAA written examination and an FAA flight check.26 
 
F2.2 Aircraft Operators 
F2.2.1 Major Air Carriers 
The major air carriers are defined as those with gross revenues of more than $1 billion per year. 
They account for the vast majority of the revenue passenger miles flown each year.27 The major 
carriers operate approximately 3,700 aircraft and employ more than 441,000 people, including 
54,000 pilots. (See Table F-3.) 
 
Table F-3.  Major Air Carriers 
Name of Airline # of Employees # of Pilots 
# of 
Aircraft Pilot Union or Association 
Alaska Airlines 8,596 1,260 85 Air Line Pilots Association  
America West Airlines 11,494 1,676 111 Air Line Pilots Association 
American Airlines 87,190 9,600 672 Allied Pilots Association  
Continental Airlines 34,982 4,097 435 International Association of 
Continental Pilots 
Delta Airlines 68,889 9,495 562 Air Line Pilots Association  
Northwest Airlines 47,998 6,305 415 Air Line Pilots Association  
Southwest Airlines 27,675 3,400 288 Southwest Airline Pilots Association  
TWA Airlines 24,008 2,443 190 Air Line Pilots Association  
United Airlines 88,887 10,139 572 Air Line Pilots Association 
US Airways  42,104 5,897 393 Air Line Pilots Association  
 Total 441,823 54,312 3,723  
 
                                                
25  Title 14, CFR, Chapter I, Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 61, Subpart G, Airline Transport Pilots, 
(1999), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
26  Title 14, CFR, Chapter I, Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 61, Subpart H, Flight Instructors, (1999), 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
27 Air Line Pilots Association, Herndon, VA. Lampl, R., Editor, The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac 
2000, New York: McGraw-Hill. Weimer, Kent J., Editor. World Aviation Directory, Winter 1999, New 
York: McGraw-Hill.     
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F2.2.2 National Air Carriers  
The national carriers are defined as those with gross revenues between $100 million and 
$1 billion annually.28  The national carriers operate approximately 998 aircraft and employ more 
than 56,000 personnel, including 9,281 pilots.  Attachment F-1 lists the national air carriers with 
numbers of employees and aircraft.  
 
F2.2.3 Regional Air Carriers  
Large regional air carriers have annual gross revenues between $10 million and $99.9 million. 
A medium regional is a carrier that has annual gross revenues of less than $10 million.29 
Regional air carriers operate 1,781 aircraft and employ more than 40,000 personnel, including 
13,323 pilots.  These carriers operate smaller airplanes than the major and national airlines and 
are often referred to as commuter airlines.  Attachment F-2 lists the regional air carriers with 
numbers of employees and aircraft. 
 
F2.2.4 Air Cargo Carriers  
The air cargo carriers are a fast-growing segment of the commercial aviation industry.30 Freight 
carriers employ approximately 292,000 personnel, including 14,106 pilots, and operate 
1,585 aircraft. Attachment F-3 lists airlines that specialize in transporting freight.  
 
F2.2.5 Charter and Non-Scheduled Carriers  
The charter and non-scheduled air services, which include air taxi and contract services, are 
normally small operations that provide on-demand air service to isolated communities around the 
country.  They operate more than 2,000 aircraft and employ more than 17,000 personnel, 
including 7,179 pilots.31  Attachment F-4 lists non-scheduled and charter operators.  
 
F2.2.6 General Aviation  
General aviation is the largest segment of the aviation industry.  Although there is no legal 
definition of general aviation, it is commonly described as “all civil aviation except that carried 
out by the commercial airlines or the military.”  There are more than 183,000 active general 
aviation aircraft.  This number represents 98 percent of the total aircraft in the United States.32  
General aviation also includes a variety of aircraft, including airplanes, helicopters, and gliders. 
 
General aviation aircraft are used for a variety of purposes. According to the National Business 
Aviation Association, 5,000 U.S. companies have corporate flight departments operating more 
                                                
28 Air Line Pilots Association, Herndon, VA. Lampl, R., Editor, The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac 
2000, New York: McGraw-Hill. Weimer, Kent J., Editor. World Aviation Directory, Winter 1999, New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
29 Air Line Pilots Association, Herndon, VA. Weimer, Kent J., Editor, World Aviation Directory, Winter 
1999, New York: McGraw-Hill. Lampl, R., Editor. The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac 2000, New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
30 Weimer, Kent J., Editor. World Aviation Directory, Winter 1999, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
31 Weimer, Kent J., World Aviation Directory Winter 1999, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
32 Federal Aviation Administration Statistical Handbook 1999, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office; Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Frederick, MD. 
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than 10,000 aircraft and employing 20,000 pilots.33 General aviation also includes private flying 
for pleasure and business, flight instruction, aerial application, aerial observation, photography, 
fire fighting, police traffic control, and pipeline/powerline surveillance. Table F-4 provides the 
distribution of general aviation aircraft.34  
 
Table F-4. General Aviation Aircraft Distribution 
Type # of Aircraft % of Total # of Hours Flown % Total 
Corporate 9,652 5.60% 2,548,000 11.00% 
Business 25,554 14.90% 3,055,000 13.00% 
Instructional 14,568 8.54% 4,156,000 17.50% 
Personal 100,839 59.10% 8,116,000 34.20% 
Aerial 
Application 
4,215 2.47% 1,210,000 5.10% 
Aerial 
Observation 
4,936 2.90% 1,750,000 7.40% 
External Load 133 0.08% 172,000 0.75% 
Other Work 1,214 0.71% 226,000 0.95% 
Air Taxi 3,927 2.30% 1,670,000 7.10% 
Sightseeing 1,336 0.78% 323,000 1.40% 
Other 4,226 2.48% 640,000 0.30% 
Total 170,600 23,866,000 
 
 
F2.2.7 Helicopter Air Service  
Helicopters provide a variety of services, including air ambulance, pipeline and power line 
surveys, fire fighting, and police and media reporting. Commercial helicopter operators employ 
more than 5,000 personnel, including more than 1,700 pilots and operate 1,061 aircraft. 
Attachment F-5 lists commercial helicopter operators.35  
  
                                                
33 National Business Aviation Association Source Book on Aviation 1998, Washington, DC. 
34 U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association and the National Business Aviation Association. (Both airplanes and helicopters are included 
in these summary statistics.)  
35 Lampl, R., Editor. The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac 2000, New York: McGraw-Hill. Weimer, Kent 
J., Editor. World Aviation Directory, Winter 1999, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
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Attachment F-1. National Airlines36 
Airline State # of Employees # of Pilots 
# of 
Aircraft 
Air Tran GA 3,500 380 37 
Air Transport FL 520 101 30 
Air Wisconsin WI 800 312 28 
Aloha HI 2,249 206 17 
American Trans Air IN 6,000 981 71 
Atlantic Southeast GA 2,762 756 88 
Carnival FL 1,220 234 22 
Continental Express FL 1,820 768 96 
Continental Micronesia GU 2,000 200 19 
Hawaiian HI 2,400 288 23 
Horizon Air CO 3,100 510 62 
Mesa AZ 1,450 1,134 183 
Midway IL 1,000 309 28 
Midwest Express WI 2,223 337 27 
Reno Air NV 2,500 286 30 
Simmons TX 4,400 840 86 
Sun Country AZ 2,010 208 19 
Tower NY 11,800 219 17 
Trans States CA 2,000 682 74 
U.S. Airways Shuttle VA 650 200 12 
Western Pacific CO 1,155 180 17 
World VA 725 150 12 
Totals 56,284 9,281 998 	  	   	  
                                                
36 Air Line Pilots Association, Herndon, VA. Lampl, R., Editor. The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac 
2000, New York: McGraw-Hill. Weimer, Kent J., Editor. World Aviation Directory, Winter 1999, New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
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Attachment F-2. Regional Air Carriers37 
Name State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
Air Midwest/Mesa Air Group KS 225 12 120 
Air Nevada NV 88 8 16 
Air South SC 550 7 80 
Air Sunshine FL 22 7 12 
Alaska Island Air AK 12 2 4 
Alaska Juneau Aeronautics AK 70 20 27 
Allegheny PA 1,200 41 400 
Aloha Islandair HI 230 6 60 
Alpine UT 55 12 30 
American Eagle CA 1,300 35 350 
Arctic Circle Air Service AK 31 4 20 
Arctic Transportation 
Services AK 65 15 12 
Aspen Mountain Air TX 250 8 80 
Astral Aviation WI 248 15 150 
Atlantic Coast Airlines VA 1,300 59 590 
Atlantic Southeast Airlines GA 2,762 82 820 
Atlantic World Airways FL 47 3 15 
AVI NV 125 11 50 
Aviation Services  
Ltd./Freedom Air GU 49 4 12 
Baker Aviation AK 32 5 10 
Bemidji Aviation  MN 50 5 15 
Bering Air AK 85 4 16 
Big Sky Airlines MT 75 3 15 
Business Express NH 1,200 39 390 
Cape Smythe Air Service AK 105 8 20 
Caribbean Int'l PR 35 3 12 
Casino Express NV 102 2 15 
CCAir NC 600 26 260 
Chautauqua Airlines IN 320 30 180 
Chicago Express IL 100 10 50 
Coastal Air Transport VI 10 2 4 
Colgan Air VA 140 6 60 
Comair Inc. OH 3,000 96 960 
Commutair NY 340 30 150 
Conquest Airlines TX 141 8 48 
Continental Express TX 1,820 106 1,000 
(continued on next page) 
                                                
37 Air Line Pilots Association, Herndon, VA. Lampl, R., Editor. The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac 
2000, New York: McGraw-Hill. Weimer, Kent J., Editor. World Aviation Directory, Winter 1999, New 
York: McGraw-Hill.  
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Attachment F-2. Regional Air Carriers (continued) 
Name State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
Corporate Air MT 320 82 109 
Corporate Express TN 150 8 60 
East Coast Aviation 
Services/Executive Airlines NY 43 3 18 
Eastwind Airlines NC 120 2 20 
Empire Airlines ID 250 48 60 
ERA Aviation AK 160 87 120 
Executive Airlines PR 1,446 18 180 
Express Airlines 1 GA 900 58 500 
Flagship Airline TN 2,126 68 680 
Flamenco Airways PR 65 4 20 
Flying Boat Inc/ 
Pan Am Air Bridge FL 45 5 20 
40 Mile Air AK 25 4 6 
Frontier Airlines CO 700 10 100 
Frontier Flying Service AK 85 4 30 
Grand Canyon Airlines AZ 40 5 25 
Great Lakes Airlines IA 1,400 57 560 
Gulfstream Int'l Airlines FL 500 23 200 
Haines Airways AK 40 7 7 
Hyannis Air Service MA 200 5 50 
Island Airlines MA 53 2 4 
Jettrain PA 120 2 20 
Jib/Action Airlines CT 11 2 4 
Kenmore Air Harbor WA 65 7 30 
Ketchikan Air Service AK 75 3 10 
LAB Flying Service AK 75 2 6 
Laker Airways FL 175 4 40 
Larry's Flying Service AK 60 2 15 
Las Vegas Airlines NV 28 2 8 
Mahalo Air HI 300 7 70 
Mesa Air Group NM 2,500 100 1,134 
Mesaba Aviation MN 1,800 74 750 
Mission Aviation Fellowship CA 295 6 60 
Nations Air Express GA 102 3 30 
New England Airlines RI 15 2 8 
Olson & Sons AK 29 3 10 
Pacific Island Aviation MP 130 7 50 
Pan American World Airways FL 600 4 60 
Paradise Island Airlines FL 125 5 40 
Peninsula Airways AK 350 16 40 
(continued on next page) 
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Attachment F-2. Regional Air Carriers (continued) 
Name State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
Pennsylvania Aviation  PA 50 2 10 
Piedmont Airlines/ 
Sub US Airways MD 1,750 49 490 
Planet Airways FL 10 1 6 
Prestige Airways VA 150 5 50 
Proair WA 175 2 20 
PSA Airlines OH 900 25 250 
Redwing Airways MO 7 6 5 
Reeve Aleutian Airways AK 240 5 40 
Rich Int'l Airways FL 1,100 10 100 
Samoa Aviation AS 65 3 15 
Skagway Air Service AK 10 12 10 
Skywest Airlines UT 2,100 69 690 
Southcentral Air AK 28 7 10 
Spirit Airlines MI 400 13 130 
Springdale Air Service AR 24 23 18 
Sunshine Airlines CA 18 7 12 
Tanana Air Service AK 14 8 8 
Tatonduk Outfitters AK 28 5 18 
Trans Air HI 52 5 14 
Tristar Airlines NV 165 1 8 
UFS MO 400 9 90 
Vanguard Airlines MO 568 8 80 
Vieques Air Link VI 53 2 10 
Village Aviation AK 50 8 7 
Virgin Air/Air St. Thomas VI 22 4 8 
West Isle Air WA 26 4 7 
Wright Air Service AK 25 2 6 
Yute Air Alaska AK 180 1 4 
Totals  40,917 1,781 13,323 	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Attachment F-3. Cargo-Only Airlines38 
Name State # of Employees # of Pilots # of Aircraft 
ABX Air/Airborne Express OH 6,800 1,100 109 
Air Cargo Carriers WI 140 60 19 
AirPac Airlines WA 30 6 2 
American Int'l Airways MI 3,000 300 54 
Ameriflight  CA 550 120 83 
Amerijet FL 512 150 16 
Atlas Air NY 610 676 22 
BankAir SC 85 40 30 
Bax Global CA 630 407 37 
BigHorn Airways WY 16 6 4 
Burlington Air Express CA 6,300 250 18 
Business Air Inc. VT 40 21 13 
Capital Cargo Int'l Airlines FL 21 6 2 
Challenge Air Cargo FL 800 30 4 
Custom Air Transport FL 90 20 5 
DHL Airways CA 10,000 487 33 
Emery Worldwide CA 10,020 454 62 
Evergreen Int'l OR 475 295 20 
Express One Int'l TX 455 258 27 
Federal Express TN 145,000 5,833 505 
Fine Airlines FL 1,000 120 15 
Florida West Int'l Airways FL 71 11 2 
Gemini Air Cargo DC 250 90 6 
IFL Group (Corporate Express) MI 51 18 8 
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo TX 500 300 46 
Merlin Express TX 130 64 38 
Mid-Atlantic Freight NC 120 35 20 
Million Air FL 150 27 5 
Mountain Air Cargo NC 280 120 69 
Northern Air Cargo AK 220 70 14 
Polar Air Cagro CA 600 184 13 
Regional Express  ID 175 12 7 
Relient Airlines MI 150 36 14 
Renown Aviation CA 115 30 5 
Suburban Air Freight NE 60 30 6 
UPS Airlines KY 103,000 2,321 193 
USA Jet Airlines Inc. MI 320 75 25 
Westair Inc. CA 60 44 34 
Totals 292,826 14,106 1,585 
  
                                                
38 Air Line Pilots Association, Herndon, VA. Lampl, R., Editor. The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac 
2000, New York: McGraw-Hill. Weimer, Kent J., Editor. World Aviation Directory, Winter 1999, New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
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Attachment F-4. Charter and Non-Scheduled Carriers39 
Name State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
A&M Aviation/CNS IL 15 12 24 
Aberdeen Flying Service SD 8 1 2 
Ace Aerial Service/CNS CA 3 10 20 
ACM Aviation/CNS CA 40 9 20 
Action Airlines/CNS CT 36 8 16 
Adirondack Flying Service/CNS NY 8 6 8 
Aero Air/CNS OR 75 4 6 
Aero Freight/dba Aero Executive/CNS TX 20 8 16 
Aero Tech Flight Service/CNS AK 30 17 25 
Aeroflite/CNS IL 15 5 10 
Agile Air Service/CNS NH 5 2 6 
Air Alpha/CNS OH 5 1 3 
Air America/CNS MI 15 4 5 
Air Cargo Carriers WI 92 10 25 
Air Carriage/CNS CA 5 4 10 
Air Charter of Virginia/CNS VA 14 5 10 
Air Charter Service/CNS PA 12 3 8 
Air Midway/CNS NE 5 3 4 
Air Molokai HI 30 3 6 
Air Nevada Airlines NV 88 11 33 
Air San Luis/CNS CA 18 4 8 
Air Service Int'l/CNS CA 90 14 22 
Air Trek/CNS FL 12 2 3 
Airmotive Enterprises Inc./CNS MN 10 4 6 
Airspect Inc./CNS OH 5 6 4 
Airstar Int'l Airlines/CNS FL 13 1 4 
Alexander Aviation Inc./CNS MN 5 8 25 
Alpine Air Charter/CNS IL 5 1 2 
American Flag Airlines, Inc./CNS FL 7 2 4 
American Flight Services/CNS DC 12 8 12 
Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc/CNS TX 45 4 18 
Archway Aviation Inc./CNS MO 10 8 6 
Aroostook Aviation Inc./CNS ME 15 4 6 
Atlantic Aviation Flight Service Inc./CNS NJ 35 8 16 
Aviation Methods, Inc./NS CA 300 50 225 
Aviation Resources Ltd./Valley 
Aircraft/CNS ND 45 7 25 
(continued on next page) 
  
                                                
39 Lampl, R., Editor. The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac 2000, New York: McGraw-Hill. Weimer, Kent 
J., Editor. World Aviation Directory, Winter 1999, New York: McGraw Hill. 
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Attachment F-4. Charter and Non-Scheduled Carriers (continued) 
Name State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
Aviex Jet, Inc./CNS TX 24 10 12 
Baron Enterprises/CNS OH 12 7 7 
Basco Flying Service Inc./CNS PA 16 9 9 
Basler Airlines/CNS WI 32 7 7 
Bay Air Flying Service/CNS FL 30 4 4 
Beaver Aviation Services Inc./CNS PA 80 3 3 
BeckAir Co. Inc./CNS IN 8 2 2 
Bird Air Fleet, Inc./CNS NH 16 7 7 
Blackhawk Air Service/CNS IL 7 4 4 
Bluffton Flying Service Co./CNS OH 8 10 4 
Bowman Aviation Inc./CNS IN 125 10 6 
Bridgeford Flying Service/CNS CA 30 25 20 
Brooks Seaplane Service/CNS ID 13 1 2 
Bullock Charter Inc./CNS MA 5 1 2 
Bun Air Corp./CNS PA 11 8 8 
Business Jetsolutions/CNS TX 250 14 25 
Capital Aviation Corp./CNS ND 6 5 5 
Casper Air Service/CNS WY 60 10 20 
Central Air Service/CNS MT 3 5 3 
Central Air Southwest/CNS OK 25 4 8 
Champion Air/CNS MN 200 6 30 
Channel Islands Aviation/CNS CA 30 19 22 
Charter Jet Int'l/CNS CO 42 4 10 
Chester Country Aviation/CNS PA 36 3 5 
Cheyenne Charter Inc./CNS IN 7 3 3 
Clay Lacy Aviation/CNS CA 58 12 24 
Clintondale Aviation/CNS NY 75 3 10 
Coastal Air Services/CNS CT 15 11 12 
Commercial Aviation Corp./CNS OH 16 9 8 
Condor Enterprise Inc./CNS IL 8 2 4 
Consolated Airways Inc./CNS IN 11 3 6 
Corporate Jets, Inc./CNS PA 700 35 140 
Croporate Airways/CNS FL 10 7 7 
Crossings Aviation/CSN WA 30 6 14 
Crossjet, Inc./CNS DC 6 2 2 
Davisair, Inc./CNS PA 20 6 14 
Deland Aviation/CNS FL 10 11 4 
Denison Aviation, Inc./CSN IA 7 7 3 
Dodson Int'l Air/CNS GA 22 8 11 
Don Davis Aviation/CNS KY 18 5 6 
Downeast Flying Service/CNS ME 10 1 2 
(continued on next page) 
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Attachment F-4. Charter and Non-Scheduled Carriers (continued) 
Name State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
EL Aero Services/CNS NV  4 13 3 
Elmira Aeronautical Corp/CNS NY 20 1 3 
Encore Int'l Airways/CNS WA 16 2 4 
Executive Flight/CNS WA 10 3 5 
Executive Fliteways, Inc./CNS NY 25 11 15 
F.I.T. Aviation/CNS FL 15 43 10 
Falcon Aviation/CNS SD 6 8 5 
Falwell Aviation/CNS VA 20 7 10 
Flight Int'l/CNS VA 125 21 84 
Flight One Inc./CNS MI 11 3 6 
FlightStar Corp./CNS IL 55 5 20 
Gibson Aviation/CNS MD 12 4 6 
Global Air Charter/CNS FL 65 6 30 
Grand Aire Express/CNS MI 170 24 100 
Gunnison Valley Aviation/CNS CO 10 5 6 
Hansen Flying Service/CNS MI 16 6 8 
Hart Enterprises/CNS ID 7 3 3 
Havre Flying Service/CNS MT 5 1 2 
Holman's Transportation Systems/CNS AL 4 1 2 
Hutcherson Air Service/CNS TX 10 5 5 
Iliamna Air Taxi/CNS AK 12 11 7 
International Aviation/CNS FL 73 5 36 
Int'l Jet Aviation Services/CNS CO 32 12 25 
Island Air Charters/CNS FL 5 3 3 
Jaax Flying Service/CNS CA 3 3 2 
Jackson Hole Aviation/CNS WY 24 5 12 
Jet Aviation Int'l/CNS FL 424 47 225 
Jet Charter Inc./CNS NJ 10 4 4 
Jet East, Inc./CNS TX 86 4 24 
Jet Services/CNS NJ 18 1 4 
Jim Air/CNS AK 8 4 4 
Kaiser Air Inc./CNS CA 130 3 20 
Katmai Air/CNS AK 15 7 6 
Kenai Air/CNS AK 2 4 1 
Lake Mead Air/CNS NV 13 23 10 
Lakeland Aviation Co./CNS WI 7 1 2 
Lane Aviation/CNS OH 162 4 30 
Logan & Reavis Air/CNS OR 9 5 5 
Lumanair/CNS IL 35 2 8 
Lynch Flying Service/CNS MT 55 22 25 
Lynstar Aviation/CNS NJ 30 3 15 
(continued on next page) 
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Attachment F-4. Charter and Non-Scheduled Carriers (continued) 
Name State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
Magnus Aviation/CNS WI 32 6 20 
Martin Aviation/CNS CA 70 10 45 
Mayo Aviation/CNS CO 50 14 28 
Meeker Airport/CNS CO 3 4 2 
Miami Air Int'l/CNS FL 329 5 55 
Mid-Coast Air Charter/CNS TX 10 4 6 
Midstate Aviation/CNS WA 25 15 18 
Miller Flying Service/CNS TX 18 2 6 
Mobile Air Center/CNS AL 45 4 6 
Monterey Airplane Co./CNS CA 9 3 3 
Mountain Air Services/CNS ME 3 7 2 
Mountain Bird Inc./CNS ID 12 9 7 
National Jets/CNS FL 60 7 30 
Navajo Aviation/CNS CA 45 5 20 
New Mexico Flying Service/CNS NM 20 16 10 
North American Airlines/CNS NY 160 3 30 
Omni Air Express/CNS OK 50 3 30 
Orco Aviation/CNS CA 25 4 5 
PAB Aviation/CNS PA 20 3 3 
Pacific Flights/CNS OR 17 4 7 
Panama Aviation/CNS FL 8 5 4 
Pensacola Aviation Center/CNS FL 49 12 15 
Phoenix Air/CNS GA 140 23 98 
Prime Airborne/CNS NY 10 7 6 
Pro-Flite of Vero/CNS FL 54 31 38 
Pronghorn Aviation/CNS CA 3 2 1 
Redtail Aviation/CNS UT 7 9 5 
Rhoades Aviation/CNS IN 65 22 44 
Richmor Aviation/CNS NY 180 20 100 
Ross Aviation/CNS NM 126 6 65 
RSVP Jet/CNS CA 4 1 2 
Ryan Int'l Airlines/CNS KS 698 41 410 
Scenic Airlines/CNS-Sub Sky West AZ 45 22 30 
Schaefer Air Service/CNS CA 250 3 20 
Seneca Flight Operations/CNS NY 22 6 12 
Servair/CNS ND 8 8 6 
Sierra Nevada Airways/CNS NV 18 4 12 
Sierra Pacific Airlines/CNS AZ 30 1 15 
Silver Ranch Airpark/CNS NH 5 2 2 
Sky Aviation/CNS WY 5 7 6 
Skybird Aviation/CNS CA 6 1 2 
(continued on next page) 
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Attachment F-4. Charter and Non-Scheduled Carriers (continued) 
Name State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
Southeast Airmotive/CNS NC 25 15 17 
Southwest Aviation/CNS/Midwest 
Aviation MN 10 6 5 
Sportsflight Airways/CNS AZ 125 1 15 
Star Airlines/CNS OH 30 2 10 
Star Aviation/CNS SD 9 4 4 
Sternair/CNS TX 20 6 8 
Sugarpine Aviatiors/CNS CA 3 2 2 
Summit Aviation/CNS NT 20 3 12 
Sun Pacific Int'l/CNS AZ 50 2 24 
Sunbird Aviation/CNS MT 20 8 14 
Sundance Helicopter/CNS NV 32 11 12 
Superior Aviation/CNS MI 80 21 38 
T.S.P.I./CNS OK 25 10 15 
Taft Air/CNS NJ 10 3 4 
Taquan Air Service/CNS AK 21 3 12 
Telford Aviation/CNS ME 50 16 37 
Thunderbird Airways/CNS TX 7 12 5 
Towle Enterprises/CNS/Twin Air 
Service FL 30 4 8 
Trans Northern Airways/CNS FL 25 10 15 
Trans-Florida Airlines/CNS FL 19 5 6 
Transit Aviation of Lake Charles/CNS LA 28 7 14 
Tri-Star Aviation/CNS VA 4 4 3 
Tulip City Air Service/CNS MI 38 5 10 
Umiat Enterprises/CNS AK 7 3 2 
Universal Airways/CNS TX 10 2 2 
Vee Neal Aviation/CNS PA 10 14 8 
Victoria Aviation Services/CNS TX 15 8 8 
Viscount Air Services/CNS AZ 250 4 60 
Ward Air/CNS AK 10 4 6 
Wayfarer Aviation/CNS NY 60 15 30 
West Coast Air Charter/CNS TX 9 4 3 
Weyerhaeuser Co. Aviation/CNS WA 80 16 49 
Wiggins Airways/CNS MA 105 35 70 
Wild Blue Yonder/CNS ID 7 4 6 
World Aircraft/Spares Corp./CNS FL 18 22 15 
Wren Air/CNS AK 7 3 5 
Totals  9,004 1,566 3,713 
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Attachment F-5. Commercial Helicopter Services40 
Helicopter Air Service State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
Advance Life Support Emergency Rescue 
Team 
MT 4 1 3 
Aero-Copters Inc. WA 6 3 4 
Air Logistics of Alaska AK 44 14 20 
Air Methods CO 250 34 130 
Aircoastal Helicopters FL 6 5 5 
Allied Helicopter Service OK 8 11 5 
Arctic Air Service AK 12 3 4 
Arrowhead Helicopters AZ 2 1 2 
Astrocopters CA 8 5 5 
Aviation Services Unlimited NY 6 2 3 
Joe Brigham NH 5 5 5 
Cane Air LA 5 1 3 
Carson Services PA 75 6 12 
Cascade Helicopters WA 22 9 10 
Central Helicopters MT 5 1 2 
Classic Helicopter Corp. WA 13 10 10 
Columbia Helicopters OR 800 40 70 
Crew Concepts ID 5 3 3 
Diamondback Aviation Services AZ 10 3 5 
ERA Helicopters AK 485 90 110 
Erickson Air Crane OR 60 16 20 
Evergreen Helicopters OR 140 63 80 
Evergreen Helicopters of Alaska AK 9 5 6 
Falcon Helicopters CO 4 3 3 
Fetsko Aviation Sales & Transportation PA 6 2 3 
Fly Wright Corp. WA 5 3 4 
Fostaire Helicopters IL 10 8 6 
Geo-Seis Helicopters CO 75 26 33 
Heli-Cab Helicopter Services TX 5 1 3 
Helicopter Consultants of Maui HI 98 13 20 
Helicopter Minit Men OH 20 4 6 
Helicopter Services Inc. TX 12 13 10 
Helicopters Inc. IL 60 37 43 
Heliflight FL 15 12 13 
Heli-Jet Corp. OR 25 7 12 
Helinet Corp. CA 18 6 9 
Helistream Inc. CA 16 11 11 
(continued on next page) 
  
                                                
40 Lampl, R., Editor. The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac 2000, New York: McGraw-Hill. Weimer, Kent 
J., Editor. World Aviation Directory, Winter 1999, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
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Attachment F-5. Commercial Helicopter Services (continued) 
Helicopter Air Service State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
High Tech Applications WV 6 2 3 
Hillsboro Aviation OR 65 27 30 
Horizon Helicopters CA 10 3 5 
Houston Helicopters TX 38 29 25 
Industrial Helicopters LA 60 14 20 
Interstate Helicopters OK 3 3 3 
Keystone Flight Services PA 71 18 25 
Landells Aviation CA 8 4 5 
Liberty Helicopters NJ 45 11 14 
Maritime Helicopters AK 9 3 5 
McMahon Helicopter Services MI 12 8 9 
Metro Aviation  LA 85 21 25 
Metropolitan Helicopter Services NJ 4 1 2 
Mid Valley Helicopters OR 5 4 4 
Midwest Helicopter Airways IL 15 4 6 
Miller-Crestar Helicopters PA 2 2 2 
National Helicopter Service & Engineering 
Company CA 14 10 12 
New England Helicopter NY 2 2 2 
New York Helicopter NY 150 4 20 
Norcross Helicopter NY 5 3 3 
Papillon Grand Canyon Helicopters WA 100 20 30 
Petroleum Helicopters LA 1,850 242 642 
Redding Air Service CA 10 4 6 
Reforestation Services Inc. OR 18 1 4 
Rogers Helicopters CA 25 23 23 
Royale Helicopter Service PA 3 3 3 
Sacramento Executive Helicopters Inc. CA 15 4 6 
St. Louis Helicopter Airways MO 70 17 25 
Salaika Aviation TX 15 4 8 
San Joaquin Helicopters CA 90 19 25 
Shier Aviation CA 6 6 6 
Sky Helicopters TX 4 5 4 
Skyhawk Helicopter Service UT 5 2 4 
South Sea Helicopter Corp. HI 25 3 9 
Southeast Mississippi Air Ambulance 
District MS 7 1 3 
Suncoast Helicopters FL 15 9 12 
U.S. Helicopters Inc. NC 22 17 18 
Versatile Helicopters Inc. OK 9 8 8 
(continued on next page) 
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Attachment F-5. Commercial Helicopter Services (continued) 
Helicopter Air Service State # of Employees # of AC # of Pilots 
West Florida Helicopters Inc. FL 9 2 3 
Western Helicopter Services OR 15 8 8 
Whirl-Away Helicopters Inc. IN 10 5 5 
Wolfe Air Aviation CA 6 5 5 
Zebra Air Inc. TX 4 3 3 
Totals  5,291 1,061 1,773 
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Appendix G. NAOMS Air-Carrier-Pilot Survey Sample Size 
by Individual Survey Item 
 
 
An analysis was made of sample size requirements for each event addressed in the questions of 
Section B of the air-carrier-pilot survey using the records of the first 8,000 interviews. This study 
was done to complement and supplement a similar study that had been conducted based on the 
data obtained during the field trial. From the field trial, the decision was made to conduct 8,000 
interviews/year. The analysis reported here was undertaken to confirm that with approximately 
8,000 interviews, NAOMS would be able to detect a shift from year to year of 20% with 95% 
confidence for a substantial number of the events studied. 
 
The preliminary analysis estimated upper-bound sample sizes by simplifying much of the 
information collected in the survey. The unit of observation used was the respondent rather than 
aggregate hours or legs from which a rate might be calculated. We assumed that pilots had equal 
time ‘at risk’ for each of the events and that each pilot had an equal chance to be selected in the 
sample. Also, this simple analysis did not distinguish captains, first officers, or other flight-crew 
positions or circumstances that might affect the probability of an event being observed. 
 
Sample sizes were calculated to detect year-to-year differences in proportions, i.e. the proportion 
of pilots reporting equipment problems or the proportion of pilots reporting bird strikes. This 
approach allowed straightforward statistical techniques to be used, specifically those described in 
Snedecor and Cochran (1989) (Section 7.13-Sample size for comparing two proportions, pp. 
129–133) and Kahn (1989) (Difference Between Binomial Parameters, pp. 27–33). 
 
According to formulas in the two references, only the sample proportions ( pˆ and 1- pˆ ),  the selected 
Type I and Type II errors, and the desired change to be detected affect the calculations.  Sample 
sizes were calculated to detect a 20% change, in the proportion of pilots reporting each event 
addressed in items of the survey. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.10, and 0.20 were calculated. These 
sample sizes are presented as Table G-1, along with the number of pilots giving a response to each 
item, the number of pilots reporting one or more events, the percent ( pˆ *100) of pilots reporting the 
event, and the number of pilots that would involve a 20% change. Each event question is presented 
in Table G-1 as it appears on the survey questionnaire. Results were obtained for 88 event 
questions. Of these, for 47 events (53%), NAOMS would be able to detect 20% rate shifts with 95% 
confidence should such changes occur with 8,000 or fewer interviews per year. 
 
It is believed these calculations represent upper bounds for sample size requirements. They 
ignore substantial information that the survey collects, such as the number of hours flown during 
the recall period and the actual number of events reported, that more detailed statistical measures 
can apply. More precise estimates that reduce variance and increase power may be derived 
through special applications of generalized linear models such as Poisson regression that can 
model underlying rates instead of simple characteristics of the survey respondents. 
 
References: 
Snedecor, G.W. and Cochran, W.G. 1989 Statistical Methods. Iowa State University Press. 
Kahn, H.A. and Sempos, C.T. 1989 Statistical Methods in Epidemiology. Oxford University Press. 
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Table G-1. Sample Sizes to Compare Two Proportions 
Section 
B 
Question 
Number 
of Pilots 
Reporting 
Number 
of Pilots 
Reporting 
1+ Event 
Percent of 
Pilots 
Reporting 
1+ Event 
+/- 20% 
Change in 
Number of 
Pilots 
Reporting 
1+ Event 
Sample Size 
Power=.20 
Alpha=.05 Alpha=.10 Alpha=.20 
ER1 7996 427 5.3 85.4 6998 5539 4021 
ER2 7998 22 0.3 4.4 143135 113295 82242 
ER2A 21 16 76.2 3.2 123 98 71 
ER2B 22 2 9.1 0.4 3948 3125 2268 
ER2C 19 7 36.8 1.4 677 536 389 
ER3 7982 150 1.9 30.0 20614 16317 11844 
ER4A 7996 102 1.3 20.4 30555 24185 17556 
ER4B 7994 43 0.5 8.6 73002 57783 41945 
ER4C 7997 43 0.5 8.6 73030 57805 41961 
ER4D 7995 47 0.6 9.4 66764 52846 38361 
ER4E 7995 18 0.2 3.6 174964 138490 100530 
ER4F 7993 24 0.3 4.8 131092 103763 75322 
ER4G 7996 37 0.5 7.4 84926 67221 48796 
ER4H 7993 32 0.4 6.4 98220 77744 56435 
ER4I 7997 133 1.7 26.6 23344 18477 13413 
ER4I2_1 133 133 100.0 . . . . 
ER4I2_2 4 4 100.0 . . . . 
ER4I2_3 1 1 100.0 . . . . 
ER4I2_4 1 1 100.0 . . . . 
ER5A 7998 42 0.5 8.4 74787 59196 42971 
ER5A1 42 2 4.8 0.4 7896 6250 4537 
ER5B 7997 37 0.5 7.4 84936 67230 48802 
ER5B1 31 24 77.4 4.8 115 91 66 
ER5C 7999 19 0.2 3.8 165818 131250 95275 
ER5C1 18 4 22.2 0.8 1382 1094 794 
ER5D 7994 184 2.3 36.8 16758 13264 9629 
ER5D1 176 57 32.4 11.4 824 652 474 
ER5E 7995 126 1.6 25.2 24657 19516 14167 
ER5E1 122 21 17.2 4.2 1899 1503 1091 
ER5F 7998 89 1.1 17.8 35084 27770 20159 
ER6 7998 68 0.9 13.6 46041 36443 26454 
ER7 7999 19 0.2 3.8 165818 131250 95275 
TU1 7995 450 5.6 90.0 6620 5240 3803 
(continued on next page) 
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Table G-1. Sample Sizes to Compare Two Proportions (continued) 
Section 
B 
Question 
Number 
of Pilots 
Reporting 
Number 
of Pilots 
Reporting 
1+ Event 
Percent 
of Pilots 
Reporting 
1+ Event 
+/- 20% 
Change in 
Number of 
Pilots 
Reporting 
1+ Event 
Sample Size 
Power=.20 
Alpha=.05 Alpha=.10 Alpha=.20 
TU1A 449 242 53.9 48.4 338 267 194 
TU1B 448 242 54.0 48.4 336 266 193 
TU2 7980 1360 17.0 272.0 1922 1521 1104 
WE1 7953 1152 14.5 230.4 2331 1845 1339 
WE1A 1151 336 29.2 67.2 958 758 550 
WE1B 1146 268 23.4 53.6 1293 1024 743 
WE2 7988 395 4.9 79.0 7589 6007 4361 
WE2A 394 57 14.5 11.4 2334 1848 1341 
WE3 7995 665 8.3 133.0 4352 3445 2500 
WE4 7994 62 0.8 12.4 50510 39980 29022 
WE5 7978 1709 21.4 341.8 1448 1146 832 
WE6 7995 283 3.5 56.6 10759 8516 6182 
CP1 6445 365 5.7 73.0 6576 5205 3779 
CP2 6443 69 1.1 13.8 36471 28868 20955 
CP3 6445 310 4.8 62.0 7813 6184 4489 
AC1 7985 1107 13.9 221.4 2453 1942 1409 
AC2 7990 903 11.3 180.6 3099 2453 1780 
AC3 7973 299 3.8 59.8 10133 8020 5822 
GE1 7998 9 0.1 1.8 350455 277396 201363 
GE2 7991 235 2.9 47.0 13030 10314 7487 
GE2A 235 198 84.3 39.6 74 58 42 
GE2B 235 45 19.1 9.0 1667 1319 958 
GE2C 235 0 0.0 . . . . 
GE3 7996 291 3.6 58.2 10454 8274 6006 
GE4 7996 288 3.6 57.6 10567 8364 6071 
GE5 7997 1 0.0 0.2 3156861 2498750 1813853 
GE6 7998 3 0.0 0.6 1052155 832813 604542 
GE7 7997 31 0.4 6.2 101452 80302 58292 
GE8 7981 104 1.3 20.8 29903 23669 17181 
GE9 7985 81 1.0 16.2 38525 30494 22136 
GE10 7995 95 1.2 19.0 32831 25987 18864 
GE10A 94 21 22.3 4.2 1372 1086 789 
GE10B 95 67 70.5 13.4 165 131 95 
(continued on next page) 
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Table G-1. Sample Sizes to Compare Two Proportions (continued) 
Section 
B 
Question 
Number 
of Pilots 
Reporting 
Number 
of Pilots 
Reporting 
1+ Event 
Percent of 
Pilots 
Reporting 
1+ Event 
+/- 20% 
Change in 
Number of 
Pilots 
Reporting 
1+ Event 
Sample Size 
Power=.20 
Alpha=.05 Alpha=.10 Alpha=.20 
GE10C 95 7 7.4 1.4 4963 3929 2852 
AH1 7981 764 9.6 152.8 3729 2952 2143 
AH2 7988 305 3.8 61.0 9945 7872 5714 
AH3 7983 1916 24.0 383.2 1250 990 718 
AH3A 1906 329 17.3 65.8 1892 1498 1087 
AH4 7993 46 0.6 9.2 68207 53988 39190 
AH5 7995 5 0.1 1.0 630898 499375 362498 
AH6 7986 441 5.5 88.2 6755 5347 3881 
AH7 7995 4 0.1 0.8 788722 624297 453180 
AH8 7996 9 0.1 1.8 350368 277326 201312 
AH9 7995 154 1.9 30.8 20102 15911 11550 
AH10 7989 25 0.3 5.0 125769 99550 72264 
AH11 7991 24 0.3 4.8 131059 103737 75303 
AH12 7996 59 0.7 11.8 53111 42039 30516 
AH13 7992 69 0.9 13.8 45334 35883 26048 
AH14 7991 112 1.4 22.4 27774 21984 15958 
AH15 7996 4 0.1 0.8 788820 624375 453236 
AH15A 4 0 0 . . . . 
AH15B 4 3 75.0 0.6 132 104 76 
AH15C 4 1 25.0 0.2 1184 938 681 
AH15C1 0 0 . . . . . 
AD1 7994 399 5.0 79.8 7515 5948 4318 
AD1A 399 32 8.0 6.4 4528 3584 2602 
AD2 7991 21 0.3 4.2 149838 118601 86093 
AT1 7969 2321 29.1 464.2 961 760 552 
AT1A 2318 613 26.4 122.6 1098 869 631 
AT1B 2320 1686 72.7 337.2 148 118 85 
AT1C 2319 845 36.4 169.0 689 545 396 
AT2 7966 2938 36.9 587.6 676 535 388 
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Appendix H. Workshop 1: Agenda and Participants 
 
 
NAOMS held Workshop 1 on the developing program on May 11, 1999, in Alexandria, Virginia. 
Its purpose was to acquaint stakeholders with the nature of the program and its methods and to 
enlist their support in implementing the program. During this first workshop, the 76 participants 
formed breakout groups to address questions posed to them and to provide their feedback, 
comments, and recommendations to the NAOMS team. 
 
This appendix includes the workshop agenda and attendance list, as well as the questions posed 
and feedback from workshop participants 
 
Workshop 1 Agenda 
 
8:00 to 8:30 A.M. ................. Registration  
8:30 to 9:00 A.M.  ................ Linda Connell will provide project overview with focus on policy 
issues and the reason for the workshop.  
900 to 9:40 A.M. .................. Bob Dodd will introduce the project goals and tasks completed to 
date. He also will focus on the tasks to be completed in FY99. This 
session will include a high-level discussion of the experiment; 
planned accomplishments; and the outcome, including analysis 
products.  
9:40 to 10:00 A.M. ............... Break and Questions 
10:00 to 10:45 A.M. ............. Jon Krosnick will speak about survey research methods and the 
development of the survey instrument. His primary goal is to 
describe the strengths and weaknesses of survey research 
methodology, using examples where possible. Jon will describe 
how we developed an instrument that was reliable and valid. 
10:45 to 11:15 A.M. ............. Joan Cwi will discuss the process of applying the survey, 
emphasizing that the process will be anonymous and that we hope 
to work with the stakeholders to facilitate the process.  
11:15 to 11:45 ...................... Linda Connell will speak again, setting up the workshop and 
speaking specifically to the sensitivity issues that she perceives 
might be a problem. 
11:45 to 1:00 P.M. ...............  Lunch 
1:00 to 1:15 P.M. ................. Introduction to Workshop Activities 
1:15 to 3:15 P.M. ................. Working Groups  
3:15 to 3:30 P.M. ................. Break 
3:30 to 5:00 P.M. ................. Work Group Summaries and Discussion 
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Workshop 1 Attendance List 
 
First Name Last Name Organization Office Job Title 
Mark Anderson Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State 
University 
 Associate 
Professor 
Mac Armstrong United Airlines   
Henry Armstrong Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Rotorcraft 
Directorate 
Manager 
Julie Austin United Airlines   
Susan Baker Johns Hopkins Injury 
Prevention Research Center 
 Professor 
Jim Blancahrd Embry Riddle Aeronautical 
University 
 Professor 
Phil Boyer Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association 
 President 
Bill  Bozin Air Transport Association   
Mads Brandt Teledyne Controls  Director, Flight 
Data Systems 
Joseph Breen Transportation Research 
Board 
National Research Council 
 Senior Program 
Officer Aviation 
Malcom Brenner National Transportation 
Safety Board 
  
Jan  Brett-Clark Federal Aviation 
Administration 
  
R. Thomas Buffenbarger The International 
Association of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers 
 President 
Phillippe Burcier Airbuse Industries  Operational 
Prevention and 
Safety 
Assurance 
Brigadier 
General 
Charles M. 
Burke U.S. Army Safety Center   
Kim Cardosi U.S. Department of 
Transportation 
 Engineering 
Psychologist 
Rick Cassell Rannoch Corp.   
Terry Clark Alaska Airlines   
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First Name Last Name Organization Office Job Title 
Walt Coelman Regional Airline 
Association 
  
Steve Corrie Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Office of System 
Safety 
 
James Deimler Flight Data Company  Regional 
Manager 
Thomas Diefiore Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Aviation Safety 
Division 
 
Eleana Edens Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Human Factors 
Dividsion 
 
William Edmunds Airline Pilots Association   
Carolyn Edwards Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Office of System 
Safety 
 
Jack Enders Enders and Associates  President 
Ray Fenster Association of Flight 
Attendants 
  
George Finelli National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Aviation Safety 
Program Office 
Aviation Safety 
Program Office 
Charles Fluet Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Office of 
Integrated Safety 
Analysis 
Deputy Director 
Roy Fox Bell Helicopter   
Mike Gallagher Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Transport 
Airplane 
Directorate 
Manager 
Daniel Garland Embry Riddle Aeronautical 
University 
Department of 
Human Factors 
and Systems 
Chair 
Major 
General 
Francis C. 
Gideon Air Force Safety Center   
Curtis Graeber Boeing Commercial 
Airplane Group 
Human 
Engineering 
Chief 
Christopher Hart Federal Aviation 
Administration  
ASY-1: Office of 
System Safety 
Assistant 
Administrator 
Chuck Hedges Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Office of System 
Safety 
 
Captain 
Mike 
Holtom Meridian Senior Manager, 
Safety 
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First Name Last Name Organization Office Job Title 
Charles Huettner National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Aviation Safety 
Research 
Director 
Mike Kennedy Pratt & Whitney   
Dr. James Kuchar Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
Department of 
Aeronautics and 
Astronautics 
 
Carl Kuwitzky SouthWest Airlines Pilots' 
Association 
 Chairman, Air 
Safety 
Committee 
Bruce  Landsberg    
John  Lauber Airbus Industries  Airbus Training 
Center 
Captain 
Richard 
LaVoy Allied Pilots Association  President 
Nancy Leveson Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
 Hunsaker 
Visiting 
Professor of 
Aeronautical 
Information 
Engineering 
Guohua Li Johns Hopkins University 
Hospital 
  
Bernard Loeb National Transportation 
Safety Board 
 Director, Office 
of Research and 
Engineering 
Thomas Longridge Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Data 
Management and 
Analysis Section 
Aviation 
Research 
Psychologist, 
Supervisor 
Nancy Mathiowetz Joint Program in Survey 
Methodology 
 Assistant 
Professor 
Stuart  Matthews Flight Safety Foundation  President 
John McCarthy Naval Research Laboratory  Manager, 
Scientific and 
Technical 
Program 
Michael McNally    
Tom McSweeny Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Office of 
Regulation and 
Certification 
Associate 
Administrator 
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First Name Last Name Organization Office Job Title 
John O'Brien Air Line Pilots Association  Director, 
Engineering and 
Air Safety 
John Olcott National Business Aircraft 
Association 
 President 
Jay Pardee Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Engine & 
Propeller 
Directorate 
Manager 
Dave Patterson MacFadden and Associates  Senior 
Consultant 
Ben Phelps National Air Traffic 
Controllers Association 
 Safety 
Coordinator 
Tom Poberezny Experimental Aircraft 
Association 
 President 
Jacques Press Federal Aviation 
Administration 
FAA Technical 
Center 
 
Ronald Robinson Boeing Commercial 
Airplane Group 
 Director, 
Airplane Safety 
Paul Russell Boeing Commercial 
Airplane Group 
Airplane Safety 
Engineering 
Chief Engineer, 
Stewart Schreckengas
t 
The Mitre Corporation  Ph.D. 
David Schroeder Federal Aviation 
Administration  
Human 
Resources 
Research 
Division 
Manager 
Ronald  Simmons Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Human Factors 
Division AAR-
100 
 
Catherine Simonne-
Jondot 
Airbus Industrie  Group Manager, 
In-Service Data 
Collection 
Stan Smith National Transportation 
Safety Board 
 Data Systems Manager 
Captain Ed Soliday United Airlines Safety & 
Security 
Vice President 
Jeremy Sprung Sandia National 
Laboratories 
  
Larry Sukut Alaska Airlines   
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First Name Last Name Organization Office Job Title 
Ronald Swanda General Aviation 
Manufacturers Association 
 Vice President 
Operations 
Dr. Jay Swink   Senior 
Technical 
Specialist in 
Crew Systems 
Technology 
Robert Toenniessen Federal Aviation 
Administration, ASY-100 
NASDAC Manager 
Robert Vandal Flight Safety Foundation  Executive Vice 
President 
Ron Wojnar Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Transport 
Airplane 
Directorate 
Manager ANM-
100 
Richard Wright Helicopter Association 
International 
  
 
 
 
Questions Posed and Feedback from Workshop Participants 
 
This section presents the discussion questions posed to the workshop participants and provides a 
bulletized summary of their responses. 
 
Group A 
Question: Do we have the courage to act on the data we collect? 
Group Discussion: 
• Maybe 
• Could be heroes or villains 
• The data will not be ignored 
• But, reasonable people may disagree about the actions it does (or does not) motivate 
 
Question: Could we reform existing data sources instead? 
Group Discussion: 
• In some cases, yes 
• But, many existing data collection efforts are passive, not active and statistically 
designed 
• NAOMS should avoid redundancy unless that redundancy serves to validate 
 
Other Comments: 
• Not linking causal factors to events is a mistake 
—Will lead to data that cannot be analyzed 
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• Need to explain why some questions relate to the past 30 days and others to the past 
year 
—Not obvious from survey design 
—Could be off-putting to respondents 
• Need to recognize the limitations of the survey 
—Not create expectations that cannot be met 
• Causal information may be at wrong level of detail 
—Is not sufficient to support intervention strategies 
 
Group B 
Question: Do you have specific suggestions regarding the conduct of the field trial? 
Group Discussion: 
• Important to experiment with sampling during trial (i.e., medical-based) 
• Obtain more feedback 
• Additional survey needed to encourage questions/comments on the original survey 
 
Question: Have we adequately addressed issues surrounding data sensitivity and use? 
Group Discussion: 
• There needs to be a statement in the first paragraph stating the confidentiality agreement 
• Link it to ASRS, to show a pattern of confidentiality 
• Get AOPA and ATA to endorse it early and clear on the front page 
• Needs an endorsement letter to assure the aviation community of its support 
• Overall consensus was that the issues have been addressed adequately 
 
Question: Could you suggest ways of improving the proposed data collection process? 
Group Discussion: 
• Recommend surveying on a monthly basis; need to look at 30-day data to identify 
trends 
• Is there a core questionnaire for all groups; or is this survey tailored to each group (i.e., 
flight attendants, pilots, etc.)? 
• Send out quarterly reports 
• Date the survey it so you can refer back to it in 30-day increments 
• Why not 60-to 90-day increments? 
 
Question: What can we do to maximize participation and response in the field trial and 
beyond? 
Group Discussion: 
• Needs to be clarified that this is not a duplication of information 
• Need to give follow up data to close the loop: 
—Post card 
—Web site 
—Callback or Directline Publications 
• Persons being surveyed need to see that this survey has had a direct impact on future 
survey tools 
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Question: Do you have suggestions for ways to improve the survey instrument? 
Group Discussion: 
Flight Experience Section 
• Shorten form 
• Use standard categories: light, medium, and heavy 
• Define “Other Aircraft” column 
• Flight Experience matrix needs to be more specific 
• Where do unscheduled aircraft fit in? 
• Demographic information should be 60+ instead of 60-65 
Safety Events Section (Previous 12 Months) 
• Text introduction should insert the word “observed” after “flight experienced” 
• Needs to be directed to more than just pilots and flight crewmembers 
• Aircraft Equipment Problems: 
—“Experienced an engine fire” does not capture the consistency; there can be a 
large range of engine fires 
—Needs to be clarified more on the severity of what aircraft problems would 
lead to the return to land or diversion 
• Actual Or Potential Loss of Control:  
—Encountered wake turbulence that induced 45 or more degrees of roll; needs to 
be changed to 30 
• Airborne Conflicts:  
—Not just “nearly” collided, but “actually” collided 
—Expand bird strike to include volcanic ash, hail, etc. 
—Take the word “residual” out; maybe replace it with “horizontal” or “vertical” 
• ATM Problems: 
—Write out the acronym 
—Take out the word nearly; it is redundant 
—Need to be more specific on whether the ATC clearance you received that 
resulted in a near collision with terrain or a ground obstruction was followed, 
corrected, or not heard 
Safety Events Section (Previous 30 Days) 
• Wrong Place, Wrong Time: 
—Landed without a clearance is too vague. This happens all day with non-tower 
airports 
Safety Events Section (Contributing Factors and Positive Factors) 
• Page too busy 
• Should not be an opinion-based questionnaire, we should stick with occurrences and 
events 
• Needs to be more specific 
• Review this page more to see if it adds value 
• Comments and details section should be broken into the following two categories: 
(1) What could be done to enhance survey? 
(2) Other comments and details 
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Question: How might we formalize industry, government, and professional organization 
participation in continuing NAOMS development? 
Group Discussion: 
• Create a committee 
• Define who the implied users are that would benefit from the data 
• Determine what information would be essential to each group to have a better focus 
• Data may be too soft; “fringe” data 
 
Question: Would an advisory panel be appropriate? 
Group Discussion: 
• They believed it was a premature step 
• Maybe a user group 
—Doesn’t need to include all people that attended workshop 
—Should be separate from ASRS Subcommittee 
—If NASA is internally assessing this, why form a committee at all? 
Other Comments: 
• Be careful not to collect data we have no use for; concentrate on specifics 
 
 
Group C 
Question: Do you have specific suggestions regarding the conduct of the field trial? 
Group Discussion: 
• If our goal is to increase response rate, then cover letter from union would be helpful 
 
Question: Have we adequately addressed issues surrounding data sensitivity and use? 
Group Discussion: 
• Feel it has been pretty well covered 
• But, when would the database be released so that single incidents couldn’t be matched 
to other databases? 
• Desperate for this type of information in a timely manner 
• But also will want to link it to other databases for validation, etc. 
 
Question: Could you suggest ways of improving the proposed data collection process? 
Group Discussion: 
• Recommend surveying on a monthly basis; need to look at 30-day data to identify 
trends 
• The survey would have to be altered 
• Cost concerns 
• Scantron or automated response for data collection would be helpful 
• Eventual resolution of Web site survey issues 
 
Question: What can we do to maximize participation and response in the field trial and 
beyond? 
Group Discussion: 
• Need to make a commitment to offer feedback to those that are completing the survey 
• Suggest a Web site 
• Data should be accessible in a timely fashion 
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• Produce articles to be disseminated to industry for publication in internal documents 
(also could use Callback and DirectLine) 
 
Question: Do you have suggestions for ways to improve the survey instrument? 
Group Discussion: 
Flight Experience Section 
• Remove word “air carrier” from spanners 
• Use standard classifications of type of operations (column 1)—suggest using FAR 
119; needs to be dynamic/flexible with changing FARs 
• Use standard categories: light, medium, and heavy 
• Define “Other Aircraft” column 
• Add lighter-than-air, rotorcraft, etc., now 
• As pilot gets older, the flight time may not be as accurate—100 hours doesn’t mean 
as much when you have 15,000 hours  
—A range of flight hours might be better (e.g., 10,000-12,000 hrs.) 
Safety Events Section (Previous 12 Months and Previous 30 Days) 
• Instead of using Number of Occurrences column, suggest two columns: one for 30 
days, one for 12 months for all questions 
• Recommend use of Jon’s categories from his presentation 
• Need to document the objectives of each question and how we can use the data 
• Would like to gather less serious or “precursor” information to know if something is 
about to happen (e.g., deviated due to icing) 
• Use a fixed reference period (e.g., March 1999 instead of “last 30 days”) so data can 
be compared over time and with other data sources 
—Does this compromise confidentiality? Overall, the questions will collect good 
and useful data 
Safety Events Section (Contributing Factors and Positive Factors) 
• Overall, what is learned from this part if we can’t link anything up? 
—Suggest reformulating this page to target risk areas and understand where to do 
further research 
• As a pilot, I find it sort of difficult (might be the layout). Ask for the most 
significant rather than circle all that apply 
• May want to eliminate the use of the word “aircraft design” and just leave it as 
“problems” 
 
Question: How might we formalize industry, government, and professional organization 
participation in continuing NAOMS development? 
• Just ask 
• Identify organizations that are doing safety analysis 
 
Question: Would an advisory panel be appropriate? 
• In the beginning of the program and to help identify topical questions 
• Maybe a user group 
 
Other Comments 
• Suggestion to get the BTS involved 
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Appendix I.  FAA Comments after Workshop 1 and NASA Responses 
(February 20, 2000) 
 
 
The FAA Office of System Safety conducted a survey of FAA staff members who attended the  
11 May 1999 NAOMS workshop. Their inputs, and NASA responses to those inputs, are 
summarized here. The questions are numbered and listed with the Comments (C) as in the original 
document from the FAA. NASA’s Responses (R) follow the comments where appropriate. 
 
 
 
Q1. What was your general reaction to the National Aviation Operational Monitoring 
Service (NAOMS) concept presented by NASA representatives at the May 11, 1999 
workshop (Holiday Inn, Alexandria, VA)? 
 
C1.1   I thought that the general concept had merit. However, I felt that additional effort was 
needed to determine precisely the type of information required that would provide the basis for 
decision-making to enhance safety. Consideration needs to be given to narrowing the focus of 
the questionnaire. 
R1.1 Input on questionnaire content was derived from a number of different sources, including: 
• Information provided during focus groups with active air carrier pilots 
• Analyses of ASRS and NASDAC incident and accident data resources 
• Results from background research on current safety issues and relevant safety 
information sources, and  
• Review by industry and government safety representatives. 
It should also be remembered that the field trial participants will be asked about their opinions on 
the questionnaire including question content and formatting.  
 
The survey instrument has a tri-part structure. The first part collects risk exposure information 
(hours and legs flown, etc.). The second part collects information on incident occurrences for 
trending and high-level safety indication. The third part contains focus questions that can be 
made more or less detailed depending on the specific information needs of decision makers. 
Parts 1 and 2 are needed to calculate event rates. Part 3 is needed to evaluate technology impacts 
and to address topical questions of interest to the aviation community. 
 
C1.2   With a sound survey design and support of all major segments of the aviation community, 
the proposal could provide high-level information for assessing the general safety status of the 
national aviation system. However, to significantly affect the accident rate, much more detailed 
information than that currently contained in the draft proposal will be required. 
R1.2   The NAOMS questionnaire is a compromise between the specificity needed to produce 
meaningful safety information and the brevity needed to obtain a high survey response rate. It is 
important to remember that one of the primary goals of NAOMS is to provide early, high-level 
indications of emerging safety concerns. NAOMS data will reveal presence of increasing or 
decreasing rates of events in a quantitative manner but may not pinpoint their exact nature. 
Additional comparison to other data sources may need to be accomplished, or additional 
investigations may be required, to understand why the observed trends are occurring. The latter 
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will provide the detailed information needed to develop interventions that address the emerging 
safety issue, but the NAOMS data will help guide these efforts toward interventions that are data 
driven. 
 
C1.3   The NAOMS concept could perhaps be an effective component of a well thought out 
integrated approach to a coordinated safety program that would help identify precursors to 
accidents and incidents. However, things need to be addressed from a systematic perspective by 
identifying the “problem space,” current data collection efforts, and the data/information gaps. 
An assessment needs to be made of how this concept fits in with other initiatives and data 
collection programs to determine if NAOMS is the best way to fill in the gaps. 
R1.3   This issue was considered during the design of the NAOMS process and the questionnaire. 
Background research was conducted to evaluate current aviation (and proposed) safety data or 
information sources, their strengths and weaknesses, and what gaps needing to be addressed. The 
results from this analysis were used during the design of the field trial questionnaire. 
 
More generally, the NAOMS development process was assisted by more than two decades of 
experience operating the ASRS as well as consultations with FAA, ALPA, HAI, and other 
industry representatives. The ASRS has fielded many thousands of data requests over that time 
period. Its experience suggested that there were at least two significant gaps in available aviation 
safety information. The first involved numbers (quantitative value). There is a paucity of hard 
numbers—scientifically collected and reliable—characterizing the frequency of unwanted safety 
events. The other related to impacts of new technologies on aviation safety. Information relating 
to technological impacts tends to be variable. Severe side effects are generally reported. But, 
lesser issues often failed to surface in a timely way or available data are not at the level of detail 
sought by technology implementers. NAOMS was designed to fill both of these gaps. 
 
C1.4   Sounds like a good idea, however, question the value of this program versus other 
possibilities, e.g. APMS. 
R1.4 See Response 1.3. It is our opinion that no single program is adequate to address aviation 
safety issues due to the system’s complexity and dynamic characteristics. NAOMS proposes to 
provide an accurate, reliable quantitative measure of safety events in the system from the 
experiences of the people working in it. Other programs contribute to other aspects of any 
quantitative and qualitative safety effort. 
 
C1.5   I was very positively impressed by the presentation of the data system. It appears to have 
the rudiments of a very valuable addition to the aviation safety data set if it is implemented 
properly. The actual draft form that was reviewed by participants in the afternoon session was 
unfortunately highly inconsistent with the presentations made in the morning. If this is the form 
of the survey that is implemented, it will not live up to the expectations created during the 
morning sessions and presentations. 
R1.5   The questionnaire used in the field trial was modified to be in concert with the concepts 
discussed in the morning presentations at the workshop. The field trial itself is expected to 
produce many additional changes in the instrument as a consequence of respondent feedback. 
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C1.6 As analysts, we are always seeking quality aviation safety data. When concrete data do not 
exist, surveys can provide some useful insight into the effectiveness of our aviation domain. Thus, 
I do support the NAOMS concept. Three major concerns that I have with the NAOMS concept, as 
presented, are: 
a. the frequency of the data collection 
b. the consistency of data being collected. (Will the questionnaire be constantly 
undergoing change/modification? For comparison purposes, we do need to standardize 
the questionnaire.) 
c. response rate. 
R1.6   Frequency of Data Collection: The field trial is designed to evaluate the optimum recall 
period (which will influence the frequency of data collection) as will the response rate achieved 
for the various modes of questionnaire application (mail, telephone and face-to-face interviews). 
The working hypothesis is that a monthly survey application may the best option. 
Consistency of Data Collected: The NAOMS program from its inception was (and is) designed 
to use a “core” set of questions that will be applied consistently over time so meaningful trends 
can be developed. 
Response Rate: The field trial will determine whether NAOMS achieves the necessary response 
rate for statistical accuracy. The target figure is 70%. The lowest acceptable figure is 
approximately 50 percent. 
 
Q2. How effective do you believe the proposed NAOMS will be in providing information to 
meet the measurement objectives described in the introductory briefing, i.e. 
• Better, more comprehensive numbers to help reach the safety improvement goal 
(80% reduction in fatal accident rate in 10 years)  
• Better and more rapid feedback on technological and procedural change 
• Escape from event-driven safety policy, and  
• Create a data-driven basis for safety decisions. 
 
C2.1   If the authors do not provide significant changes in the format of the questionnaire and 
aspects of the approach to data gathering, I think that the outcomes will not provide the 
necessary information to have a significant impact on aviation safety. The critical feature will be 
whether the information gathered will be of sufficient detail to permit the identification of 
specific intervention strategies. As reviewed, the information would be too global to have the 
specificity needed to identify appropriate intervention strategies. For example, it did not appear 
that the questionnaire adequately addressed safety issues in US airspace versus flights involving 
oceanic or international airspace. If used effectively, questionnaires can provide rapid feedback 
on the impacts of technological and procedural changes. However, this requires a highly specific 
and focused questionnaire. 
R2.1   The questionnaire was modified in response to the comments from the first NAOMS 
industry workshop. As discussed earlier, one of the primary goals of NAOMS is to provide early 
indicators of safety concerns before they result in undesirable outcomes. The primary method for 
this will be the tracking of trends for safety issues identified in the NAOMS questionnaire. If 
unusual or changing trends are noted, additional investigation will be required to understand why 
the observed trends are occurring. It is this resulting investigation and evaluation that will 
provide the detailed information needed to design interventions to reduce the accident potential. 
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If the standard questions in the NAOMS questionnaire do not address an area of concern, then 
questions can be developed and added to the questionnaire in the “topical questions” section 
(questions that are not routinely asked in the “core” portion of the questionnaire). These 
questions would not be asked over an extended period of time but only for a few cycles of the 
questionnaire’s application. These questions may be much more detailed than the core questions. 
The last point to remember is that the initial NAOMS industry workshop, the field trial of the 
questionnaire, and the second NAOMS industry workshop are all designed to evaluate the 
proposed NAOMS process and the questionnaire. It is hoped that any concerns about question 
specificity or subject areas will be discovered through that process. 
C2.2   If the questions remain at the high, broad level presented in the draft survey instrument, it 
may be difficult to get information that is detailed enough to affect the accident rate. For 
example, it appears that in the survey of air carrier pilots, no information will be collected by 
airport.  
R2.2   At this point, specific questions concerning airports are not included. NAOMS has been 
advised that this information may lead to some level of identification. In regard to asking more 
specific information, please look at Response 1.2. The general observation is true, however, that 
NAOMS will not be useful as a carrier-, aircraft-, or location-specific surveillance system. It is 
thought that other Federal programs (e.g., SPAS) fill these requirements. 
C2.3   The survey may be effective in providing feedback on technological changes, and perhaps 
procedural changes, to the extent that they are implemented at a national level. 
• Re better, more comprehensive numbers, think it is questionable whether NAOMS will 
succeed. Concerned about how you factor out biases. 
• Re better and more rapid feedback, presupposes that people will respond to the survey. 
• Re escape from event-driven safety policy…perhaps. 
• Re create a data-driven basis for safety decisions…will have data, but question the 
validity of the data due to its subjective nature. 
R2.3   Biases / Subjectivity. Two approaches have been used to minimize the impact of biases 
and subjectivity. First, the questionnaire was designed to remove questions concerning the 
reporter’s opinion. Instead, the focus was on actual operational experience. This modification 
occurred after the first NAOMS industry workshop. Secondly, the field trial was designed to 
evaluate the influence of reporter biases so that they might be better understood and mitigated. 
C2.4   Each of these objectives can be furthered significantly if NAOMS is implemented 
consistent with the presentations made about it during the morning session. If not, determining 
its value will be problematic. 
R2.4   See Response 1.5. 
C2.5   It does appear that the questionnaire might provide us with some insight into potential 
safety issues, thus we should have better numbers in determining how well we are attaining our 
safety goal. If the data are of high quality and complete, then I could see the FAA moving into a 
more data-driven basis (pro-active) for safety decisions. However, this does not mean the end for 
an event-driven safety policy, but it will help minimize the tendency for the FAA to be in a 
reactive mode. 
R2.5   NAOMS agrees with these perceptions and is optimistic about a positive contribution to 
the safety process. 
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C2.6   Since it isn’t clear what problems are being solved by this data collection effort, it isn’t 
clear that the right questions are being asked. For example, while there were questions in the 
draft survey instrument by aircraft weight categories, there were no questions that would provide 
information on new generation aircraft with glass cockpits versus legacy aircraft types. 
R2.6   The questionnaire was revised after the first NAOMS industry workshop to collect 
information on aircraft make and model. Also, please see Responses 1.2 and 1.3. 
 
Q3. Are there aspects of the NAOMS concept that you like? Please specify.  
C3.1   I think that the use of questionnaires can provide relevant data for planning safety 
interventions. Significant planning was evident in developing an appropriate approach to the 
questionnaire. 
C3.2   Plans to include all segments of the aviation community in the NAOMS effort. 
C3.3   NASA appears to have assembled a well-qualified development team to work on this 
initiative. 
C3.4   Getting the industry together to define safety issues is important, the question is what is 
the best way to do it.  
C3.5   The "proposed" survey would be open to new evaluations of incident "cause" over and 
above those developed in the past. (The draft document didn't fulfill this promise.) 
C3.6   First, I believe that NASA (Linda Connell, Mary Connors, et al) has assembled a quality 
team. Battelle, OSU, Dodd and Associates have vast experience when it comes to aviation safety. 
(I have to admit, I have never heard of CPHRE until the meeting.) Second, submitting a standard 
survey to all types of aviation employees is a good idea. I would be interested in compiling and 
comparing the results by user type, e.g., pilot, ATC, mechanic, flight attendant, etc. Third, the 
de-identification is a must; you wouldn’t receive any useful information without this. 
C3.7   Like the idea of reaching out to people involved in the day-to-day operations of the 
system. Such an approach may provide opportunities to identify precursors and allow us to get 
ahead of some of the emerging safety issues. The questions that remain are: (1) are there other 
ways of getting at the information, and (2) how is one method valid over others? 
 
Q4. What are your greatest concerns about the NAOMS proposal? 
C4.1   In general, the specificity of much of the data being gathered was insufficient to permit the 
development of appropriate intervention strategies. There was little indication of how the 
questionnaire was designed to handle information involving safety concerns on international 
flights versus those in US airspace. As proposed, the questionnaire also did not adequately 
address issues associated with the implementation of new technologies and possible training 
issues associated with new technologies and procedures. It would be my strong recommendation 
that the questionnaire become more focused prior to distribution. I also had some concerns 
associated with the response categories proposed for various items. The use of “always” and 
“never” has been shown, in some contexts, to modify the typical response distribution. While the 
questionnaire appeared to be designed to link flight time and other variables to the types of 
incidents reported, the structure was insufficient to permit direct comparison of those issues. 
This was one of several concerns raised during the subgroup meetings. Additional work was also 
 
197 
 
required to define and categorize data regarding type of aircraft flown and the equipage of the 
aircraft. 
R4.1    Specificity of data: See Response 1.2. 
International airspace: During the background research for NAOMS, international airspace was 
not an issue that caused extensive concern for U.S. air carrier pilots. If it is an issue that needs to 
be evaluated, then perhaps it could be a “special topic” for a subsequent NOAMS survey. 
New technologies: NAOMS was designed from the beginning to incorporate questions on special 
topics, including new technologies and procedures. In the field trial, two special topics (MEL 
Items and In-Close Approach Changes) were evaluated.  
Response categories: The opinion related response categories were dropped from the 
questionnaire used in the field trial. 
Aircraft flown: The questionnaire was revised to obtain information on the aircraft make and 
type.  
C4.2   The development of NAOMS is based on the premise that FOQA will not be in place and 
operating any time in the near future. Would it not be more productive if NASA were to focus the 
resources toward the development of software tools that can be applied to FOQA and ASAP 
data? The CFIT JSIT is preparing to include this proposal in their Detailed Implementation 
Plan. 
R4.2   NAOMS is not designed to replace any current or planned data collection or analysis 
systems. It was designed from its inception to be complimentary to these systems. However, 
NAOMS does not assume that one or more carriers will not have operational FOQA programs. It 
recognizes, however, that (a) FOQA data can address only a limited range of aviation safety 
questions, (b) FOQA data are highly proprietary and may not be available to the government for 
this purpose, and (c) even if the data were available, they would only describe the operations of 
selective fleets flown by selective air carriers. NAOMS wishes to address a broad array of safety 
issues, on a system-wide level, in a statistically robust fashion. FOQA data obviously cannot 
meet these requirements at least in the near- to medium-term. 
C4.3   We don't want to burden the system with yet another data gathering system. It was pointed 
out to NASA that several of the events being monitored by the survey would already require 
written reports due to the nature of the event. It is important that this should not be redundant to 
existing programs. 
R4.3   NAOMS data collection will avoid redundancies. If reliable quantitative information is 
already available in a safety area, NAOMS will not seek duplicative information. It is NAOMS’ 
perception, however, that many types of aviation safety events are not well quantified.  
C4.4   The ASRS program has only enough funding to process a small portion of the reports they 
receive. Shouldn’t this be a priority before initiating a new program? 
R4.4 NAOMS is not being funded with ASRS monies. The NASA Aviation Safety Program 
(AvSP) research and development dollars are funding this effort. 
C4.5   There are no current plans to review other databases in conjunction with the NAOMS 
data. This would mean that NAOMS is a stand-alone system and does not benefit from the other 
safety programs currently underway. 
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R4.5   See Responses 1.1 and 1.3. NAOMS benefit from prior database reviews conducted by the 
FAA Office of Aviation Safety as well as others. NAOMS disagrees with the perception that it 
will be a stand-alone system that does not benefit from other programs. In fact, there will be a 
strong synergy. NAOMS will create a numeric framework that can be used to calibrate other data 
sets and put them in larger perspective. 
C4.6   The plan doesn't contain a mechanism to "change" the system once a safety trend has 
emerged.  
R4.6   This is true. Much as with other safety data gathering systems, NAOMS’ responsibility 
will be to collect data, convert it to useful information, and bring that information to the attention 
of persons with operational authority. Whether or not these aviation authorities ultimately use the 
information developed by NAOMS is a matter to be decided by them. 
C4.7   During the planning phase, NASA held meetings with ALPA, ATA, HAI, Boeing, etc. 
regarding the draft questionnaire, but apparently left the FAA off their list of people to see. So 
essentially, this was the first time that the FAA had an opportunity to provide input to the 
questionnaire, when in fact, we are one of the major customers. 
R4.7   The NAOMS project proposal was briefed very early in the process to many FAA offices 
(e.g. ASY-1, ASY-300). A kick-off workshop for the entire AvSP element (then titled “System-
Wide Monitoring and Data Analysis”) was held at NASA-HQ in November 1997. The NAOMS 
program was subsequently briefed at numerous meetings of the ASRS Advisory Subcommittee 
the following year with two FAA representatives in attendance. Thus, the May 1999 NAOMS 
workshop was the last formal briefing opportunity on the NAOMS program that the FAA 
attended. 
C4.8   Little, if any, information gathered in the survey address automation issues. I think with 
the changing levels of automation in the cockpit that this is a major area to look at. 
R4.8   See Response 1.2 and 4.1. 
C4.9   Concerned that the current proposed survey would not be able to obtain information at a 
detailed enough level to affect accident rates. I question the ability of the current proposal to 
adequately capture information on aviation events (many of which are rare occurrences) and 
then accurately extrapolate sample results to population levels. For example, suppose you were 
trying to determine the number of runway incursions that occurred at specific airports across the 
nation during a particular year. Suppose that you use a sample size of 10% of the air carrier 
pilot population who conducted flights covering 200 of the nation’s approximately 350 towered 
airports. Would you not only be able to estimate the number of air carrier pilots involved in 
runway incursions (at the national level) and the number of incursions at those 200 airports 
serviced by pilots constituting your 10% sample? You would not be able to say anything about 
the number of events that occurred at the remaining 150 airports not serviced by pilots in the 
survey? (Incidentally, it doesn’t appear that the current proposal will capture any information by 
airport location). 
R4.9   The NAOMS sample size will probably range between five and ten thousand observations 
per year. This will allow NAOMS to make inferences about trends involving rare events (defined 
by NAOMS to be once-in-a-career pilot experiences) with substantial certainty at a national 
scale. This is in keeping with NAOMS role as a high-level surveillance system that will map 
progress towards the national 80% aviation safety improvement objective. However, NAOMS 
data will not be able to make reliable inferences about rare events at particular locales. 
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C4.10   Concerns about plans to administer the survey through special interest groups who may 
attempt to sway their members to respond in ways that could bias the survey results. 
R4.10   This possibility cannot be dismissed, but attempts to bias survey results in that fashion 
may be detectable through various means. Also, experience suggests that such biasing influences 
cannot be sustained over an extended time period, e.g., they may cause a “blip” in the data but 
not a long-term trend. 
C4.11   Concerns about how you maintain the momentum? How do you get respondents to 
respond year after year? 
R4.11   Survey application designs that will minimize declining participation are being 
considered for the fully operational NAOMS if this is discovered to be a problem. However, the 
pilot population is large enough that any given individual is likely not to be asked twice. This 
may be more of a challenge with the much smaller air traffic controller population. 
C4.12   Concerns about method for developing questions to be asked in the survey. 
R4.12   NASA will make the final decision about what questions to include in the NAOMS 
survey and their exact phrasing. However, NASA will engage in extensive consultations with all 
segments of the aviation community as it develops topical questions for the NAOMS survey 
instrument. Its goal is for survey instruments to be as inclusive and neutral as possible. 
C4.13   Concerns about how to factor out biases re political/economic agendas? 
R4.13   See Response 4.10. 
C4.14   Concerned that NASA will implement a version of the survey only slightly different from 
the one shown to the participants at the conference. This will potentially nullify the benefits that 
it might otherwise provide. 
R4.14   The questionnaire has been significantly modified since the first workshop. It is also the 
goal of the second workshop, and subsequent discussions to obtain input from all interested 
parties on the questionnaire content and design. The field trial has also generated much valuable 
feedback that is being used to enhance the instrument design. 
C4.15   How does this proposal fit in with other efforts such as CAST, FOQA, etc. and is it the 
best way to fill in any gaps in existing information? What information would be provided as an 
adjunct to other information sources? Also concerned that this approach does not appear to be 
addressing the issues of aircraft with advanced automation versus legacy aircraft types. 
R4.15   See Responses 1.3 and 4.5. 
C4.16   Need to identify and define the metrics that NAOMS is interested in measuring. Without 
this, how does anyone know if NAOMS is collecting, via the survey, the ‘right’ data? It was 
unclear to me as to whether a complete set of metrics had been defined. 
R4.16   NAOMS intent is to develop metrics that are useful to mid- and high-level decision 
makers in both the governmental and private sectors of the aviation community. Accordingly, 
NAOMS has developed questions that relate to prominent, widely recognized safety issues. 
NAOMS understanding of these issues is informed by more than two decades of experience 
operating the ASRS, and also by regular interactions with the aviation community through 
NASA advisory committees and other mechanisms. The NAOMS Workshops also provide a 
very important reality check in this regard. 
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Finally, NAOMS asked respondents during the field trial whether it was asking questions that 
were relevant to aviation safety. The overwhelming majority answered in the affirmative. 
C4.17   Another issue was the timeframe. If I recall properly, the user would be required to 
respond to questions regarding events that took place in the most recent 30 days and most recent 
12 months. I wonder (from a human factors perspective) the statistical importance/significance 
of data that is based on human recall over a 12-month period.  
R4.17   One of the goals of the field trial was to evaluate what the most accurate recall period 
might be. The field trial evaluated time periods from one week to twelve months. The upcoming 
Workshop will report on the outcome of this research. 
C4.18   RE: Questionnaire: Some of the questions posed (e.g., on aircraft equipment problems) 
may not be necessary. Turnbacks, engine damage, fire or smoke events are required to be 
submitted to the FAA. The acronym “ATM” should be spelled out. 
R4.18   There may be some redundancy between NAOMS topics and other data systems. This is 
by design since many of these other data systems appear to suffer from under-reporting. 
However, NAOMS will not collect data when strong pre-existing data resources exist. “ATM” 
will be spelled out. 
C4.19   In the flight experience section, need to remove “other aircraft” column. There is a row 
entitled “GA/other.” 
R4.19   This portion of the questionnaire was revised. 
C4.20   Regarding the contributing factors section, I have serious reservations as to the 
reliability and utility of the collected data/information. As an example, I don’t believe pilots have 
sufficient knowledge in determining whether a contribution factor could have been a design flaw. 
R4.20   This section of the questionnaire was dropped. 
 
Q5. What changes would you suggest to NASA to improve or revise the NAOMS approach 
described at the workshop? 
C5.1   A number of my concerns were addressed during the workshop. I am not including all of 
those concerns in this discussion. Many of the changes needed are addressed above. Recommend 
reviewing the response alternatives (“always” and “never”). Item revisions are needed to 
introduce greater specificity in the response. For example, “Received ATC clearance that nearly 
resulted in a near collision with terrain or a ground obstruction.” To ensure that all respondents 
have the same frame of reference in responding to that item it would require that the parameter 
of nearness with terrain or ground be defined (e.g. within x feet). Reduce time to respond to 
items concerning flight experience in the past 12 months. Since you are asking for 
approximations, why not consider asking pilots to place percentages in the various categories 
rather than indicating specific hours (e.g. 500 hours last 12 months, with 90% wide body and 
10% GA/other). I also feel that in dealing with a sample of pilots the large number of categories 
in the matrix (type of operation versus type of aircraft) will be too large. Recommend inclusion 
of questions concerning equipage of the aircraft flown. Are automation-related concerns more 
likely in aircraft with certain display configurations, etc? Information is needed to determine 
whether problems were most common in US or other airspace. Need to develop a way of linking 
events to contributing factors. 
R5.1   See Responses 1.2, 1.6, 2.6 and 4.1. 
 
201 
 
C5.2   Rather than using the membership lists of various special interest organizations, use 
national population databases, such as the Airmen Registry, for the sampling frame so that a 
truly representative sample can be selected. 
R5.2   This is the approach that was used in the field trial. 
C5.3   Develop a briefing or some materials that would describe to the various stakeholders how 
the information that is collected would be used. 
R5.3   This will be developed as the program matures. The NAOMS is intended to be an 
industry/gov’t program. The continued involvement and advice is required and will likely take 
the form of an Advisory Committee, Executive Council, or Steering Group of stakeholder 
membership. 
C5.4   Describe approaches that you plan to use to validate information that will be collected in 
the survey. 
R5.4   This information will be presented at the second NAOMS industry workshop. 
C5.5   More cooperation with FAA & industry in development of survey instrument. 
R5.5   See Response 4.12. 
C5.6   Would like to see a thorough analysis of the cost of this approach versus other 
approaches, e.g. APMS. 
R5.6   As mentioned earlier, NAOMS is designed to supplement these programs, not replace 
them. The NAOMS survey process was the only viable method identified for achieving the 
statistically reliable national measures of aviation safety sought by this initiative. 
C5.7   Would like more clarity on what would be done with the information resulting from the 
survey. 
R5.7   It is intended that NAOMS survey results will be a regular input to mid- and high-level 
decision makers in NASA, the FAA, and the aviation industry. It is hoped that NAOMS’ 
products will be used by government and industry officials when they develop safety program 
plans and make safety investment decisions. NAOMS data will help these organizations monitor 
aviation safety trends; track the effectiveness of safety interventions; and evaluate the impacts of 
new aviation technologies and procedures. 
C5.8   It is very important that any information gathered about causes be linked back to events. 
The form that was circulated at the conference completely failed to ensure this. Such data would 
probably be useless in helping to identify, in advance, any serious potential causes of accidents 
or incidents. 
R5.8   The questionnaire has been revised to focus on events. The causal portion of the 
instrument was deleted after NAOMS concluded that this information is better obtained through 
other data resources. 
C5.9 Would have been great to have the draft questionnaire in advance. Perhaps I would have 
circulated the questionnaire to my staff for comments. Would have been better prepared to 
participate in the afternoon session. 
R5.9   The questionnaire will be made available before the second NAOMS industry workshop.  
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C5.10   Stop what you are doing and let’s look at things from a systematic perspective – define 
the problem space, identify current data collection efforts, then identify gaps. Let’s examine what 
is being done and why. Start with a small core group of NASA/FAA folks to develop a “straw 
man” integrated approach. Add to this group slowly. 
R5.10   See Response 1.3. The NAOMS industry workshops along with input from the NASA 
AvSP Executive Committee (FAA, NASA, industry associations) have served as a review and 
advisory panel throughout the development process. The NAOMS program will proceed in 
deliberate, incremental steps beginning with an air carrier pilot implementation in FY2000. 
 
Q6. Other Comments: 
C6.1   One of the reasons cited for the NAOMS concept in lieu of using FOQA data is that it will 
be many years before all the major U. S. carriers have FOQA programs. (There are 10 U.S. 
carriers (excluding cargo carriers that are considered major according to the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (BTS) definition of major, i.e. $1 billion or more in revenues). Airlines 
that currently have FAA-approved FOQA programs include Alaska, Continental, Delta, TWA, 
United, and US Airways. According to the Air Transport Association, a number of additional 
carriers are working on FOQA programs and they expect as many as 10 carriers to have FOQA 
programs by the end of the year. 
R6.1   See Response 4.2. 
C6.2   If you have other workshops, provide more information prior to the meeting, e.g. the draft 
survey instrument was first provided to participants at the May workshop. 
R6.2   Advance materials will be made available.  
C6.3   It is important to get feedback from the industry on safety issues, but don’t know if this is 
the best process. 
R6.3   It is the best process that NASA has been able to identify but NASA is always open to 
new possibilities. 
C6.4   Think NASA is taking their charge seriously and applaud them for their effort. 
R6.4   Thank you. 
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Appendix J.  Workshop 2 Agenda and Participants 
 
 
Workshop 2 was held on March 1, 2000, in Washington, D.C. Its purpose was to update 
stakeholders on progress being made toward NAOMS implementation, especially the results of 
the field trial. During the workshop, the participants formed breakout groups and provided 
comments, questions, and recommendations to the NAOMS team. 
 
This appendix contains the workshop agenda and attendance list, as well as feedback from 
workshop participants to issues posed for discussion by the NAOMS team. 
 
 
Workshop 2 Agenda 
 
8:00 to 8:30 A.M. .............Registration 
8:30 to 9:00 A.M. .............Welcome and Opening Comments; Introduction of NAOMS Team & 
Workshop Goals. Linda Connell, NASA Project Manager 
9:00 to 10:00 A.M. ...........Project Background: Goals, Development and Experimental Work, 
Questionnaire Development. Robert Dodd, Sc.D., Project Manager, 
Dodd and Associates 
10:00 to 10:15 A.M. .........Break 
10:15 to 11:00 A.M. .........Conducting the NAOMS Field Trial. Joan Cwi, Ph.D., Battelle 
11:00 to Noon ..................Field Trial Findings: Mode Effects and Recall Periods. Jon Krosnick, 
Ph.D., Ohio State University 
Noon to 1:00 P.M. ............Lunch 
1:00 to 2:00 P.M. .............Field Trial Findings: Feedback from Participants. Elisa Ingebretson, 
Research Scientist, Battelle 
2:00 to 2:30 P.M. .............Next Steps. Linda Connell, NASA Project Manager 
2:30 to 3:00 P.M. .............Break 
3:00 to 4:45 P.M. .............Discussions 
4:45 to 5:00 P.M. .............Summary and Closing Comments. Linda Connell, NASA Project 
Manager 
5:00 P.M. ..........................Adjourn 
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Workshop 2 Attendance List 
 
 
First Name Last Name Organization Office Job Title 
Ralph A'Harrah NASA  Office of 
Aerospace 
Technology 
Goal Manager, 
Aviation Safety 
Jim Burin Flight Safety 
Foundation 
  Director of 
Technical Programs 
Doug Carr NBAA Domestic 
Operations 
Manager 
Linda Connell NASA ARC; 262-
7 
  Director Aviation 
Safety Reporting 
System 
Mary Connors NASA ARC; 262-
4 
NASA Aviation 
Safety Program 
  
Joan Cwi Battelle   Director of Survey 
Operations 
Robert Dodd Dodd and  
Associates 
  Principal 
Investigator 
Bill Edmunds ALPA  Human Performance 
Specialist 
Ray Fenster Fenster Information 
Overload 
Corporation 
 
Charles Fluet Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Office of 
Integrated Safety 
Analysis 
Deputy Director 
Michael Ganley Airbus Industrie of 
North America 
    
Larry Hackler Federal Aviation 
Administration  
AAR-424 
Technical Center   
Charles Harrison Federal Aviation 
Administration 
ASW-110 
Rotorcraft 
Directorate 
  
Chris Hart Federal Aviation 
Administration, 
ASY-1 
Office of System 
Safety 
Assistant 
Administrator for 
System Safety 
Chuck Hedges Federal Aviation 
Administration, 
ASY-300 
Office of System 
Safety 
Manager, Systems 
Safety Engineering 
& Analysis Division 
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First Name Last Name Organization Office Job Title 
Priscilla Hospers Battelle ASRS   
Elisa Ingebretson Battelle ASRS Research Scientist 
Mike Jobanek Florida Technical   Aviation Domain 
Consultant 
Ray King HQ Air Force  Safety Center AFSC/SEPR 
Jon Krosnick Ohio State 
University 
Department of 
Psychology 
(Social) 
  
Mike Lewis NASA Langley 
Research Center  
Aviation Safety 
Program Office 
 
Harkey Mayo FAA ASY-100 Office of System 
Safety 
Data Systems 
Manager 
Tom Nesthus Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Civil 
Aeromedical 
Institute 
  
Albert Prest Air Transport 
Association 
   
Loren Rosenthal Battelle     
Mike Schanck General Aviation 
Manufacturers 
Organization 
  Safety Affairs and 
Operations Manager 
Vincent Schultz NASA Langley  
Research Center 
  Program Manager 
Nan Shellabarger Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Office of 
Aviation Policy 
and Plans 
 
Michael Silver Ohio State 
University 
Department of 
Psychology 
(Social) 
  
Stan Smith National 
Transportation  
Safety Board 
Data Systems Manager 
Lee Snowberger Conwal   Program Manager 
Arthur Salomon Federal Aviation 
Administration, 
APO-110 
NASA Aviation 
Safety Program 
 
Irv Statler NASA NASA Aviation 
Safety Program 
  
Bruce  Tesmer Continental 
Airlines 
Flight Crew 
Performance 
Captain, Manager 
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First Name Last Name Organization Office Job Title 
Jim Varsel International 
Association of 
Machinists and 
Aerospace 
Workers 
  Assistant Airline 
Coordinator 
Carla Winkler International 
Association of 
Machinists and 
Aerospace 
Workers 
    
Dick Wright Helicopter 
Association 
International 
Safety and Flight 
Operations 
Director  
Brien Wygle Aerospace 
Industries 
Association, 
Retired 
Boeing, 
Subcommittee 
Chairman ASRS 
 
 
Feedback from  Workshop Participants 
 
This section presents the discussion issues posed to the workshop participants and provides a 
bulletized summary of their responses. 
 
Survey Content 
• In Section A, regarding the potential inclusion of International Operations, item A3 should be 
redesigned to avoid errors.  A distinction should be made between domestic and international 
flying, especially regarding ATC and language problems with international ATC. 
• Consider adding autorotation/emergency procedures if you are going to look at rotorcraft 
operations. 
• Consider adding “execute emergency procedure” to list of events. 
• Consider adding autorotation to list of events for helicopter pilots. 
• Regarding FC4 and 5 (sterile cockpit), different companies and the government have different 
regulations about sterile cockpit and flight time/duty time restrictions.  Clarify in the 
questionnaire what is being asked about. 
• Consider having a question that doesn't constrain the respondent to a recall period but instead 
allows him to report on any life-changing event that may have occurred in his career. 
• Make sure unions are involved in the development of items for all future questionnaires. 
• Was a fault tree analysis used to look at causal factors? Use a “fault tree approach” to identify 
item types for future surveys. 
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• How flexible are the responses allowed to be? For example, if the recall period is four weeks, 
but a pilot experienced something 4.5 weeks ago that he/she wants to report, how can the pilot 
report that? 
• Include government flight operations (FAA, etc.) in future surveys. 
• What does “engine exhaust” refer to in the Main Events section? 
• Consider adding a question about “loss of situational awareness.” 
 
Data Protection 
• How is NASA going to protect the data? 
• When will data be released? 
• Will the data be indefinitely confidential? 
• The FAA’s new Advisory Circular could potentially cover the pilots.  NASA could protect the 
data as a “research instrument” for a while.  Others could help NASA analyze the data when it 
is ready for manipulation. 
• How did NASA decide on the specific MEL and ICAC questions and sections? 
• Consider using the safer skies model for topical sections. 
• CAST could help to develop ideas for topical sections.  Consider making a presentation to 
CAST. 
 
Other Comments 
• The FAA’s General Aviation survey work could help the NAOMS team, and vice versa. 
• Will there be more workshops in the out years? 
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Appendix K. Field Trial Results 
 
 
Authors’ Note: In April 2000, after all data had been collected, the NAOMS team produced the 
following final report on field trial results.  The results pointed the way toward 
implementation of the full air- carrier (AC) survey. 
 
 
NAOMS Field Test Results: 
Implications For Full Project Implementation 
Introduction 
The National Aviation Operations Monitoring Service (NAOMS) field trial was designed to 
evaluate the feasibility of collecting primary data on aviation safety events from air-carrier pilots.  
The field trial enabled evaluation of issues needing resolution before a full-scale survey for air 
carrier pilots could be initiated.  These issues included the rate of response, the accuracy and 
quality of the information collected, most effective recall period, necessary sample size, and the 
projected cost.  Central to all these issues is the selection of the mode of survey application: mail 
or telephone. 
 
This document provides a summary of the key issues associated with selecting the appropriate 
mode for full-scale implementation of NAOMS for the air-carrier-pilot community and the 
appropriate recall period.  Each issue is addressed separately and the implications for each mode 
discussed.  A summary matrix of the characteristics of each of these topics by mode is provided at 
the end of this document. 
K1. Mode Selection Factors 
K1.1 Completion Rates 
One of the more important dimensions of selecting a mode for survey application is the rate of 
completion to the questionnaire (that is, the number of people who complete the questionnaire 
from the pool of eligible respondents).  Usually, higher completion rates are better since the basis 
for conducting a sample based survey is the desire to apply the findings to a larger total population.  
Generally speaking, a completion rate has to exceed 70% for the findings to be accepted as 
representative of the total population.  Lower completion rates may indicate that a significant 
portion of the sample (those who chose not to respond) may differ markedly from those who did 
respond.  If so, generalization to the full population from a sample with inadequate responses may 
be erroneous.  This was a concern in the NAOMS field trial.  If completion rates were low, it 
might have been due to the fact that those pilots were more prone to safety problems and not 
willing to admit this fact to the researchers.  This did not turn out to be a problem. 
 
Table K-1 presents the response rates by telephone and mail modes attained during the field trial.  It 
should be noted that these completion rates did not occur as a result of the first contact with the 
survey respondents.  For most respondents, more than one request was required before a successful 
interview was completed regardless of mode. Additional contact was required because the pilots did 
not respond to earlier requests, had scheduling conflicts, lost the original mailing, etc. 
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Table K-1. Completion Rates by Mode 
 Mail Telephone 
Response rate 70% 81% 
 
 
K1.2 Data Quality 
The quality of data collected is also an important consideration when evaluating what mode of 
survey should be selected. A high completion rate is not of much value if questions are not 
answered accurately. There are a number of approaches to evaluating data quality, each of which is 
presented below. 
 
K1.2.1 Time for Questionnaire Completion 
Evaluation of the time needed to complete the interview is a relative measure of data quality.  The 
underlying assumption is that the more time a respondent takes to complete a questionnaire, the 
better the quality of the resulting data. Table K-2 provides the key data. 
 
As can be seen, the average time to complete the telephone interview took 12 minutes more (70% 
more) than the mail mode.  Some of this difference may be due to the need for the respondent to 
listen and then assimilate what the interviewer asked in the telephone interview versus the ability 
of the respondent to quickly read the question in the mail interview.  It is unlikely, however, that 
this explanation explains all the difference in average completion time for the two modes.  The 
lesser amount of time needed to complete the interview when conducted by mail may be indicative 
of pilots working through the questionnaire quickly, thereby paying less attention to questions or 
spending less time trying to accurately recall the events. 
 
Table K-2. Questionnaire Mean Completion Time 
 Mail Telephone 
Completion time 17 minutes 29 minutes 
 
 
K1.2.2 Missing Responses 
Another way to evaluate the quality of data reported is to look at the number of missing responses 
for the questionnaire.  Table K-3 presents the percentage of respondents that did not complete at 
least one question in the questionnaire by mode. 
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Table K-3. Percentage of Respondents Who Failed to 
Complete at Least One Question 
 Mail Telephone 
One or more missing answers 4.8% 0.0% 
 
 
The lack of any missing answers for the telephone mode is due to the fact that each question, when 
read by the interviewer, requires a response.  Since most of the responses to the questions in this 
survey appropriately received the response of ‘0’ (for incidents that did not occur during the recall 
period) it is easy to see how respondents would be tempted to skip quickly across questions in the 
instrument.  This would also explain why the mail version of the questionnaire took so much less 
time to complete than the telephone version.  In the mail version, the pilots did not have anyone 
prompting them to slow down and think about each answer.  In contrast, the interviewers during 
the telephone interview asked the pilot each question in turn.  The pilot did not know what 
question came next so he or she had to listen to the question to understand its meaning and then 
think to develop a response. 
 
K1.2.3  Total Number of Events and Total Hours Flown in the Recall Period 
The observed relationship between the reported number of events and the total hours flown in the 
recall period also provides insight into data quality.  If the questionnaire is capturing accurate 
responses from pilots about the frequency of events they experience, then pilots with more flight 
time should experience and report a proportionately greater number of events than those pilots who 
flew fewer hours. 
 
Several quantitative analyses were conducted looking at the association between the number of 
events reported and the number of hours flown during the recall period.  For all such analyses, one 
would expect to see a positive relationship between the variables if the data are valid (more flight 
hours should result in greater number of events reported).  This tight relationship is evidenced by a 
higher coefficient of regression (COR).  Higher CORs indicate stronger relationships between the 
data. Table K-4 shows the pertinent findings. 
 
Table K-4. Demonstrated Association between Number of 
Events Experienced and Hours Flown 
 
Mode 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient of 
Regression 
 
Significance 
Number of 
Respondents 
Mail .086 p<.001 223 
Telephone .136 p<.001 220 
 
 
Associations for both modes were positive, indicating that pilot reports of event frequencies 
corresponded to experience during the recall period.  However, data from the telephone mode 
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showed a somewhat higher degree of association between number of events reported and the 
number of hours flown indicating greater consistency in the data. 
 
K1.2.4 Total Number of Events and Number of Days in Recall Period  
By similar logic, one would expect respondents who were asked to use longer recall periods to 
report proportionately more events than those asked to use shorter periods.  Table K-5 shows the 
relationships found in the data.  Once again, the relationship was positive with both modes, but it 
was considerably stronger with the telephone mode.  This suggests that telephone respondents 
were working harder to recall events accurately for the longer recall periods. 
 
Table K-5. Demonstrated Association between Number of Pilot 
Reported Events and Recall Period 
 
Mode 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient of 
Regression 
 
Significance 
Number of 
Respondents 
Mail 0.190 p<.001 228 
Telephone 0.265 p<.001 220 
 
 
K1.3 Recall Period 
Another key objective of the NAOMS field trial was to determine the appropriate recall period.  
There were two primary competing considerations.  First, as recall period lengthens, the memory 
of events weakens.  Shorter recall periods promote quality.41  Second, longer recall periods favor 
the recollection of more events permitting more events to be uncovered from fewer respondents.  
Longer recall periods promote cost savings.  Respondents were asked to use a variety of recall 
periods ranging from one week to six months during the field trial.  The resulting data have helped 
the NAOMS team find the point that provides a reasonable balance between these two 
considerations. 
 
K1.4 Reporter Confidence 
One way to address the effect of the various recall periods used during the field trial was to ask the 
respondents how confident they were in the answers the had provided.  The results are summarized 
in Table K-6.42 
  
                                                
41 NAOMS did some earlier experimental work with a group of air-carrier pilots who were asked to recall 
the number of landings made in the previous month. It was found that shorter recall periods were more 
accurate. For routine events like recalling number of landings, accuracy fell off sharply after one week. 
42  This table was derived from analysis of pilots who completed the survey by either telephone or by mail. 
Face-to-face interview results were not included.  
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Table K-6. Respondent Confidence in Recollection Accuracy by 
Recall Period 
Recall Period Extremely Confident Very Confident 
Moderate to No 
Confidence 
1 week 62% 36% 4% 
2 weeks 58% 34% 8% 
4 weeks 47% 39% 14% 
2 months 36% 49% 15% 
4 months 34% 47% 19% 
6 months 29% 44% 27% 
 
It can be seen that the confidence the pilots have in their ability to accurately recall events dropped 
markedly as the recall periods got longer.  However, at 60 days, 85% of respondents still indicated 
that they were either ‘Extremely’ or ‘Very’ confident in their recall.  This suggests that a 60- or 90-
day recall period may strike the best balance between quality considerations and the need to 
operate NAOMS in an economical manner. 
 
K1.5 Pilot Comments 
The questionnaire allowed pilots to offer free-form observations about the questionnaire and the 
interview process.  One recurring suggestion was that the recall period be increased.  The majority 
of these comments came from pilots who were assigned the one- or two-week recall periods.  They 
felt that these periods were too short for them to report events they remembered experiencing that 
fell outside the recall window. 
K2. Costs 
The NAOMS field trial provided an opportunity to strengthen earlier estimates of the cost of doing 
this work.  Cost elements include: 
• Project management and administration including OMB interactions 
• Time devoted to industry/labor interactions to build and maintain program support 
• Development and testing of survey instruments including topical sections 
• Development and maintenance of a database to hold survey results 
• Survey data collection 
- Mailings and postage (self-administered) 
- Interviewer training and interview time (telephone) 
- Establishing and maintaining respondent tracking programs43 
• Data analysis 
• Deliverables preparation 
                                                
43  NAOMS will track whether or not a respondent has completed a written survey or participated in a 
telephone survey session. It will not maintain any record of the actual responses provided by any 
participant. 
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NAOMS is intended to serve multiple constituencies including air carrier pilots, GA pilots, air 
traffic controllers, and others.  NAOMS costs will increase in a linear fashion with the addition of 
each new participant group.  Modest savings in administration, training and database development 
areas will be realized when new groups are added.  However, these savings will be fully offset by 
the costs of engaging the new participants in the NAOMS project, particularly development of a 
customized survey instrument.  Accordingly, serving two participant groups will be twice as 
expensive as serving one group, and so on.  Table K-7 provides high-level estimates of the cost of 
conducting NAOMS as an ongoing production for a single participant group.  The estimates shown 
cover all direct and allocated costs, but they do not include contractor fees. 
 
Table K-7. Estimated Cost of a Fully Operational NAOMS Program 
for One Participant Group (1999 Dollars) 
Cost Estimate Estimate Comments 
Project management and 
administration and Industry/Labor 
interactions 
$125K  
Development and testing of 
survey instruments 
$100K Assumes 4 sets of topical 
questions developed and tested 
on 100 respondents each year 
Data system maintenance and 
administration 
$50K  
Data collection, telephone 
Data collection, self-administered 
$408K 
$322K 
4,800 completed interviews @ $85 
4,800 completed questionnaires 
@ $67 
Data analysis and deliverables 
preparation 
$200K Assumes quarterly reports and an 
annual report 
Total (before fee): telephone $883K  
Total (before fee): self-
administered 
$797K  
 
 
K2.1 Other National Data Collection Systems 
Telephone interviewing is the preferred method for many government survey programs.  Most of 
the other long-term government data gathering efforts use the face-to-face mode despite its higher 
cost to maximize data quality.  The underlying rationale is that improved data quality is worth the 
higher data-collection costs.  Examples of ongoing surveys that use the telephone mode include: 
• Survey of Income and Program Participation (Census Bureau) 1984– 
• Consumer Expenditure Surveys (Census Bureau) 1968– 
• Annual Housing Surveys (Census Bureau) 1973– 
• Consumer Attitudes and Behavior (SRC) 1953– 
• Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys (NCHS) 1959–  
 
214 
 
• National Health Interview Surveys (NCHS) 1970  
• American National Election Studies (NSF) 1948– 
• Panel Study of Income Dynamics (NSF) 1968− 
 
Many firms compete to provide support services to the government for these programs.  Examples 
include the Gallup Organization, Westat, SPSS Services, Research Triangle Institute, and 
Mathematica, to name just a few. 
K3. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The NAOMS field trial was a highly successful undertaking that shed light on many methodological 
issues.  The following paragraphs summarize the NAOMS team’s recommendations for 
implementing the full NAOMS system. The recommendations are based on the field trial results, 
input from senior survey methodologists, and aviation safety domain experts. 
 
K3.1 Survey Mode 
The weight of the evidence proceeding from the NAOMS field trial strongly suggests that telephone 
is the preferred NAOMS data-collection mode. All data indicators suggest that data collected by 
phone will be of substantially higher quality and will have few inappropriate outlier values (due to 
question misinterpretations, etc.) that have the potential for confounding NAOMS data analyses.  The 
literature also suggests that the telephone mode will consistently yield better quality data than self-
administered surveys. This is the reason that most federal agencies that have implemented long-term 
survey data collection efforts have chosen face-to-face or telephone modes. 
 
K3.2 Recall Period 
The literature on survey methodology and theoretical considerations favor shorter recall periods 
when accuracy is a paramount concern.  On the other hand, longer recall periods would be 
expected to result in higher observation rates and potentially more economical data collection.  It is 
clear from the NAOMS field trial data that data accuracy declined as recall periods were extended.  
The fall-off in participant confidence in the accuracy of their responses was particularly noticeable 
when the recall period was lengthened from two to four weeks.  However, when the recall period 
was further extended from one to four months, the decline in respondent confidence was relatively 
small.  In fact, more than 80% of respondents said that they were “extremely or very” confident in 
their inputs when a four-month recall period was used. 
Since NAOMS research has been inconclusive on this issue, a split design is recommended for the 
first year of implementation. Under this design, half of all respondents would be asked to use a 30-
day recall period; the other half would be asked to use a 90-day period. The data would then be 
evaluated at the end of one year. If the longer 90-day recall period does not appear to materially 
compromise data quality, it should be adopted since it is the more economical approach. 
Otherwise, the 30-day recall period would be preferred. 
 
K3.3 Random versus Panel Design 
The field trial itself did not address the issue of random versus panel designs. The literature 
indicates that a purely random approach is statistically optimal. It is usually easier to administer 
random designs as well. However, the domain experts on the Team tend to prefer the panel 
approach. The rationale underlying the NAOMS effort is that the aviation community—pilots, 
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controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, and others—are a highly professional and generally well 
educated group who can be enlisted as active monitors of NAS safety. It is further believed that 
enrollment in NAOMS panels will cause participants to become even more acute observers of 
aviation system safety. 
 
These competing considerations also suggest that a split design would be desirable in Year 1 of the 
NAOMS implementation. Approximately half of data collection could be accomplished with 
respondents chosen on a purely random basis from the sample pool and the other half with 
respondents who agreed to join a NAOMS panel. Each panel respondent44 would be asked to enroll 
for one-year period with the expectation that he/she would be asked to participate in four surveys 
spaced at three-month intervals. 
 
K3.4 Sample Size 
An annual sample size of 4,800 observations (400 per month) is recommended. While a larger 
sample size would give both greater precision and accuracy, a sample of 4,800 should be sufficient 
to detect relatively modest downward or upward trends in the occurrence of infrequently occurring 
aviation safety events. 
 
  
                                                
44 Some participants in the first year would be asked to enroll for several additional quarters so that one-
fourth of panel participants could be replaced each quarter beginning in Year 2. 
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Appendix L. OMB Submission 
 
 
NAOMS, like all significant government data collection efforts, is required to secure Office 
of Management & Budget (OMB) approval prior to the commencement of data collection 
activities.  The NAOMS project team submitted the following document to OMB in June 2000, in 
support of its request to commence active data survey operations. 
 
 
APPLICATION FOR OMB CLEARANCE 
 
 
This submission requests approval for a data-collection process that will be used to help 
evaluate national aviation safety through the establishment of a survey-based methodology. The 
system will be called the National Aviation Operations Monitoring Service (NAOMS) NASA will 
operate NAOMS on behalf of government and industry. 
NAOMS will use information provided by the “first-line” operators of the aviation system 
to measure and monitor aviation safety; namely, the pilots, air traffic controllers, mechanics and 
flight attendants who routinely operate aircraft and provide support services. 
While NAOMS is envisioned to be an ongoing process involving many aviation 
stakeholder groups, this submission requests approval for collecting safety information from 
commercial air- carrier-pilots for a period of one year.  Workshops, focus groups, and field trials 
have been conducted to help ensure the feasibility of NAOMS and to lay groundwork for its 
design.  Many questions have been answered, but some issues are not yet fully resolved.  The latter 
will be addressed during the first year of the survey effort.45  NASA will make revised submissions 
to OMB thereafter for continued operation and development of NAOMS. 
NASA, as a research agency with an exemplary reputation in aviation safety and human 
factors research, will conduct the survey.  The trust and confidence engendered from their lengthy 
history of successful research efforts and proven protection of confidentiality will provide the basis 
for participation by aviation personnel in this important project. 
Justification 
I.A. Explain Why the Data Collection is Necessary 
To improve aviation safety one must be able to measure safety in both relative and absolute 
terms.  To know whether the actions taken to improve safety are working, one must be able to 
measure safety trends over the near- and long-term.  Reliable measurements, such as these, in the 
current National Aviation System (NAS) are limited and often absent. This is a critical problem for 
both aviation policy makers and technology developers.  It constitutes a critical technical challenge 
for the nation’s safety efforts both in the government and the aviation industry.  
                                                
45 The primary methodological issue relates to whether a cross-sectional or panel design is the most effective and 
efficient approach for this project.  
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The White House Commission on Aviation Safety has articulated the nation’s safety goal, 
which is to improve NAS safety by 80% over the next decade.46  This proposed data-collection 
process provides the essential tool for measuring the effectiveness of interventions and 
improvements intended to meet that goal. 
I.B. Indicate by Whom and for What Purpose the Information Will be Used 
Each year many new aviation safety investments are proposed.  Many other proposals are 
carried over from previous years. Some of these proposed investments involve new technologies; 
others entail improvements in training, facilities, equipment, and procedures. Managers in 
government and industry must sort through these alternatives and make hard choices. These 
managers want this to be a rational, data-driven process.  This requires numbers that quantify the 
safety risks these investments are expected to reduce, numbers that reveal trends portending future 
safety problems, and still more numbers that measure the effectiveness of past safety investments.  
Further, the aviation safety efforts underway to meet the goals of the White House 
Commission on Aviation Safety need accurate numbers on the frequency and causes of safety 
events.  Additionally, the NASA’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSP), as well as other government 
and industry efforts, are developing technologies and proposing procedural changes that are 
intended to improve aviation safety. NAOMS’ metrics will be used to determine how well these 
safety investments have worked when they are implemented into operating environment. 
The information developed by NAOMS will be used by NASA’s AvSP managers to 
evaluate the progress of their efforts to improve aviation over the next decade.  Information will 
also be made available to other Government agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT) and the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB). Private organizations such as universities and aviation industry associations will also be 
provided information if they so desire. It is anticipated that these and other academic and private 
sector organizations will use NAOMS information to evaluate their own safety programs and 
performance and to help develop well-informed safety policies. 
I.C. Whether, and to What Extent, the Data Collection Will Use Automated, Electronic, 
Mechanical, or Other Technological Methods for Data Collection 
Interviews will be conducted using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). 
This technology ensures that all skip patterns included in the survey are automatically and 
correctly followed, provides pre-established prompt cues to interviewers, and provides a clean data 
file immediately after the termination of the interview.  Prior data collection efforts have 
determined that there was a qualitative advantage to the CATI versus self-administered method.  In 
addition, standardized interviewer prompts will be developed within the CATI system to address 
issues discovered during the field trial.  
A management information system (MIS) developed by Battelle (the contractor that will be 
employed by NASA to conduct the proposed data collection) will be used to track mailing 
schedules (advance letters), the release of new names, appointments, and final dispositions in the 
CATI center. The system will provide study data to the NAOMS survey managers who will use the 
MIS to maximize the survey response rate and ensure data are collected efficiently and with 
minimum burden to respondents. 
                                                
46 Final Report to President Clinton, White House Commission On Aviation Safety, Vice President Gore, 
Chairman, Washington D.C. February 12, 1997. 
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In future years, Web interviewing techniques will be carefully explored.  NASA needs to 
reassure itself that responses obtained over the Web have the levels of quality and completeness 
necessary to the NAOMS mission. 
I.D. Describe Efforts to Identify Duplication 
A significant effort was undertaken to identify and evaluate other aviation safety data-
collection efforts currently in progress or planned.  Two government-industry workshops were 
conducted on the proposed NAOMS effort.  One of the central purposes of these workshops was to 
identify viable alternative data sources that would obviate the need for NAOMS.  None were 
identified. The following paragraphs further explain why a new aviation safety data resource is 
needed. 
I.D.1. Characteristics Desired in the NAOM Aviation Safety Measurement System 
To achieve the desired functionality, NAOMS aviation safety metrics must be: 
• ACCURATE – So that policy makers, technology developers, and the other data users would 
have sufficient confidence to act on the data they have been given; 
• COHERENT – So that data are conducive to seeing the big safety picture and understanding 
the key forces and trends influencing NAS safety;  
• PRECISE – So that decision-makers have enough operational details to develop credible 
responses to identified safety deficiencies; 
• QUANTITATIVE – So that decision-makers can move beyond qualitative assessments of 
safety issues and formally assess risk; 
• STABLE – So that data users do not perceive “trends” or “shifts” that are really statistical 
artifacts resulting from inadequate or inconsistent data collection methods; 
• COMPREHENSIVE – So that the metrics address commercial, corporate and general 
aviation operations; on large- and small-scales; during all-airborne and ground phases; in all 
relevant environments including flight decks, aircraft cabins, control facilities, maintenance 
hangars, and other operational environments; 
• HUMAN-CENTERED – So that the data help to illuminate the human performance issues 
that are central to aviation safety and to the ultimate success or failure of aviation 
technologies; 
• TOPICAL – So that the data address the issues that are of prime interest to policy makers, 
technology developers, and other members of the aviation community; 
• ACCESSIBLE – So that political, legal, or commercial considerations do not inhibit practical 
application of the data to current safety issues. 
 
Many valuable sources of aviation safety data currently exist, but none have all of the 
virtues outlined above.  The main area where existing data sets fail is in the quantification of NAS 
safety and safety trends.  The current absence of solid quantitative information places a significant 
burden on the aviation decision-makers who must assess risk and allocate scarce resources among 
competing safety investments. 
I.D.2. Deficiencies in Existing Sources of Aviation Safety Data 
One might hope that existing data sources, or some combination of those sources, would 
provide the needed quantitative information.   Several potential data sources were identified: 
• Accident Data, Commercial Flight Operations  
• Aviation Incident Data 
 
219 
 
'82  '83  ’84  '85  ‘86  '87  ‘88  '89  '90  '91  ’92  '93  ‘94  '95  ’96  '97 
 
Figure 1. Commercial Air Carrier Data are Too Coarse and  
Volatile to Measure Short- and Medium-Term Safety Trends 
 
• Air Carrier Digital Flight (FOQA) Data 
• Air Traffic Control Radar Tapes 
 
The following passages examine these data sets and explain why the information they 
contain is highly complementary, but not fully commensurate with the needs outlined earlier. 
l.D.2.1 Commercial Air Carrier Accident Data47  
Major air transport accidents are mercifully rare events in both the statistical and practical 
senses.  Major U.S. air carrier operators (FAR part 121) in scheduled service experienced an 
average of just 3.4 fatal accidents over the 1982-1997 time period.48 Many millions of flight 
operations were 
safely accomplished 
during this same time 
frame.  Rare events, 
like air carrier 
accidents, are often 
characterized by 
Poisson distributions.  If 
the accidents of Part 121 
operators really are an 
outcome of a Poisson 
process with a mean of 
3.4, one would expect these data to display a great deal of year-to-year volatility with observed 
values generally ranging between zero and seven.  As Figure 1 indicates, actual air-carrier-accident 
data display just such traits.  It is obvious that such accident data are too coarse and volatile to 
form the basis of a comprehensive NAS safety measurement system. 
l.D.2.2. Aviation Incident Data and Other Event Data 
Aviation safety incidents can be defined as any unsafe event or situation that occurs within 
the NAS but does not culminate in an accident.  Aviation safety incidents are far more common 
than accidents, and would be expected to more reliably measure safety trends. Aviation incidents 
come to light in a variety ways.  One important type of incident data is the incident report such as 
those submitted to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), to the FAA’s NAIMS 
database, and to various other FAA, NTSB, and air carrier data-collection systems.  
These incident reports are mainly composed of free-form textual descriptions of 
undesirable occurrences.  These reports are often highly topical, shedding light on current safety 
problems.  The ASRS has demonstrated that such data can be used to provide powerful insights 
into human performance and the dynamics of safety events, the qualitative side of safety data. 
The difficulty is that the incident data collected by NASA, FAA, NTSB, and others suffer 
from unmeasured reporting biases.  These data-collection systems are unable to calculate what 
portion of the total universe of safety events is reported to them each year.  They do not know 
whether near-midair collisions are more likely to be reported than altitude deviations; or whether 
carrier X’s pilots are more likely to report than carrier Y’s; or whether an unusually large number 
                                                
47 This discussion relates to data describing commercial aviation accidents in the U.S. 
48 The source is the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
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of controller reports coming from region Z results from a greater awareness of the incident 
reporting programs or to poorer system performance. 
The data of every incident reporting program suffers from the same statistical limitations.  
This does not negate the value of incident data for explaining safety events and human 
performance issues, but it does make them relatively limited source of quantitative safety 
information.  
l.D.2.3. Air Carrier Digital Flight (FOQA) Data 
European air carriers have routinely collected and analyzed flight data for many decades; 
U.S. air carriers are beginning to do the same.  Modern air transports record thousands of 
parameters that are available for collection and analysis via the on-board digital flight data 
recorders.  Virtually every control surface, control position, instrument reading, display mode, and 
switch position can be monitored and recorded by these recorders. 
Enormous amounts of digital flight data may eventually be collected under air carrier flight 
operational quality assurance (FOQA) programs.   However, it will probably be many years before 
all major U.S. air carriers have such programs, and many more years before smaller air carriers and 
GA operators institute FOQA programs.  When these data do become available, they will be 
among the most proprietary safety data possessed by aircraft operators. They will be protected for 
reasons of public relations, competition, and fear that they may be used in the course of litigation. 
Digital flight data are an unexcelled quantifier of aircraft flight performance, but the range 
of issues they can address is limited by the nature of the sensing devices.  These data may 
ultimately be used to make inferences about aircrew performance, but it is unlikely that they can be 
used to measure the performances of individual crewmembers. The inferences that can be made 
will generally document human behavior but not explain it.  Moreover, flight data recorders do not 
currently capture contextual information vital to interpreting observed behaviors (e.g., operative 
ATC clearances). 
l.D.2.4. ATC Radar Data 
The FAA routinely records the radar tracks of aircraft within airspace under its control.  
These radar data have many of the virtues and weaknesses of digital flight data. They measure the 
gross movements of aircraft in controlled airspace.  However, the parameters collected by ATC 
radar tapes are relatively few in number compared to the flight data recorders on board modern 
aircraft; they provide relatively little data about participants who do not participate in the air traffic 
control system, and even less about human performance issues.  (The latter include the plans, 
thoughts, expectations, and actions of the people who operate the aviation system; the efficacy of 
human-technology interfaces; and the effects of training, schedules, workload, and other factors on 
human performance.)  ATC radar data would probably be suitable for measuring total system 
safety performance in a gross sense, but the range of safety issues that could be addressed would 
be very limited for the reasons outlined above. 
l.D.3. Reliably Quantifying NAS Safety 
Each of the data sources described above contributes to the total body of information 
available about NAS safety performance.  This body lacks a skeleton—a framework for 
assembling and arranging the information so that it makes sense in a total, integrated way.  A 
comprehensive, structured approach is needed to measure NAS safety.  This structure should first 
define key safety metrics in accordance with the government and industry needs and then measure 
NAS performance against those metrics.  These data would add perspective to the many other 
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kinds of aviation safety data collected.  They would be invaluable for assessing safety risks and for 
achieving a rational allocation of safety investment resources. 
Accordingly, NASA proposes to undertake the development of NAOMS for surveying the 
operators of the national aviation system - its pilots, controllers, mechanics, and flight attendants—
to obtain critical quantitative data on NAS safety performance.  NAOMS would, in effect, view the 
aviation-operating environment through the eyes of the many thousands of persons who make it 
work.  These persons would be regularly asked about their operational exposure; the rates at which 
they experience safety events; and their experiences with new technologies and procedures.  
NAOMS would also address the human performance issues that are crucial to understand in 
relation to new aviation technologies and their success or failure. 
These survey data will be collected voluntarily in accordance with a rigorous statistical 
design.  A well-designed, carefully implemented system will produce data that have all of the ideal 
attributes enumerated at the beginning of this submission: accurate, coherent, precise, quantitative, 
stable, comprehensive, human-centered, topical, and accessible.  Most importantly, the data 
collection effort would be focused on precisely those topics that are of greatest importance to 
government and industry. 
I.E. Data Collection Impacts On Small Businesses or Other Small Entities 
There are no small entities involved with this study.  Potential respondents for this study 
include approximately 5,000 commercial airline pilots who will be randomly selected from the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s Airman’s Medical Certification database that includes a list of 
certified pilots (N~700,000) operating in the United States. 
I.F. Describe Consequences if Collection is Not Conducted or is Conducted Less Frequently 
As described above, failure to collect these data will result in maintaining the status quo 
that is an inability to accurately measure the progress in meeting the aviation safety goals as 
described in the White House Commission on Aviation Safety report published in 1997, and thus 
improved public safety.  It is anticipated that policy makers will wish to review progress towards 
safety goals on at least quarterly basis (preliminary evaluations).  They will need definitive safety 
measurements annually.  The NAOMS sample design has been structured in accordance with these 
considerations.  Reducing the planned data collection frequency (described in more detail later in 
this submission) will invalidate the underlying statistical design and reduce or eliminate NAOMS 
ability to generalize findings from the sample to the air carrier pilot population at large. 
I.G. Describe Special Circumstances that would Cause Information to be Collected in a 
Manner… 
1.G.1 More Often than Quarterly 
NAOMS will not ask respondents to provide information more often than once per quarter. 
I.G.2. Responding Fewer than 30 Days 
NAOMS will not ask respondents to respond in fewer than 30 days. 
I.G.3. Submission of More than an Original and Two Copies of a Document 
NAOMS will not ask respondents to submit any documents. 
I.G.4. Requires Respondents to Retain Records for More than 3 Years 
NAOMS will not ask respondents to retain records for the purpose of this study. 
I.G.5. That Cannot be used to Generalize to the General Population 
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The data collected by NAOMS will not be generalized to the general public.  However, it 
will be generalized to the air carrier population, which is the intent of this survey. 
I.G.6. Using a Statistical Data Classification that has not been Reviewed and Approved by 
OMB 
NAOMS will not be using any standardized data classification schemes.  Data 
classification will categorize the unique events reported by air carrier pilot.  This is necessary to 
support the analytical needs of NAOMS described elsewhere.  NASA will bear the full cost 
entailed by prescribed classification coding scheme. The classification-coding scheme will not 
shift agency information costs to respondents. 
I.G.7. That Includes a Pledge of Confidentiality 
The participants in this data collection effort will be assured of data confidentiality. For 
more on this see section I.J. below. 
I.G.8. Requires Respondents to Submit Proprietary Trade Secrets or Confidential 
Information 
NAOMS respondents will not be asked to submit proprietary trade secrets, but they will be 
asked to provide confidential information. All information will be recorded anonymously in 
manner that prevents its linkage to any given respondent. 
 
I.H. Provide a Copy of Federal Register Requesting Comments on Data Collection 
[To Be Inserted by NASA] 
I.I. Explain Decision to Provide Payment or Gift for Participation 
NAOMS does not intend to provide payment or other incentives to respondents. 
I.J. Describe Any Assurance of Confidentiality if Based on Statue, Regulation, or Agency 
Policy 
The data being collected are potentially sensitive since respondents will be reporting 
safety-related events in which they are involved.  Data will be collected anonymously to prevent 
the disclosure of respondent identities.  The CATI interview management system is programmed 
so that there is no linkage between the respondent’s database and the completed interview.  Once 
completed, the completed interview will be electronically submitted without any linkage to 
identifiers.  The interviewer will note in the system that the respondent has completed the 
interview in order to prevent re-contacting them, but the respondent ID will not be linked to the 
recorded questionnaire responses. 
In this current proposal, pilots will be notified in an advance letter and consent statement 
that the study is anonymous.  A brief explanation will be given about how NASA and its 
supporting contractor will assure this anonymity.  In addition to anonymity of reporting, NASA 
and its supporting contractor will put the following confidentiality protection measures in place: 
• The identity of respondents will not be revealed to anyone outside of the study staff. 
• The data presented in reports and publications will be in aggregate form only. 
• The respondent will be assured that participation is completely voluntary and in no way 
affects their employment.  
6 
All interviewers and project staff will sign a confidentiality statement attesting that they 
will maintain the privacy of all information collected through the conduct of this study.  The 
confidentiality statement includes non-disclosure of any information learned about respondents or 
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the data obtained.   It further requires interviewers to decline interviewing a respondent he or she 
knows personally. 
I.K. Provide Justification for Any Questions of Sensitive Nature Including Why the 
Questions Are Necessary, the Specific Uses of the Information, and the Explanation Given to 
the Respondents 
Respondents will be asked questions about safety events that happened during the conduct 
of aviation operations.  Potentially, some of these events could have been due to operator error, 
and thus be self-implicating.  Leakage of such information could lead to serious consequences for 
the pilot such as punishments, fines, notations in their personnel records, or other penalties.  Such 
information is central to NAOMS purpose: the measurement of aviation safety levels and trends. 
The data are not available elsewhere.  Accordingly, these questions must be asked.  But, they will 
be posed in the most diplomatic manner possible.  As noted earlier, no records will be kept that 
link respondents’ identities to the responses they provided. 
I.L. Provide Estimates of the Hour Burden of the Collection of Information 
We will be employing a split-design during the first year of NAOMS data collection in 
accordance with Figure 2.  The design will employ two distinct recall periods (one month and three 
months) and two respondent selection processes (cross cross-sectional and panel).  Panel 
participants will be surveyed on a quarterly basis.  The split-design is intended to resolve 
methodological issues that were addressed, but not fully answered, during pre-survey research. 
 
 Design 
Cross-Sectional Panel 
Recall period 
(months) 
1 2,000 500 
2 2,000 500 
Figure 2. Number of Respondents 
 
 
I.L1. The Number of Respondents 
A total of 7,142 randomly sampled individuals will be invited to participate the survey.  
Based on pre-survey research, we expect a response rate of 70%.  This will result in net 
participation by 5,000 individuals over the course of the year.  Roughly 1,400 of these persons will 
be asked to become member of a panel that will be surveyed once per quarter over the course of 
the year.  The balance will be interviewed just once during the survey period.  We expect the 
combined process to yield 8,000 responses total over the one-year survey period. 
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I.L2. Frequency of Response 
The pilots in the cross-sectional sample will be interviewed once.  Panel members will be 
interviewed quarterly for one year, for a total of four times.  The commercial air pilot respondents 
will have roughly a 5% chance of being selected in any given year. 
I.L.3. Annual Hour Burden and an Explanation of How the Burden Was Estimated 
The total time per completed interview is 45 minutes, including 30 minutes to complete the 
interview, 15 minutes to read the advance letter, screen for eligibility, and have informed consent 
read to them.  The average time per response is slightly lower for panel members since they will be 
participating four times over the year and will not need to repeat some of the initial screening 
steps.  Pilots who are screened ineligible have a burden of 10 minutes for reading the advance 
letter and having the screening conducted. Table 1 displays the results of the burden calculation. 
The total annual burden is estimated as 5,907 hours. 
 
Table 1. Estimate of Annual Hour Burden 
Type of Respondent Number of Respondents 
Frequency of 
Response 
Average Time 
Per Response 
(Hours) 
Annual Hour 
Burden 
Cross-sectional 4,000 l 0.75 3,000 
Panel 1,000 4 0.56 2,240 
Decline to 
participate 2,142 n/a 0.17 364 
Ineligibles 1,785 n/a 0.17 303 
Subtotal    5,907 
 
 
I.L.4. Estimates of Annualized Costs to Respondents Using Appropriate Wage Categories 
Based on the average salary of $100,000 for air carrier pilots who work on average 1,500 
hours per year (including training, preflight activities, and other work activities ancillary to flying), 
the average cost per hour for respondents will be $67 ($100,000 / 1500 = $67).  The total estimated 
cost burden is $395,769 ($67 x 5,907 = $395,769). 
I.M Provide an Estimate of Other Total Annual Cost Burden to Respondents or Record 
Keepers 
The data collection entails no additional cost burden to respondents or record keepers. 
I.N. Provide Estimates of Annualized Costs to the Federal Government 
Table 2 provides an estimate of the annualized costs to the Federal government for this 
data-collection effort.  These estimates are based on previous survey work for other government 
agencies and have been divided by costs elements/tasks to the federal government.  The total 
estimate for all data collection activities is $1,013K for the first year. 
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Table 2. Estimated Cost of Data Collection to the Federal Government 
Cost Element Estimate Comment 
Project Management & Administration 
including Interactions with 
Stakeholders 
$125K  
Development and Testing of Survey 
Instruments $100K 
Assumes four sets of topical 
question developed and 
tested on 100 respondents 
each year 
Data system maintenance and 
administration $50K  
Data Collection by Telephone $680K @ $85 per interview 
Contractor Fee $58K @ 6.1% 
Total Cost plus Fee $1,013K  
 
 
I.O. Outline Plans for Tabulation and Publications 
Current plans include one summary publication for the initial year.  As the data collection 
continues for the pilots, and other operational personnel such as air traffic controllers are added, it 
is likely that quarterly reports and annual reports will be developed. 
For this first year, the annual report will provide estimates of aviation safety event rates for 
commercial air carrier pilots.  These event rates will be expressed in terms of the numbers of 
events per flight hour and per landing.  Because these are sensitive data, their interpretation and 
publication will be accomplished in coordination with an aviation government-industry steering 
committee.  
Collection of Information Employing Statistical Methods 
II.A. Describe the Respondent Universe and Sampling Methods to Be Used. Indicate 
Expected Response Rates for the Whole. 
Figure 2, presented earlier, describes the split-design that will be used during the first year 
of the survey effort.  The design elements differ in terms of the sampling process (cross-sectional 
vs. panel) and recall period (1 vs. 3 months). 
II.A.1 Respondent Universe 
The study universe, or target population, includes all commercial airline pilots in the 
United States, a group comprised of roughly 100,000 individuals.  For the purposes of NAOMS, 
the target sample is limited to pilots who have flown commercially during the recall period. 
II.A.2 Sampling Methods 
The airline pilot sample will be extracted from the FAA’s Airman’s Medical Certification 
database, which is publicly available.  Commercial pilots are required to update their medical 
certification every six months, so this data source remains relatively current. Pilots will be 
randomly selected from this database from among those who designate themselves as U.S.-based, 
commercial aviation pilots flying multi- engine planes.  Telephone numbers are not available in the 
database.  So, the latter will be obtained through Telematch, a service that matches names and 
addresses with telephone numbers.  If telephone numbers are not available through Telematch or 
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Table 3. Sampling Frame 
addresses are not current, the pilot will be located using other conventional methods including: 
National Change of Address and Directory Assistance searches. 
II.A.3 Cross-Sectional vs. Panel Design 
Survey methodology literature suggests that a purely cross-sectional study approach is 
usually statistically optimal.  It is usually easier to administer cross-sectional designs as well.  
However, the domain experts on the research team are interested in potential benefits of the panel 
approach. The rationale underlying the NAOMS effort is that the aviation community—pilots, 
controllers, mechanics, and flight attendants—is comprised of highly professional and well-
educated persons who can be en enlisted as active participants in the ongoing evaluation of NAS 
safety.  It is further believed that enrollment in NAOMS panels will encourage participants to 
become even more acute observers of aviation system safety. 
These competing considerations also suggest that a split design would be desirable in Year 
1 of the NAOMS implementation.  One half of data collection will be accomplished using a cross- 
sectional sample, one-twelfth of which would be interviewed each month.  The other half will 
employ a panel design.  Each panel respondent would be asked to enroll for a one-year period with 
the expectation that he/she would be asked to participate in four surveys spaced at three-m-month 
intervals. 
II.B. Describe the Procedures for the Collection of Information 
II.B.1. Statistical Methodology for Stratification and Sample Selection  
No sampling stratification will be done during this first year of the NAOMS process. 
Table 3 describes the sampling frame. The frame size is designed to compensate for 
respondents who are ineligible (pilots who did not fly a commercial aircraft during the recall 
period), who refuse to participate, for whom current location or telephone number information 
cannot be obtained, or cannot be contacted.  Based on the field trial results (discussed more fully 
later in this document), we expect roughly 20% of the persons contacted to be ineligible.  We 
further expect that at least 70%of those who are eligible will elect to participate in the survey.  
Thus, it is anticipated that 5,000 out of the initial 8,928 persons who are contacted by NAOMS 
would be eligible and would agree to participate. 
Potential respondents will be 
randomly assigned to either the cross-
sectional or panel groups.  Persons in the 
cross- sectional group will be further 
randomly assigned to one of the twelve 
months in the survey period.  Members of 
the cross-sectional group will be interviewed 
once within 90 days of their assigned 
interview-release date.  Panel members will 
be interviewed shortly after their release 
date, and once each quarter thereafter. 
As Table 4 indicates, NAOMS 
expects to receive a total of 8,000 completed 
surveys. Four thousand of these will come 
from the Cross-sectional group.  The balance will come from the panel members each of whom 
will participate four times in the NAOMS survey effort. 
  
Persons 
Number 
of 
Persons 
Balance 
Initially Contacted 8,928 8,928 
Estimates 
based on 
field trial 
findings 
Ineligible 1,786 7,142 
Refusals 857 6,285 
Unlocatable 643 5,642 
Non-
response 
642 5,000 
NAOMS Participation  5,000 
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II.B.2.Estimation Procedures 
The goal of NAOMS is to estimate rates at which particular types of events occur in the 
course of commercial air travel.  Each respondent will be asked to report how many occurrences of 
each event type or category he/she experienced during the recall period, and respondents will also 
report how many hours and how many legs (takeoff / landing cycles) they flew commercially 
during the recall period.  Therefore, NASA and its supporting contractor will be able to compute 
the total number of times each event occurred during the recall period per hour flown and per flight 
leg.  These are, in effect, event frequencies normalized for exposure.  They are the key indicators 
that NAOMS will use to measure NAS safety levels and trends. 
II.B.3 Degree of Accuracy Needed for the Purpose Described in the Justification 
The goal of NAOMS is to be able to detect changes in the operation of the commercial air 
travel system from one year to the next.  Because safety-related events vary in nature and 
frequency across the calendar year due to weather and climate fluctuation, as well as the volume of 
air travel, data collection, must occur throughout the year.  However, statistics will be computed 
for  
The level of accuracy required is one that will permit reliable detection of a 20% change 
from one year to the next.  That is, NASA and its supporting contractor must be able to detect a 
20% decrease (or increase) in event rates with a high degree of certainty and have confidence in 
the accuracy of the measurement.  Pilots may experience some of the events being measured only 
once every ten years or less (e.g., a near mid-air collision).  While such events are far more 
frequent than accidents, a substantial sample size is still required to measure their frequency within 
operationally useful confidence intervals (roughly, +/- 20%).  Power analyses, using classical 
statistical methods and simulations, determined that the samples sizes proposed in this document 
are the minimum required to reliably detect such change. 
NAOMS’ primary reason for using a split-design during this first year of the data collection 
is to determine whether a 3-month recall period will yield responses of acceptable quality, i.e., 
whether there ether was a significant diminution of quality relative to a one-month recall period. 
The field trial results were ambiguous in this regard. The split-design will also explore the use of 
cross-sectional vs. panel approaches.  NAOMS’ intent is to ask panel participants to maintain brief 
notes regarding the their aviation safety experiences between survey applications, thus elevating 
response quality. 
II.B. 4. Unusual Problems Requiring Specialized Sampling Procedures 
Specialized sampling procedures will not be implemented. 
Group Number of Participants 
Responses 
per 
Participant 
Completed 
Surveys 
Cross-
sectional 4,000 1 4,000 
Panel 1,000 4 4,000 
Total 5,000  8,000 
Table 4. Number of Responses 
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II.B. 5. Any Use of Periodic (Less Frequent than Annual) Data Collection Cycles to Reduce 
Burden 
Data collection will occur at the least frequent intervals possible in order to provide sufficiently 
valid data.  Because statistics must be generated to describe air travel system safety for each year, 
data collection must occur throughout the year.  It is an anticipated that the policy makers who use 
NAOMS data will wish to see preliminary data on, at least, a quarterly basis as well as more 
definitive results at year-end. 
II.B. 6. Information on Data Collection Procedures 
Battelle will conduct all data collection activities for this study under contract with NASA. 
Battelle’s Centers for Public Health Research (CPHRE) survey operations unit has over twenty 
years of experience in survey data collection procedures.  This particular study will use computer- 
assisted telephone interviewing (CATI).  
Telephone interviewing is a popular mode of conducting data collection because most 
people have telephones, it is cost effective, and data can be collected quickly.  With the advent of 
computer-assisted-telephone interviewing (CATI), additional advantages have been introduced in 
term of quality control.  CATI questionnaires have many built-in features including: (1) predefined 
terms and definitions that the interviewer can read to help respondents with questions; (2) range of 
value, skip pattern, and logic checks that greatly reduce respondent or interviewer error in 
administration; and (3) elimination of the need for data entry for receipt control or data cleaning.  
It also allows telephone supervisors to monitor interviewer work in real time by silently listening 
in on the interviewer.  The supervisor can see what interviewer is recording in the computer and 
can compare it with what he/she heard. 
CATI interviews will be administered from Battelle’s Telephone Center located in 
Baltimore, Maryland.  In the field trial, an 81% completion rate for CATI interviewing was 
obtained, and no data were lost due to respondent or interviewer error. 
II.B. 6.1. Interviewer Training 
Interviewers will be given sixteen hours of training led by the data collection Project 
Director and other key staff. 
Battelle supervisors, interviewers, and editors will attend the training. 
Interviewer training will consist of introducing the study, its background and purpose.  
There will also be an introduction to aviation and aircraft terminology.  The interviewers will be 
trained on the questionnaire, the advance letters, confidentiality, and various administrative forms 
and procedures used in the study.  During training, there will be group role-playing to familiarize 
the interviewers with the questionnaire and the types of responses they might receive from 
respondents.  Each interviewer will then conduct a one-on-one interview with a member of training 
team.  Interviewers will return to the office over the next few days to conduct a “certification” 
interview, in which they will have to demonstrate they were competent in all the procedures 
involved in the study. 
After being certified, CATI interviewers will begin interviewing from the Battelle 
Telephone Center.  Interviewers working out of the Telephone Center will have their work silently 
monitored by CHPRE validation staff.  The introductory telephone script read to pilots will include 
the fact that supervisors may monitor the call for quality assurance purposes. 
There will be periodic trainings for new interviewers to replace staff lost to attrition. 
II.B. 6.2. Implementation  
The following implementation tasks will occur on the schedule outlined below.  
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Day1: A cover letter on NASA stationary is mailed describing the purpose of the study, 
confidentiality provisions, and the identity of the funding agency.  The letter will describe 
what participation means for both the Cross-sectional and Panel sample members.  
Day 3-90: Respondents are called to screen for eligibility and to pre-arrange appointments 
to conduct the interview.  A call scheduler is built into the CATI system. Whenever an 
appointment is made, it recorded in the scheduler and will automatically come up as an 
interviewer assignment at the appointed time.  Calls will be made from 9am to 10pm seven 
days a week and across all time zones. 
Day 60: A reminder letter will be mailed to respondents who have not yet been interviewed 
explaining that interviewing will soon be ending.  The letter will indicate that it is 
important to talk with him/her to establish eligibility and find out whether or not they want 
to participate. 
Panel Sample: Follow-up interviews for Panel Sample members will be conducted around 
the 3-, 6-, and 9-month anniversary of the first interview.  A letter will be mailed to the 
pilots a week before their anniversary date reminding them that an interviewer will be 
calling again. 
II.C. Methods to Maximize Response Rates 
The field trial results indicate there should not be a problem achieving a 70% completion 
rate.  Nevertheless, measures have been incorporated to maximize the response rates.  Pilots 
frequently mentioned how important the NASA name was in their decision to participate.  The 
NASA name/logo will be used on all materials and in verbal introductions.  The advance letter 
serves the dual purpose of introducing the study and establishing its legitimacy to the pilots.  It will 
have the telephone number of a high-level person well versed in the issues most likely to arise.  
The advance letter will be marked with "address correction requested" so bad addresses can be 
updated and new letters can be sent out.  Attempts will be made to locate pilots whose addresses 
are not current.  Finally, interviews will be scheduled at times that are most convenient for 
respondents. 
Most importantly, as noted earlier, we intend to use a multi-layered set of prompts and 
reminders to achieve the maximum response rate practical from our population. 
II.D. Describe Tests of Procedures and Methods 
Numerous tests were made of procedures and methods prior to finalizing the interview 
contents and the design of the full-survey.  Development of the questionnaire followed normal 
survey research experimental protocols.  Then a field trial was conducted to test the design.  Each 
of these steps is described below. 
II.D.1. Focus Groups 
Four different confidential focus groups with nine active air carrier pilots were conducted.  
These air carrier pilots were randomly selected from different pilot sub-populations including 
international air carrier pilots, domestic air carrier pilots and regional commuter airline pilots.  An 
experienced focus group facilitator conducted each session.  The discussions were recorded and 
transcribed.  Identifying information for each individual was n removed from the transcript and the 
recording tapes destroyed. 
The goal of these focus groups was to obtain a listing of safety events that these individual 
pilots had experienced.  Personal opinions on individual safety concerns were not solicited.  The 
findings were then used to begin development of a draft questionnaire.  The focus group responses 
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were substantially augmented by input from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System’s 
(ASRS) incident database. 
II.D. 2. One-on-One Interviews 
Volunteer active airline pilots were interviewed one-on-one by project researchers to test 
the validity of the list of events developed from the focus groups and ASRS inputs.  Each event 
derived from the focus groups was presented to the pilot and discussed.  Through this process, the 
relative perceived safety significance of each of the events was determined. 
Additionally, the pilots participating in the one-on-one interviews provided information 
that was used to help in the organization of the draft questionnaire.  Each pilot took a stack of 96 
cards, each with a safety-related incident described on it derived from the focus groups, and sorted 
them into groupings of events that seem seemed to be related to one another.  Then the pilots wrote 
descriptions of what each grouping was about.  This process helped determine how the pilots 
organized and categorized safety events.  This information was used in designing the format and 
sequence of questions at in the draft questionnaire. 
II.D. 3. Pilot Recall Accuracy 
One of the most significant decisions in designing the NAOMS questionnaire is specifying 
the length of time during which respondents will be asked to recall events in their recent pasts. 
Because it is essential that measurements be as precise as possible, the possibility that pilots will 
misremember the frequency, nature, or timing of events is of great importance.  Based upon the 
cognitive psychology literature on memory and the experience of survey researchers seeking to 
document events, three sorts of misremembering are significant threats to the validity of NAOMS 
measurements.  First, respondents may forget events that occurred.  Second, respondents may 
remember events that did occur but may misremember the dates on which they occurred, leading 
respondents to report these events as having occurred during the “reference period” (i.e., the period 
during which they are being asked to recall events), when in fact they occurred prior to the 
reference period.  Third, respondents may imagine events that never occurred.  The recall period 
for the NAOMS survey instrument must keep these potential errors at acceptable levels. 
Rare, emotionally arousing events are likely to be remembered well, but events that occur 
frequently and are of less severity are more at risk for being e misremembered.  For starters, it is 
important to know how long pilots can accurately recall highly routine events.  A small-scale 
pretest study was conducted to help make this determination.  In this study, pilots were asked to 
perform a relatively simple memory task (remembering the number of landings that they had 
recently performed) the results of which could be objectively verified against official records. This 
research indicated that pilots had highly accurate recall of these routine events for one week after 
their occurrence.  Accuracy declined thereafter.  The question remained whether pilots could 
accurately recall more unusual occurrences, like safety events, for a longer period of time.  This 
question was addressed during the NAOMS field trial. 
II.D.4. Field Trial 
A field trial was conducted during the November 1999 - February 2000 time frame.  It was 
designed to test mode (self-administered, CATI, in-person); recall period (one week, two weeks, 
four weeks, two months, four months and six months); and alternative questionnaire structures 
(four).  This design resulted in 72 cells for the pilot population that would be the initial subjects of 
this survey effort. 
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The field trial used air carrier pilot respondents.  The sample was randomly drawn from the 
FAA’s Airman’s Medical Certification database.  Sampled pilots were then randomly assigned to 
interviewing cell.  Telematch was used to obtain current telephone numbers.  
NAOMS received 627 responses, averaging 8.7 completes per cell.  Response rates by 
mode were 70% for self-administered questionnaires (SAQ) and 81% for computer-assisted-
telephone interviews (CATI).  In-person interviewing was cancelled after reaching a 59% 
completion rate because it became clear this mode would be too expensive to implement on a 
nationwide scale. 
II.D.4.1. Field Trial Data Quality Assessment 
The quality of data collected is also important consideration when evaluating what mode of 
survey should be selected.  A high response rate is not of much value if questions are not 
completed accurately.  There were a number of approaches to evaluating data quality based on the 
field trial results, each of which is presented below. 
Completion Time for Questionnaire.  Evaluation of the time needed to complete the 
interview is a relative measure of data quality.  The underlying assumption is that the more time a 
respondent takes to complete a questionnaire, the better the quality of the resulting data. 
As can be seen in Table 5, the average time to complete the telephone interview took 12 
minutes more (40% more) than the mail mode.  Some of this difference may be due to the need for 
the respondent to listen and then assimilate what the interviewer asked in the telephone interview 
versus the ability of the respondent to quickly read 
the question in the mail interview.  It is unlikely, 
however, that this explains all the difference 
between the two modes.  The lesser amount of time 
needed to complete the self-administered surveys 
is probably indicative of pilots working through 
the questionnaire quickly, paying less attention to 
questions and spending less time trying to accurately recall the events, than respondents who 
participated over the telephone. 
Missing Responses. Another 
way to evaluate the quality of data 
reported is to look at the number of 
missing responses for the questionnaire. 
Table 6 presents the percentage of 
respondents that did not complete at least 
one question in the questionnaire by mode.  
The lack of any missing answers for the telephone mode is due to the fact that each 
question, when read by the interviewer, requires a response.  Since most of the responses to the 
NAOMS field trial questions appropriately received the response of  ‘0’ (for event or events that 
did not occur during the reference period) it is easy to see how respondents would be tempted to 
skip quickly across questions in the survey instrument.  This would also explain why the mail 
version of the survey instrument took so much less time to complete than the telephone version.  In 
the mail version, the pilots did not have anyone prompting them to slow down and think about 
each answer.  In contrast, the CATI interviewers asked the pilot each question in turn.  The pilot 
did not know what question came next so he or she had to listen to the question to understand its 
meaning and then think to develop a response. 
Total Number of Events and Total Hours Flown in the Recall Period. The observed 
relationship between the reported number of events and the total hours flown in the recall period 
 
Table 5. Questionnaire Mean Completion 
Time (Minutes) 
 Mail Telephone 
Completion Time 17 29 
   
 
Table 6. Respondents Who Failed to 
Complete at Least One Question 
 Mail Telephone 
One or More Missing 
Answers 4.8% 0.0% 
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also provides insight into data quality.  If the questionnaire is capturing accurate responses from 
pilots about the frequency of events they experience, then pilots with more flight time should 
experience and report a proportionately greater number of events than those pilots who flew fewer 
hours. 
 Several quantitative 
analyses were conducted looking 
at the association between the 
number of events reported and 
the number of hours flown 
during the recall period.  For all 
such analyses, one would expect 
to see a positive relationship 
between the variable if the data are valid (more flight hours should result in greater number of 
events reported).  The higher the correlation, the tighter the relationship.  Table 7 shows the 
pertinent findings. 
Associations for both modes were positive, indicating that pilot reports of event frequencies 
corresponded to experience during the recall period.  However, data from the telephone mode 
showed a somewhat higher degree of association between number of events reported and the 
number of hours flown indicating greater consistency in the data. 
Total Number of Events and Number of Days in Recall Period. By similar logic, one 
would expect respondents who were asked to use longer recall periods to report proportionately 
more events than those asked to use shorter periods. Table 8 shows the relationships found in the 
data. Once again, the relationship was positive with both modes, but it was considerably stronger 
with the telephone mode.  This suggests that telephone respondents were working harder to recall 
events accurately for the longer recall periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimum Recall Period. Another key objective of the NAOMS field trial was to 
determine the appropriate recall period.  There were two primary competing considerations.  First, 
as recall period lengthens, the memory of events weakens.  Shorter recall periods promote quality.  
Second, longer recall periods favor the recollection of more events permitting more events to be 
uncovered from fewer respondents.   Longer recall periods promote cost savings. 
 Respondents were asked to use a variety of recall periods ranging from one week to six 
months during the field trial.  At the end of the survey, respondents were asked how confident they 
were in the answers they had provided.  The results are summarized in Table 9.49   It can be seen 
that the confidence the pilots have in their ability to accurately report events dropped as the recall 
                                                
49 This table was derived from analysis of pilots who completed the survey either by telephone or by mail.  
Face-to-face interview results were not included. 
 
Table 7. Demonstrated Association Between Number  
of Events Experienced and Hours Flown 
Mode 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient of 
Regression 
Significance 
Mail .086 p<.001 
Telephone .136 p<.001 
Table 8: Demonstrated Association Between 
Number of Pilot Reported Events and Recall 
Period 
Mode 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient of 
Regression 
Significance 
Mail .190 p<.001 
Telephone .265 p<.001 
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periods got longer.  However, at 60 days, 85% of respondents still indicated that they were either 
‘Extremely’ or ‘Very’ confident in their event reporting.  This suggests that a 60- or 90-day recall 
period may provide the best balance between quality considerations and the need to operate 
NAOMS in an economical manner. 
 
Table 9: Respondent Confidence in Reported 
Accuracy by Recall Period 
Recall  Period Extremely Confident 
Very 
Confident 
Moderate to No 
Confidence 
1 Week 62% 36% 4% 
2 Weeks 58% 34% 8% 
4 Weeks 47% 39% 14% 
2 Months 36% 49% 15% 
4 Months 34% 47% 19% 
6 Months 29% 44% 27% 
 
 
II.D.4.2.  Costs 
NAOMS wishes to achieve its data-collection objectives in the most cost-efficient manner 
possible without compromising quality.  This is why tests with various recall periods and data 
collection modes were conducted during the field trial.  It was determined that telephone collection 
costs would be 15 to 25% higher per completed response than self-administered questionnaires.  
Despite this higher cost, NAOMS has elected to use the telephone mode for quality considerations.  
Every quality indicator in the field trial suggested that phone interviews yielded more complete 
and consistent results than self-administered surveys. 
 
II.E. Provide the Names and Telephone Numbers of Individuals Consulted on Statistical 
Aspects of the Design, Name of the Unit within NASA, Contractor(s), Grantee(s) or Other 
Person(s) Who Will Actually Collect and/or Analyze the Information for NASA 
Battelle and its supporting contractors worked with NASA personnel to design the study 
protocol. 
Linda Connell, M.A., NASA Ames Research Center, [(650) 960-6059] is the NASA 
Project Manager for NAOMS and the Level III Lead for NASA AvSP Extramural Monitoring. 
Mary Connors, PhD., NASA Ames Research Center, [(650) 604-6114] is the Branch Chief 
for System Safety Research and Level III Lead for NASA AvSP Modeling and Simulation. 
From Battelle's Mountain View, CA Operations, Loren Rosenthal, M.S., is the Battelle 
Vice President Aviation Safety & Efficiency, and Elisa Ingebretson, B.S., is a Battelle Research 
Scientist.  Both are available at (650) 969-3969. 
From Battelle's Center for Public Health Research (CPHRE), Joan Cwi, PhD, is Project 
Director of Data Collection and Louise Glezen, M.A., is Study Leader.  Both are available at (410) 
377-5660. 
From Battelle’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL), Tom Ferryman, PhD, is 
a Senior Statistician on the NAOMS project. 
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Consultants include Robert Dodd, PhD, Principle Investigator, and Mike Jobanek, M.S., 
from Dodd & Associates.  Dr. Dodd and Mr. Jobanek are available at (410) 923-6086. 
From Ohio State University's Department of Psychology and Political Science, Jon 
Krosnick, PhD [(614) 292-3496] and Michael Silver, M.S. [(614) 292-1714] provide survey 
methodology expertise. 
Battelle and its supporting contractors will co collect and analyze the data for NASA. 
Battelle's Survey Operations Unit (within CPHRE) will conduct data collection under the direction 
of Dr. Cwi.  The team of Rosenthal, Dodd, Krosnick and Cwi will analyze data, with assistance 
from Dr. Tom Ferryman from Battelle’s Pacific Northwest Laboratories on statistical design. 
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Appendix M. Results of Analysis 
 
 
The results for the 43 events for which there were sufficient number of reports during the 
collection period of 3 years to allow reliable statistical analysis are presented here. 
Questions about airborne conflicts 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 4.24 bird strikes per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest 
rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (2.28) and the highest rate was observed in the fourth 
quarter of 2004 (5.83).  The reported rate of bird strikes increased across the observation period 
(b=.020, Wald X2(1) =8.227, p=.004; see Figure 1).50  However, this trend is dependent on a 
usually low rate of reported bird strikes during the first quarter 2002 and an unusually high rate of 
reported bird strikes during the final quarter of 2004.  If these quarters are removed from the data, 
the observed increase is not significant (Wald X2(1)=.005, p=.945; red line). 
AC1:  Experience Bird Strike 
 
  
                                                
50 Of the 18358 reports obtained, 19 (0.10%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 139.42 per 
1,000 legs compared to 5.66 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed (but see main text).  There was a significant increase in the rate of reported bird 
strikes across the observation period (b=.024, Wald X2(1)=11.270, p=.001).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18356)=21946.95, ratio=1.196; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18327)=20144.24; ratio=1.099).  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
However, there was a seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3) =70.351, p<.001; see Figure 3).  The rate of 
reported bird strikes was highest in the summer and fall (which did not differ: Wald X2(1)=0.752, 
p=.386), lower in the spring than in the summer (Wald X2(1)=8.858, p=.003) and still lower in the 
winter than in the spring (Wald X2(1)= 30.199, p<.001).  No year by season interaction was 
observed (Wald X2(6) =8.242, p=.221). 
If the first and last quarters are omitted from the analysis, no substantial changes result.  The 
change across years is not statistically significant (Wald X2(2)=1.478, p=.478).  There is a 
significant seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3)=58.437, p<.001) and no year by season interaction (Wald 
X2(4)=1.712, p=.789).  The rate of reported bird strikes is highest in the summer and fall (which do 
not differ: Wald X2(1)=0.270, p=.603), lower in the spring than in the summer (Wald X2(1)=8.858, 
p=.003) and still lower in the winter than in the spring (Wald X2(1)= 24.711, p<.001).   
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences in the rates of reported bird strikes between aircraft categories 
(Wald X2(3)=140.781, p<.001; see Figure 4).  The highest rates of bird strikes were reported by 
pilots of wide-body aircraft.  Pilots of large aircraft reported significantly lower rates of bird 
strikes than did pilots of wide-body aircraft  (Wald X2(1)=43.724, p<.001).  Pilots of medium 
aircraft reported lower rates than did pilots of large aircraft but this difference was only marginally 
significant (Wald X2(1)=3.197, p=.074).  The rates of reported bird strikes did not differ between 
medium and small aircraft categories (Wald X2(1)=.011, p=.915). 
Interactions 
Although the full interaction model could not be properly specified, there was no evidence of 
interactions between aircraft category and year/season in this (ΔLLR X2(33)=25.98, p=.802) or 
smaller models.   
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Operation 
Pilots of aircraft engaged in cargo operations reported significantly higher rates of bird strikes than 
did pilots of passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=384.387, p<.001). 
Interactions 
There were no interactions between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11)=11.042, p=.440). 
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AC2: Perform Evasive Action to Avoid In-flight Collision 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 3.60 evasive actions to avoid in flight collisions per 1,000 
legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 2004 (2.83) and the 
highest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (4.27).  The reported rate of evasive actions 
to avoid in-flight collisions decreased across the observation period (b=-.018, Wald X2(1) =6.093, 
p=.014; see Figure 1).51   
 
 
 
  
                                                
51 Of the 18,354 reports obtained, 42 (0.23%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 249.96 per 
1,000 legs compared to 3.94 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed.  There was a significant decrease in the rate of evasive actions to avoid in-flight 
collisions across the observation period (b=-.014, Wald X2(1)=3.208, p=.073).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18351)=22598.388, ratio=1.231; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18309)=19253.608; ratio=1.052).  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There was a significant linear decrease across years (Wald X2(1)=7.840, p=.005) in the reported 
rate of these events (year: Wald X2(2)=8.500, p=.014; see Figure 2).  There was also a seasonal 
pattern (Wald X2(3)=10.961, p=.012; see Figure 3).  The highest average reported rate of evasive 
actions to avoid in-flight collisions was in the summer.  However, the average reported rate for 
winter was only slightly lower and not significantly different (Wald X2(1)=.732, p=.392).  The 
reported rates for fall (Wald X2(1)=8.323, p=.004) and spring (Wald X2(1)=6.868, p=.009) were 
significantly lower than in the summer.  No other differences between seasons were statistically 
significant.  There was no year by season interaction (Wald X2(6)=2.601, p=.857). 
 
  
  
0	  1	  
2	  3	  
4	  5	  
2002	   2003	   2004	  R
at
e	  
pe
r	  
10
00
	  L
eg
s	  
Year	  
Figure	  2:	  Perform	  Evasive	  
Action	  to	  Avoid	  an	  In-­‐Qlight	  
Collision	  by	  Year	  
0	  1	  
2	  3	  
4	  5	  
Winter	   Spring	   Summer	   Fall	  R
at
e	  
pe
r	  
10
00
	  L
eg
s	  
Season	  
Figure	  3:	  Perform	  Evasive	  
Action	  to	  Avoid	  an	  In-­‐Qlight	  
Collision	  by	  Season	  
 
241 
 
Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences between aircraft categories in the reported rates of these events 
(Wald X2(3)=173.372, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of small aircraft reported substantially higher 
rates of taking evasive actions to avoid in-flight collisions than did pilots of other aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=85.986, p<.001).  Pilots of medium aircraft reported higher rates of these events than did 
pilots of larger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=25.807, p<.001).  Pilots of large aircraft reported the lowest 
rate of evasive actions to avoid in-flight collisions; however, this rate was only slightly lower than 
that reported by pilots of wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=3.659, p=.056). 
Interactions 
No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (Δ LLR X2(33)=23.202, 
p=.897). 
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Operation 
Pilots of passenger aircraft reported significantly higher rates of these events than did pilots of 
cargo aircraft (Wald X2(1)=17.811, p<.001; see Figure 5). 
Interactions 
No interactions between type of operation and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(11)=11.564, 
p=.397). 
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AC3: Loss of Separation 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 1.20 events of loss of separation while airborne per 1,000 
legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2004 (0.80) and the 
highest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (1.67).  The reported rate of loss of 
separation while airborne decreased across the observation period (b=-.027, Wald X2(1) =5.246, 
p=.022; see Figure 1).52   
 
 
  
                                                
52 Of the 18,354 reports obtained, 43 (0.23%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 261.77 per 
1,000 legs compared to 1.32 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, the 
observed decrease in the reported rate of loss of separation remains (b=-.021, Wald X2(1)=3.726, p=.054).  However, 
the overall fit of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18352)=52849.376, ratio=2.880; Model 
without outliers:  Pearson X2(18309)=24891.475; ratio=1.360).  These cases were omitted from the remaining 
analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There was a significant change over years in the rate of reported events (Wald X2(2)=9.364, 
p=.009).  The yearly average rate of reported events decreased linearly over the observed period 
(linear Wald X2(1) =8.849, p=.003; see Figure 2).  There were also significant changes across 
seasons (Wald X2(3)=8.721, p=.033).  The reported rate of events was higher in the summer than 
during the other seasons (Wald X2(1)=6.141, p=.013; see Figure 3).  No other differences between 
seasons were observed.  There was no year by season interaction (Wald X2(6) =9.006, p=.173).   
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences in the rate of reported events across aircraft categories (Wald 
X2(3)=141.374, p<.001).  Pilots of small aircraft reported significantly higher rates of events than 
did pilots of other aircraft (Wald X2(1)=58.625, p<.001).  No other differences between aircraft 
categories were observed. 
Interaction 
There were no significant interactions between aircraft category and year/season (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=44.396, p=.089). 
 
 
 
  
0	  0.5	  1	  
1.5	  2	  2.5	  
3	  3.5	  4	  
Ra
te
	  p
er
	  1
00
0	  
Le
gs
	  
Aircraft	  Category	  
Figure	  4:	  Loss	  of	  Separation	  
(<500')	  by	  Aircraft	  Category	  
 
246 
 
Operation 
Pilots of passenger aircraft reported slightly higher rates of these events than did pilots of cargo 
aircraft, but this difference was not statistically significant at conventional levels (Wald 
X2(1)=3.048, p=.081). 
Interactions 
No interactions between type of operation and year/season were observed (Wald X2(11)=10.20, 
p=.512). 
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Questions about altitude deviations 
 
AD1: Inadvertently Deviate from an Assigned Altitude > 300 Feet 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 1.21 events per 1,000 legs was reported in which a crew 
inadvertently deviated from an assigned altitude by more than 300 feet. The lowest rate was 
observed in the fourth quarter of 2004 (0.77) and the highest rate was observed in the third quarter 
of 2002 (1.62).  The rate of reported deviations decreased linearly across the observation period 
(b=-.026, Wald X2(1) =4.637, p=.031; see Figure 1).53 
 
 
 
  
                                                
53 Of the 18,372 reports obtained, 47 (0.26%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 138.35 per 1,000 legs compared to 1.34 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events decreased 
across the observation period (b= -.030, Wald X2(1)=6.628, p=.010).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18370)=23905.764, ratio=1.301; Model without outliers:  
Pearson X2(18323)=19660.872; ratio=1.073).  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
 
Taking into account seasonal variations, the mean rates of these events decreased linearly across 
years (b=-.231, Wald X2(1)=4.692, p=.030); however, the omnibus test of differences between 
years was not significant (Wald X2(2) =3.204, p=.201; see Figure 2).  No differences between 
seasons were observed (Wald X2(3) =4.237, p=.237; see Figure 3).  No year by season interaction 
was observed (Wald X2(6) =10.336, p=.111).   
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Aircraft Category 
 
There were significant differences in the rate of these events between aircraft categories (Wald 
X2(3)=41.482, p<.001).  Pilots of small aircraft reported higher rates of inadvertent deviations than 
did pilots of larger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=23.018, p<.001; see Figure 4).  No other differences 
between aircraft types were observed. 
 
Interactions 
No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(33)=35.254, 
p=.362).54 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
54 Note:  The full model could not be properly estimated given the large number of parameters and the 
pattern of the data.  Smaller models were fit and the same conclusion obtained. 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported significantly more inadvertent deviations than did pilots of 
passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=27.199, p<.001; see Figure 5). 
Interactions 
No interactions between operation and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(11)=10.278, p=.506). 
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Questions about aircraft-handling related events 
 
AH1:  Use of Reserved Fuel 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 4.13 events in which reserve fuel was used per 1,000 legs 
was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 2002 (2.94) and the highest rate 
was observed in the fourth quarter of 2004 (5.62).  The reported rate of use of reserve fuel increased 
linearly across the observation period (b=.057, Wald X2(1) =61.459, p<.001; see Figure 1).55   
 
 
 
  
                                                
55 Of the 18,350 reports obtained, 57 (0.31%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 361.74 per 
1,000 legs compared to 5.44 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events demonstrated a linear increase across the observation 
period (b=.066, Wald X2(1)=89.194, p<.001).  However, the overall fit of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  
Pearson X2(18348)=42953.235, ratio=2.341; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18291)=31541.373; ratio=1.724).  
The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
The rate of events increased across the years in the sample (Wald X2(1) =60.909, p<.001; omnibus 
test: Wald X2(2)=61.132, p<.001; see Figure 2). There was no seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3) =1.729, 
p=.631; see Figure 3) or year by season interaction (Wald X2(6) =8.456, p=.207).   
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Aircraft Category 
The rates of these events differed by aircraft category (Wald X2(3)=86.382, p<.001).  Overall, 
pilots of wide-body aircraft reported higher rates of using reserve fuel than did the pilots of smaller 
aircraft (Wald X2(1)=66.221, p<.001). Pilots of small aircraft reported the lowest rates, 
significantly less than pilots of medium aircraft (Wald X2(1)=3.948, p=.047).  Pilots of medium 
and large aircraft did not differ in the rate of events that they reported (Wald X2(1)=0.050, p=.822; 
see Figure 4).   
Interactions 
The observed temporal patterns differed by aircraft category (ΔLLR X2(33) =79.142, p<.001).  The 
observed linear increase across years in the reported rate of use of reserve fuel was statistically 
significant for medium (Wald X2(1)=46.146, p<.001), large (Wald X2(1)=10.104, p=.006), and 
wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=11.816, p=.001).  Although small aircraft demonstrated a general 
increase in the rate of these events across the observation period, there was considerable variation 
across quarters and the overall pattern across years was not statistically significant (Wald 
X2(2)=1.465, p=.481). 
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Operation 
In general, pilots flying cargo operations reported a higher rate of use of reserve fuel than did 
pilots flying passengers (Wald X2(1)=6.824, p=.009; see Figure 5).  
Interactions 
There were significant interactions between type of operation and the year/season patterns (ΔLLR 
X2(11)=35.104, p<.001).  The linear increase across years in the reported rates of the use of reserve 
fuel described above was statistically significant only for passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=65.133, 
p<.001).  No change across years was observed for cargo aircraft (Wald X2(2)=1.970, p=.373). 
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AH2:  Accepted an ATC Clearance with Which the Aircraft Could Not Comply 
Due to Performance Limitations 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported accepting ATC clearances with which the aircraft 
could not comply due to performance limitations did not change linearly across the observation 
period (b=-.024, Wald X2(1) =2.020, p=.155; see Figure 1).56  Across the study period, a mean rate 
of 1.23 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 
2004 (0.96) and the highest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (2.07).   
 
 
  
                                                
56 Of the 18,364 reports obtained, 67 (0.36%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 246.99 per 1,000 legs compared to 1.52 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events decreased 
across the observation period (b=-.008, Wald X2(1)=0.249, p=.618).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18362)=24983.998, ratio=1.361; Model without outliers:  
Pearson X2(18295)=16228.589; ratio=0.887).  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
No differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =3.181, p=.204; see Figure 2).  No 
differences between seasons were observed (Wald X2(3) =0.179, p=.981; see Figure 3).  No year 
by season interaction was observed (Wald X2(6) =7.784, p=.254).   
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences between aircraft categories (Wald X2(3)=23.738, p<.001).  
Pilots of small aircraft and wide-body aircraft reported higher rates of accepting ATC clearances 
that the aircraft could not perform than did pilots of medium and large aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=12.783, p<.001; see Figure 4).  No other differences between aircraft types were observed. 
Interactions 
No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(33)=25.588, 
p=.687). 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported significantly higher rates of these events than did pilots of 
passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=17.647, p<.001).   
Interactions 
There was a significant interaction between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11)=20.278, 
p=.042).  Pilots of passenger aircraft reported a significant decrease across years in the rates of 
these events (Wald X2(1)=12.751, p<.001).  For cargo aircraft, no significant effects of year (Wald 
X2(2)=3.113, p=.211), season (Wald X2(3)=1.200, p=.753, or year by season were observed (Wald 
X2(6)=6.624, p=.357). 
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AH3:  Lost Sight of Another Aircraft While Attempting to Maintain 
Visual Separation 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 4.27 events of loss of visual contact with another aircraft 
while attempting to maintain visual separation from that aircraft per 1,000 legs was reported. The 
lowest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2004 (9.51) and the highest rate was observed in the 
first quarter of 2002 (13.79).  The reported rate of loss of visual contact with another aircraft while 
attempting to maintain visual separation from that aircraft decreased across the observation period 
(b=-.014, Wald X2(1) =5.166, p=.023; see Figure 1).57  Although the first quarter 2002 rate was 
unusually high, the observed decrease is not due to this anomalous quarter.  The observed rate does 
not change appreciably when this quarter is not considered (b=-.012, Wald X2(1) =3.599, p=.058).   
 
 
  
                                                
57  Model Pearson X2(18295) = 18922.350; ratio = 1.034.  Of the 18,374 reports obtained, 50 (0.27%) reported event 
rates that are suspect because they departed substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean 
reported event rate amongst these cases was 484.02 per 1,000 legs compared to 13.21 per 1,000 legs for the other 
cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  These cases were omitted 
from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
The rate of these events differed across years (Wald X2(2)=9.760, p=.008).  Overall the rate of 
events in 2002 did not differ from the rate in 2003 (Wald X2 (1) =0.875, p=.350) but both differed 
from the lower rate observed in 2004 (Wald X2(1) =7.680, p=.006; see Figure 2).  A seasonal 
pattern was also observed (Wald X2(3) =11.581, p=.009).  In general, the reported rates of events 
were higher in the spring and summer than in the winter or fall (Wald X2(1) =7.282, p=.007; see 
Figure 3).  There was no year by season interaction (Wald X2(6)=8.113, p=.230). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were differences between aircraft categories in the rate of loss of visual contact with another 
aircraft while attempting to maintain visual separation (Wald Χ2 (3)=38.717, p<.001;  see Figure 
4).  Pilots of small aircraft reported significantly higher event rates than those reported by pilots of 
larger aircraft (Wald Χ2 (1)=21.331, p<.001). Pilots of wide-body aircraft reported lower rates of 
these events than did pilots of the other aircraft (Wald Χ2 (1)=28.586, p<.001). The reported rate of 
events did not differ between medium and large aircraft (Wald Χ2 (1)=0.517, p=.472).58 
Interactions 
There were no interactions between aircraft category and year/season (ΔLLR Χ2(33)=36.008, 
p=.330). 
 
 
 
  
                                                
58 Note: The figures presented in the text display the number of events/number of legs together with the 
associated 95% Poisson confidence intervals.  The analyses reported in the text were conducted on the 
reported rates provided by each individual pilot.  Occasionally, as in this instance the mean of the reported 
rates is substantially different from the mean events/leg.  Hence, the pattern depicted in the figure may 
depart from the results reported in the text. 
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Operation 
There were no difference between pilots of aircraft engaged in cargo operations and pilots of 
aircraft engaged in passenger operations in the reported rates of these events (Wald Χ2(1)=0.540, 
p=.462; see Figure 5).  
Interactions 
 No significant interaction between operation and year/season was observed (ΔLLR 
Χ2(11)=11.736, p=.384). 
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AH3A:  Lost Sight of Another Aircraft While Attempting to Maintain Visual 
Separation in Marginal Visual Conditions 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 1.68 events of loss of visual contact with another aircraft 
while attempting to maintain visual separation from that aircraft in marginal VMC per 1,000 legs 
was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2004 (1.14) and the highest rate 
was observed in the third quarter of 2003 (2.21).  The reported rate of loss of visual contact with 
another aircraft while attempting to maintain visual separation from that aircraft decreased across 
the observation period.  This decrease was marginally significant (b=-.019, Wald X2(1) =3.549, 
p=.060; see Figure 1).59   
 
 
  
                                                
59  Of the 18,334 reports obtained, 52 (0.28%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 255.95 per 
1,000 legs compared to 1.75 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, the linear 
decrease across quarters becomes significant (b=-.028, Wald X2(1)=8.765, p=.003).  However, the fit of the model 
decreased (Model without outliers Pearson X2(18280)=31162.357, ratio=1.705; Model with outliers: Pearson 
X2(18332)=53360.646, ratio=2.911).  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There was no significant difference in the rate of these events across years (Wald X2(2)=4.495, 
p=.106).  A seasonal pattern was observed (Wald X2(3) =17.619, p=.001).  The reported rates of 
these events were highest in the spring and summer and lowest in the winter.  The mean reported 
rate in the winter was significantly lower than in the spring (Wald X2(1)=5.759, p=.016) and 
summer (Wald X2(1)=14.517, p<.001) but not significantly less than in the fall (Wald X2(1)=.885, 
p=.347; see Figure 3).  There was no year by season interaction (Wald X2(6)=4.643, p=.590). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were differences between aircraft categories in the rate of loss of visual contact with another 
aircraft while attempting to maintain visual separation in marginal visual conditions (Wald Χ2 
(3)=9.055, p=.029;  see Figure 4).  Pilots of small aircraft reported significantly higher event rates 
than did pilots of medium aircraft (Wald Χ2 (1)=6.471, p=.011) or wide-body aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=5.531, p=.019). The reported rate of events did not differ between small and large aircraft 
(Wald Χ2 (1)=2.176, p=.140).  No other differences between aircraft were significant.   
Interactions 
A test of the full interaction model could not be performed.  A partial model revealed no 
interactions between aircraft category and year/season (ΔLLR Χ2(15)=17.798, p=.273). 
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Operation 
There were no differences between cargo and passenger operations in the reported rates of these 
events (Wald Χ2(1)=3.590, p=.058; see Figure 5).  
Interactions 
 A test of the full interaction model could not be performed.  A partial model revealed no 
significant interaction between operation and year/season (ΔLLR Χ2(5)=9.366, p=.095).   
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AH6:  Inadvertently Deviated From Assigned Vector 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 1.60 events of inadvertent deviations from assigned vectors 
per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2003 (1.27) and 
the highest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 2002 (1.83).  The rate of reported inadvertent 
deviations from assigned vectors did not change across the observation period (b=.003, Wald X2(1) 
=0.077, p=.782; see Figure 1).60   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
60 Of the 18,361 reports obtained, 43 (0.23%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 274.09 per 
1,000 legs compared to 1.79 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed.  No change in the rate of reported events was observed (b=-.008, Wald X2(1)=.391, 
p=.532).  However, the overall fit of the model decreased substantially (Model with outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18359)=35009.661, ratio=1.907; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18316)=19054.112; ratio=1.044).  The outlier 
cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There were no differences across years (Wald X2(2) =3.140, p=.208; see Figure 2) or seasons 
(Wald X2(3) =1.330, p=.722; see Figure 3) and no year by season interaction (Wald X2(6) =3.688, 
p=.719). 
 
  
 
Aircraft Category 
 
There were no significant differences between aircraft categories in the reported rates of these 
events (Wald X2(3) =5.924, p=.115; see Figure 4).   
Interactions 
There were no interactions between aircraft category and year/season (ΔX2(33) =33.396, p=.448). 
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Operation 
The type of operation did not affect the rate of reported events (Wald X2(1)=1.328, p=.249; see 
Figure 5). 
Interactions 
There were no interactions between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11) =6.574, p=.832).  
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AH9:  Experience Hard Landing 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported hard landings did not change linearly across the 
observation period (b=-.029, Wald X2(1) =2.227, p=.136; see Figure 1).61  Across the study period, 
a mean rate of 0.41 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the first 
quarter of 2002 (0.13) and the highest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 2003 (0.59).   
 
 
 
  
                                                
61 Of the 18,375 reports obtained, 28 (0.15%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 238.13 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.49 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events did not 
change linearly across the observation period (b=-.033, Wald X2(1)=3.617, p=.057).  However, the overall 
fit of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18373)=68785.737, ratio=3.744; Model 
without outliers:  Pearson X2(18345)=28527.071; ratio=1.555).  These cases were omitted from the 
remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
Significant differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =11.992, p=.002; see Figure 2).  
The rate of hard landings in 2004 was significantly lower than in the previous years (Wald X2(1) 
=4.947, p=.026).  The mean rate of hard landings in 2003 was higher than in 2002, but this 
difference was only marginally statistically significant (Wald X2(1) =3.714, p=.054).  However, 
these differences are a product of a more complex pattern (see Figure 1).  Only the first quarter of 
2002 demonstrates a substantially lower rate than the corresponding quarter in 2003.  In addition, 
after a drop in the rate of hard landings in the first quarter of 2004 the rate climbs steadily back 
towards the mean for 2003.   
Significant differences between seasons were observed (Wald X2(3) =8.581, p=.035; see Figure 3).  
The rate of reported hard landings in winter was significantly lower than in the other quarters 
(Wald X2(1)=8.757, p=.003), which did not differ (Wald X2(1)=1.121, p=.290).  No year by season 
interaction was observed (Wald X2(6) =3.414, p=.755). 
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Aircraft Category  
There were significant differences in reported rates of hard landings between aircraft categories 
(Wald X2(3)=13.742, p=.003; see Figure 4).  Pilots of medium and large aircraft reported lower 
rates of hard landings than did pilots of small and wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=11.062, p=.001).  
No other differences were significant.   
Interaction 
 Full interaction models could not be estimated.   Investigations of year/season patterns within each 
category were hampered by the small number of events.  The general yearly pattern described 
above was observed in each aircraft category.  It was significant for the medium aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=7.580, p=.006) and nearly significant for wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=3.349, p=.067). 
No significant season effects were observed.   
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported a higher rate of hard landings than did pilots of passenger aircraft 
(Wald X2(1)=73.260, p<.001; see Figure 5). 
Interaction 
Due to convergence problems, a full interaction model could not be specified.  Smaller interaction 
models revealed no significant interactions (LLR X2(5)=3.962, p=.5549).  
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AH12: Takeoff with Improper Configuration 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported taking off with improper configurations did not 
change linearly across the observation period (b=.035, Wald X2(1) =1.494, p=.222; see Figure 1).62  
Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.19 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate 
was observed in the second quarter of 2003 (0.10) and the highest rate was observed in the first 
quarter of 2003 (0.30).   
 
 
 
  
                                                
62 Of the 18,373 reports obtained, 42 (0.23%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 96.36 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.14 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events did not 
change across the observation period (b=0.018, Wald X2(1)=0.594, p=.441).  However, the overall fit of the 
model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18371)=38016.518, ratio=2.069; Model without 
outliers:  Pearson X2(18329)=15447.432; ratio=0.843).  These cases were omitted from the remaining 
analyses. 
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Year/Season 
No statistically significant differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =2.306, p=.316; 
see Figure 2).  No differences between seasons were observed (Wald X2(3) =0.732, p=.866; see 
Figure 3).  No year by season interaction was observed (Wald X2(6) =9.081, p=.169). 
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Aircraft Category 
Rates of takeoffs with improper configurations varied by aircraft category (Wald X2(3)=35.255, 
p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of small aircraft reported higher rates than did pilots of larger aircraft 
(Wald X2(1)=15.424, p<.001).  Pilots of medium aircraft reported higher rates of these events than 
did pilots of large and wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=5.390, p=.020).  The rates of events 
reported by pilots of large aircraft did not differ from the rates of events reported by pilots of wide-
body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=0.026, p=.873).   
Interactions 
No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(33)=46.426, 
p=.061).63 
 
 
 
  
                                                
63 The full factorial model did not fulfill convergence criteria.  However, smaller models that did fulfill 
criteria were fit to the data as well and these also did not demonstrate any interaction effects. 
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Operation 
There were no significant differences between cargo and passenger operations in the reported rates 
of these events (Wald X2(1)=0.048, p=.826). 
Interactions 
Interactions between year/season and operations could not be fit due to the very small number of 
events (21) reported by pilots of cargo aircraft and the distribution of these events across years and 
seasons. 
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AH13:  Experience an Unusual Attitude 
 
The rate of reported instances of unusual attitudes did not change linearly across the observation 
period (b=.001, Wald X2(1) =0.001, p=.980; see Figure 1).64  Across the study period, a mean rate 
of 0.21 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 
2002 (0.064) and the highest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 2003 (0.34).   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
64 Of the 18,372 reports obtained, 32 (0.17%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 115.21 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.18 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events did not 
change linearly across the observation period (b=-.016, Wald X2(1)=0.489, p=.484).  However, the overall 
fit of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18370)=42713.391, ratio=2.325; Model 
without outliers:  Pearson X2(18338)=17638.572; ratio=0.962).  These cases were omitted from the 
remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
No differences between years (Wald X2(2) =0.023, p=.989; see Figure 2) or seasons  (Wald X2(3) 
=3.945, p=.267; see Figure 3) were observed.  However, there was a significant year by season 
interaction (Wald X2(6) =22.343, p=.002), indicating that the rates of these events varied across 
seasons and this seasonal pattern changed across years.  However, there was no clear pattern in 
these shifts. 
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Aircraft Category  
The rate of these events differed by aircraft category (Wald X2(3)=14.257, p=.003).  Pilots of small 
aircraft reported higher rates of unusual attitudes than did pilots of larger aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=7.965, p=.005).  No other differences between aircraft categories were observed. 
Interactions 
No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(33)=40.662, 
p=.169).65 
 
 
 
  
                                                
65 The full factorial model did not fulfill convergence criteria.  However, smaller models that did fulfill 
criteria were fit to the data as well and these also did not demonstrate any interaction effects. 
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Operation 
No differences due to type of operation were observed (Wald X2(1)=1.823, p=.177; see Figure 5). 
Interaction 
There were no significant interactions between operation and year/season (Δ LLR X2(11)=11.536, 
p=.340). 
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AH14:  Experience Stick Shaker/Stall Warning 
 
The reported rate of stick shaker/stall warning events decreased linearly across the observation 
period (b=-.072, Wald X2(1) =7.295, p=.007; see Figure 1).66  Across the study period, a mean rate 
of 0.22 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 
2004 (0.12) and the highest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (0.40).   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
66 Of the 18,356 reports obtained, 50 (0.27%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 122.33 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.21 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, the observed trend remains in the same direction, but it becomes non-significant 
(b=-.019, Wald X2(1)=0.774, p=.379) and the overall fit of the model is much poorer (Model with outliers:  
Pearson X2(18354)=44093.694, ratio=2.402; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18304)=19946.043; 
ratio=1.090).  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
Significant differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =7.374, p=.025; see Figure 2).  
The rate of stick shaker/stall warning experiences decreased linearly across the years in the sample 
(Wald X2(1) =4.962, p=.026).  No differences between seasons (Wald X2(3) =4.024, p=.259) and 
no year by season interaction were observed (Wald X2(6) =6.240, p=.397).   
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Aircraft Category  
There were significant differences in reported rates of stick shaker/stall warning events between 
aircraft categories (Wald X2(3)=31.032, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of medium and large aircraft 
reported lower rates of these events than did pilots of small and wide-body aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=20.061, p<.001).  No other differences between categories were observed. 
Interaction 
A significant interaction between aircraft category and year/season was observed (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=49.294, p=.034).  However, given the small number of events and the uneven distribution 
of those events, neither the full interaction model nor models fit to each category separately could 
be properly fit.  Smaller models did not demonstrate significant interactions. 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported significantly higher rates of these events than did pilots of 
passenger aircraft (Wald X2(2)=26.765, p<.001). 
Interactions 
No interactions between operation and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(11)=4.594, p=.949). 
 
 
 
 
  
0	  0.1	  
0.2	  0.3	  
0.4	  0.5	  
0.6	  
Cargo	   Passenger	  
Ra
te
	  p
er
	  1
00
0	  
Le
gs
	  
Operation	  
Figure	  5:	  Experience	  Stick	  
Shaker/Stall	  Warning	  by	  
Operation	  
 
286 
 
 
Questions about interactions with air traffic control 
 
AT1:  Unable to Communicate with ATC Due to Frequency Congestion 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 21.97 events in which pilots were unable to communicate 
with ATC due to frequency congestion per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed 
in the first quarter of 2003 (19.02) and the highest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2003 
(26.09).  The rate of reported instances in which pilots were unable to communicate with ATC due 
to frequency congestion did not change linearly across the observation period (b=-.001, Wald X2(1) 
=0.060, p=.807; see Figure 1).67   
 
 
 
  
                                                
67 Of the 18,355 reports obtained, 47 (0.26%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 1084.41 per 
1,000 legs compared to 26.11 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed (b=.000, Wald X2(1)=.001, p<.997).  However, the overall fit of the model decreased 
(Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18353)=26708.736, ratio=1.455; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18305)=20657.881; ratio=1.129).  The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There were no differences across the years (Wald X2(2) =0.923, p=.630; see Figure 2), but there 
was a significant seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3) =17.256, p=.001; see Figure 3).  The rate of these 
events was higher in the spring and summer than in the winter and fall (Wald X2(1) =17.641, 
p<.001).  The rate of events during the fall did not differ from that during the winter (Wald X2(1) 
=0.426, p=.514) and the rate during the spring did not differ from that during the summer (Wald 
X2(1) =0.108, p=.742).  There was no year by season interaction (Wald X2(6) =9.339, p=.155).   
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Aircraft Category 
There were marginally significant differences between aircraft categories (Wald X2(3)= 7.748. 
p=.052; see Figure 4).  Pilots of medium sized aircraft reported significantly lower rates of these 
events than did pilots of wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=4.889, p=.027) and nearly significantly 
lower rates than did pilots of large aircraft (Wald X2(1)=3.654, p=.056).  No other differences 
between aircraft categories were statistically significant. 
Interactions 
There was a significant interaction between year/season and aircraft category (ΔLLR X2(33) 
=53.488, p=.013).   This was due largely to the higher variability in the rates of these events 
reported by pilots of small aircraft.  There is no interaction between aircraft category and 
year/season when small aircraft are eliminated from the analysis (ΔLLR X2(21) =32.043, p=.080).  
For small aircraft, the seasonal pattern varied by year (Wald X2(6)=16.765, p=.010).   
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Operation 
The rates of reported failures to contact ATC due to frequency congestion did not differ between 
pilots of passenger aircraft and pilots of cargo aircraft (Wald X2(1)=0.475, p=.491; see Figure 5).   
Interactions 
There were no interactions between type of operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11) =9.21, 
p=.603).   
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AT1A:  Unable to Contact ATC in Time Critical Situation on the Ground 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 3.42 events in which aircraft were unable to contact ATC 
in time critical situations while on the ground per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was 
observed in the third quarter of 2002 (2.93) and the highest rate was observed in the third quarter 
of 2002 (3.98).  The rate of reported these events did not change linearly across the observation 
period (b=.008, Wald X2(1) =0.955, p=.328; see Figure 1).68   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
68 Of the 18,357 reports obtained, 52 (0.28%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 447.22 per 1,000 legs 
compared to 3.66 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, a significant change 
in the trend was observed (b=.020, Wald X2(1)=7.448, p=.006).  However, the overall fit of the model with outliers 
was very poor (Pearson X2(18355)=80064.030, ratio=4.362) and substantially worse than the fit of the model without 
outliers (Pearson X2(18303)=41559.360; ratio=2.271).  The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There were no significant differences in the rates of these events across years (Wald X2(2) =2.751, 
p=.276; see Figure 2) or seasons (Wald X2(3) =5.263, p=.154; see Figure 3).  There was no year by 
season interaction (Wald X2(6) =6.069, p=.416).   
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Aircraft Category 
The reported rates of these events differed by aircraft category (Wald X2(3)=43.564, p<.001; see 
Figure 4).  Pilots of small aircraft reported the lowest rates of these events and significantly lower 
rates than did pilots of wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=5.361, p=.021).  In turn, pilots of wide-
body aircraft reported significantly lower rates than did pilots of medium aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=22.814, p<.001) and large aircraft (Wald X2(1)=7.918, p=.005).  The rates of these events 
reported by pilots of medium aircraft did not differ from the rates reported by pilots of large 
aircraft (Wald X2(1)=0.507, p=.476). 
Interactions 
There was a significant interaction between aircraft category and year/season (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=102.184, p<.001).  In several years/seasons the pattern of rates differed from that described 
above.  However, there was no clear pattern to these exceptions.  Furthermore, the pattern 
described above was observed during most quarters.  In 9/12 quarters, the mean rate of events 
reported by pilots of small aircraft was lower than that reported by pilots of wide-body aircraft.  In 
8/12 quarters, the mean rate of events reported by pilots of wide-body aircraft was lower than that 
reported by pilots of large aircraft.  In 11/12 quarters the mean rate of events reported by pilots of 
wide-body aircraft was lower than that reported by pilots of medium aircraft. 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported significantly lower rates of these events than did pilots of 
passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=34.916, p<.001). 
Interactions 
There were significant interactions between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11)=42.908, 
p<.001).  The mean rates of these events reported by cargo pilots were higher than the mean rate of 
events reported by passenger pilots during two quarters (spring 2002, winter 2003).  During all 
other quarters, the pattern described above was observed. 
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AT1B.  Unable to Communicate with ATC Due to Frequency Congestion  
in the Terminal Area 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 11.3 events of failures to communicate with ATC due to 
frequency congestion in the terminal area per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was 
observed in the first quarter of 2003 (9.81) and the highest rate was observed in the second quarter 
of 2002 (13.14).  The rate of reported failures to contact ATC due to frequency congestion in the 
terminal area did not change linearly across the observation period (b=-.004, Wald X2(1) =0.297, 
p=.586; see Figure 1).69   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
69 Of the 18,350 reports obtained, 53 (0.29%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 646.35 per 
1,000 legs compared to 13.62 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed.  No change in the rate of reported events was observed (b=.003, Wald X2(1)=.243, 
p=.622).  However, the overall fit of the model decreased substantially (Model with outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18347)=24645.037, ratio=1.343; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18294)=19364.898; ratio=1.054).  The outlier 
cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
No differences in the event rates by year (Wald X2(2)=.730, p=.694; see Figure 2) or season (Wald 
X2(3)=6.069, p=.108; see Figure 3) were observed.  No year by season interaction was observed 
(Wald X2(6)=6.921, p=.328). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were differences across aircraft categories in the rate of reports of being unable to contact 
ATC due to frequency congestion in the terminal area (Wald X2(3)=13.348, p=.004; see Figure 4).  
Pilots of medium aircraft reported fewer events than did pilots of small (Wald X2(1)=4.689, 
p=.030) or wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=9.863, p=.002).  Pilots of large aircraft reported 
slightly more events than did pilots of medium aircraft, but this difference was not statistically 
significant at conventional levels (Wald X2(1)=2.137, p=.144).  No other differences between 
aircraft categories were observed. 
Interactions.  A significant interaction between year/season, and aircraft category was observed 
(ΔLLR X2(33)=48.705, p=.038).  This was due to statistically significant changes across quarters 
in the rate of reported events from pilots of small aircraft (Wald X2(6)=18.927, p=.004).  No other 
aircraft category demonstrated a significant change over time.  The observed changes in the rates 
of reported events in small aircraft did not appear to follow any consistent pattern. 
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Operation 
The reported rates of these events did not differ by type of operation (Wald X2(1)=2.339, p<.126; 
see Figure 5). 
Interactions.  No interactions between type of operation and year/season were observed (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=9.014, p=.999). 
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AT1C: Unable to Communicate with ATC Due to Frequency  
Congestion En route 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 5.88 failures to communicate with ATC due to frequency 
congestion en route per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the fourth quarter 
of 2003 (4.08) and the highest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2003 (8.17).  The rate of 
reported failures to communicate with ATC due to frequency congestion while en route did not 
change linearly across the observation period (b=.008, Wald X2(1) =1.635, p=.201; see Figure 1).70   
 
 
 
  
                                                
70 Of the 18,352 reports obtained, 57 (0.31%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 477.96 per 1,000 legs 
compared to 6.67 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little change in the 
trend was observed.  There was no change in the rate of reported events across the observation period (b=-.006, Wald 
X2(1)=1.032, p=.310).  However, the overall fit of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18350)=57526.932, ratio=3.135; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18293)=37081.227; ratio=2.027).  These 
cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There were significant differences in the rate of these events between years (Wald X2(2)=7.061, 
p=.029).  The rate of reported events was higher in 2003 than in 2002 (Wald X2(1)=7.401, p=.007; 
see Figure 2).  The rates in 2003 and 2004 did not differ (Wald X2(1)=1.062, p=.303).  There were 
also significant differences between the seasons (Wald X2(3)=84.224, p<.001).  The rates of 
reported events were higher in the spring and summer than in the winter or fall (Wald 
X2(1)=75.648, p<.001).  No differences between spring and summer (Wald X2(1)=1.493, p=.222)or 
between winter and fall (Wald X2(1)=1.523, p=.217) were observed.  There were significant 
differences in the seasonal pattern across years (Wald X2(6)=19.236, p=.004; see Figure 3).  
However, this was apparently due to small (but statistically significant) shifts in the seasonal 
pattern, not dramatic changes in the pattern.  
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences between aircraft categories in the rate of these events (Wald 
X2(3)=20.058, p<.001).  Pilots of medium aircraft reported significantly lower rates of these events 
than did pilots of other aircraft (Wald X2(1)=17.954, p<.001; see Figure 4).  No other differences 
between aircraft categories were observed. 
Interactions 
There were significant differences in the year/season patterns by aircraft category (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=89.058, p<.001).  For small aircraft, there was a significant seasonal pattern (Wald 
X2(3)=23.298, p<.001) that changed across years (Wald X2(6)=35.422, p<.001).  For these aircraft, 
there were no differences between the seasons in 2002 (Wald X2(3)=2.719, p=.437).  In 2003 and 
2004, the rates of these events during the spring and summer were higher than during the winter 
and fall (2003 Wald X2(1)=4.976, p=.026; 2004 Wald X2(1)=7.962, p=.005) and the rate during 
the winter was higher than during the fall (2003 Wald X2(1)=6.059, p=.014; 2004 Wald 
X2(1)=5.649, p=.017).  For medium aircraft, the rates of these events during the spring and summer 
are higher than the winter and fall during each year (2002: Wald X2(1)=15.159, p<.001; 2003 Wald 
X2(1)=38.493, p<.001; Wald X2(1)=17.616, p<.001).  For large aircraft, there was no seasonal 
effect during 2002 (Wald X2(3)=2.885, p=.410).  During 2003, the rates of these events were 
higher during the spring and summer than during the winter and fall (2003 Wald X2(1)=9.052, 
p=.003).  During 2004, the rates of these events during the fall were lower than during the other 
seasons (Wald X2(1)=12.559, p<.001), which did not differ.  For wide-body aircraft, there were 
differences between the seasons during 2002 (Wald X2(3)=17.319, p=.001) and 2004 (Wald 
X2(3)=8.533, p=.036) but the pattern varied each year.  For these aircraft there were no differences 
between the seasons during 2003 (Wald X2(3)=3.314, p=.346). 
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Operation 
Pilots of passenger aircraft reported higher rates of these events than did pilots of cargo aircraft 
(Wald X2(1)=4.571, p=.033; see Figure 5). 
Interactions 
There was a marginally significant interaction between operation and year /season (ΔLLR 
X2(11)=19.41, p=.054).  For passenger operations the seasonal pattern described above was 
generally apparent.  However, for cargo operations, the rates of these events during spring 
appeared to be consistently higher than during the other quarters with summer also demonstrating 
a similarly high rate only during 2004. 
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AT2:  Fly an Undesirably High/Fast Approach Due to an ATC Clearance 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 30.84 instances in which pilots flew an undesirably 
high/fast approach per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the first quarter of 
2004 (26.41) and the highest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2003 (38.53).  The rate of 
reported undesirably high/fast approaches due to ATC clearances did not increase or decrease 
linearly across the observed quarters (b=-.005, Wald X2(1)=.930, p=.335).71 
 
 
 
  
                                                
71 Of the 18,342 reports obtained, 34 (0.19%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 930.31 per 1,000 legs compared to 38.02 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of these events did not change 
across the observation period (B=-.006, Wald X2(1)=1.543, p=.214).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased somewhat (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18339)=20957.247, ratio=1.143; Model without 
outliers:  Pearson X2(18305)=19314.558; ratio=1.055).  The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining 
analyses. These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
The rate of reported events did not change over the observed years (Wald X2(2)=3.664, p=.160; see 
Figure 2).  However, there was a significant seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3)=15.045, p=.002; see 
Figure 3).  The rate of reported events was lower in the winter than during the other quarters (Wald 
X2(1)=12.200, p<.001), which did not differ.  This pattern did not vary significantly by year.  
There was no year by season interaction (Wald X2(6)=7.808, p=.252). 
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Aircraft Category 
The rates of reported events differed across aircraft categories (Wald X2(3)=94.954, p<.001; see 
Figure 4).  Each of the aircraft categories differed from the others (p≤.001).  Pilots of small aircraft 
reported the lowest rate of instances in which they flew an undesirably high or fast approach due to 
an ATC clearance.  Pilots of large aircraft reported the highest rate. 
Interactions.  No interaction between aircraft category and year/season was observed (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=30.282, p=.603). 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported higher rates of these events than did pilots of passenger aircraft 
(Wald X2(1)=6.714, p=.010; see Figure 5). 
Interactions.  No interaction between operation and year/season was observed (ΔLLR 
X2(11)=13.638, P=.254). 
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Questions about passenger-related events 
 
CP1:  Expedite Landing or Divert Due to Medical Emergency 
 
The reported rates of expedited landings or diversions due to medical emergencies increased 
linearly across the observation period (b=.035, Wald X2(1) =8.079, p=.004; see Figure 1).72  Across 
the study period, a mean rate of 1.47 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was 
observed in the third quarter of 2002 (1.10) and the highest rate was observed in the third quarter 
of 2003 (1.80).   
 
 
 
  
                                                
72 Of the 14,282 reports obtained, 48 (0.34%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 176.08 per 1,000 legs compared to 1.93 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events increased 
linearly across the observation period (b=.040, Wald X2(1)=11.389, p=.001).  However, the overall fit of the 
model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(14280)=23014.080, ratio=1.612; Model without 
outliers:  Pearson X2(14232)=17047.351; ratio=1.198).  These cases were omitted from the remaining 
analyses. 
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Year/Season 
Significant differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =6.482, p=.039; see Figure 2).  
The rate of these events increased linearly across the years in the sample (Wald X2(1) =6.619, 
p=.010).  No differences between seasons were observed (Wald X2(3) =0.268, p=.966; see Figure 
3).  No year by season interaction was observed (Wald X2(6) =6.781, p=.342). 
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Aircraft Category  
There were significant differences between aircraft categories in reported rates of these events 
(Wald X2(3)=146.180, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of small aircraft reported the lowest rates of 
these events.  Pilots of wide-body aircraft reported the highest rates of these events.  All 
differences between aircraft categories were statistically significant (p<.001). 
Interaction 
 No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(33)=42.742, 
p=.119). 
 
 
 
 
Operation 
Cargo operators did not report any instances of diversions or expedited landings due to medical 
emergencies. 
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CP3:  Crewmember Left Cockpit to Handle Disturbance 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported hard landings did not change linearly across the 
observation period (b=-.056, Wald X2(1) =3.060, p=.080; see Figure 1).73  Across the study period, 
a mean rate of 0.18 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the fourth 
quarter of 2003 (0.11) and the highest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (0.56). 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
73 Of the 14,280 reports obtained, 53 (0.37%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 126.50 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.29 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, the linear decrease in the rate of reported events became significant (b=-.056, 
Wald X2(1)=4.877, p=.027).  However, the overall fit of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson 
X2(14278)=43979.033, ratio=3.080; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(14225=25453.191; ratio=1.789).  
In addition, when the first quarter is eliminated from the analysis the negative trend becomes non-
significant (Wald X2(2)=2.675, p=.102).  The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
No significant differences between years (Wald X2(2)=5.263, p=.072; see Figure 2) or seasons 
(Wald X2(3)=7.214, p=.065) were observed.  There was no year by season interaction (Wald 
X2(6)=4.618, p=.594). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences in the rates of these events between aircraft categories (Wald 
X2(3)=112.191, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of wide-body aircraft reported higher rates of leaving 
the cockpit to handle disturbances than did pilots of smaller aircraft (Wald X2(1)=34.479, p<.001).  
No other differences were statistically significant. 
Interactions 
Models with complete interaction terms could not be properly specified.  Based on partial models, 
there was no evidence of interactions between aircraft category and year/season. 
 
 
 
 
Operation 
Only two events of leaving the cockpit to handle disturbances were reported by pilots of cargo 
aircraft. 
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Questions about equipment-related events 
 
 
ER1: Divert Due to Equipment Problem 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported diverting due to aircraft equipment problems did not 
change linearly across the observation period (b=.010, Wald X2(1) =0.822, p=.365; see Figure 1)74. 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 1.35 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate 
was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (1.00) and the highest rate was observed in the third 
quarter of 2003 (1.61). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
74 Of the 18,368 reports obtained, 61 (0.33%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 180.61 per 1,000 legs compared to 1.61 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events did not 
change linearly across the observation period (b=.008, Wald X2(1)=0.568, p=.451).  However, the overall fit 
of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18366)=32984.507, ratio=1.796; Model without 
outliers:  Pearson X2(18305)=23866.328; ratio=1.304).  These cases were omitted from the remaining 
analyses. 
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Year/Season 
No significant differences between years (Wald X2(2)=1.394, p=.498; see Figure 2) or seasons 
(Wald X2(3)=6.312, p=.097; see Figure 3) were observed.  There was no year by season interaction 
(Wald X2(6) =4.795, p=.570).   
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences between aircraft categories in the rates of these events (Wald 
X2(3)=79.234, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of small aircraft reported the highest rates of these 
events, significantly higher than all other aircraft (Wald X2(1)=22.138, p<.001).  Pilots of wide-
body aircraft reported the second highest rates of these events, significantly higher than medium 
(Wald X2(1)=26.061, p<.001) and large aircraft (Wald X2(1)=15.794, p<.001), which did not differ 
(Wald X2(1)=.066, p=.797). 
Interactions 
There were no interactions between aircraft category and year/season (Wald X2(33)=34.106, 
p=.414). 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported significantly greater rates of diversions due to equipment problems 
than did pilots of passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=94.400, p<.001). 
Interactions 
There were no interactions between operation and year/season (Wald X2(11)=14.652, p=.199). 
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ER3:  Cargo Shift 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported cargo shifts did not change linearly across the 
observation period (b=-.034, Wald X2(1) =2.387, p=.122; see Figure 1).75  Across the study period, 
a mean rate of 0.32 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the fourth 
quarter of 2003 (0.19) and the highest rate was observed in the second quarter of 2003 (0.48).   
 
 
  
                                                
75 Of the 18,356 reports obtained, 47 (0.26%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 165.46 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.32 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, the downward linear trend is significant (b=-.085, Wald X2(1)=23.591, p<.001).  
However, the overall fit of the model decreased substantially (Model with outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18354)=66212.724, ratio=3.608; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18307)=27357.162; ratio=1.494).  
These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
No significant differences between years (Wald X2(2) =0.718, p=.698; see Figure 2) or seasons 
(Wald X2(3) =3.311, p=.346; see Figure 3) were observed and there was no year by season 
interaction (Wald X2(6) =10.208, p=.116). 
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Aircraft Category  
There were significant differences in the reported rates of cargo shifts between aircraft categories 
(Wald X2(3)=145.887, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of medium aircraft reported the lowest rates.  
The rates of these events reported by pilots of small aircraft were marginally higher (Wald 
X2(1)=3.719, p=.054).   Pilots of large aircraft reported significantly higher rates of these events 
than did pilots of small aircraft (Wald X2(1)=13.559, p<.001).  Pilots of wide-body aircraft reported 
the highest rates of cargo shifts, significantly higher than the rates reported by pilots of large 
aircraft (Wald X2(1)=4.795, p=.029).  
Interaction 
 Although the full factorial model could not be estimated, partial models revealed significant 
interactions between aircraft category and year/season (ΔLLR X2(15)=37.820, p=.001).  However, 
there are no significant year/season effects for any aircraft category examined separately. 
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Operation 
Pilots of passenger aircraft reported significantly lower rates of these events than did pilots of 
cargo aircraft (Wald X2(1)=42.720, p<.001; see Figure 5). 
Interactions 
Although the full interaction model could not be fit properly, there were significant interactions 
between operation and season (Wald X2(3)=16.273, p=.001) in a smaller model.  Cargo operations 
demonstrated a seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3)=13.710, p=.003).  For these operations, the reported 
rate of these events was highest in the spring; significantly higher than the fall (Wald X2(1)=7.280, 
p=.007).  The reported rate for the fall was not significantly different from the summer (Wald 
X2(1)=.257, p=.612) but significantly higher  than the winter (Wald X2(1)=9.584).  Passenger 
operations did not demonstrate a seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3)=5.495, p=.139). 
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ER5D:  Smoke, Fire, or Fumes in the Galley 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.30 events per 1,000 legs of smoke, fire or fumes in the 
galley was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the fourth quarter of 2004 (0.16) and the 
highest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2004 (0.38).  The rate decreased across the 
observation period (b=-.044, Wald X2(1) =3.816, p=.051; see Figure 1)76.   
 
 
 
  
                                                
76 Of the 18,363 reports obtained, 61 (0.33%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. The mean 
reported event rate amongst these cases was 98.81 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.27 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  
When the suspect observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events 
decreased across the observation period (b=-.047, Wald X2(1)=5.948, p=.015).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18361)=34707.545, ratio=1.890; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18300)=18240.828; ratio=0.997).   
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Year/Season 
There were no significant yearly (Wald X2(1) =3.313, p=.191; see Figure 2) or seasonal patterns 
(Wald X2(3) =3.425, p=.331; see Figure 3) and no year by season interaction (Wald X2(6)=4.571, 
p=.600). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences between aircraft categories (Wald X2(3)=12.554, p=.006).  
However, because many small aircraft do not have galleys, data from small aircraft were 
eliminated from this analysis.  No significant differences between the remaining aircraft categories 
were observed (Wald X2(2)=.398, p=.819).   
Interactions 
No significant interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR 
X2(9)=11.534, p=.241).77 
Operation 
Because few cargo aircraft have galleys, no analysis by operation was performed. 
 
 
 
  
                                                
77 Note:  With or without the small aircraft in the analysis, the full model could not be properly estimated 
given the large number of parameters and the pattern of the data.  Smaller models were fit and the same 
conclusion obtained. 
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ER5E:  Smoke, Fire, or Fumes in the Passenger Compartment (not in Galley) 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.16 events per 1,000 legs of smoke, fire or fumes in the 
passenger compartment other than in the galley was reported. The lowest rate was observed in 
the third quarter of 2004 (0.06) and the highest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2002 
(0.27).  The rate decreased across the observation period (b=-.095, Wald X2(1) =8.844, p=.003; 
see Figure 1)78.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
78 Of the 18,350 reports obtained, 50 (0.27%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. The mean 
reported event rate amongst these cases was 90.27 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.11 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  
When the suspect observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events 
decreased across the observation period (b=-.087, Wald X2(1)=11.801, p=.001).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18348)=34961.191, ratio=1.905; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18298)=13149.763; ratio=0.719).   
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Year/Season 
Significant differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =8.651, p=.013; see Figure 2).  
The rate of reported events decreased linearly (Wald X2(1)=7.889, p=.005).  No differences 
between seasons were observed (Wald X2(3) =0.838, p=.840; see Figure 3) and no year by season 
interaction was observed (Wald X2(6)=5.605, p=.469). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were no significant differences between aircraft types (Wald X2(3) =4.504, p=.212; see 
Figure 4).   
Interactions 
Significant interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=48.118, p=.043).  Only the medium aircraft demonstrated a consistent linear decrease 
across the years (Wald X2(1)=12.480, p<.001).   Large aircraft demonstrated a generally downward 
trend across the observed period (Wald X2(1)=4.484, p=.034) but the rates of these events in 2004 
was somewhat above the rates in 2003 though lower than in 2002 (Wald X2(1)=4.523, p=.033).  No 
yearly pattern was observed for the other aircraft types. 
 
 
 
 
Operation 
Because this question asked about the passenger compartment, there were no reports of these 
events from cargo aircraft. 
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ER5F:  Smoke, Fire, or Fumes Other than in the Engine Nacelle, Flight Deck, 
Cargo Hold, Galley, or Passenger Compartment 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.17 events per 1,000 legs of smoke, fire, or fumes other 
than in the engine nacelle, flight deck, cargo hold, galley, or passenger compartment was reported. 
The lowest rate was observed in the second quarter of 2004 (0.05) and the highest rate was 
observed in the first quarter of 2002 (0.27). The rate decreased linearly across the observation 
period (b=-.096, Wald X2(1) =9.825, p=.002; see Figure 1)79.   
 
 
 
  
                                                
79 Of the 18,373 reports obtained, 50 (0.27%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. The mean 
reported event rate amongst these cases was 88.07 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.14 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  
When the suspect observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events 
decreased across the observation period (b=-.067, Wald X2(1)=7.809, p=.005).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18371)=36737.145, ratio=2.000; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18321)=15502.864; ratio=0.846).  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
Significant differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =8.210, p=.016; see Figure 2).  
The rate of reported events decreased linearly across the years (Wald X2(1)=7.297, p=.007).  No 
differences between seasons were observed (Wald X2(3) =4.516, p=.211; see Figure 3) and no year 
by season interaction was observed (Wald X2(6)=4.001, p=.676). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were no significant differences between aircraft categories (Wald X2(3) =3.784, p=.286; see 
Figure 4).   
Interactions 
No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(33)=35.198, 
p=.364)80. 
 
 
 
  
                                                
80 Note:  The full model could not be properly estimated given the large number of parameters and the 
pattern of the data.  Smaller models were fit and the same conclusion obtained. 
0	  0.05	  0.1	  
0.15	  0.2	  0.25	  
0.3	  
Ra
te
	  p
er
	  1
00
0	  
Le
gs
	  
Aircraft	  Category	  
Figure	  4:	  Smoke/Fire/Fumes	  Not	  
in	  Engine,	  Flight	  Deck,	  Galley,	  
Cargo,	  or	  Passenger	  
Compartment	  by	  Aircraft	  
Category	  
 
329 
 
Operation 
No effect of type of operation was observed (Wald X2(1)=0.530, p=.466). 
Interactions 
No interactions between operation and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(11)=7.508, p=.757). 
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Questions about ground operations 
 
GE02: Collision or Near Collision with Ground Vehicles 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.57 events per 1,000 legs of collisions or near collisions 
with ground vehicles was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2004 
(0.33) and the highest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (1.07).  The rate decreased 
linearly across the observation period (b=-.041, Wald X2(1) =6.038, p=.014; see Figure 1).81   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
81 Of the 18,375 reports obtained, 49 (0.27%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. The mean 
reported event rate amongst these cases was 136.65 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.50 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  
When the suspect observations are included, little change in the results is observed (b=-.032, Wald X2(1)=4.760, 
p=.029).  However, the overall fit of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18373)=39206.147, 
ratio=2.134; Model without outliers: Pearson X2(18324)=19644.182; ratio=1.072).  These cases were omitted from the 
remaining analyses.  The observed trend does not depend on the first quarter.  However, when data from this quarter 
are eliminated, the trend weakens and becomes marginally significant (b=-.033, Wald X2(1)=3.498, p=.061).  
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Year/Season 
Significant differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =13.204, p=.001; see Figure 2).  
The rate of these events was highest in 2002 and lower in 2003 and 2004 (Wald X2(1)=9.870, 
p=.002), which did not differ (Wald X2(1)=.938, p=.333).  Significant differences between seasons 
were also observed (Wald X2(3) =14.202, p=.003; see Figure 3). The rates of these events were 
significantly lower in the spring and summer than in the fall and winter (Wald X2(1)=10.432, 
p=.001).  No other differences between the seasons were statistically significant.  No year by 
season interaction was observed (Wald X2(6)=5.089, p=.532). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were no significant differences between aircraft categories (Wald X2(3)=1.061, p=.786).   
Interactions 
No significant interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=44.82, p=.082).82   
 
 
 
  
                                                
82 Note:  The full model could not be properly estimated given the large number of parameters and the 
pattern of the data.  Smaller models were fit and the same conclusion obtained. 
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Operation 
There was no significant difference between passenger and cargo operations in the rates of these 
events (Wald X2(1)=0.939, p=.333). 
Interactions 
No significant interactions between operation and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(11)=7.77, 
p=.734). 
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GE2A:  Collide or Nearly Collide with a Ground Vehicle  
On/Near the Ramp, Apron, or Gate 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported collisions or near collisions with ground vehicles in 
the vicinity of the ramp, apron, or gate decreased linearly across the observation period (b=-.042, 
Wald X2(1) =5.380, p=.020; see Figure 1).83  Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.47 events 
per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2004 (0.30) and 
the highest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (0.94).  The unusually high rate for the 
first quarter contributes substantially to the observed downward trend.  When the data from this 
quarter is removed from the analysis, the downward linear trend weakens and becomes marginally 
significant (b=-.033, Wald X2(1) =2.896, p=.089). 
 
 
 
  
                                                
83 Of the 18,375 reports obtained, 47 (0.26%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 127.56 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.40 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events decreased 
linearly across the observation period (b=-.030, Wald X2(1)=3.866, p=.049).  However, the overall fit of the 
model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18373)=39579.254, ratio=2.154; Model without 
outliers:  Pearson X2(18326)=18368.131; ratio=1.002).  These cases were omitted from the remaining 
analyses. 
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Year/Season 
Significant differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =9.646, p=.008; see Figure 2).  
The rate of collisions or near collisions in the ramp/apron/gate area in 2002 was significantly 
higher than in 2003 (Wald X2(1) =8.137, p=.004).  The rate of these events in 2003 did not differ 
from the rates in 2004 (Wald X2(1) =0.463, p=.496).  Significant differences between seasons also 
were observed (Wald X2(3) =13.147, p=.004; see Figure 3).  The reported rates of these events 
were higher in the winter than in the other seasons (Wald X2(1)=8.315, p=.004).  No other 
differences between seasons were found.  No year by season interaction was observed (Wald X2(6) 
=5.110, p=.530). 
When the first quarter is eliminated, the general pattern of results remains the same.  There are 
significant differences between the years (Wald X2(2)=7.175, p=.028) and the seasons (Wald 
X2(3)=10.085, p=.018) and no year by season interaction (Wald X2(5)=4.875, p=.431).  However, 
the observed effects are weaker.  The reported rates of events in 2002 are significantly higher than 
in 2003 (Wald X2(1)=3.918, p=.048) and there is no difference between 2003 and 2004 (Wald 
X2(1)=0.463, p=.496).  The rates of events reported during winter are significantly higher than 
those reported in the other seasons (Wald X2(1)=4.211, p=.040) no other differences are 
statistically significant. 
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Aircraft Category  
There were no significant differences between aircraft categories in the rates of these events (Wald 
X2(3)=3.245, p=.355). 
Interactions 
Although full factorial analyses could not be run on these data, analysis of partial models did not 
reveal any interactions between aircraft category and year or season. 
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Operation 
There were no significant differences in the rates of these events between cargo and passenger 
operations (Wald X2(1)=1.213, p=.271). 
Interactions 
There were no interactions between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11)=7.808, p=.730). 
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GE3: Slide, Skip, or Hydroplane Resulting in Increase in Stopping Distance 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported sliding, skipping, or hydroplaning sufficient to cause 
an increase in stopping distance decreased linearly across the observation period (b=-.036, Wald 
X2(1) =7.069, p=.008; see Figure 1).84  However, this trend is dependent on an unusually high rate 
of events in the first quarter of 2002.  If that quarter is eliminated from the analysis, the downward 
trend is no longer statistically significant (b=-.021, Wald X2(1)=2.177, p=.140).  Across the study 
period, a mean rate of 0.92 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The highest rate was observed in 
the first quarter of 2002 (2.14) and the lowest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2003 (0.45).   
 
 
 
  
                                                
84 Of the 18,371 reports obtained, 53 (0.29%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 147.76 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.92 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events decreased 
linearly across the observation period (b=-.039, Wald X2(1)=10.425, p=.001) – but see text above.  
However, the overall fit of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18369)=39511.418, 
ratio=2.151; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18316)=21573.377; ratio=1.178).  These cases were 
omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
When the data from all quarters are included, marginally significant differences between years 
(Wald X2(2) =5.830, p=.054; see Figure 2) and significant differences between seasons were 
observed (Wald X2(3) =93.271, p<.001; see Figure 3).  However, when the data from the first 
quarter are excluded, the differences between years are not statistically significant (Wald 
X2(2)=4.236, p=.120) but the differences between seasons remain (Wald X2(3)=11.862).  There 
were significantly higher rates of these events in the winter than during the other seasons (Wald 
X2(1)=47.483, p<.001).  The rates in summer were lower than in the spring (Wald X2(1)=7.198, 
p=.007) or fall (Wald X2(1)=11.294, p=.001).  The rates in spring did not differ from those in fall 
(Wald X2(1)=0.562, p=.453).  Marginally significant interactions between year and season were 
also observed (Wald X2(6) =12.420, p=.053).  However, these reflect minor variations across years 
in the seasonal pattern described above. 
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Aircraft Category  
There were significant differences in reported rates of these events between aircraft categories 
(Wald X2(3)=8.243, p=.041; see Figure 4).  Pilots of large aircraft reported the lowest rates, 
significantly lower than the rates reported by pilots of small (Wald X2(1)=6.834, p=.009) and 
medium aircraft (Wald X2(1)=4.253, p=.039).  No other differences between aircraft categories 
were statistically significant. 
Interaction 
 No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(33)=41.834, 
p=.139). 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported a higher rate of these events than did pilots of passenger aircraft 
(Wald X2(1)=24.370, p<.001; see Figure 5). 
Interaction 
There were no significant interactions between operation and year/season (Δ LLR X2(11)=13.448, 
p=.265).   
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GE4:  Rejected Takeoffs 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.71 rejected takeoffs per 1,000 legs was reported. The 
lowest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (0.47) and the highest rate was observed in the 
second quarter of 2002 (0.90).  The rate did not change linearly across the observation period (b=-
.018, Wald X2(1) =1.514, p=.219; see Figure 1).85   
 
 
 
  
                                                
85 Of the 18,374 reports obtained, 52 (0.28%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. The mean 
reported event rate amongst these cases was 140.70 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.72 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  
When the suspect observations are included, little change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported events 
decreased across the observation period (b=-.019, Wald X2(1)=1.807, p=.179).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18372)=26127.617, ratio=1.422; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18320)=18414.623; ratio=1.005).   
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Year/Season 
No significant differences between years (Wald X2(2) =1.236, p=.539; see Figure 2) or seasons 
(Wald X2(3) =1.864, p=.601; see Figure 3) were observed and no year by season interaction was 
observed (Wald X2(6)=4.025, p=.673). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences between aircraft categories (Wald X2(3) =50.653, p<.001; see 
Figure 4).  Pilots of small aircraft reported higher rates of rejected takeoffs than did pilots of larger 
aircraft (Wald X2(1)=25.075, p<.001).  No other differences between aircraft categories were 
observed. 
Interactions 
No significant interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=37.532, p=.269).86   
 
 
 
  
                                                
86 Note: The full model could not be properly estimated given the large number of parameters and the 
pattern of the data.  Smaller models were fit and the same conclusion obtained. 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported a higher rate of rejected takeoffs than did pilots of passenger 
aircraft (Wald X2(1)=37.922, p<.001). 
Interactions 
There were no significant interactions between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11)=16.85, 
p=.112).   
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GE8:  Began Takeoff While Another Aircraft was on the Runway 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported beginning takeoffs while another aircraft was on the 
runway decreased linearly across the observation period (b=-.119, Wald X2(1) =28.316, p<.001; 
see Figure 1).87  This trend remained statistically significant when the data from the first quarter of 
2002 is omitted from the analysis (b=-.106, Wald X2(1)=20.279, p<.001).  Across the study period, 
a mean rate of 0.33 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the first 
quarter of 2004 (0.20) and the highest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (0.93).   
 
 
 
  
                                                
87 Of the 18,351 reports obtained, 60 (0.33%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 147.72 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.26 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, the downward trend remains (b=-.041, Wald X2(1)=7.204, p=.007).  However, 
the overall fit of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18349)=66878.386, ratio=3.645; 
Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18289)=26397.657; ratio=1.443).  These cases were omitted from the 
remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
Significant differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =32.560, p<.001; see Figure 2).  
The reported rates of these events decreased linearly across the years in the sample (Wald X2(1) 
=25.174, p<.001).  No differences between seasons were observed (Wald X2(3) =4.686, p=.196; 
see Figure 3).  No year by season interaction was observed (Wald X2(6) =5.260, p=.511). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences in the reported rates of these events between aircraft categories 
(Wald X2(3)=25.614, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of medium aircraft reported the highest rates, 
significantly higher than those reported by pilots of large (Wald X2(1)=12.138, p<.001) or wide-
body (Wald X2(1)=40.607, p<.001) aircraft.  The difference in reported rates between small and 
wide-body aircraft was also statistically significant (Wald X2(1)=8.651, p=.003).  No other 
differences between aircraft categories were significant.   
Interaction 
 No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(15)=17.942, 
p=.266).88 
 
 
 
  
                                                
88 The full factorial model did not fulfill convergence criteria.  However, smaller models that did fulfill 
criteria were fit to the data as well and these also did not demonstrate any interaction effects. 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported significantly lower rates of beginning takeoffs with another aircraft 
on the runway than did pilots of passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=10.090, p=.001; see Figure 5). 
Interaction 
There were no significant interactions between operation and years/seasons (Δ LLR X2(5)=3.702, 
p<.593). 
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GE9:  Landing While Another Aircraft is on the Runway 
 
The rate of instances in which pilots reported landing while another aircraft was on or crossing the 
runway decreased linearly across the observation period (b=-.053, Wald X2(1) =4.891, p=.027; see 
Figure 1).89  Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.27 events per 1,000 legs was reported. The 
lowest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2004 (0.05) and the highest rate was observed in the 
second quarter of 2003 (0.52).   
 
 
 
  
                                                
89 Of the 18,367 reports obtained, 37 (0.20%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 181.35 per 1,000 legs compared to 0.24 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  The outlier cases were 
omitted from the remaining analyses. When the suspect observations are included, little change in the trend 
was observed.  The rate of reported events decreased linearly across the observation period (b=-.103, Wald 
X2(1)=32.782, p<.001).  However, the overall fit of the model was extremely poor (Model with outliers:  
Pearson X2(18365)=72236.226, ratio=3.933).  The fit of the model without outliers was substantially better 
(Pearson X2(18328)=32360.873; ratio=1.766), but there were still substantial departures.  The reported 
results were confirmed using a variety of alternate analyses.   
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Year/Season 
Significant differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =11.980, p=.003; see Figure 2).  
The reported rate of landings while other aircraft were on the runway in 2004 was significantly 
lower than in 2003 (Wald X2(1) =13.404, p<.001).  No other difference between the years was 
significant. 
There were also significant differences between the seasons (Wald X2(3) =19.221, p<.001).  The 
lowest rates of these events occurred in the winter.  The rate during the winter was significantly 
lower than in the spring (Wald X2(1)=25.314, p<.001), summer (Wald X2(1)=8.616, p=.003), and 
fall (Wald X2(1)=5.011, p=.025).  The summer and fall did not differ (Wald X2(1)=0.456, p=.499).  
In the spring, the reported rate of these events was higher than in the summer (Wald X2(1)=6.036, 
p=.014) and fall (Wald X2(1)=9.229, p=.002).  No year by season interaction was observed (Wald 
X2(6) =9.148, p=.165). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences in the rates of these events between aircraft categories (Wald 
X2(3)=14.754, p=.002).  Pilots of small aircraft reported significantly more landings while another 
aircraft was on or crossing the runway than did pilots of aircraft in other categories (Wald 
X2(1)=7.948, p=.005; see Figure 4).  However, this result is due entirely to an unusually high rate 
of these events during the spring of 2003.  When data from that quarter are removed, there are no 
significant differences between aircraft categories (Wald X2(3)=1.479, p=.687).  There were no 
other significant differences between aircraft categories.   
Interactions 
 Due to the small number of events and the unequal distribution of events across quarters, neither a 
full interaction model nor a model containing only the 2-way interactions could be properly 
estimated.  When separate models are fit for each aircraft category, no significant year or season 
effects were observed for any aircraft category. 
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Operation 
There were no significant differences between passenger and cargo operations in the rates of these 
events (Wald X2(1)=2.216, p=.137). 
Interactions 
A full factorial model could not be fit; a smaller model containing only 2-way interaction terms 
revealed no significant interactions between type of operation and year/season (ΔLLR 
X2(5)=2.296, p=.807). 
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Questions about turbulence 
 
TU1:  Encounters with Severe Turbulence 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 1.79 encounters with severe turbulence per 1,000 legs 
was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2002 (1.19) and the highest 
rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (2.67).  The rate of reported instances in which 
pilots encountered severe turbulence that caused large abrupt changes in altitude, airspeed, or 
attitude did not change linearly across the observation period (b=-.016, Wald X2(1) =2.563, 
p=.109; see Figure 1).90  
 
 
 
  
                                                
90 Of the 18,376 reports obtained, 59 (0.32%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 259.50 per 
1,000 legs compared to 2.38 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed (b=-.007, Wald X2(1)=0.600, p=.438).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18374)=46101.899, ratio=2.509; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18315)=30567.792; ratio=1.669).  The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There were no differences across the years (Wald X2(2) =2.058, p=.357; see Figure 2), but there 
was a significant seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3) =25.747, p<.001; see Figure 3).  The rates of 
reported encounters with severe turbulence were higher in the winter and spring compared to the 
summer and fall (Wald X2(1)=22.898, p<.001).  No other differences between seasons were 
significant.  There was a statistically significant year by season interaction (Wald X2(6) =15.811, 
p=.015).  This was due to an unusually high rate of these events during the summer of 2004. 
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Aircraft Category 
The rates of reported encounters with severe turbulence varied by aircraft category (Wald 
X2(3)=306.834, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of small and wide-body aircraft reported higher rates 
of encounters with severe turbulence than did pilots of medium or large aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=124.151, p<.001).  In addition, pilots of large aircraft reported significantly higher rates than 
did pilots of medium aircraft (Wald X2(1)=17.957, p<.001). No other differences between aircraft 
categories were statistically significant. 
Interactions 
There were significant interactions between aircraft category and year/season (Δ LLR X2(33) 
=51.236, p=.022).  This was due largely to greater variability in the rates reported by pilots of 
small aircraft.  When only the data from the larger aircraft are considered, the interaction between 
aircraft category and year/season  is not statistically significant (Δ LLR X2(22) =32.392, p=.071).  
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported higher rates of encounters with severe turbulence than did pilots of 
passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=316.612, p<.001).   
Interactions  
There was no interaction between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11) =9.274, p=.597).    
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TU1A:  Encounters with Severe Turbulence in IMC 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 1.04 encounters with severe turbulence in IMC per 1,000 
legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2002 (0.63) and the highest 
rate was observed in the second quarter of 2002 (1.04).  The rate of reported instances in which 
pilots encountered severe turbulence in IMC that caused large abrupt changes in altitude, airspeed, 
or attitude did not change linearly across the observation period (b=-.018, Wald X2(1) =1.654, 
p=.198; see Figure 1).91  
 
 
 
  
                                                
91 Of the 18,372 reports obtained, 46 (0.25%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 213.85 per 
1,000 legs compared to 1.06 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed (b=-.011, Wald X2(1)=0.713, p=.398).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18370)=44769.294, ratio=2.437; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18324)=27383.360; ratio=1.494).  The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There were no differences across the years (Wald X2(2) =3.381, p=.184; see Figure 2) or seasons 
(Wald X2(3) =1.890, p=.596; see Figure 3) and there was no year by season interaction (Wald X2(6) 
=10.761, p=.096). 
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Aircraft Category 
The rates of reported encounters with severe turbulence in IMC varied by aircraft category (Wald 
X2(3)=116.477, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of small and wide-body aircraft reported higher rates 
of encounters with severe turbulence in IMC than did pilots of medium or large aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=51.992, p<.001).  In particular, pilots of medium aircraft reported the lowest rates, 
significantly lower than pilots of large aircraft (Wald X2(1)=5.811, p=.016).  In turn, pilots of large 
aircraft reported significantly lower rates of these events than did pilots of wide-body aircraft 
(Wald X2(1)=17.950, p<.001) or small aircraft (Wald X2(1)=16.954, p<.001).  No difference 
between small and wide-body aircraft categories was observed (Wald X2(1)=0.939, p=.333). 
Interactions 
There were no interactions between aircraft category and year/season (Δ LLR X2(33) =38.358, 
p=.239).    
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported higher rates of encounters with severe turbulence in IMC than did 
pilots of passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=237.442, p<.001).   
Interactions  
There was no interaction between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11) =8.246, p=.691).    
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TU1B:  Encounters with Severe Turbulence in Clear Air 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.81 encounters with severe turbulence in clear air per 
1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2002 (0.53) and the 
highest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (1.60).  The rate of reported instances in 
which pilots encountered severe turbulence in clear air that caused large abrupt changes in altitude, 
airspeed, or attitude did not change linearly across the observation period (b=-.006, Wald X2(1) 
=0.158, p=.691; see Figure 1).92  
 
 
 
  
                                                
92 Of the 18,370 reports obtained, 49 (0.27%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 171.77 per 
1,000 legs compared to 1.07 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed (b=.013, Wald X2(1)=0.972, p=.324).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18368)=44109.608, ratio=2.401; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18319)=28338.229; ratio=1.547).  The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There were no differences across the years (Wald X2(2) =0.033, p=.984; see Figure 2).  However, 
there was a significant seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3) =33.109, p<.001; see Figure 3).  The reported 
rate of these events was higher in the winter than during the other seasons (Wald X2(1)=19.685, 
p<.001).  The mean rate during the spring was lower than in the winter (Wald X2(1)=9.857, 
p=.002) but higher than in the summer (Wald X2(1)=4.332, p=.037) and marginally higher than in 
the fall (Wald X2(1)=3.225, p=.073).  The rates reported in the summer did not differ from those 
reported in the fall (Wald X2(1)=.055, p=.815). There was no year by season interaction (Wald 
X2(6) =6.988, p=.322). 
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Aircraft Category 
The rates of reported encounters with severe turbulence in clear air varied by aircraft category 
(Wald X2(3)=152.322, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of small and wide-body aircraft reported 
higher rates of encounters with severe turbulence in clear air than did pilots of medium or large 
aircraft (Wald X2(1)=56.464, p<.001).  In particular, pilots of medium aircraft reported the lowest 
rates, significantly lower than pilots of large aircraft (Wald X2(1)=14.087, p<.001).  In turn, pilots 
of large aircraft reported significantly lower rates of these events than did pilots of wide-body 
aircraft (Wald X2(1)=18.978, p<.001) or small aircraft (Wald X2(1)=12.636, p<.001).  No 
difference between small and wide-body aircraft categories was observed (Wald X2(1)=0.036, 
p=.850). 
Interactions 
There were significant interactions between aircraft category and year/season (Δ LLR X2(33) 
=62.078, p<.002).   The seasonal effect was significant for the wide-body aircraft (Wald 
X2(3)=24.906, p<.001), marginally significant for the large aircraft (Wald X2(3)=7.012, p=.072) 
and not significant for the medium aircraft (Wald X2(3)=5.089, p=.165) and small aircraft (Wald 
X2(3)=4.389, p=.109).  
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported higher rates of encounters with severe turbulence in clear air than 
did pilots of passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=105.276, p<.001).   
Interactions  
There was a significant interaction between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11) =24.808, 
p=.009).  Pilots of cargo aircraft reported unusually high rates of severe turbulence in clear air in 
the winter of 2003.  Pilots of passenger aircraft reported unusually high rates of severe turbulence 
in clear air during the winter of 2002. 
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TU2:  Encounter Wake Turbulence 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 7.44 encounters with wake turbulence per 1,000 legs was 
reported. The lowest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (5.93) and the highest rate was 
observed in the second quarter of 2002 (8.54).  The rate of reported encounters with wake 
turbulence did not change linearly across the observation period (b=-.006, Wald X2(1) =0.894, 
p=.344; see Figure 1).93   
 
 
 
  
                                                
93 Of the 18,365 reports obtained, 45 (0.25%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 343.79 per 
1,000 legs compared to 7.87 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed (b=-.003, Wald X2(1)=0.355, p=.551).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18363)=28207.934, ratio=1.536; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18318)=21510.751; ratio=1.174).  The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There were no differences across the years (Wald X2(2) =0.151, p=.927; see Figure 2), but there 
was a significant seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3) =13.540, p=.004; see Figure 3).  The rate of 
reported events was lower in the winter compared to all of the other seasons (Wald X2(1) =9.901, 
p=.002).  The rate of these events was higher in the summer than in the fall (Wald X2(1)=4.209, 
p=.040) but did not differ between the spring and the summer (Wald X2(1)=2.273, p=.132).  There 
was no year by season interaction (Wald X2(6) =6.293, p=.391).   
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Aircraft Category 
The reported rates of encounters with wake turbulence differed by aircraft category (Wald 
X2(3)=48.911, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of wide-body aircraft reported lower rates of these 
events than did pilots of the other aircraft (Wald X2(1)=25.591, p<.001).  Pilots of medium aircraft 
reported the highest rates, significantly greater than the rates reported by pilots of large (Wald 
X2(1)=11.493, p=.001) and wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=52.105, p<.001), but not significantly 
different from the rate reported by pilots of small aircraft (Wald X2(1)=1.739, p=.187). 
Interactions 
There was a significant interaction between aircraft category and year/season (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=53.856, p=.012).  This was due to an anomalously high rate of events reported by pilots of 
small aircraft during the final quarter of 2004.  When this quarter is eliminated from the analysis, 
no interaction between aircraft category and year or season is observed (ΔLLR X2(30)=36.682, 
p=.187).  
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported significantly lower rates of encounters with wake turbulence than 
did pilots of passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=42.173, p<.001). 
Interactions 
There was no interaction between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11)=16.042, p=.140). 
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Questions about weather-related events while airborne 
 
WE1:  Lacked Accurate Weather Information While Airborne 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 10.9 events in which pilots reported lacking accurate 
weather information while airborne per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in 
the first quarter of 2003 (7.89) and the highest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2003 
(15.63).  The rate of reported instances in which aircrews lacked accurate weather information 
while airborne did not increase or decrease linearly across the observed quarters (b=-.002, Wald 
X2(1)=.170, p=.680).94 
 
 
 
  
                                                
94 Of the 18,350 reports obtained, 54 (0.29%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 1049.41 per 1,000 legs compared to 14.40 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, a statistically significant decrease in the rate of these events cross the observation 
period was observed (b=-.015, Wald X2(1)=8.598, p=.003).  However, the overall fit of the model decreased 
(Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18348)=96337.885, ratio=5.251; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18294)=63964.113; ratio=3.496).  The high X2/df ratios indicate that these data depart from the negative 
binomial (2) distribution.  The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. These cases were 
omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
The rate of reported events did not change over the observed years (Wald X2(2)=2.182, p=.336; see 
Figure 2).  However, there was a significant seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3)=69.910, p<.001; see 
Figure 3).  All seasons were significantly different from each other.  There was also a year by 
season interaction (Wald X2(6)=18.730, p=.005).  In 2003 and 2004, the rates of these events were 
highest in the summer.  However, in 2002 the rates of these events were highest in the spring and 
summer, which did not differ. 
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Aircraft Category 
The rates of reported events differed across aircraft categories (Wald X2(3)=238.414, p<.001; see 
Figure 4).  Pilots of small and wide-body aircraft reported a higher rate of these events than did 
pilots of medium and large aircraft (Wald X2(1)=100.125, p<.001).  There was no difference 
between the rates reported by pilots of small and wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=0.195, p=.658).  
Pilots of large aircraft reported higher rates than did pilots of medium aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=14.700, p<.001).   
Interactions.   
Statistically significant interactions between aircraft category and year/season were observed 
(ΔLLR X2(33)=85.998, p<.001).  The data obtained from pilots of medium, large, and wide-body 
aircraft demonstrated significant seasonal and year by season effects.  The data obtained from 
pilots of small aircraft did not. 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported higher rates of these events than did pilots of passenger aircraft 
(Wald X2(1)=120.708, p<.001; see Figure 5). 
Interactions.   
Statistically significant interactions between operation and year/season were observed (ΔLLR 
X2(11)=37.742, p<.001).  The rates reported for cargo aircraft demonstrated somewhat more 
variability than did those reported for passenger aircraft. 
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WE1A:  Lacked Wx Information When Needed While Airborne—Non-US 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 2.01 events in which crews reported that they lacked 
weather information while airborne outside the United States per 1,000 legs was reported. The 
lowest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2002 (1.44) and the highest rate was observed in 
the first quarter of 2002 (3.07).  The rate of events in which crews reported that they lacked 
weather information while airborne outside the United States did not change linearly across the 
observation period (b=.018, Wald X2(1) =3.520, p=.061; see Figure 1).95  
 
 
 
  
                                                
95 Of the 18,353 reports obtained, 65 (0.35%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 528.69 per 
1,000 legs compared to 3.23 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed (but see main text).  There was no change in the rate of reported events across 
quarters during the observation period (b=.002, Wald X2(1)=0.038, p=.845).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18351)=132127.453, ratio=7.200; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18286)=66636.062; ratio=3.644).  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There were significant differences in the rates of these events across years (Wald X2(2)=19.821, 
p<.001; see Figure 2).  The reported rates of these events were lower in 2003 than in 2002 and 
2004 (Wald X2(1)=18.412, p<.001). There were significant differences in the rates of these events 
across seasons (Wald X2(3)=13.035, p<.005).  The reported rates of these events were lower in the 
spring and summer than in the winter and fall (Wald X2(1)=12.161, p<.001).  However, there was 
a significant year by season interaction, indicating that the seasonal pattern differed across years 
(Wald X2(6)=19.104, p<.004; see Figure 3).  In 2002, the rates reported during the summer were 
significantly lower than during the other quarters, which did not differ.  In 2003, there were no 
significant differences across seasons.  In 2004, the rates reported during the spring were 
significantly lower than during the other quarters, which did not differ. 
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Aircraft Category 
The rates of these events differed by aircraft category (Wald X2(3)=606.397, p<.001).  Not 
surprisingly, pilots of wide-body aircraft reported the highest rate of these events by far (see Figure 
4).  These aircraft are frequently used for long haul operations.  This rate was significantly higher 
than that reported by pilots of smaller aircraft (Wald X2(1)=226.080, p<.001).  Pilots of large 
aircraft reported significantly higher rates of these events than did pilots of smaller aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=30.592, p<.001).  No difference in the rates reported by pilots of small and medium aircraft 
was observed (Wald X2(1)=0.885, p=.347).  
Interactions 
There was a significant interaction between aircraft category and year/season (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=140.906, p<.001).  Each category of aircraft demonstrated somewhat different patterns 
across seasons and years. 
 
 
 
  
0	  1	  
2	  3	  
4	  5	  
6	  7	  
Small	   Medium	   Large	   Widebody	  
Ra
te
	  p
er
	  1
00
0	  
Le
gs
	  
Aircraft	  Category	  
Figure	  4:	  Lacked	  Wx	  Information	  
When	  Needed	  While	  Airborne	  -­‐	  
Non	  US	  by	  Aircraft	  Category	  
 
377 
 
Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported significantly higher rates of these events than did pilots of 
passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=176.780, p<.001). 
Interactions 
There were significant interactions between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11)=25.018, 
p=.009).  The rates reported by pilots of cargo aircraft demonstrated considerably greater 
variability than did those reported by pilots of passenger aircraft. 
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WE1B: Lacked Accurate Weather Information While Airborne - ATIS 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 1.19 instances per 1,000 legs of pilots lacking accurate 
weather information while airborne due to ATIS problems was reported. The lowest rate was 
observed in the fourth quarter of 2004 (0.78) and the highest rate was observed in the first quarter 
of 2002 (1.67).  The rate of reported instances of these events decreased linearly across the 
observation period (b=-.030, Wald X2(1) =6.198, p=.013; see Figure 1).96  
 
 
 
  
                                                
96 Of the 18,327 reports obtained, 54 (0.29%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 275.22 per 
1,000 legs compared to 1.24 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed (b=-.023, Wald X2(1)=4.725, p=.030).  However, the overall fit of the model 
decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18325)=66810.909, ratio=3,646; Model without outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18271)=34064.788; ratio=1.864).  The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
There were significant differences across the years in the reported rates of these events (Wald X2(2) 
=10.489, p=.005; see Figure 2).  There was a significant linear decrease across years (Wald 
X2(1)=9.810, p=.002).  There was no seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3) =4.527, p=.210; see Figure 3) 
but there was a significant season by year interaction (Wald X2(6)=18.987, p=.004).  There were no 
significant differences across seasons in 2002 (Wald X2(3)=3.822, p=.281).  There were significant 
differences across seasons in 2003 (Wald X2(3)=9.604, p=.022) and 2004 Wald X2(3)=11.159, 
p=.011), but the patterns were different. 
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Aircraft Category 
The rates of these events varied by aircraft category (Wald X2(3)=7.851, p<.049; see Figure 4).  
Pilots of large aircraft reported the lowest rates of lacking accurate weather information while 
airborne due to problems with ATIS, significantly lower than the rates of these events reported by 
pilots of small (Wald X2(1)=4.058, p=.044) or wide-body aircraft (Wald X2(1)=6.611, p=.010) but 
not significantly different from the rates reported by pilots of medium aircraft (Wald X2(1)=2.448, 
p=.118).  No other differences between aircraft categories were statistically significant. 
Interactions 
There was a significant interaction between aircraft category and year/season (ΔLLR 
X2(33)=56.966, p=.006).  Small aircraft demonstrated a significant decrease across years (Wald 
X2(1)=4.844, p=.028).  The decrease across years was nearly significant for large aircraft (Wald 
X2(1)=3.671, p=.055).  There were no significant patterns across years or seasons for medium or 
wide-body aircraft. 
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported higher rates of these events than did pilots of passenger aircraft 
(Wald X2(1)=101.670, p<.001).   
Interactions  
However, there were significant interactions between operation and year/season (ΔLLR X2(11) 
=27.844, p=.003).   The linear decrease in the rate of these events across years was more 
pronounced and less variable across seasons for cargo aircraft (Wald X2(1)=4.321, p=.038) than for 
passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=3.703, p=.054). 
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WE2:  Failure to Receive ATC Approval for a Request to  
Avoid Severe Weather 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 2.49 failures to receive ATC approval for a request to 
avoid severe weather per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the first quarter 
of 2003 (1.60) and the highest rate was observed in the third quarter of 2003 (3.83).  The rate of 
reported failures to receive ATC approval for a request to avoid severe weather did not increase or 
decrease linearly across the observed quarters (b=.007, Wald X2(1)=.722, p=.395).97 
 
 
 
  
                                                
97 Of the 18,367 reports obtained, 47 (0.26%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 666.25 per 1,000 legs compared to 3.35 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, the trend becomes statistically significant (b=.031, Wald X2(1)=16.371, p<.001).  
However, the overall fit of the model decreased substantially (Model with outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18365)=142660.521, ratio=7.768; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18318)=56978.881; ratio=3.111).  
The outlier cases were omitted from the remaining analyses.  
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Year/Season 
The rate of reported events did not change over the observed years (Wald X2(2)=0.617, p=.735; see 
Figure 2).  However, there was a significant seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3)=78.713, p<.001; see 
Figure 3).  The rate of reported events was highest in the summer, significantly lower in the spring 
(Wald X2(1)=14.933, p<.001), and still lower in the fall than in the spring (Wald X2(1)=10.144, 
p=.001).  The rate of reported events in the fall was significantly higher than the rate in the winter 
(Wald X2(1)=4.300, p=.038).  There was a year by season interaction (Wald X2(6)=18.963, 
p=.004).  There was an unusually low rate of these events (not significantly different from the 
spring) during the summer of 2002. 
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences in these event rates between aircraft categories (Wald 
X2(3)=109.907, p<.001).  Pilots of wide-body aircraft reported higher rates of events that did pilots 
of other aircraft (Wald X2(1)=52.378, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of medium aircraft reported 
lower rates than did pilots of large aircraft (Wald X2(1)=4.766, p=.029) but only marginally lower 
than pilots of small aircraft (Wald X2(1)=3.365, p=.067). 
Interactions 
There were significant differences between aircraft categories in the year/seasonal pattern 
described previously (Δ LLR X2(33)=108.716, p<.001).  Pilots of small aircraft reported an 
unusually high rate of these events during the spring of 2002.  Pilots of wide-body aircraft 
generally reported higher and more variable rates of these events. 
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Operation 
No differences in the rate of events by type of operation were observed (Wald X2(1)=2.178, 
p=.140). 
Interactions 
A full factorial model could not be fit to these data.  A smaller model containing only 2-way 
interactions revealed no differences in the observed year/season patterns by type of operation (Δ 
LLR X2(5)=9.966, p=.076).   
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WE3:  Diversion to Alternate Due to Weather 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 2.69 diversions due to weather per 1,000 legs was reported. 
The lowest rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (2.40) and the highest rate was observed 
in the third quarter of 2004 (3.89).  The rate of reported diversions due to weather appears to 
increase across the observed quarters (b=.023, Wald X2(1)=7.639, p=.006; see Figure 1).98  
However, this trend is due entirely to an anomalously high rate of reported diversions in the 
summer of 2004.  When this quarter is omitted from the analysis, no significant trend is observed 
(b=.006, Wald X2(1)=.435, p=.514). 
 
 
 
  
                                                
98 Of the 18,371 reports obtained, 34 (0.19%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 285.49 per 1,000 legs compared to 2.95 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed (b=.024, Wald X2(1)=8.421, p=.004).  
However, the overall fit of the model decreased somewhat (Model with outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18369)=25169.677, ratio=1.370; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18335)=20324.300; ratio=1.108).  
However, as noted in the text, the apparent trend is due entirely to one anomalous quarter.  The outlier cases 
were omitted from the remaining analyses.  
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Year/Season 
The rate of reported events did not change over the observed years (Wald X2(2)=5.429, p=.066; see 
Figure 2) and there was no significant seasonal pattern (Wald X2(3)=4.797, p=.187; see Figure 3) 
or year by season interaction (Wald X2(6)=8.552, p=.200). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences between aircraft categories in the rates of these events (Wald 
X2(3)=71.332, p<.001).  Pilots of small aircraft reported significantly higher rates of diversions due 
to weather than did pilots of larger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=42.318, p<.001; see Figure 4).  Pilots of 
large aircraft reported slightly lower rates of these events than did pilots of medium (Wald 
X2(1)=5.453, p=.020) but not wide-body (Wald X2(1)=1.594, p=.207) aircraft.  No difference in the 
rate of these events between medium and wide-body aircraft was observed.  This pattern of results 
is essentially unchanged if the data from summer 2004 is omitted from the analysis. 
Interactions 
There were significant interactions between aircraft categories and years/seasons (Δ LLR X2(33)= 
53.794; p=.006).  However, this effect is due entirely to the anomalously high rate reported for 
summer 2004.  When this quarter is omitted from the analysis, no interaction with aircraft category 
is observed (Δ LLR  X2(33)=37.706, p=.263).    
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported significantly higher rates of these events than did pilots of 
passenger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=51.851, p<.001). 
Interactions 
A significant interaction between year/season and type of operation was observed (Δ LLR 
X2(11)=38.100, p<.001).  When the data from summer 2004 are omitted, the interaction remains 
though it is considerably weaker (Wald X2(1)=19.924, p=.046).  Cargo and passenger aircraft 
demonstrated different seasonal patterns.  However, these patterns were not significant when data 
from the summer of 2004 is omitted. 
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WE4:  Experience In-flight Icing Causing Performance or  
Handling Anomalies 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.22 icing events per 1,000 legs was reported. The highest 
rate was observed in the first quarter of 2002 (0.33) and the lowest rate was observed in the third 
quarter of 2004 (0.13).  The reported rate of icing events causing handling or performance 
anomalies decreased across the observation period (b=-.054, Wald X2(1) =4.143, p=.042; see 
Figure 1).99  
 
 
 
  
                                                
99 Of the 18,364 reports obtained, 43 (0.23%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 111.52 per 
1,000 legs compared to 0.14 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed.  There was a significant decrease in the rate of reported bird strikes across the 
observation period (b=-.091, Wald X2(1)=19.863, p<.001).  However, the overall fit of the model decreased (Model 
with outliers:  Pearson X2(18362)=48184.286, ratio=2.624; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18319)=17505.501; 
ratio=0.956).  These cases were omitted from the remaining analyses. 
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Year/Season 
The change across years was statistically significant (Wald X2(2) =6.589, p=.037; see Figure 2).  
The reported rates of these events were significantly lower in 2003 (Wald X2(1)=5.138, p=.023) 
and marginally lower in 2004 (Wald X2(1)=3.646, p=.056) than in 2002.  There were no 
differences across seasons (Wald X2(3) =1.357, p=.716; see Figure 3).  No year by season 
interaction was observed (Wald X2(6) =5.291, p=.507). 
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Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences in the reported rates of these events between aircraft categories 
(Wald X2(3)=81.823, p<.001; see Figure 4).  The reported rates of these events were significantly 
higher for small aircraft than for larger aircraft (Wald X2(1)=30.475, p<.001).  Pilots of medium 
aircraft reported significantly higher rates than did pilots of larger aircraft  (Wald X2(1)=10.937, 
p=.001).   
Interactions 
There was no year by category interaction (Wald X2(6)=1.520, p=.958).  No other interaction 
models could be estimated. 
 
 
 
  
0	  0.2	  0.4	  
0.6	  0.8	  1	  
1.2	  
Ra
te
	  p
er
	  1
00
0	  
Le
gs
	  
Aircraft	  Category	  
Figure	  4:	  Experience	  In-­‐Qlight	  
Icing	  Causing	  Performance	  or	  
Handling	  Anomalies	  by	  Aircraft	  
Category	  
 
393 
 
Operation 
Pilots of aircraft engaged in passenger operations reported significantly higher rates of these events 
than did pilots of cargo aircraft (Wald X2(1)=10.927, p=.001). 
Interactions 
The full interaction model could not be estimated.  There were no interactions between operation 
and year/season in a smaller model containing only 2-way interaction terms (ΔLLR X2(11)=9.76, 
p=.082). 
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WE5: Encountered Wind shear or Microburst that Resulted in  
≥ 15 kt Airspeed Deviation 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 8.61 encounters with wind shear or microbursts that 
resulted in airspeed deviations of 15 knots or more per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate 
was observed in the third quarter of 2003 (6.98) and the highest rate was observed in the first 
quarter of 2002 (12.46).  The rate of reported encounters with wind shear or microbursts did not 
show a significant linear trend across the observed quarters (b=-.006, Wald X2(1)=1.112, p=.292; 
see Figure 1).100   
 
 
 
  
                                                
100 Of the 18,369 reports obtained, 28 (0.15%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed 
substantially (> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these 
cases was 447.44 per 1,000 legs compared to 11.03 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect 
observations are included, little change in the trend was observed (b=-.008, Wald X2(1)=2.195, p=.138).  
However, the overall fit of the model decreased somewhat (Model with outliers:  Pearson 
X2(18367)=25936.583, ratio=1.412; Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18339)=22329.398; ratio=1.218).   
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Year/Season 
The rate of reported events did not change over the observed years (Wald X2(2)=1.863, p=.394; see 
Figure 2).  The reported rate did change across seasons (Wald X2(3)=50.022, p<.001; see Figure 3).  
The lowest reported rates of these events were in the summer, significantly lower than in the fall 
(Wald X2(1)=11.859, p=.001).  The reported rate was lower in the fall than in the winter (Wald 
X2(1)=8.637, p=.003) and spring (Wald X2(1)=5.358, p=.021), which did not differ (Wald 
X2(1)=1.102, p=.294).  However, the seasonal pattern varied across the years (Wald X2(6)=27.118, 
p<.001).  In particular, 2002 demonstrated a significantly different pattern.  During the winter, the 
rate of events in 2002 was unusually high and significantly higher (p<.02) than the rate observed 
during the winter of 2004 (the rate in the winter of 2003 did not differ from the winter rate in either 
of the other years).  During the fall, the rate of events in 2002 was unusually low and significantly 
(p<.04) lower than the rates in the fall of 2003 and 2004 (which did not differ from each other). 
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Aircraft Category 
The reported rates of encounters with wind shear or microbursts that caused airspeed deviations of 
15 knots or greater varied by aircraft category (Wald X2(3)=141.308, p<.001; see Figure 4).   Pilots 
of wide-body aircraft reported the highest rate of these events.  This rate was significantly greater 
than the rate reported by pilots of small aircraft (Wald X2(1)=5.580, p=.018).  Pilots of large 
aircraft reported slightly lower rates than pilots of small aircraft. (Wald X2(1)=6.431, p=.011).  
Pilots of medium aircraft reported rates lower than those of large aircraft (Wald X2(1)=5.705, 
p=.017).   
Interactions 
There were no significant interactions between aircraft categories and years/seasons (Δ LLR 
X2(33)= 38.854; p=.223).   
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Operation 
Pilots of passenger aircraft reported a significantly lower rate of these events than did pilots of 
cargo aircraft (Wald X2(1)=13.281, p<.001; see Figure 5). 
Interactions 
There was a statistically significant interaction between operation and year/season (Δ LLR 
X2(11)=22.006, p=.024).  Pilots of cargo aircraft reported higher rates of these events than did 
pilots of passenger aircraft on 8/12 quarters.  However, the seasonal patterns varied across years 
and by type of operation. 
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WE6:  Encounter with Wind shear or Microburst that Required 
an Avoidance Maneuver 
 
Across the study period, a mean rate of 0.97 encounters with wind shear or microbursts that 
required an avoidance maneuver per 1,000 legs was reported. The lowest rate was observed in the 
first quarter of 2004 (0.61) and the highest rate was observed in the second quarter of 2002 (1.23).  
The rate of reported encounters with wind shear or microbursts did not vary linearly across the 
observation period (b=-.005, Wald X2(1) =0.129, p=.720; see Figure 1).101   
 
 
 
  
                                                
101 Of the 18,369 reports obtained, 37 (0.20%) reported event rates that are suspect because they departed substantially 
(> 8 sd) from the overall distribution of events.  The mean reported event rate amongst these cases was 196.69 per 
1,000 legs compared to 1.10 per 1,000 legs for the other cases.  When the suspect observations are included, little 
change in the trend was observed.  The rate of reported encounters with wind shear or microbursts that required an 
avoidance maneuver did not show a linear trend across the observation period (b=-.008, Wald X2(1)=0.450, p=.520).  
However, the overall fit of the model decreased (Model with outliers:  Pearson X2(18367)=35370.228, ratio=1.926; 
Model without outliers:  Pearson X2(18330)=23725.521; ratio=1.294).  These cases were omitted from the remaining 
analyses. 
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Year/Season 
No differences between years were observed (Wald X2(2) =1.256, p=.534; see Figure 2).  The 
seasonal pattern was significant (Wald X2(3) =8.426, p=.038; see Figure 3).  The rate of wind shear 
or microburst encounters that required an avoidance maneuver was higher in the spring and 
summer than in the fall and winter (Wald X2(1) =7.846, p=.005).  There was no year by season 
interaction (Wald X2(6)=11.662, p=.070). 
 
  
 
  
0	  0.2	  
0.4	  0.6	  
0.8	  1	  
1.2	  
2002	   2003	   2004	  R
at
e	  
pe
r	  
10
00
	  L
eg
s	  
Year	  
Figure	  2:	  Encounter	  with	  
Windshear	  or	  Microburst	  by	  
Year	  
0	  0.2	  
0.4	  0.6	  
0.8	  1	  
1.2	  1.4	  
Winter	   Spring	   Summer	   Fall	  R
at
e	  
pe
r	  
10
00
	  L
eg
s	  
Season	  
Figure	  3:	  Encounter	  with	  
Windshear	  or	  Microburst	  by	  
Season	  
 
400 
 
Aircraft Category 
There were significant differences in the rates of these events between aircraft categories (Wald 
X2(3)=32.204, p<.001).  Pilots of small and wide-body aircraft reported significantly higher rates 
of these events than did pilots of medium and large aircraft (Wald X2(1) =20.064, p<.001; see 
Figure 4).  No other differences between aircraft categories were observed. 
Interactions 
The full factorial model could not be estimated.  A smaller model containing only 2-way 
interactions was estimated.  No interactions between aircraft category and year/season were 
observed (ΔLLR X2(15)=19.96, p=.173).  
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Operation 
Pilots of cargo aircraft reported higher rates of these events than did pilots of passenger aircraft 
(Wald X2(1)=10.476, p=.001). 
Interactions 
 No interactions between operation and year/season were observed (ΔLLR X2(11)=14.526, 
p=.205). 
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Appendix N. Results of the Study with the CAST/JIMDAT 
 
 
 
The Civil Aviation Safety Team (CAST) had recommended many Safety Enhancements (SEs) for 
implementation by the industry to mitigate the occurrences of problems they found were common 
in aviation accidents. The CAST organized the Joint Implementation Measurement Data Analyses 
Team (JIMDAT) to monitor and measure the effectiveness of these SEs and they expressed 
interest in the possibility of using NAOMS for this purpose. 
 
A working group was formed composed of members of the JIMDAT and the NAOMS Team to 
evaluate the use of NAOMS to assess the efficacies and the extent of implementation of SEs. This 
group decided that they should focus their experiment on the SEs that were concerned specifically 
with training and procedures and that these could be appropriately addressed in Section C of the 
pilot-survey questionnaire, the section that addresses special topics. The CAST and the JIMDAT 
specified the topics they wanted addressed by the questions in the new Section C of the survey 
instrument. They related to the following: 
• Avionics and Navaids  
• SOPs and Current Practices  
• Training  
• Flight Deck Innovations  
• Air Carrier Safety Culture 
 
The joint working group designed a new survey instrument that incorporated a revised set of 
questions for Section C on these issues. The specific questions used in this small survey for the 
JIMDAT are provided in Appendix E as part of the air-carrier pilot questionnaire and replaced the 
Section C concerned with ICAC that had been part of the survey of the 25,000 air-carrier pilots 
conducted from 2001 to 2004. Telephone interviews were conducted with 1,194 additional air-
carrier pilots over a three-month period ending in December 2004 to collect the data for this 
special study. Of these, 18 interviews were deleted due, primarily, to outlier exceedances; 26 
interviews were excluded because they were business- aircraft pilots, and 2 interviewees stopped 
midway through their interviews. The responses from the remaining 1,145 pilots to the questions 
in Section A were used for normalization of their responses to the questions in Section C. 
 
This Appendix documents the complete set of the results for all of the questions in Section C used 
for the JIMDAT study just as they were presented to the full JIMDAT and to the CAST. 
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